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Abstract 
The limited research that has been undertaken into occupational fraud has focused on the 
offender and why he or she does it. This thesis focuses on the situation of the crime, the 
organisation. Some organisations acquiesce to internal fraud whilst others robustly confront it. 
The research employs a mixed-method strategy to explore the structures, social influences and 
cultural characteristics of organisations which lead either to active prevention or passive 
tolerance. 
The first stage of the research examines the nature of the occupational fraud threat. The 
prevalence of the crime indicates that low value, occasional offending has become normalised 
behaviour. However the greatest financial threat comes from a small number of habitual 
offenders dominated by high greed sociopaths. The difficulties in tackling fraud flow from the 
ambiguities in its definition, not least because it is contingent on circumstances, local rules, 
contractual terms and the role of the transgressor. Subjectively labelling observed behaviour as 
fraudulent is thus in itself a major challenge.  
The second stage of the research employs interview, case study, documentary data and 
ethnographic methods to explore how organisations respond to the challenges. An important 
focus of the research is the comparison of two large organisations, one with a very strong 
counter-fraud culture, the second seemingly indifferent to the threat. The thesis identifies ethical 
climate as a key variable. It proposes a five stage organisational ethical development model and 
identifies some of the characteristics associated with each stage, characteristics which suggest 
that situational crime prevention is an important component of a progressive ethical climate. 
A key emergent theme is the range of excuses and justifications that are deployed to avoid 
tackling occupational fraud. These rationalisations mirror the rationalisations constructed by 
offenders to justify their actions. The thesis posits differential rationalisation as a new 
criminological theory, an addendum to differential rationalisation. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Introduction: the case for occupational fraud 
 
This thesis is concerned with a crime in relation to employment. As a scholarly endeavour, the 
study of occupational fraud or embezzlement commenced with the ground-breaking work of 
Sutherland (1940). Sutherland brought attention to the hidden criminality of the privileged 
classes within the workplace and coined the phrase “white-collar crime”. Although his principal 
focus was the malodorous activities of “robber barons” on behalf of their corporations, his white-
collar crime typology explicitly included the more humble embezzler (Sutherland, 1940). 
Sutherland criticised his criminological colleagues for their preoccupation with traditional 
criminality despite the cost of white-collar crime being ‘…probably several times as great as the 
financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily regarded as the “crime problem”’ 
(Sutherland, 1940). Despite Sutherland’s exhortations, financial crime has largely been ignored by 
scholars (Tombs and Whyte, 2007). The paucity of research may in part be due to perception of 
influential criminologists that it is a rare event (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990, p198) and 
therefore less worthy of funding than more accessible and less complex crimes (Croall, 1992, 
p17). Quantifying the scale of the fraud problem is indeed a significant challenge due to its 
invisibility and the lack of consensus in its definition (Levi, 2012). The biennial reports from the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) are frequently cited and sometimes used as the 
basis for research (Holtfreter, 2005). Their most recent report (ACFE, 2014) estimates 
organisations lose the equivalent of 5% of their revenues to occupational fraud. Button, Gee and 
Brooks (2012) estimate that organisations lose 5% of expenditure to fraud and error of all types. 
Applied to the £3.5 trillion turnover of non-financial UK companies (BIS, 2014), both estimates 
suggest a total loss of a staggering £175bn every year. In an extensive study involving 9,175 
employees of 45 organisations, Hollinger and Clark (1983) found that one-third of employees 
offend at least once per year. In a self-reporting survey Karstedt and Farrell (2006, 2007) found 
that 61% of 1,807 adults surveyed had committed at least one fraud type offence, 38% had 
committed two or three frauds and 6% had committed more than nine. Although the 
methodologies and results of these studies are inconsistent, they nevertheless point to fraud 
being a high frequency, high value crime committed by ordinary people as they go about their 
private and professional lives.  
2 
 
 
Whatever the stated philosophical bent of individual criminologists, positivism has pervaded the 
scholarship in the hunt for causes and solutions to criminality. The study of white-collar crime is 
no different and always involves, with varying degree of emphasis, the individual criminal and his 
or her interaction with the world outside of the self. Classical Beccarian explanations focus on the 
deterrence effect of formal crime control structures (Newburn, 2007, p116). Sutherland (1940) 
explained the deviance of white-collar criminals through his differential association social 
learning theory. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) acknowledged the relevance of external controls 
but assigned the principal cause to a low self-control personality brought about by inadequate 
childhood rearing. Cressey (1953) blamed insurmountable financial worries pressing on the 
individual. White-collar scholars describe causation in cultural terms related to the criminogenic 
nature of the capitalist corporation (Braithwaite, 1985; Coleman, 1992). Similarly, in their 
ethnographic studies, Mars (1973) and Ditton (1977) observed how organisational climate is a 
major contributory factor in the genesis of occupational crime. Latterly Smith, Button, Johnston 
and Frimpong (2010, p82) have taken up the challenge by viewing fraud through the prism of 
situational crime theory (Clarke, 1995), focusing their attention on the vulnerability of situations 
and how criminals perceive the risks associated with those potential targets. 
 
Research aims and questions 
 
This thesis differs from these previous research studies because it is inspired by the question: 
why do organisations not prevent occupational fraud? The offender and the external justice 
systems are considered but the organisation and its victimhood is central to the question. 
Victimological research is usually associated with human persons (Spalek, 2006) and 
victimologists rightly wrestle with the difficult issues of victim characteristics and victim fault, 
especially in relation to vulnerable individuals and predatory offenders (Spalek, 2006, p33-35). 
The present research is concerned with a human construct and is predicated on the assumption 
that all organisations are vulnerable to internal criminality and their level of vulnerability is a 
function of organisational characteristics. An important difference between organisational and 
individual victims is that organisations have duties to their shareholders, employees, external 
stakeholders and wider society in preventing crime and promoting normative values. Thus 
examining the accountability of organisations for their victimhood is far less problematic than it is 
for individuals. The research does not consider the consequential impact on secondary and 
tertiary victims (Spalek, 2006, p13).  
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The primary question is deliberately posed in the negative. The theories in the introductory 
section illustrate how the bulk of criminological research is concerned with the positive correlates 
of criminality, the complex array of individual and environmental variables and influences which 
cause crime. The ultimate goal of criminology is to reduce criminality by explaining these causes 
and formulating ways to reduce their power and salience. In this positivist sense the present 
research is no different and seeks to explore the ‘fraudgenic’ characteristics of organisations. 
Importantly the research is also concerned with the features of organisations which at first sight 
appear neutral to the crime question, which form their apparent neutral acquiescence to internal 
criminality. This subtle shift in emphasis tunes the researcher’s sensors not only to observable 
characteristics, but also to what is not there. It is a way of thinking encouraged by situational 
crime theory (Clarke, 1980; Button and Gee, 2013, p85) and reflects Johnston and Shearing’s 
(2003) conceptualisation of security governance in terms of security mentalities. Perhaps 
managers simply do not think about or care about internal fraud. Perhaps it is such a small 
problem as to be unworthy of management time or maybe they just have not noticed it. 
 
The acquiescent emphasis is a result of personal experience. I am a victim of fraud. Having spent 
nearly twenty years working for large corporations I sought a new challenge and purchased a 
small engineering business. However it soon became apparent that the business relied on corrupt 
relationships with its customers. By dishonestly declaring that the firm’s turnover did not rely on 
corruption, the previous owners had fraudulently misrepresented the true value of the company. 
Although the case raised significant questions relating to professionals advisers and financial 
auditors, the questions that exercised me most related to the behaviour of the customer’s 
management. Why would they not respond to evidence of corruption within? Why had it been 
allowed to go on for so long at such a high level? Why were they still unwilling to address it? Why 
did they not care about the consequential damage to others? What sort of people do it? Were 
we unlucky or naïve? Why did the client’s management shrug off employee fraud as if it were 
perfectly normal practice? What is it about some organisations that their management tolerate 
employee fraud whilst others are intolerant? 
 
The objective of the research programme is to develop an understanding of the occupational 
fraud challenge and the characteristics of organisations which account for the differences in their 
responses. The ambition of the research programme is not to produce a single, general 
explanation of occupational fraud; such an endeavour would be a chimera, doomed to eternal 
failure (Geis, 1992) and as useful as a general theory of disease (Clarke, 1980). The aim is to 
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contribute to this under-researched area by developing some ideas to stimulate further research 
and hypotheses for further testing. 
 
Structure of thesis 
 
The structure of the thesis reflects the emergent themes. It is organised into four sections. 
Section 1 (Chapters 2 and 3) reviews the available literature and sets out the research 
methodology. Section 2 (Chapters 4 to 6) examines the nature of the occupational fraud threat 
and the challenge facing organisations. Section 3 (Chapters 7 to 11) explores the characteristics 
of organisations which distinguish those that actively tackle fraud from those that tolerate it. The 
conclusions are in Section 4. 
 
The body of the work draws on the theoretical and conceptual background critically examined in 
Chapter 2. The literature review starts at the beginning with an introduction of the early work of 
Sutherland (1940, 1949) and Cressey (1953). Though subject to justifiable criticism, their ideas 
have sufficient horsepower to sustain their relevance. Reflecting the simplicity of the principle 
behind Lewin’s field theory (Lewin, 1951), the subsequent two sections discuss the relevant 
psychological and environmental theories including the ideas of business ethics scholars. These 
theories may be unfamiliar to criminologists but I believe cross-pollination between different 
schools is important to maintain the health of the academic gene pool. The final, shortest section 
introduces the research most closely related to the present research, that connecting theory and 
practice. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the mixed method approach to the research. The core of the research is 
founded on the constructionist perspective, seeking to understand how individuals from a range 
of professional backgrounds perceive the fraud phenomenon, what it means to them and their 
interpretations of the attitudes and behaviour of other actors and organisations towards fraud. 
The chapter examines the ethical issues associated with the methodology and explains the 
systematic approach to controlling and minimising the ethical risks. 
 
Some claim that the ambiguities in the definition of fraud have been tidied up by the introduction 
of the Fraud Act 2006 (Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2012, p19). I disagree. Though a unified 
definition would seem to offer great advantages, Chapter 4 shows that it is a slippery concept 
that defies all attempts at descriptive brevity. Indeed it is probably unhelpful to constrain the 
definition of fraud in legal and sociological terms whilst society, commerce and technology 
5 
 
continue to evolve, innovate and adapt. However it is important that the researcher defines his 
or her meaning and scope of interest to avoid misinterpretation or misuse of the results. Chapter 
4 defines what the author means by fraud and in doing so demonstrates that a simple, unified 
legal and social meaning must be elusive because it is dependent on context and local rules. 
 
Chapter 5 adds to the context of the fraud threat by exploring its various dimensions. Existing 
estimates of the scale of fraud tend to focus only on the value dimension (NFA, 2013; ACFE, 
2014). Whilst the understanding of financial loss is vital, it is equally important from a 
criminological perspective to understand how many people do it and how often. This information 
provides clues as to the type of people involved and the challenges of control. If, as Gottfredson 
and Hirschi (1990) assert, occupational fraud is rare, then there is a valid reason for not dealing 
with it. The thrust of Chapter 5 is a meta-analysis using the best available secondary data to 
estimate the extent of occupational fraud. The chapter concludes that occupational fraud is very 
common, involving at least one-third of the workforce and should be tackled. The analysis 
proposes a standard fraud frequency distribution which quantifies the nature of the challenge: 
the minority of occupational fraud losses are caused by the majority of offenders, and the 
majority of losses are caused by a few offenders. 
 
Chapter 6 expands further on the fraud challenge by correlating the quantitative data from 
Chapter 5 with an offender typology. It builds on the ideas of Weisburd, Waring and Chayet 
(2001), Pogarsky (2002) and Wikstrom (2006) that people can be categorised into acute 
conformists, deterrable occasional offenders or deterrence resistant habitual offenders 
motivated by a palette of opportunity, greed and crisis. The chapter concludes that counter-fraud 
strategies need to be designed in recognition of two broad types of offender: normal individuals 
and sociopaths. It is argued that fraud is a normal activity and most fraudsters are normal 
individuals susceptible to positive cultural influences and the threat of sanctions, but the greater 
damage is caused by low morality individuals, the sociopaths who are more immune to 
normative values and the power of general deterrence. 
 
DEF Group is a very large distribution business with a successful counter-fraud culture. The case 
study of the company is centred on the interaction between the Security and Compliance 
Department (SCD) and the rest of the organisation. The study explores the features of the 
company which contribute to its measurable success in preventing two dominant types of fraud: 
sales frauds perpetrated by customers and occupational fraud.  An important characteristic is the 
coherence of the company’s broad ethical strategy which addresses all types of deviant 
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behaviour including fraud in general and occupational fraud in particular. The case study is 
divided into two chapters. Chapter 7 describes the organisation’s structures, policies and 
arrangements for combating fraud. Chapter 8 describes how the company responds to detected 
frauds and examines some of the resulting obstacles to justice which support an effective 
sanction deterrence strategy. An emergent theme is the utilitarian tensions that can develop 
when ethical discipline competes with the commercial objectives of the company. If it were not 
for the intervention of the SCD team and the robust support of the executive, line managers 
would be more likely to construct utilitarian rationalisations for excusing employee fraud. 
 
Chapter 9 is an ethnographic study of a contract bribery fraud case involving a contract employee 
of a major manufacturing company, ‘R&T Industries’, and an engineering supplier, ‘Northwick 
Projects’. The opportunity to observe the events came about through the author’s role as the 
manager of a small engineering business, a competitor of Northwick and the author’s 
involvement in exposing the fraud to R&T’s management. The study focuses on the pressures 
experienced by a junior manager of R&T in dealing with the corruption. Morality and justice on 
one side compete against a combination of corporate utilitarian objectives and job survival 
pressures on the other. The contrasting responses of R&T Industries and DEF Group to allegations 
of fraud highlights the crucial role of leadership in supporting employees as they deal with those 
pressures and contemplate their ethical decisions (Trevino and Weaver, 2003). Without 
meaningful support and guidance to bolster their moral agency, junior managers may learn to 
rationalise a passive tolerance of fraud. 
 
Rationalisation theory pervades much psychological and sociological thinking as a pivotal 
principle in explaining deviance (Jones, 1908; Cressey, 1953; Sykes and Matza, 1957; Turner, 
2013). It focuses on the psychological processes of the offender to explain how otherwise moral 
people maintain their self-image by constructing false explanations of their behaviour. A key 
theme introduced in Chapter 9 is how moral employees, whether shop-floor colleagues, junior or 
senior managers, see fraudulent behaviour in others, recognise it as immoral yet do not seek to 
hold the offenders to account. The phenomenon is central to the research questions. Chapter 10 
introduces the theory of differential rationalisation which adds to Sutherland’s cultural learning 
theory, differential association (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947, p88). Differential 
association focuses on the offender and how criminality is learnt through their association with 
criminals. Differential rationalisation shifts attention to the role of the organisation as a victim. 
The theory posits that organisational members’ rationalisations for not tackling occupational 
fraud mirror the rationalisations constructed by fraudsters to engage in fraud. The more that 
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acquiescent rationalisations are constructed both in frequency and type, the greater the 
likelihood of fraud. Organisations are more fraudgenic and employees are more likely to become 
occupational fraudsters when the organisation’s rationalisations for not enforcing the law are in 
excess of the fraudster’s rationalisations favourable to fraud. The theory implies that, whilst 
there may be utility in tackling offender rationalisations (Nettler, 1974; Cressey, 1986), counter-
fraud strategies will be more successful if organisations first concentrate on dismantling 
rationalisations which encourage passive tolerance. 
 
Stimulated by the ideas of Kohlberg (1968) and Weaver and Trevino (2003), Chapter 11 focuses 
on the organisational climate and explores the role of differential rationalisation in the 
development of ethical climates. The analysis develops a typology of ethical climates from 
delinquent at one end to values-orientated at the other. It hypothesises that regressive 
differential rationalisation is a characteristic of delinquent, fraudgenic organisations and 
progressive differential rationalisation is a feature of fraud resilient organisations at higher stages 
of ethical development. 
 
The final chapter draws together the thesis conclusions. In critically examining the extent to 
which the research aims were achieved, Chapter 12 identifies the research limitations and 
opportunities for further research. It also briefly outlines the potential application of the 
postulated theoretical concepts to other sociological fields. 
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SECTION 1 
 
Literature review and methodology 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 
The study of fraud began with Edwin Sutherland’s ground-breaking work on white-collar crime in 
the 1930s (Sutherland, 1940). Since Sutherland, white-collar crime and fraud has attracted, with a 
few notable exceptions, little interest from the criminological fraternity (Benson and Simpson, 
2009, p211). Occupational fraud has attracted even less attention and original empirical research 
that examines the context and role of the organisation is very rare. Under these circumstances 
one has to seek intellectual stimulation in the most relevant theoretical concepts of criminology 
and adjacent scholarly fields. This chapter starts out with a brief discussion of the genesis of fraud 
theory in Sutherland’s white-collar crime and differential association theories. The discussion 
then moves on to explore offender theories and the attendant psychology forces with a 
particular emphasis on rationalisation theory. The organisational context is considered in terms 
of situational crime prevention, deterrence and ethical climate, introducing ideas from business 
ethics scholars. The final, shortest section introduces original research which focuses on the 
organisation and its approach to occupational fraud. The review provides a critique of the 
theoretical concepts in order to highlight a number of areas for further research, some of which 
are explored by the present research programme. 
 
White-collar crime 
 
Sutherland’s original purpose was to expose the deficiencies in the existing criminological 
theories by challenging the traditional image of criminals and criminality (Sutherland, 1940). He 
framed white-collar crime in terms of social status and the types of crimes associated with the 
occupational setting: “White-collar crime may be defined approximately as a crime committed by 
a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation” (Sutherland, 
1949, p9). Sutherland’s typology included both corporate and occupational frauds such as 
accountancy fraud, manipulation in the stock exchange, bribery, mis-selling, tax fraud and 
embezzlement (Sutherland, 1940). Sutherland argued that the essentials of higher status white-
collar is the same as lower class criminality and that the genesis of both groups can be explained 
by his theory of differential association (Sutherland, 1983, p240). His critical observation was that 
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the only difference between the two groups lay in the structure of the legal systems which 
segregated white-collar crime administratively from common crimes (Sutherland, 1940). The 
criminal justice system, the police and courts focused on the lower class crimes whilst the crimes 
of the privileged were predominantly handled by civil courts and administrative bodies 
(Sutherland, 1940). Consequently the very structure of the justice systems disguised the true 
level of white-collar crime, the financial cost of which “…is probably several times as great as the 
financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily regarded as the ‘crime problem’” 
(Sutherland, 1940). Thus he concluded that criminological research which uses official records to 
develop theories of crime is bound to be unrepresentative with an inevitable bias towards lower 
class criminality (Sutherland, 1940). 
 
Sutherland identified a number of reasons for the differential implementation of justice: the 
influence the corporations exert over the legislators, the admiration and respect held by justice 
administrators for businessmen who do not conform to the criminal stereotype, the attendant 
corollary that white-collar crimes are not real crimes and the ability of corporations to avoid the 
attention of the courts (Sutherland, 1940; 1945). In the last respect Sutherland retained a 
particular opprobrium for the clever innovations of corporate lawyers (Sutherland, 1940). Indeed 
Sutherland experienced himself how business and law connived to conceal corporate criminality. 
In his original version of White Collar Crime (Sutherland, 1949) Sutherland excoriated the leaders 
of seventy American corporations for their criminality, including war crimes. However the names 
of the corporations were deleted due to the threat of legal action against the publisher, Dryden 
Press, and Indiana University’s fear that the book would alienate wealthy contributors (Galliher 
and Guess, 2009). It would be a further three decades before the Sutherland’s original data files 
were unsealed and the identities of high profile firms involved in supporting the Nazi war 
machine revealed, companies such as IBM, Kodak, Chase Bank, Ford, General Motors and Coca 
Cola (Galliher and Guess, 2009; Sutherland, 1983). 
 
Since Sutherland, the definition of white-collar crime has evolved, becoming controversial 
(Benson and Moore, 1992), somewhat blurred and ambiguous (Nelken, 2007, p737). The absence 
of a precise definition of white-collar crime has plagued researchers from the outset (Schlegel 
and Weisburd, 1992) and continues to do so. Confusion has arisen out of the difficulties in clearly 
identifying the offender, the beneficiary and the victim, the location of the offence and the status 
of the offender thus leading to uncertainty about what and who to study (Hagan, Nagel and 
Albonetti, 1980). The result is that the ‘white-collar crime’ phrase has developed less as a 
theoretical concept and more as the symbolic taxonomic title of a genus of misconduct that 
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encompasses both the professional and private worlds, high and low status individuals. In 
keeping with Sutherland’s original concept the genus includes health and safety, employment 
and environmental infringements (Friedrichs, 2010, p82), negligence such as that associated with 
the challenger space shuttle accident (Vaughan, 1992, p136), the financial crimes of Enron and 
Worldcom (Gobert and Punch, 2003) and occupational fraud (Cressey, 1953). However other 
scholars have extended Sutherland’s formulation for research expediency. Quantitative 
researchers often use non-occupational criminal justice data such as veterans’ benefit fraud 
(Hagan, Nagel and Albonetti, 1980), income tax evasion (Wheeler, Weisburd and Bode, 1982), 
low status clerical bank embezzlers and unemployed bank fraudsters (Daly, 1989). Interviews 
with white-collar offenders tend to include non-occupational offenders (Goldstraw-White, 2012; 
Klenowski, 2012; Stadler and Benson, 2012) 
 
These scholars are trying to provide a clear contrast to common, street crimes (Weisburd, Waring 
and Chayet, 2001, p9), but in doing so they have compromised Sutherland’s exhortation to focus 
on the aetiology of crime in the organisational context and have distracted attention from asking: 
what is it about organisations that promotes or permits crime at work? Coleman (1987) correctly 
noted that the white-collar crime scholarship encompasses too many diverse, unrelated 
behaviours and should be broken down into smaller, discrete categories. This study focuses on 
occupational fraud, a white-collar crime that is committed by employees against their employers, 
as opposed to corporate fraud, that committed on behalf of the organisation (Clinard and 
Quinney, 1973, p188). However readers should be forewarned that by focusing on the 
organisational context rather than the offender an overlap emerges between occupational and 
corporate fraud. Although one might initially regard this blurring as unsatisfactory, a common 
aetiology is revealed at the intersection which illuminates the cultural forces at work. 
 
Differential association 
 
Differential association is Sutherland’s interactionist social learning theory which hypothesises 
that criminal behaviour is learned in association with those who define such criminal behaviour 
favourably and in isolation from those who define it unfavourably (Sutherland, 1983, p240). 
Sutherland originally developed the theory whilst researching delinquency in Chicago 
neighbourhoods but found that it equally applied to criminals in suits. More recent examples of 
corporate crime provide ample support for the continued relevance of the general theory of 
white-collar crime in conjunction with the specific theory of differential association. Following 
the deregulation of the Savings and Loan mortgage companies in the USA in the 1980s, negative 
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associations allowed criminality to infect the entire industry leading to the conviction of over 
1,000 managers and executives (Pontell, Black and Geis, 2014). The financial sector failed yet 
again with the global meltdown in 2008 (Pontell, Black and Geis, 2014). The price-fixing cartel is 
officially defined as a fraud offence (Home Office, 2012b) and is another powerful manifestation 
of the interaction between white-collar crime and differential association. In the four year period 
2011 to 2014 the European Commission found 123 corporations guilty of cartel offences and 
imposed €6bn in fines (EC, 2015). The damage caused to competitors, business customers and 
consumers is incalculably large and can only be gauged by the penalties imposed. For example, 
the Commission fined seven cathode ray tube manufacturers a total of €1.47bn for conspiring to 
fix prices over a ten year period (EC, 2012). The scheme’s members included well-known brands 
Philips, Panasonic and Toshiba. 
  
The first key tenet of differential association is that criminal behaviour is learned and the learning 
includes methods, attitudes, motives and rationalisations. The second is that a person becomes 
delinquent because of exposure to an excess of definitions favourable to criminality (Sutherland, 
Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947, p88). To put it in the way that many parents of delinquents 
rationalise their children’s behaviour: they are good kids led astray by bad associates. Sutherland 
did not claim that the theory was a general theory and by glossing over the issues of psychopathy 
and sociopathy he did not allow for true deviancy Coleman (1992) or indeed the influence of 
individual agency (Newburn, 2007, p151). Subsequent commentators, however, have promoted 
differential association as a general theory. Donald Cressey argued that differential association is 
an explanation of all criminal behaviour but for an act to attract the criminal label it must have a 
motive, a “linguistic construction which organises acts in particular situations” (Cressey, 1954). 
He argued that acts with no rational motive but which have an aetiology in a “mysterious” mental 
dysfunction cannot be crimes, rather they are born of insanity and belong to the province of 
psychiatrists. Thus he carefully ring-fenced the definition of the criminal to fit the theory: a 
rational actor brought to law-breaking by a motivated criminal intent learnt through a 
dominating association with practising criminals. 
 
Psychological forces 
 
Fraud triangle 
 
The limited occupational fraud research has predominantly focused its attention on the aetiology 
of the crime through the offender, for example Cressey (1953), Mars (1973), Ditton (1977), 
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Hollinger and Clark (1982a, 1983a), Benson (1985), Greenberg (1990), Leatherwood and Spector 
(1992), Gill (2005) and Holtfreter (2005). Cressey’s own seminal work, Other People’s Money 
(Cressey, 1953) stipulates, in a deterministic fashion, three necessary pre-conditions for 
embezzlement. The first is a motive and in this respect Cressey found that white-collar 
embezzlers are subject to a secret financial pressure. The second is the opportunity and 
employees with the relevant skills and access to their employer’s financial systems have plenty of 
opportunities. The third is rationalisation. Rationalisation in Cressey’s terms is the cognitive 
process whereby individuals maintain their perceptions of themselves as moral actors by 
constructing justifications for their criminality (Cressey, 1953). The peculiarity in Cressey’s train of 
arguments is that his model is inconsistent with differential association: it explicitly precludes 
social learning and conspiracy between multiple actors. Furthermore it precludes a base human 
motivation, greed. These inconsistencies do not falsify differential association or Cressey’s fraud 
theory, they simply demonstrate that neither can be elevated to general theories. It is therefore 
unfortunate that the fraud triangle paradigm, perhaps due to its attractive simplicity, has become 
entrenched in practitioner texts (Comer, 2003; Giles, 2012; Vona, 2008; Wells 2007), furnishing 
counter-fraud specialists with a narrow perspective of occupational fraud risks, that they are 
associated with employees suffering from some financial misfortune, acting alone and self-
justifying aberrant behaviour. As a result the roles of the potentially most damaging 
determinants of occupational fraud, internal criminal sub-cultures formed through differential 
association and psychopaths, tend to be diminished. 
 
Self-control theory 
 
Gottfredson’s and Hirschi’s famous general theory of crime is founded on classical criminology 
that people seek pleasure and avoid pain, and crime is just one way to achieve these outcomes 
by the use of force or fraud Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, p5). The two essential determinants 
of crime are inadequate pain inducing external controls, by way of formal sanctions and 
associated esteem damage, and the simultaneous existence of weak self-control (Gottfredson 
and Hirschi, 1990, p85).  Fundamental to their claim that their theory has universal application is 
that it must be consistent with all types of criminality including rare phenomena. Because they 
viewed white-collar crime as a rare event based on the low rates recorded by the American 
criminal justice system (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990, p39), they used white-collar crime as a 
test case to support the development of their theory. They criticised all social learning theories 
including differential association on two principles: firstly, social learning theories ignored 
pathological influences and secondly they viewed white-collar crime as a risky, secret crime that 
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cannot be learnt (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1987). They also dismissed Cressey’s fraud theory and 
posited an even simpler alternative: some people want money that belongs to others and simply 
have insufficient self-control to resist taking it (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990, p39-40). 
 
Their idea that all criminals lack self-control due to ineffective childhood socialisation 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990, p97) is really just a restatement of social learning theory 
(Bandura, 1971) and its impact on cognitive moral development (Kohlberg, 1968). The tautology 
of their binary perception where the cause is defined by the outcome is a particular weakness of 
the theory in that it ignores the myriad of variables, events, pressures and immediate situational 
circumstances that causally lead to the control failure and the crime act. Their description of the 
characteristics of persons with low self-control accurately reflects psychopathy (Gottfredson and 
Hirschi, 1990, p89) yet they do not recognise it as such and they dismiss biological predisposition 
as a meaningless notion (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990, p61). One could reframe Gottfredson’s 
and Hirschi’s analysis as criminals are psychopaths and their psychopathy is learnt from 
significant associations during childhood. Despite referencing white-collar crime as the means to 
validate their theory, Gottfredson and Hirschi failed to heed Sutherland’s warning that 
criminological theories predominantly based on the traditional perception of the criminal 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990, p16) and biased official statistics are bound to fail (Sutherland, 
1940). 
 
Rationalisation theory 
 
Rationalisation is a psychological defence mechanism referred to within differential association 
(Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947) and central to the fraud triangle theory (Cressey, 
1953) but it is not unique to criminology. It was first recognised by Ernest Jones (Jones, 1908), a 
prominent psychoanalyst and contemporary of Sigmund Freud. He defined it as a false 
explanation of behaviour with a plausible ring of rationality that is in agreement with the 
individual’s normative ideas (Zepf, 2011) and it bears a special relation to the prevailing opinion 
of the circle of people most significant to the person concerned (Jones, 1908). It appears in 
identity theory (Turner, 2013, p335), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Murray, Wood 
and Lilienfeld, 2012), groupthink theory (Janis, 1973), social learning theory (Bandura, 2004) and 
within psychology where the International Classification of diseases (ICD-10) lists it as a 
characteristic of anti-social personality disorder (ASPD). Hollin (2007) describes it as a cognitive 
distortion which bends the dominant normative structure (Sykes and Matza, 1957). 
Rationalisation theory has become a core paradigm within criminology, probably due to the 
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prominence of the fraud triangle, where it has collected two additional descriptors: 
neutralisation theory (Sykes and Matza, 1957) and accounting theory (Goldstraw-White, 2012). 
 
Since Cressey a number of studies have been undertaken to document the types of 
rationalisations employed by offenders (Sykes and Matza, 1957; Scott and Lyman, 1968; Klockars, 
1974; Minor, 1981; Zietz, 1981; Benson, 1985; Coleman, 1987; Daly, 1989; Gill, 2005; Dhami, 
2007; Goldstraw-White, 2012; Stadler and Benson, 2012). These rationalisations can be 
approximately divided into two categories: externalised blame which lay the fault with others 
and internalised justifications which tend to acknowledge the accusation but justify the 
behaviour and diminish blame by attenuating its pejorative quality. The externalised group 
includes denial of victim, condemnation of condemnors, higher loyalty, denial of responsibility 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957), unworkable laws, normal behaviour (Benson, 1985), unnecessary laws, 
duress (Scott and Lyman, 1968) and entitlement from exploitative employers (Coleman, 1995). 
The internal justifications include interpreting embezzlement as an intention to borrow money 
(Cressey, 1953), the metaphor of ledgers (Klockars, 1974), uncharacteristic behaviour (Benson, 
1985) and the defence of necessity (Minor, 1981). 
 
A number of scholars have criticised rationalisation theory (Goldstraw-White, 2012, p28), but 
these criticisms do not invalidate the concept, rather they present difficulties which researchers 
need to be aware of and control as best as possible in conducting their research. As Cressey 
(1953) pointed out, offenders’ rationalisations are verbalisations, and for the researcher they are 
the only means to gain an insight into the hopefully true perceptions of the individuals. These 
accounts are the offenders’ own explanations of untoward behaviour which bridge the gap 
between actions and normative expectations (Scott and Lyman, 1968). Therefore decoupling 
those ex ante facto accounts constructed in anticipation of the act from those expressed ex post 
facto in response to accusations is uncertain (Hirschi, 1969, p208; Goldstraw-White, 2012, p28). 
 
Cressey (1954) insists that criminologists are concerned with before-the-fact rationalisations that 
psychologically prepare the individual for the act, whilst after-the-fact rationalisations are within 
the purview of psychiatrists who are seeking to uncover hidden motives. This clear delineation 
reflects Cressey’s distinction between practical criminology and the deep, mysterious world of 
psychiatric treatment (Cressey, 1954). In his view rationalisations are a major psychological part 
of the up-front motivation (Cressey, 1954; Coleman, 1995). Coleman (1987) and Benson (1985) 
are more ambivalent to the before-or-after debate, though Benson notes that accounts given to 
judges in order to deny or mitigate guilt differ from those given to probation officers after 
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sentencing. Hirschi (1969, p208) however firmly believes that theory fails if the rationalisation 
occurs after the fact as it then merely describes the offender’s reaction to the event. Hirschi’s 
point is relevant for crime prevention initiatives which seek to dissuade people from 
contemplating crime by neutralising rationalisations before the event (Cressey, 1986; Nettler, 
1974). The implication is that organisations’ anti-rationalisation programmes will not operate 
successfully on every individual, only those that need to address internal moral dissonance prior 
to the act. 
 
Therefore there has to be some uncertainty, particularly with fraudsters who are practised liars, 
as to whether the account givers are bridging the gap between their own moral standards and 
their behaviour or the gap to their perceptions of what the researcher might hold as morally 
acceptable. The former case reflects a real level of dissonance between behaviour and self-
concept. The latter reflects a reconciliation of the gap between behaviour and normative social 
values. The account may be just an on-stage effect (Kalof, Dan and Dietz, 2008, p159). 
Nevertheless in both cases the gap is bridged and both cases are valid phenomena for 
constructionist research. It is then down to the researchers skill and experience to distinguish 
between the two cases if the purpose of the research so demands. 
 
There is also contention in the conflation of motivation and rationalisation. Duffield and 
Grabosky (2001) maintain that in order to understand the aetiology of a criminal act, the 
motivation which drives the act and the ex ante facto neutralisation which nullifies internal 
objections must be separated. Similarly Nettler (1974) asserts that separating motive and 
rationalisation is important in developing strategies to deal with occupational fraud, specifically 
programmes to identify and eliminate non-shareable problems and educational campaigns to 
expose and nullify rationalisations. Cressey (1954) is far less dogmatic in the need for separation. 
How, for example, is one to separate the defence of necessity rationalisation from motive? A 
desperate financial need is the motive and the justification which neutralises internal blame. Less 
contentious debate is aroused by the attempt to distinguish between rationalisation, 
neutralisation, excuses, justifications and apologies (Benson, 1985; Coleman, 1992). Scott and 
Lyman (1968) categorise rationalisations into excuses and justifications: excuses are accounts 
that deny or diminish responsibility for actions, justifications diminish the egregiousness of the 
offences. It is not clear whether there is any sensible purpose to this categorisation. 
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Psychopathy 
 
A more serious criticism of rationalisation research which has not been adequately elucidated by 
scholars is that it has failed to control for personality disorders, particularly sociopathy and 
psychopathy. Originally this may have been due to the prevailing criminological view that 
criminality is learned: Cressey (1954) dismissed the relevance of the mysteries of the mind and 
soul, and Sykes and Matza (1957) stated that “…the social scientist has long since ceased to 
search for devils in the mind…”. Coleman (1995) perpetuated the paradigm by calling on the 
“generally agreed” view that personal pathology has no significant role in the genesis of white-
collar crime, that white-collar offenders are psychologically normal. 
 
Whilst criminality and deviance may be symptoms of an anti-social personality, alone they are 
insufficient evidence for a pathological diagnosis; other factors are required which have a causal 
relationship to the criminality (Sass and Felthous, 2008, p27). In other words it is important to 
distinguish between anti-social behaviour and inherent anti-social character. Unfortunately 
psychologists are not unified in the definition of anti-social personality disorder, which means 
that the common definitions are frequently used synonymously in the literature though, if strictly 
interpreted, their meanings are not the same (Sass and Felthous, 2008, p28). There are three 
diagnostic doctrines, and Sass and Felthouse (2008, p26) provide one explanation of the 
relationship between them: antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) under the DSMV (Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual V) produced by the American Psychiatric Association, dissocial (antisocial) 
personality disorder (DPD) under ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases-10) produced by 
the World Health Organisation and Robert Hare’s 20 point, 0 to 40 scale psychopathy checklist 
(PCL-R). Because it is well beyond the competence of the present work to settle these matters, it 
is important to explain how terms are interpreted within this thesis. ASPD and sociopathy are 
used interchangeably to describe anti-social personality disorder, that is someone with a mix of 
the following personality traits: lack of empathy, self-centred, deceitful, manipulative, disregard 
for social norms, lacks remorse, refuses to take responsibility for own actions, blames others and 
impulsive. Psychopathy is used as a descriptor of the most unpleasant sociopaths, those with 
higher levels of sociopathy where these traits are the most pronounced.  
 
Lowell (2012) suggested that sociopaths are less susceptible to cognitive dissonance, that is, they 
do not experience moral conflict when they engage in anti-social behaviour. Murray, Wood and 
Lilienfeld (2012) reproduced a form of experiment originated by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) 
and concluded that people with higher levels of psychopathic traits do not experience cognitive 
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dissonance after engaging in deception. The implication is that individuals higher in sociopathic 
traits do not need to rationalise deviant behaviour in part because their perceptions of rational 
choices (Clarke and Cornish, 1985) are distorted by their lack of empathy, acceptance of high risk 
and need for self-gratification; these may be the types of individuals for whom anti-
rationalisation programmes are ineffective. Further work is required to support this hypothesis. A 
productive research programme would involve mapping levels of sociopathy against rational 
choice decisions, rationalisations employed by offenders and deterrability.  The rationalisation 
categories posited above, externalised blame and internalised justifications, may be a useful 
instrument. 
 
Situational action theory 
 
Criticism of Gottfredson’s and Hirschi’s theory would have been assuaged had the authors 
allowed a deal more humility in their claims and posited deeper questions about the causes of 
low self-control. Subsequent research supports their theory that low self-control, which should 
probably be re-framed as psychopathy, is an indicator of criminality (DeLisi and Vaughn, 2007) 
but it is far from a complete general theory as it denies biology and the complexities of 
immediate environmental influences. Others have developed general theories which draw on 
existing theories, for example control balance theory (Tittle, 1995) and situational action theory 
(Wikstrom, 2006). Like many criminologists, Per-Olof Wikstrom’s principal interest is in the 
development of criminality through adolescence. His theory builds on self-control theory and 
places it squarely in the constructionist paradigm. He redefines self-control as an activity, 
something people do, rather than a trait as conceptualised by Gottfredson and Hirschi (Wikstrom 
and Treiber, 2007). The relevant deterministic trait is the person’s executive capability, the 
cognitive process which influences self-control. In turn an individual’s executive capability is 
formed through genetics and / or acquired through environmental influences and experiences 
(Wikstrom and Treiber, 2007). Thus Wikstrom references biological pre-dispositions and, in a 
similar fashion to Kohlberg (1968) and Bandura (1976), alludes to development through 
childhood. 
 
In his study of deterrence Pogarsky (2002) identified three offending profiles. The acute 
conformists comply with the law because they believe that conformity is the right and moral 
thing to do; for them formal sanctions are irrelevant because they never break the law. 
Incorrigible offenders are impervious to dissuasion and the deterrence effect of sanctions. The 
third group are deterrable offenders who can be influenced by sanction threats. Similarly 
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Wikstrom (2006) categorises people into three crime propensity groups. The cognitive ability to 
consider morals and exercise self-control is irrelevant for high morality individuals who never 
offend irrespective of the circumstances they find themselves in. It is also irrelevant for low 
morality, habitual offenders. In both of these cases the choice of which action to take involves no 
deliberation, no engagement of the executive cognitive function. For the remainder, the action 
choice is contingent on motivations and strains (Agnew, 2001), rational choice assessments 
(Clarke and Cornish, 1985) of risk and deterrence cues, and the interaction between a person’s 
own morality and his perception of the moral context, framed by normative values, associated 
with the opportunity presented by the immediate setting (Wikstrom, 2006, p93). In other words 
there are saints, habitual sinners, who are more likely to be psychopathic, and the rest of us, 
whose immediate behavioural choices are contingent on a multiplicity of historic learning, 
environmental, strains, deterrence cues, risk, opportunity, reward and moral factors. Lewin 
(1951) produced the most elegant psycho-sociological description of such factors with his field 
theory of behaviour (B) expressed in terms of the only two environments that matter, the 
internal and external, the person (P) and the environment (E): B=f(P,E). Behaviour is the product 
of the interaction between the environment and the way in which individuals interpret its stimuli 
(Burnes and Cooke, 2013). If there is such a thing as a general theory of crime, this has to be the 
closest. 
 
Organisational forces 
 
Situational crime prevention in organisations 
 
Situational action theory (Wikstrom, 2006) is a commendable attempt to integrate existing 
criminological theories. As the title suggests, in addition to psychological pathologies, the theory 
incorporates the immediate environmental situations and how they are perceived by offenders 
as viable opportunities. Thus Wikstrom calls on rational choice theory (Clarke and Cornish, 1985), 
classical deterrence theory (Newburn, 2007, p115), routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 
1979) and situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1980). Clarke describes how these theories 
interact to provide a conceptual framework for the development of practical crime prevention 
strategies (Clarke, 1995). Rational choice is a utilitarian theory which finds a common premise in 
Hirschi’s (1969, p34) famous statement: “Why don’t we all do it?” It assumes that we are all 
economic beings who continually search for opportunities for personal benefit so that the 
decisions to commit an offence in specific situations are, with a nod to the restraining influences 
of family and social circles, dominated by the rational calculation of risk, reward and effort 
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(Clarke and Cornish, 1985). The routine activity approach states that there are three elements for 
predatory crime: a likely offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian 
(Cohen and Felson, 1979). 
 
Situational crime prevention regards crime as more of a function of opportunities and is less 
concerned with offenders’ dispositions brought about through their social histories, 
developmental influences through childhood and biology (Clarke, 1980). Clarke (1997, p2) 
criticises criminology’s obsession with offenders and how society should deal with them whilst 
failing to separate the problem of the offender from the problem of the crime. He focuses his 
attention on the crime using an action research methodology that seeks to block opportunities to 
crime. The methodology involves the systematic analysis of specific situations to identify highly 
specific crime opportunities and design prevention solutions which act on rational choice 
assessments in three ways, by increasing risk and effort and reducing reward. Typical solutions 
include target hardening of shops and post offices, burglar alarms, fences, surveillance, rapid 
repair of vandalised materiel, credit card photographs, customs declarations and hotel 
registrations (Clarke, 1995). In later years Clarke rowed back somewhat from his determined 
exclusion of offender characteristics and subsequently included two further dimensions: 
removing excuses or rationalisations (Clarke, 1995) and, in response to the critique of Wortley 
(1998), removing provocations such as prohibiting racial slurs, segregating football fans, 
disorganised queues and introducing soothing music in public places (Cornish and Clarke, 2003). 
The result is a matrix of twenty five techniques of situational crime prevention. 
 
The organisation is an ideal context for the application of situational theory, where it can inform 
security governance strategies (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) and promote effective defences. 
These security techniques are becoming increasingly evident, such as access controls, remote 
CCTV monitoring centres, criminal record checks, computer firewalls, anti-money laundering 
checks and in the ways banks monitor unusual spending patterns to detect frauds. However the 
focus of these precautions is mainly the perceived threats from external offenders. Though the 
relevance of situational crime theory to fraud in organisations is recognised (Smith, Button, 
Johnston and Frimpong, 2011, p82), there is as yet very little original research into its application 
to internal corporate crime and occupational fraud. In a small vignette study Paternoster and 
Simpson (2006) showed that the threat of formal and informal sanctions acts on rational choice 
assessments producing a deterrent effect on corporate crimes such as bribery and price-fixing. 
Benson and Madensen (2007) imagine how situational theory could be applied to white-collar 
crime and use healthcare fraud in America as an example. In their analysis of control and 
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prevention of white-collar crime, Benson and Simpson (2009, p196) discuss at length legal 
controls, sanctions and social shaming influences but only provide a short list of things that 
organisations do to prevent crime including guards, security codes, cameras, passwords, 
psychometric testing and so on. Similarly Jones (2004, p55) provides a list of management 
controls which should harden defences and increase offender risks but again without supporting 
evidence. The lack of original research may be due in part to the significant challenge in applying 
situational crime prevention theory to occupational fraud. Unlike external threats, occupational 
fraudsters have legitimate reasons to be at the locale of the offence, they have the skills acquired 
through their roles and their offences are often invisible (Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2012, p24). 
Theorising about how to prevent a legitimate person from committing an invisible illegitimate act 
is tricky. 
 
Deterrence 
 
The utility of formal controls referred to by Benson and Simpson (2009, p183) is born out of the 
deterrence theory that has pervaded criminology since Beccaria in the 18th century (Newburn, 
2007, p116). Beccaria believed that for punishments to be effective they must be certain, quick 
and proportionate (Newburn, 2007, p116). Bentham added in the 19th century that the 
punishment should outweigh the pleasure of the gain from the crime and it should be 
understandable and predictable (Newburn, 2007, p118). The utilitarian purpose of sanction 
deterrence is two-fold: to reform the criminogenic behaviour of detected criminals and to 
suppress criminality in the wider society (Maguire, 2002). Direct and vicarious behaviour 
reinforcement through reward and punishment is a cornerstone of social learning theory 
(Bandura, 1971): exemplary punishment strengthens restraints but unpunished transgression 
encourages prohibited behaviour (Bandura, 1977, p121). It is recognised as an important 
component of organisations’ fraud prevention strategies (Button and Gee, 2013, p97). 
 
The premise behind deterrence theory is that the actual or potential criminal is a deterrable, 
rational actor who makes rational choices as to the risks and rewards of deviant behaviour 
(Jacobs, 2010). The deterrence effect is not just the perceptions of detection and formal 
punishment risks, it also includes the threat to social status, reputation and important 
relationships (Braithwaite, 1985, 1989). Thus with much to lose, deterrence theory suggests that 
stigma sensitive white-collar criminals should be highly susceptible to sanction threats 
(Braithwaite, 1985; Holtfreter, 2005; Levi, 2006). The exceptions to this premise are those with 
higher levels of psychopathic traits (Duffield and Grabosky, 2001; Dressing, Salize and Gass, 2008, 
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p582), due to their greater tolerance of risk, increased selfishness and lower investment in social 
bonds (Nagin and Paternoster, 1994). The implication is, as Bandura (1976, p121) noted, that the 
deterrence power of punishment is most effective for those who need it least. 
 
Since Beccaria and Bentham the range of legal and regulatory landscape has expanded to address 
modern social complexities. In addition to the police and Crown Prosecutors, state bodies have 
emerged which specialise in particular types of fraudulent behaviour, for example the Serious 
Fraud Office, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Office of Fair Trading. The civil courts assist 
litigants in settling disputes which are predominantly non-criminal in nature (McGrath, 2008). 
Whilst the civil courts may assist fraud victims in recovering losses, they are symbolically the 
domain of disputes and disagreements. As their purpose is not the symbolic imposition of 
sanctions, the civil courts are not the judicial pathway for exposing the more pejorative acts to 
public scrutiny and deterrence punishment: civil judgments do not attract the stigma penalty 
associated with criminal sanctions (Sutherland, 1945). Private professional bodies such as the 
General Medical Council and the Solicitors Regulation Authority handle professional misconduct 
cases. The least formal route is the internal disciplinary policies and procedures developed by 
organisations to control employee behaviour. 
 
Fraud is a serious crime that requires aggressive prosecution to reaffirm society’s condemnation 
of fraud and make it more difficult for potential offenders to rationalise their behaviour (Duffield 
and Grabosky, 2001).  Maintaining organisation discipline requires consistent sacking and 
prosecution (Levi, 1988). It is unfortunate therefore that the criminal justice system in the UK is 
ineffective in dealing with fraud. Smith, Button, Johnston and Frimpong (2011, p121) discuss the 
fragmented prosecution system, the incompatibility of case complexities with the jury system 
and weak trial management. Jessica de Grazia (2008) found that the failings in the Serious Fraud 
Office were fundamentally due to weak leadership and incompetence. The lack of police interest 
is well documented (Attorney General, 2006, p45, 68; Button, Lewis, Shepherd, Brooks and 
Wakefield, 2012). Button, Blackbourn and Tunley (2014) found that just 0.5% of police officers 
specialise in fraud because police priorities lie elsewhere (Doig and Levi, 2013). As a result, of the 
1,430,573 persons handled by the criminal justice system in 2015, just 15,335 (1%) were for fraud 
offences (Ministry of Justice, 2015). Similarly the costs and risks associated with civil litigation 
chokes off access to justice for fraud victims in all but the most serious cases where the victims 
are wealthy litigants seeking substantial amounts in damages (Bingham, 2010; Smith and Upson, 
2011; Hjalmarsson, 2013). Consequently organisations tend to limit formal deterrence to 
disciplinary sanctions on the premise that activating private justice systems is better than none at 
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all (Fisse and Braithwaite, 1988). Internal disciplinary sanctions are the most common form of 
punishment for occupational fraudsters (Button, Lewis, Shepherd, Brooks and Wakefield, 2012). 
For some individuals detection, disciplinary sanctions and the associated stigma risk may be 
sufficient (Braithwaite, 1989), for others it may not be enough (Pogarsky, 2002). 
 
A small number of studies have examined the deterrence utility of sanctions. The studies 
generally examine the three Beccarian dimensions of certainty, severity and speed and can be 
roughly divided into two research groups: those assessing specific deterrence by analysing 
recidivism in criminal justice data and those measuring general deterrence through interview and 
survey methods. Inconsistencies in the research results indicate a failure to account for relevant 
variables. There is consensus that certainty of detection and a sanction consequence in some 
form has the most pronounced effect but there is disagreement over severity (Weisburd, Waring 
and Chayet, 1995, 2001; Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991; Parilla, Hollinger and Clark, 1983a; Nagin 
and Pogarsky, 2001, 2003) and no real knowledge base concerning celerity (Paternoster, 2010). 
Social learning theory (Bandura, 1971) and differential reinforcement (Jeffery, 1965) posit that 
that crime prevention operates through general and specific deterrence on would-be offenders’ 
perceptions of sanction risk by way of direct or vicarious learning. In his review of the literature 
Apel (2012) concludes that being caught or seeing others caught increases the perceived risk and 
influences individuals’ rational choice calculus to reduce criminality. Similarly, in their study of 
exam cheating, Sitren and Applegate (2007) found that the more individuals are seen to be 
getting away with it, the more likely other students will cheat. 
 
The most troubling problem with both the specific and general deterrence types of research 
implied by Pogarsky (2002) and Wikstrom (2006) is their failure to account for personality 
variables and specific personality disorders. The reliability of the general deterrence research is 
additionally questionable as the studies typically use hypothetical scenarios and non-
representative sample frames, usually students. Paternoster (1987) criticised such studies as the 
“science of sophomores”. For occupational fraud key questions remain. Controlling for certainty, 
what is the relationship between deterrence, sanction severity and levels of psychopathy? How 
many occupational fraudsters exhibit higher levels of psychopathy? Is dismissal sufficient to deter 
normal employees? Is dismissal sufficient to deter psychopathic employees? 
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Culture 
 
The high levels of fraud indicated by the NFA (2013), ACFE (2014), Karstedt and Farrell (2006) and 
Hollinger and Clark (1983a) suggests that it cannot be cured by formal sanctions alone and major 
value realignment is necessary (Newman, 1958). Such cultural considerations have practical 
relevance at the organisational level where the members of the sub-culture are subject to the 
local influences, normative values and controls defined by the organisation itself. Although white-
collar literature does not explicitly make the distinction, it nevertheless refers to two forms of 
deviant organisational cultures: utilitarian cultures that draw individuals into corporate 
criminality and exploitative cultures that pressure individuals into occupational criminality as 
response to perceived unfair treatment. Braithwaite (1985) describes competition and capitalism 
as inherently criminogenic because the higher goals of profit and shareholder value justify 
corrupt and other illegal corporate practices. Corporate utilitarianism means that, applying 
anomie theory Merton (1938), if companies cannot achieve their culturally defined goals in highly 
competitive markets by legitimate means, low risk illegitimate methods become attractive, 
rationalised, tolerated and expected (Braithwaite, 1989; Coleman, 1992). The confluence of goal 
strain, impossible performance demands and a culture less committed to ethical compliance 
draws employees into regarding corporate crime as a reasonable and rational course of action 
(Simpson and Piquero, 2002). At its worst corporations ethically numb employees to the extent 
that they are not aware their actions would be considered criminal by the world outside the 
organisation (Coleman, 1995). These capitalist rationalisations not only pave the way for 
corporate deviance, they also provide the cultural context which normalises fraudulent conduct 
and thereby foments occupational crime (Benson, 1985). It is not the subject of the present 
thesis, but an interesting piece of research would be to examine whether public sector 
employees, unencumbered by the profit motive, are less likely to commit occupational fraud. 
 
Exploitative organisational climates are more likely to induce unethical behaviour in demotivated 
and dissatisfied employees (Hollinger and Clark, 1983). Mars (1973, 1974) found that hotel 
employees and dock workers justified fiddling and theft as morally justified entitlements from 
exploitative employers, a process he called “reciprocal deviance”. In a rare natural experiment 
Greenberg (1990) found that employee theft increases in response to inequity in wage levels. 
These empirical findings support the notion derived from rationalisation theory that criminality 
can be reduced by neutralising the rationalisations (Cressey, 1986), in these cases by removing 
the circumstances which give rise to the perceptions of unfairness. As Gill and Goldstraw-White 
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(2012, p24) put it, good management prevents crime by monitoring staff aspirations, preparing 
them properly for their roles and ensuring they are fairly rewarded. 
 
One can surmise from the literature that organisation cultures at the highest risk of occupational 
fraud are those with strong utilitarian and exploitative orientations, organisations that condone 
corporate criminality and treat their staff poorly. In his ethnographic study of a family bakery, 
Ditton (1977) observed how employees were trained to defraud customers. Motivated by harsh 
working conditions, the same employees then applied the techniques to defraud the employer 
and the customers for their personal benefit. These cultural contexts lead us back to differential 
association and criminality within sub-cultures (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947), 
leadership and the tone from the top that shapes the behaviour of members and collective 
attitudes towards illegality (Coleman, 1995, p370; Gobert and Punch, p343). The corporate 
climate, attitudes of colleagues and the perceived attitudes of the executive are key 
determinants in engendering white-collar criminality (Piquero, Tibbetts and Blankenship, 2005). 
In particular any vagueness and ambiguity in the executives’ moral expectations is a principal 
source of unethical conduct that allows employees the scope to construct excuses and 
rationalisations (Kaptein, 2008). In these circumstances multiple moralities give rise to the 
selection of the most morals for the present circumstances (Cressey, 1986). Hollinger and Clark 
(1982b) found that informal, cultural controls have a more profound effect than formal controls 
in reducing occupational crime, but the formal controls are required to remove these ethical 
ambiguities and set the standards which shape the organisation’s normative structure. The 
absence of adequate controls and ethical standards allows the occupational fraudster to operate 
just like the street criminal who exploits the vulnerabilities of his neighbourhood, except the 
fraudster’s weapon of choice is not the gun or the knife, it is the organisation itself (Wheeler and 
Rothman, 1982). 
 
Business ethics 
 
Researchers in business ethics have expanded on these cultural ideas, utilising cognitive moral 
reasoning (Kohlberg, 1968), social learning theory (Bandura, 1971) and leadership theory (Bass, 
1985) as their principal inspirations to develop models of ethical climates, ethical leadership and 
good management practice. Weaver and Trevino (1999) conceptualise two principal idealised 
types of ethical control systems which reflect the commitment of senior management: 
compliance and values orientated. They also allude to a third type, window dressing programmes 
which are designed to satisfy external pressures and regulatory examination but do not reflect 
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the reality of organisational behaviour (Trevino and Weaver, 2003, p68). Such organisations are 
seeking compliance impression rather than compliance itself. Compliance orientated 
organisations require adherence to laws and local rules; they rely on regimented structures with 
monitoring, detection and disciplinary procedures to generate conformity and uniformity, thus 
suggesting that employees cannot be trusted or are ethically incompetent. Though valuable and 
effective, the coercive form of management associated with compliance orientation does not 
generate moral commitment and therefore risks a “don’t get caught” motivation (Weaver and 
Trevino, 1999). 
 
Values orientated organisations appeal to employee aspirations to behave ethically (Weaver and 
Trevino, 1999) in ways defined by shared values and mutual support rather than just by reference 
to rules (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999). Organisations which combine both orientations 
have the most effective ethical programmes as they internalise within their staff voluntary 
compliance with rules and normative values (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999). Central to the 
values orientated climate is the engagement of employees in ethical matters and the 
development of their ethical role identities (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). It requires that 
management support employees properly when they want to air ethical concerns and report 
transgressions. This leads to the characteristic which most profoundly distinguishes values 
orientated from compliance orientated climates: engaged employees with strong ethical role 
identities see ‘watching out’ for ethical problems, including deviant behaviour of colleagues, as 
part of the job (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). Organisations full of ethical “antennae” are 
inhospitable environments for organisational crime (Braithwaite, 1989), but without 
management support employees would see reporting on colleagues in this way as snitching 
Weaver and Trevino (1999). To encourage employee support, enlightened organisations reward 
employees for their ethical conduct (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999). Conversely, whenever 
compliance failures arise, management must act to avoid cynicism and distrust (Gruys, Stewart, 
Goodstein, Bing, and Wicks, 2008). The consequences may be counselling, training or ultimately 
some form of sanction. Failure to apply discipline is demeaning and disrespectful to those who 
behave ethically and fails to discriminate between ethical and unethical employees (Trevino and 
Weaver, 2001). There must be proportionate reward and punishment consequences (Detert, 
Trevino, Burris and Andiappan, 2007) to adjust the behaviour of individual transgressors, a direct 
learning mode, and to influence the behaviour of others by way of vicarious learning (Bandura, 
1976). As Trevino, Weaver, Gibson and Toffler (1999, p139) state: ‘‘. . .discipline for rule violators 
serves an important symbolic role in organizations - it reinforces standards, upholds the value of 
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conformity to shared norms, and maintains the perception that the organization is a just place 
where wrongdoers are held accountable for their actions.’’ 
 
Ethics researchers stress the importance of the ethical commitment of leaders in ensuring that 
espoused values are diffused throughout organisations (Jones, 1995; Paine 1996; Brown, Trevino 
and Harrison, 2005). Leaders at every level serve as role models (Weaver and Trevino, 1999) or 
significant others (Kohlberg, 1968; Hirschi, 1969, p34). Momeni (2009) found that more than 70% 
of employees’ perceptions of organizational climate are shaped directly by their leader’s style of 
leadership and behaviour. Avolio and Bass (1991) organise leadership styles into three 
contrasting principal forms in ascending order of effectiveness: avoidant, transactional and 
transformational leadership. Avoidant or laissez-faire leaders provide very little leadership. 
Transactional leadership is characterised by a contractual exchange between the senior manager 
and his subordinates based on contingent rewards or punishment and management by exception 
(Bass and Riggio, 2006, p7). Compliance orientated organisations are more likely to be led by 
transactional leaders who only engage with staff when something has gone wrong (Bass and 
Steidlmeier, 1999). Transformational managers enthuse followers with visionary ambitions, 
emphasise the collective purpose and ethical standards, stimulate innovation and consider the 
needs of individuals (Bass and Riggio, 2006, p6). Values orientated organisations are more likely 
to be led by transformational leaders who are fully engaged in steering their ethical climates 
(Trevino, Brown and Hartman, 2003). The business ethics literature suggests that the lowest 
levels of occupational fraud should correlate with transformational leaders and values orientated 
organisations; higher levels of occupational fraud should correlate with compliance orientated 
organisations and a transactional dominated leadership; window dressing organisations led by 
avoidant leaders should exhibit the highest levels of occupational fraud. 
 
Counter-fraud: theory and practice 
 
A number of texts have been published which provide detailed guidance on how to combat fraud 
in organisations. Some were written by counter-fraud practitioners (Wells, 2007), some by 
academics (Doig, 2012) and others by institutions (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2006) and public bodies 
(Button and Brooks, 2009). Because the essence of fraud is deceit one cannot buy things which 
prevent fraud in the way that fences and alarms can be purchased to defend against burglary. 
The common advice is inevitably based on bureaucratic management controls and culture. 
Though the teaching is practical and intuitively relevant, there is little quantitative academic 
evidence of what works or how well the advice is implemented. Holtfreter (2005) for example 
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argues that a highly visible internal audit programme ought to act as a deterrent but there is little 
supporting evidence to support the claim. The consequence is a substantial disconnect between 
the theoretical landscape and practice. Perhaps the critical knowledge gap that needs to be 
addressed is the calibration of the extent of fraud against counter-fraud methods and cultural 
characteristics. 
 
In a rare piece of research Gee, Button and Cook (2010) assessed the resilience of large UK 
organisations to fraud using the Red Book 2 model counter-fraud framework produced by the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA, 2008). The results showed that UK 
organisations are falling short in their fraud prevention strategies. For example, 18% do not have 
written strategies which would remove ambiguities and address rationalisation, 28% do not have 
programmes of work to develop ethical counter-fraud cultures and 37% do not effectively screen 
recruits which would exclude high risk individuals and psychopaths. The reasons for these failures 
are unknown and warrant further research. Similarly there has been very little research into why 
organisations tend to limit sanctions to disciplinary measures (Holtfreter, 2005).  One could 
logically adduce that it is a consequence of the failure of the criminal justice system to address 
victims’ complaints. It has also been suggested that organisations do not want to relinquish 
control of investigations to the police (Button, Lewis, Shepherd, Brooks and Wakefield, 2012) and 
are deterred by the costs of supporting prosecutions (Holtfreter, 2005). Many commentators 
speculate that fear of reputational harm is a principal reason for not reporting frauds to the 
police (Touby, 1994; Gill and Hart, 1997; Bierstaker, Brody and Pacini, 2005), yet there is little 
evidence to support these fears. Indeed Levi and Sherwin (1989) found the opposite, that 
organisational victims suffered no reputational harm. Button and Gee (2013, p141) go even 
further in arguing that securing a very visible reputation for sanctioning fraudsters is an 
important component of counter-fraud strategies because it sends out a powerful deterrence 
message. Clearly further research is required to confirm whether the reputational fear paradigm 
is true and, if it is, whether it is justified. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has introduced the theories most relevant to the present research into occupational 
fraud. Just like the bulk of criminology, the little academic research that has been undertaken 
mainly focuses on the aetiology of the fraudster’s behaviour. With a few notable exceptions, 
there has been hardly any research which considers the organisational context and the 
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interaction with the potential or actual fraudster. The review has identified some knowledge gaps 
which point to a number of challenging research opportunities in the fields of situational crime 
prevention, psychology, deterrence theory, rationalisation theory, culture and organisational 
ethics. This thesis draws on the theoretical concepts presented to examine the meaning of fraud 
in the occupational context and some of the factors which promote and inhibit dealing with the 
phenomenon. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Research Methods 
 
Introduction 
 
This research was originally triggered by the simple question: why do organisations not tackle 
employee fraud? The “why” in the question implies a positivist’s cause and effect perspective. 
Initially this approach sat well with my previous experience as an engineer comfortable with 
isolating variables, hypothesis testing and statistical analysis. Unfortunately the criminological 
fraud and white-collar crime literature review proved to be barren ground in yielding any 
substantive cues as to which variables might be relevant other than reputation concerns (Touby, 
1994) and “tone from the top” (Holloway, 2012). Both of these superficial variables just prompt 
deeper questions. What is the link, if any, between tackling occupational fraud and reputation 
damage? Why does exposing and punishing employee crime not enhance an organisation’s 
reputation? Whilst we can probably instinctively grasp the concept of “tone from the top”, that it 
is related to messages from senior management, what does it really mean? Expanding the 
literature review into the business ethics scholarship proved to be more fruitful in identifying 
ethical climate and leadership types as possible categories of independent variables. 
 
An attempt was made, using a conceptual framework (Robson, 1993, p152), to map the proposed 
independent variables against organisational decisions to implement counter-fraud strategies 
and to respond to detected events. The original idea was to borrow from Button and Brooks 
(2009) and use the model counter-fraud strategy of the CIPFA Redbook (CIPFA, 2008) as an 
instrument to measure the level of implementation. Unfortunately the framework proved far too 
complex, containing a huge list of interactive variables with no clue as to which may be the most 
salient and worthy of further examination. As a consequence three preliminary semi-structured 
interviews were undertaken to refine the scope of the research. However it became clear that in 
order to understand the relevant influences on organisations, one needs to understand the 
nature of the threat and challenge they face. Even the definition of fraud proved to be 
problematic. 
 
The author had assumed, like Gill and Goldstraw-White (2012, p19), that the Fraud Act 2006 
definition would be a tidy, universal definition. Unfortunately on deeper examination it became 
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apparent that a convenient single meaning in both legal and social terms would prove elusive. 
How people construct their perceptions of the world means that, unlike more obvious crimes 
such as murder or burglary, people have different views of what behaviour and circumstances 
justify the opprobrium of the fraud label. These contingent perceptions are reflected in the 
multitude of meanings under both statute and common law. The implication is that if people do 
not perceive behaviour as fraudulent then there is little purpose in tackling it. A theme which 
emerged early in the research was the perception that occupational fraud is as a rare hazard 
suffered by others and perpetrated by determined sociopaths. If these perceptions are correct 
then, again, there is little to be had in implementing counter-fraud strategies. These foundational 
questions had to be examined. It became apparent that an exploratory style of research was 
required with the aim of exposing substantive themes for expanding the narrative around 
existing theory and the development of new hypotheses and ideas. 
 
Research philosophy 
 
In developing a well-designed research programme the researcher needs to consider the 
philosophical  assumptions underpinning the methodologies adopted and their implications for 
the nature of the knowledge produced Denscombe (2010, p116). The researcher needs to justify 
the epistemological approach to the inquiry, describe its limitations and explain how the 
information can be further exploited. The particular problem confronting the research neophyte 
is how the philosophical approaches are couched in terms of competing camps, clashes, 
fortifications, battle, war and fury (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009, chapter 2; Denscombe, 2010, 
p117). For some the choice of research paradigm may be fenced by passionate ideological 
commitments. For the rest of us who are sceptical about unproductive philosophical debates and 
see research in terms of practical outcome, pragmatism is most appropriate, that is, using the 
approach that best suits the purpose (Denscombe, 2010, p128; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 
2004). 
 
The initial explorations indicated that a constructionist perspective was the most appropriate. 
Born out of the phenomenologist tradition, constructionism emphasises interpretivism, how 
people interpret reality to construct and make sense of their world and other people in it through 
their interactions with each other (Kalof, Dan and Dietz, 2008, p80). According to Berger and 
Luckman (1966, p30) an adequate understanding of the reality of society needs research to focus 
into the manner in which the reality is constructed. Core to making sense of the social order is 
the process of institutionalisation (Berger and Luckman, 1966, p72). It involves the cognitive 
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processes of typification and habitualisation, which develop through social interaction, and bring 
an internalised, ordered objective reality to the individual’s consciousness (Alvesson and 
Skoldberg, 2009). Considering the multi-layered nature of the inquiry, with actors located inside 
organised institutions, set within sectors and surrounded by a regulatory framework, the 
constructionist paradigm is appropriate for understanding the perspectives of the participants 
through their meanings, habits, routines and categorisations (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009). 
Although constructionism is not prescriptive in the methodological approach to social research: 
any and all of the qualitative methods are available to the researcher. The guiding principle is to 
maximise research objectivity in inherently subjective sociological questions. Bearing in mind the 
purpose of the present project is one of discovery to seed a barren ground, an adaptive mixed 
method approach is most appropriate, one that responds to and progressively homes in on 
emergent themes (Denscombe, 2010, p134). It calls to the range of tools and flexibility within the 
discovery based approach of the ethnographic tradition (Jupp, 1989, p65) allied with the power 
of cross-method triangulation to support those emerging themes (Kalof, Dan and Dietz, 2008, 
p25) and to minimise both participant and researcher subjectivity. 
 
Research strategy 
 
The bulk of the research is qualitative; it addresses the social “pre-conditions” (Jupp, 198, p10) of 
fraud in the organisational context. The quantitative element of the research is a minor but 
important component that supports the qualitative endeavour by measuring the “post-
conditions”. The quantitative procedure involves a meta-analysis of the best secondary data 
available combined with data provided by participants to produce three key annual dimensions 
for the scale of fraud in the UK: value, volume (frequency) and number of offenders. The context 
and methods used are detailed in Chapter 5. 
 
The deeper qualitative research employed three components: semi-structured interviews, a short 
case study and participant observation. Semi-structured interviews provided data from a broad 
range of perspectives, from within and outside of organisations. A case study provided a 
narrower, but richer, vein of data from a single organisation. Finally, participant observation 
generated the most real, contemporaneous data, with the minimum of researcher disturbance, 
in the most natural setting (Jupp, 1989, p58). The complete schedule of the 62 participants in 
Appendix 1.1 categorises the participants by sector, role, organisation type, size and role. The 
schedule lists each participant by personal and organisational pseudonyms and indicates which 
interviews were digitally recorded. Twenty four participants allowed recording. Appendix 1.2 lists 
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the pseudonyms of individuals and organisations referred to by the participants. Appendix 1.3 is 
a schedule of the real names of individuals and organisations cited in discussions and which are in 
the public domain. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews with managers and external professionals were used to identify and 
categorise substantive statements (Gillham, 2005, p136) and relevant themes.  Drawing on a 
broad sample frame allowed verification of emergent common themes through intra-method 
triangulation (Kalof, Dan and Dietz, 2008, p25). The interviews with the managers provided data 
on their organisations and their perceptions of the external environment, particularly the 
regulatory and legal. The interviews with the external professionals covered their perceptions of 
the organisations they serve and of their own professional environments. Table 3.1 compares the 
planned sample frame involving 30 interviews with the actual achieved.  
 
Table 3.1: Interview sample frame 
Participant group Planned Actual 
SME managers 4 6 
Large organisation managers 8 11 
Lawyers 5 6 
Auditors 5 3 
Counter-fraud professionals 4 5 
Law enforcement 4 6 
Total 30 37 
 
There was no intention that the sample frame would be representative of the population of 
organisations within the UK. The intention was purely to ensure a sensible breadth of 
perspectives. Originally it was hoped to recruit participants from the construction sector as it is 
well known for corrupt behaviour (Chartered Institute of Building, 2013) and medical companies 
because of their ethical purpose. However they all politely refused. The problem of access has 
been well documented especially when the topic is of a sensitive nature (Kalof, Dan and Dietz, 
2008, p116). The reluctance of these organisations is probably driven by a mix of limited 
management time, concern that an inquisitive stranger might expose dysfunctional practices and 
reputational risk. It is simply easier and safer to decline. Networking or snowball sampling at 
conferences and through contacts proved to be more successful. Though it is a non-probability 
method snowball sampling is a recognised approach when access is difficult (Kalof, Dan and 
Dietz, 2008, p45). A weakness of the networking technique is that it limits the reliability of the 
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sample because it tends to attract participants with some interest in the subject (Kalof, Dan and 
Dietz, 2008, p154). Multiple methods and triangulation minimised the potential bias arising from 
the method to improve validity (Jupp, 1989, p72). 
 
The professionals were far more willing volunteers. They mostly appeared to appreciate the rare 
opportunity of spending an hour or so reflecting on the topic. Under these circumstances one has 
to guard against excessive subjectivity, however its salience in this case was substantially reduced 
because the principal aim was to access their professional perceptions of others. It is also 
important to be aware of the “on-stage” effect whereby the respondents frame their answers to 
meet the researcher expectations or seek to portray a positive image of themselves to the 
researcher (Kalof, Dan and Dietz, 2008, p159). This is recognised as a particular problem when 
researchers interview offenders (Ross, 1989, p352). There is no secure defence against this kind 
of performance other than the “tuning-in” of the researcher. The author sensed very little in the 
way of stage effects, indeed the credibility of the interviewees came through the richness of their 
discourse, their use of linguistic techniques such as the painting of analogies and the telling of 
memorable events to convey meaning by typification (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009, p26). The 
memorable events proved useful as they could be cross-checked against press articles and legal 
reports. 
 
Most of the interviews were conducted at the participants’ places of work. Two were conducted 
in hotel cafes. The author followed the advice of Robson (1993, p232) to avoid cues which cause 
the interviewee to respond in a particular way. A unique prompt schedule was drafted for each 
interview. Its purpose was to thematically shepherd the interviewees in order to tease out new 
themes or to substantiate or otherwise emergent themes. The method supported a non-
judgemental, relaxed atmosphere that allowed the interviewee latitude to express their 
perceptions and opinions.  
 
Case study 
 
The case study method advocated by Robson (1993, p147-149) provided a means to mine deeper 
into the realities of a single organisation’s arrangements for dealing with internal fraud and 
exposed the features of the organisation’s structure, culture and relationships which supported 
its effectiveness. It was important that the participating organisation had an effective counter-
fraud system in order to generate some understanding of the real-world tensions, frustrations 
and difficulties in actively preventing fraud and pursuing detected fraudsters. The participating 
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organisation, DEF Group, was selected by a serendipitous encounter with its Counter-Fraud 
Manager, Mark, at a fraud conference. He spoke to the audience of his frustrations with the 
criminal justice system. It suggested that DEF had a counter-fraud mentality, it employed people 
who detected frauds, its management was not afraid to reveal them to the public and they 
actively sought sanctions. 
 
The case study involved two techniques, semi-structured interviews and document examination. 
Oral testimony from two key actors, the Counter-Fraud Manager and the Security Manager, 
Henry, provided rich information on the tensions, frustrations and difficulties in actively 
preventing fraud and pursuing detected fraudsters. The internal documents provided a means to 
improve the internal validity of the research by triangulating between what was said and what 
was written (Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000, p57). The list of documents collected is listed in 
Table 3.2. The documents can be roughly divided into two categories. The first set represents 
what the organisation sets out to be and to do, its policies, procedures and general 
communications. The second set is evidence of its counter-fraud efforts, including investigation 
reports and a database extract. The company’s Security and Counter-Fraud Department 
maintains a database of all its activities. It contains brief details of every event, task, suspicion, 
escalated concern, whistleblowing report and investigation undertaken. It also includes 
quantitative data on the frequency of detected events, the number of perpetrators and values, 
all of which contribute to the analysis in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 3.2: Case study documents 
Organisation chart 
Principles of conduct handbook 
Employee handbook 
Counter-fraud policy 
Counter-fraud procedures 
Fraud investigation procedures 
Fraud controls training package 
Inventory investigation report 
Fraud investigation report x 3 
Purchasing procedures 
Company magazine 
Fraud and security operations database 
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Participant Observation 
 
Participant observation is recognised as a valuable technique in the study of criminology. It was 
pioneered in the early 20th century by the Chicago School of sociologists including Edwin 
Sutherland (Jupp, 1989). By using all the senses the researcher is able to obtain deeper, richer 
data and more meaningful explanations from the participants in their natural environment.  Gold 
(1969) separated the continuum of participant observation into four main categories: complete 
participant, participant as observer, observer as participant and complete observer.  Maurice 
Punch (1979) spent time following Amsterdam police officers in order to gain insights into the 
institutional culture. Simon Holdaway (1983) covertly studied police culture in the UK whilst a 
serving police officer. Within the fraud scholarship Mars (1982) and Ditton (1977) covertly 
observed dockworkers and the operation of a bakery. The observational component of the 
research strategy is not intended to be as extensive as these examples. The value of the method 
for the current research is three-fold. Firstly, in identifying real issues, ideas and possible themes 
that can then be transferred to progressively focus the interview and case study elements. 
Secondly it is probably the only method capable of identifying some of the nascent conditions 
which could, with the appropriate stimuli, catalyse fraud. Such conditions or events may 
otherwise pass unobserved and not appear in the reflective data gathered by the other methods. 
 
The author’s position as an Engineer and General Manager of a small engineering company 
provided the opportunity to undertake the participant observation element of the research 
programme. The role enabled access to people who would be too busy, too disinterested or 
generally antipathetic to formal requests for participation. The trigger for introducing the 
research to a potential participant was a comment or brief conversation which hinted at deeper 
concerns, usually frustrations due to the corrupt behaviour of their customers and competitors. 
Some individuals expressed interest in the project, others were completely unmoved. The curious 
individuals were then invited to participate by way of an immediate, unstructured conversation. 
The conversational method is similar to the planned interview but is distinguished in that it 
involves an unplanned, opportunistic discussion. It was not practical to record the conversations 
due to the locations, such as in a car or on a construction site. The author also felt to do so would 
undermine the spontaneity of the method in a naturalistic setting (Jupp, 1989, p58). The 
opportunistic, observational participants are indicated on the schedule in Appendix 1 and 
summarised below in Table 3.3. There are ethical issues associated with this method which are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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One case was triggered by the author’s suspicions of corruption within a client organisation, R&T 
Industries. It led to a more traditional participant observation method except that the research 
role was not covert. The client’s representative, their Engineering Manager, Ethan, was the 
curious type and happily consented to participation, indeed he suggested it. There are parallels 
here with Ditton (1977), whose research became known to some of those he observed. The 
observations followed the progress of the case and R&T’s response to the concerns raised. The 
study would have been enhanced if it could have been turned into a case study involving access 
to local directors and the parent company’s Compliance Department. However Ethan felt that 
this would be a step too far and would risk his position in the company. On reflection, Ethan’s 
eagerness to consent to the observations probably emanated from his disquiet with the 
company’s management by exception leadership style (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999), its blame 
culture and challenging ethical climate. 
 
Table 3.3: Observational participants 
Participant group Number 
SME managers 10 
Large organisation managers 16 
Total 26 
 
 
Document research 
 
Documents are an important source of information for the research. Scott (1990, p12) defines 
documents as “…accounts, returns, statutes and proclamations that individuals and groups 
produce in the course of their everyday practice and that are geared to their immediate and 
practical needs.” The documents provided in the DEF Group case study proved invaluable in 
supporting the interview data and the quantitative research in Chapter 5. Using documents in 
this way, the case study resembles a police investigation and certainly improves internal validity 
(Jupp, 1989, p72) in that the paperwork and the oral statements are mutually verified. 
 
It is easy to take the internet for granted as a research tool, however its power needs to be 
emphasised for triangulating the statements of participants and widening the inquiry. The 
emergence of corporate social responsibility as a required badge, particularly for large 
corporations and public bodies (Cressey, 1995), has led to many organisations including 
statements of values and ethical policies on their websites. These documents provided a context 
for the observations of participants, a reference benchmark of the professed values of their 
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organisations or those they referred to. Whenever participants recalled significant events, 
searches were made for media press articles, legal cases and government inquiries to 
substantiate their commentary. References to these sources have been excluded from the 
analysis to avoid the ethical issues in exposing the identities of the participants and their 
employers. The exception is for those cases that support the emerging arguments and are 
entirely accessed from secondary sources, for example the Siemens corruption case (Schubert, 
and Miller, 2008, December 21) and the abuse of the public purse by the executives at the SFO 
(Attorney General, 2013). 
 
Reflexivity 
 
As has been mentioned, recruiting participants and negotiating access to organisations is often 
difficult, particularly when the topic is sensitive or the subjects are vulnerable persons (Kalof, Dan 
and Dietz, 2008, p116). Usually researchers are complete outsiders which means they have to 
sufficiently win the trust of the participants or their gatekeepers in order to gain access in the 
first place, and then they must maintain that trust until the research is completed (Clark, 2011). 
Sometimes researchers are complete insiders, for example Holdaway (1983), or become 
temporary insiders such as Ditton (1977). For the outsiders, the level of scrutiny, trust and 
consequent access may be contingent on the race, ethnicity, religion, gender and socio-economic 
group of the researcher in relation to the subject participant or group (Lumsden and Winter, 
2014, p5). The author found that formal approaches were rebuffed, but informal direct 
approaches and introductions were successful. There is no doubt that relational proximity 
significantly increased trust and accessibility. It is also likely that demographics influenced the 
level of accessibility. All the participants were vocational professionals or managers; all were 
middle-aged, the youngest, Ethan, was about 30 years old; all but four were male and all but one 
was white. Additionally, most of the managers worked in similar environments to the author. In 
other words, though the author was not a complete insider, he was perceived as member of the 
broader community. Being a community insider undoubtedly increases trust, because, as Clark 
(2011, p11) puts it, participants are more likely to perceive greater congruency between the 
researcher’s world views and their own. Noaks and Wincup (2004, p63) describe research access 
as a process of “getting along” through establishing a research role, building a rapport with 
participants and securing their trust’. There is no formula for building rapport: it requires the 
researcher to be personable and attentive, but above all, to never breach the negotiated rules 
and parameters of the research. An important advantage for recruiting the observational 
participants in particular, was the more natural setting in which the research was introduced, 
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within an everyday conversation. That the researcher was a social researcher and an engineer 
with perceived community insider status triggered the participants’ curiosity, overcame trust 
inhibitions and eased access. 
 
Ethical issues 
 
Summary of known ethical concerns 
 
The approach to the research ethics is based on the guidance issued by British Psychological 
Society (BPS, 2010).The key ethical issue related to the collection of confidential organisational 
information and limited personal data. It is essential under these circumstances that disclosures 
do not cause harm to the participants or their organisations (BPS, 2010, s2.4). The BPS (2010, s3) 
recommends undertaking some form of risk analysis. The ethical risk analysis structure developed 
for this project is in Appendix 2. All of the participants were experienced, professional volunteers 
who were trained in and accustomed to maintaining confidentialities: lawyers, accountants, law 
enforcement officers and managers. No vulnerable individuals were involved requiring additional 
precautions. Nevertheless the analysis identified a low residual vulnerability risk from 
inappropriate disclosures: 
 
 Breach of confidentiality by improper disclosures. 
 Disclosure of career limiting criticisms. 
 Disclosure of proscribed behaviour of organisation. 
 
The participant observation element of the programme raised additional ethical considerations in 
respect of the researcher’s role. The issues related to conflict of interest and influence can be 
addressed together. The author’s employment required the observation and recording of events, 
and, when appropriate, contribution to outcomes. These actions were undertaken irrespective of 
the ethnographic research. The additional step to the researcher ‘observer as participant’ role 
(Gold, 1969) involves the subsequent critical analysis of the data and its triangulation to the other 
research elements. Consequently the risks of role conflict are negligible because they are 
substantially the same role. Importantly exposing the data and subjecting it to robust critical 
analysis addresses the potential criticism that the observations and experiences of the day job 
could influence or bias the research. The reality is the reverse. Examining the broad aspects of 
fraud and corruption in the corporate context has increased the author’s awareness of the 
problem and sensitivity to the cues and subtle symptoms which indicate possible fraud within 
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client organisations. There is also no doubt that management colleagues have been influenced. 
At one time suspicions of corruption caused anxieties and were discussed in hushed tones behind 
closed doors. That they now feel free to openly discuss their concerns undoubtedly neutralises 
the debilitating anxieties. Although the evidence is invariably judicially weak, debating the 
suspicions allows managers to monitor the behaviour of the client’s employees, assess the risks 
and arrive at a considered commercial judgement. It is in effect a subjective value-laden due 
diligence process. That about one in ten cases are substantiated by the dismissal of one of the 
suspect buyers or engineers, which happens at least once per year, validates the process. 
 
The following arrangements to protect the participants and the researcher in all three 
ethnographic elements were applied to ensure that the residual risks identified in the risk 
analysis were minimal: 
 
Participant characteristics 
All participants are voluntary including case study and observation participants 
Ensure minimum vulnerability participants by engaging participants of 
professional status with appropriate fiduciary positions. 
 
Informed consent 
Verbally warn observational participants of risks. 
Warn participants of risks in invitation information form. 
Remind participants of risks at start of interviews. 
Inform participants that data will be published but will be untraceable and 
anonymous. 
Obtain signed consent. 
Allow participants to withdraw at any time and withdraw permission to use the 
data already obtained up to the end of the data gathering phase. 
Provide participants with the University supervisory details for making 
complaints. 
 
Dialogue management 
Detect when potential inappropriate disclosure are imminent during dialogue, 
interrupt dialogue, change focus or terminate. 
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Anonymity 
Participant is anonymised using random pseudonyms. 
Participating organisation is anonymised using random pseudonyms. 
All data not in the public domain is anonymous. 
Data in the public domain which is traceable to an anonymous participant has to 
be anonymised or discarded. 
Ensure case study participants are fully aware that their participation is known to 
the employer and the data gathered is visible and accessible to those 
responsible. 
As a last resort, discard data as unusable rather than breach confidentiality. 
Raw data is not shared with anyone else including University colleagues. 
Raw data is destroyed after completion of the thesis. 
 
In researching a crime phenomenon the researcher has to be alive to the dilemma of participants 
exposing their criminality to an extent that it ought to be reported to potential victims or the 
authorities. This dilemma was substantially ameliorated because the potential victims were 
substantial organisations rather than vulnerable individuals. The ethical arrangements also 
forestalled this risk by requiring the diversion of conversations away from inappropriate 
disclosures or termination of interviews. Active corruption was observed in just one instance 
involving R&T Industries and the company’s management were informed. One participant 
revealed without prompting that his employer used corrupt means to win contracts from 
substantial organisations. In this case the conversation was quickly shut down lest the participant 
substantiated his claim with convincing evidence. 
 
The sampling strategy for all three ethnographic elements effectively ensured that the 
prospective participants had a relevant, professional interest in fraud and were willing to share 
their experiences in some detail. In the interview and case study cases the prospective 
participants were contacted by telephone to introduce the study and outline the method and 
associated risks, followed by a relevant written invitation and consent form (Appendix 3). The 
participant observation approach was the same except that the preliminary telephone 
conversation was not required. None of the participants expressed any concerns at all in respect 
of ethical issues. 
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Data management 
 
All data was stored and managed in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998. All original 
field data was collected electronically or digitised. All the original data was stored on a PC, backed 
up onto an external hard-drive and accessible only by the researcher. No data was located on any 
server. None of the original data can be shared. The participants’ individual data was kept in 
separated folders. The participants had the right to access their own data and withdraw 
permission any time during the data gathering (BPS, 2010, p15). Original data must be destroyed 
after completion of the thesis. The data protection philosophy has to continue beyond the 
completion of the thesis in any form of publication and the key issue is the continued protection 
of the participants’ anonymity. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The quantitative analysis is described and presented in Chapter 5. As the dataset was relatively 
small it did not require sophisticated software, a spreadsheet was more than sufficient. The Excel 
spreadsheet software was also used for the qualitative analysis in a 2-dimensional array. Atlas.ti 
was considered but rejected. Excel is simple and flexible but lacks automation efficiency. Atlas.ti’s 
automation makes it more efficient for data entry and it would certainly be the preferred 
package for a project involving multiple users and a great deal of data. However the interrogation 
and sorting routines in Excel mean that it is more flexible and efficient once the data is input. 
Appendix 4.1 is an extract from the spreadsheet. The data was organised into rows so that each 
row effectively represents a unique data package. The spreadsheet contains 5,602 data packages. 
Every interview and field note was dissected entered into the system with one short paragraph 
per cell. Coded labels, pseudonyms, relevant notes and cross-references were added to the 
adjacent cells. Up to five labels acted as indexes for filtering, sorting and aggregating themes. A 
similar structure was used to create an indexed database for the secondary data documents, 
press articles, company reports and documents, legal reports and government inquiries. Using 
the sort routines on the index labels in both datasets allowed triangulation within and across the 
datasets. 
 
Appendix 4.2 is a schedule of the coding labels used for the analysis. Labels were used rather 
than alphanumeric codes simply because they are self-explanatory and therefore more efficient 
as they do not require a look-up table. The initial topics represent the broad subjects of the 
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original lines of enquiry within the data collection phase of the research. The coding labels are 
headings which summarise the detail within each data package. The labels were not set out prior 
to the analysis, rather they emerged during the analysis, and represented observations, concepts 
and salient themes. Grounded theory research uses a similar approach (Kalof, Dan and Dietz, 
2008, p90). Although Appendix 4.2 shows the labels under subject headings, for example 
offender, fraud types and management, the labels were not organised and analysed in a 
hierarchical structure under these headings. A hierarchical structure was attempted but rejected 
because it was found that forcing such a structure onto the labels tended to constrain the 
analysis to superficial, a priori themes. A flat structure with multiple summary descriptors 
attached to each data package promoted a more forensic examination of the interactions 
between labelled observations and between emerging concepts.  
 
To illustrate the process, entry CFSM5-1-186 in Appendix 4.1 refers to a section of an interview 
with Imogen, a forensic accountant, centred on occupational fraud (the topic). Imogen described 
how ordinary people with a normative sense of right and wrong cross the criminal threshold 
(Rubicon) and then, in the absence of external intervention, may become habitual fraudsters. The 
experience detoxifies and normalises crime, allowing the offenders to construct rationalisations 
to maintain their self-esteem (offender rationalisation). 
 
The filtering and sorting tools within Excel were used to group the data packages into common 
concepts such as psychology, access to justice and victim rationalisations, in order to identify 
linkages, common insights and themes. Wherever the emergent theme is not evident in the 
original topic or labels, a thematic label was attached to the data in the column headed “Index 
4”. The comment section is an integral element of the analytical structure. It fleshes out the 
observation and provides further insight into the linkages between observations and concepts. 
Entry PSM20-4-70 is an extract from an interview in which occupational fraud was discussed. The 
participant sought to illustrate how it is not always to define observed behaviour as fraud (fraud 
definition) by relating how a manager’s negligence in performing his duties (work performance) 
led to him covering up his failings by falsifying stock records. The participant detoxified the 
behaviour by calling it a fudge (fraud definition) thus allowing the company to avoid prosecuting 
the individual (victim rationalisation). The comment section refers to Kweku Adoboli (R v Kweku 
Adoboli [2012]), who was convicted of fraud, because the case bore similar characteristics: a 
poorly supervised employee who used fraudulent means to hide his inadequate work 
performance. 
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter has sought to outline and justify the methodologies applied to the research 
question. The paucity of existing research has called for qualitative mixed methods to develop 
themes and hypotheses for further exploration and testing. This approach is appropriate for the 
essential groundwork required for seeding further research which may substantiate and build on 
the ideas or indeed disprove them. The ethical issues addressed in this chapter are not peculiar 
to the subject as the avoidance of harm is a central consideration for all forms of sociological 
research. The risk based approach is not unique but the format of the analysis in Appendix 2 is 
probably novel to the management of ethical issues in sociological research. The method does 
not automatically produce ethical solutions; its purpose is to provide a framework for researchers 
to logically set out ethical considerations and risk controls. 
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SECTION 2 
 
The occupational fraud threat 
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Chapter 4 
 
Definition of Fraud 
 
“In the UK recent law – the Fraud Act 2006 – has tidied up the legal definition 
determining that a person can be guilty of fraud if he or she is guilty of false 
representation, fails to disclose information, and abuses his or her position” (Gill and 
Goldstraw-White, 2012, p19). 
 
Introduction 
 
If only it were true. Research, prosecution, litigation and fraud prevention would be far simpler 
and more efficient undertakings if the Act accurately represented the range of human behaviour 
that is broadly conceptualised as fraud. It is a deceptively simple word covering a very broad 
territory (Levi, 2012). Clearly defining fraud is necessary in order to set the fundamental context 
and the presumptive boundaries of the present research and to avoid misinterpretation or 
misuse of the results. Further than that, however, a deeper analysis is required because of the 
definitional misunderstandings and concerns expressed by the participants, almost all of whom 
said: “It depends what you mean by fraud.” In particular the relationship between fraud, bribery 
and theft is a vexed one has to be addressed. The chapter analyses the interaction between the 
statutory definitions and local rules to develop an understanding of how the definitions are not 
universally applied, but are interpreted for and contingent on local environments. 
 
Statutory definition 
 
The Fraud Act 2006 contains an objective definition of fraud which probably articulates most 
people’s concept of the offence: some kind of dishonest deception to gain some kind of unfair 
monetary advantage from another. Indeed the two fundamental prerequisites of liability under 
English common law, dishonesty and misrepresentation, have been long established (Derry v 
Peek [1889] 14 AC 337). However this conceptual alignment between the legal and social spheres 
becomes more unreliable and more subjective in the grey area between criminality, ignorance 
and sharp practice (Attorney General, 2006, p25). At what point does mis-selling (Thompson, 
2012) become criminal deceit? As advertising puffing is regarded as justifiable, at what point 
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does it become unreasonable and actionable (Zhou, 2009). How does one distinguish between 
bad debt and fraud (Levi and Burrows, 2008)? A somewhat unique feature of fraud amongst the 
acquisitive crimes is that it leaves no immediately obvious traces, no blood and no broken 
windows. Fraud is stealth and secrecy (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1987). The consequences of mis-
selling and bad debts are the same whether fraud was involved or not. The critical feature is in 
the intentions of the inappropriate seller and the defaulting buyer, whether they intended to 
deceive. But like the fraud act itself, this mens rea element also remains a secret until teased out 
by an investigation or the judicial process. 
 
The legal definition of fraud is more labyrinthine than Gill and Goldstraw-White (2012, p19) 
suggest. The Home Office (2012b) maintains an extensive taxonomy of offences including a broad 
typology of notifiable fraud offences; these are reproduced with annotations in Appendix 5. 
Appendix 6 is a contrasting schedule of offences mined from the statutes that are not classified 
under the fraud genus yet are fraudulent in nature. The first obvious result of comparing the two 
schedules is that this “other” category is much longer than the Home Office list. It appears that 
most legally framed types of fraud are not defined and counted as fraud. The fraudulent use of 
telecommunications systems under the Telecommunications Act 1984, for example, is classified 
under “other notifiable offences” (Appendix 6). A quick scan of the schedules reveals the second 
most obvious result, that the labelling of fraudulent behaviour depends on the context of the 
crime and the characteristics of the individual, whether a director (Companies Act 2006, 
Insolvency Act 1986), a small business owner (Part 8, Enterprise Act 2002), a fireman (Fire and 
Rescue Services Act, 2004), a silversmith (Hallmarking Act 1973), a marketer (Business Protection 
from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008), a finance professional (Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000) or unemployed (Social Security Administration Act 1992). 
 
A deeper inspection of the data reveals that the perceived egregiousness of the crimes, as 
measured by the penalty, is contingent on the labelling. Rogue traders are encouraged to 
improve their ways through the offices of Trading Standards (s214, Enterprise Act 2002). On the 
other hand money laundering commands an immediate maximum tariff of 14 years 
imprisonment (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002), whilst the originating fraudster risks 10 years under 
the Fraud Act 2006. The Bribery Act 2010 is aimed at business people and the maximum sentence 
is 10 years imprisonment. A politician bribing a voter is worth no more than 12 months 
imprisonment (Representation of the People Act 1983), and the penalty for a corrupt company 
liquidator is just a fine (Insolvency Act 1986). Probably one of the most damaging fraud crimes, 
which sits within the Home Office (2012b) typology, is cartel price fixing under the Enterprise Act 
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2002. Its cost to all sectors of society is unknown and in all likelihood individuals and businesses 
are not even aware that they are victims. However we do know that over a five year period to 
2012, the European Commission found against 187 businesses in regulatory hearing and imposed 
fines totalling €7b (EC, 2012b), a level which reflects the opprobrium of the authorities and the 
probable extent of the harm caused. The EC has no powers to prosecute real persons. There has 
been only one successful prosecution in the UK courts and that was prompted by the US 
authorities: three individuals pleaded guilty in the UK to avoid American prisons (Stephan, 2008). 
It is apparent from this short exposition that the definition and perceived, measured heinousness 
of fraud crimes and the level of social blame to be attached to offenders is primarily contingent 
on status, role, context and prosecution expediency, not on the level of harm inflicted. 
 
Common Law definition 
 
The definition of fraud within the civil domain is awash with yet more imprecision in the 
definition of fraud. Andrew, a solicitor in a leading law firm, described fraud as an “umbrella 
term” covering many causes of action. McGrath (2008) is a fraud litigation bible that describes 
the various possible torts and equitable remedies and how they may be applied to claims in 
fraud: deceit, unjust enrichment, conversion, knowing receipt, abuse of fiduciary duty, 
conspiracy, dishonest assistance, inducing breach of contract and bribery. The tort of deceit is 
probably the closest to the criminal definition of fraud requiring dishonesty in a 
misrepresentation (Derry v Peek [1889] 14 App Cas 337).  
 
Bribery is fraud 
 
The status of bribery is particularly pertinent to the current research and needs to be examined 
further to justify its inclusion within the research as a species of fraud. The script methodology 
formulated by Derek Cornish is an effective tool for the purpose (Levi and Maguire, 2004). The 
analysis involves setting out the sequence of actions, tactics and events which lead to the 
commission of the crime whilst drawing upon the experience of research participants. 
 
Edward is an owner director of a small network cabling company, SES Electrical. His client base 
includes public bodies, facilities management companies, media and sports stadia. He described 
an instance when the operations manager of a stadium requested a £5,000 kickback in return for 
a £10,000 contract to lay out a web of data cables prior to a major sporting event. 
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“I sent the quote to him, he was OK with it but wanted five grand for himself. I had to 
add for tax so I could pay him cash. I paid him the five grand myself and then drew that 
out as extra on the salary and took it out that way. So it about doubled the price to 
£20,000. I'm giving you rough figures you understand but I had to add the national 
insurance and the tax, that's the point.” 
 
Edward went on to explain: 
“Look if I didn't I wouldn't get the job, and wouldn't get another one there. I need the 
work, got four employees to keep going. What am I supposed to do?” 
 
The key sequence of events is: 
1. Client’s manager requests quotation for a job 
2. Supplier provides the quotation 
3. Client requests a personal cash payment above the contract value 
4. Cash value is added to the contract 
5. Supplier negotiates an addition to the contract value to cover taxes associated 
with the method of extracting the cash from his company 
 
This was a straightforward case of coercive, contractual bribery instigated by the client. Edward 
complied because he needed the work and was responsible for four employees. The stadium was 
defrauded of £10,000 by the dishonest misrepresentation of the contract value in order to fund 
the bribe. The negotiated mechanism was both a bribe and a fraud script perpetrated by the 
stadium manager against his employer in collusion with the supplier. A reverse of this script was 
described by Peter, a sales executive working at ‘Inzco’, a multinational corporation which 
supplies air conditioning systems to large public and private sector organisations: 
 
“We find out what his wife wants: car, holiday, whatever. And we do a deal. If we can, we 
stick his cost on the job, what we can, but it depends what we can get away with, what 
his budget is like. It's just doing what you need to. A bit under the table you know [palm 
down, Peter gestures towards the floor]. It's not really wrong, not like it's a crime, just 
helps everyone along to get the deal done. It's part of the package you put together, isn't 
it?” 
 
In this case the supplier instigates the bribery and negotiates an addition to the contract up to 
the value of the bribe: 
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1. Client manager requests quotation for a job 
2. Supplier provides the quotation 
3. Supplier offers to purchase goods or services for the client’s manager 
4. Supplier negotiates an addition to the contract value up to the value of the bribe 
 
These two scripts are typical of commercial bribery cases. Sometimes they are organised on an 
industrial scale. The Siemens case represent the pinnacle of efficient, systemised bribery. 
Siemens is the largest engineering company in Europe, based in Germany, with 362,000 
employees and sales of €75.9bn (Siemens, 2014). In December 2008 Siemens pleaded guilty to 
multiple charges of bribery involving its operations in Europe, the Middle East, Asia and South 
America in a prosecution agreement with the US Department of Justice. The Sentencing 
Memorandum (US Department of Justice, 2008) quantified $1.3bn in dubious payments, $0.8bn 
of which the company had paid to government officials through 2,700 intermediaries (Schubert 
and Miller, 2008, December 21) over a six year period between 2001 and 2007. The charges 
included bribing Iraqi officials to win contracts in the United Nations Oil for Food Program. The 
contract prices were inflated by 10% to cover the costs of the bribes and the accounts were 
deliberately manipulated to hide the payments from inquisitive auditors. The $1.3bn fines in 
settlement of the charges brought by the US and German authorities remain the highest ever 
levied against a company for bribery.  
 
These examples show how bribery and fraudulent conspiracy can form the same script and could 
be prosecuted under bribery or fraud charges or both. Importantly, they also show how 
corporate and occupational crimes collide: the corporate bribe to secure the contract for the 
supplier, the buyer’s occupational fraud to fund the bribe. This type of corrupt conduct emerged 
as a recurring theme of the research. As Peter implied, there are occasions when the value of the 
contract is not inflated by the cost of the bribe. Is still a fraud? Kenneth, a fraud barrister, pointed 
the way: under common law there is an irrebuttable presumption that the bribe payment forms 
part of the purchase price and without it the value of the contract would be lower (Hovenden & 
Sons v Millhof (1900) 83 LT 41). 
 
Fraud and bribery tend to part ways when favours associated with regulatory, compliance, 
permission or governance matters are at the heart of the script rather than commercial 
contracts. The first successful prosecution under the Bribery Act 2010 was against Munir Patel in 
2011, a court clerk at Redbridge Magistrates Court (Vitou and Kovolesky, 2011). Patel sought out 
and received payments from alleged traffic offenders for avoiding entering the summons details 
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on the court database. Patel pleaded guilty to bribery and to misconduct in public office, a 
common law offence. He was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment for the bribery charge and 6 
years for the misconduct charge. Unlike contractual bribery, compliance corruption of this nature 
did not appear as a theme of the research. 
 
Fraud or theft 
 
The definitional boundary and relationship between theft and fraud also requires resolving. The 
principal antecedent of the Fraud Act 2006 was the Theft Act 1968. Although most of the 
misrepresentation sections of the latter have been repealed, a few residual sections relating to 
false accounting (s17 and 19), destruction of valuable securities (s20) and dishonestly retaining a 
false credit to a bank account (s24A) remain. These sections continue to reside within the Home 
Office typology of fraud (Appendix 5). The features common to statutory theft and fraud are the 
appropriation of another’s property and dishonesty. The characteristic which sets fraud apart 
from theft is one of communication, the conveyance of a dishonest misrepresentation. Fraud 
researchers tend to conjoin employee theft and fraud, for example Holtfreter (2004; 2005) and 
Mars (1973). Some observers object to aggregating all aberrant work place behaviour under a 
single banner (Friedrichs, 2002), however it is surely justified when the subjects of the research 
are the contextual variables that influence deviant behaviour, of which theft and fraud are just 
two manifestations (Parilla, Hollinger and Clark, 1988). Fraud practitioners also encompass theft 
within their remit: the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners biennial report into the extent of 
occupational fraud includes employee theft in its typology (ACFE, 2014). 
 
One practitioner, Mark, manages the compliance department of DEF Group, a UK wide building 
supplies company. The department monitors inventory “shrinkage”, a term commonly used in 
distribution and inventory management functions that describes stock loss caused by crime, 
waste and error, for example, lost and mislabelled items and stock inaccuracies (Centre for Retail 
Research, 2013). Sometimes Mark sees losses caused by straightforward employee theft: the 
employee takes a power tool and puts it in the boot of his car. Sometimes employees try to 
disguise the theft by adjusting the inventory system. The act has become a fraud due to the 
dishonest communication, the false entry into the stock ledger that would, at the very least, 
delay detection of the crime. The only real difference between the two scripts is that the 
fraudster has access to the business controls. Mark described more sophisticated scripts which 
more obviously distinguish fraud from theft. In one case, for example, the branch employees 
used the company systems to purchase televisions which they then sold to members of the 
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public for cash. Nevertheless the similarities in the methods in the occupational context, the 
equivalence in the unit of analysis, the motivations, opportunities and the response of 
organisations to the phenomena mean that it is appropriate to include employee asset and data 
theft within analyses of occupational fraud (Figure 1.1). 
 
Offender or victim, corporate or occupational fraud? 
 
When fraud occurs in organisations it is not always obvious which party is the legal offender, 
whether the employee or the organisation, nor who is the victim, the organisation or a third 
party (Holtfreter, 2005). The solution for contemporary American researchers is their 
determination to label all fraud as white-collar crime irrespective of the location of the deviant 
behaviour, whether at work or elsewhere, the seniority of the offender or the nature of the 
victim. Consequently white-collar criminology has become plagued with conceptual confusion 
Friedrichs (2002). For example, the prominent Weisburd, Waring, and Chayet (1995) inquiry into 
the recidivism of white-collar offenders includes non-occupational offences such as personal tax 
evasion and false loan applications. Sutherland (1940) would not recognise these as white-collar 
crimes. The conceptual ambiguities which trouble researchers in defining the unit of analysis are 
similar to the legal ambiguities that prosecutors contend with in targeting offenders (Holtfreter, 
2005; Friederichs, 2010). It is not always clear whether an offence should be defined as corporate 
or occupational. Corporations are abstract social constructs, not sentient beings. Where does the 
fault lie, with the corporation or the employee? Is the corporation a victim or innocent tool of the 
employee or vice versa? What is the position of a company’s owners: culpable, victims or 
casualties of risk? 
 
The Siemens scandal exemplifies the conundrum. After bribery charges were brought against the 
company, the directors were replaced (Associated Free Press, 2008). The new management 
admitted criminal liability on behalf of the company and reached a settlement with the US and 
German authorities (US Department of Justice, 2008). Former employees were also charged and 
two received suspended sentences in Germany (Schubert and Miller, 2008). Meanwhile the new 
management successfully pursued the former directors for damages (Schafer, 2011, June 10). 
Thus it appears that there was duality in the position of the company as offender and victim: an 
offender under criminal law and a victim of its employees under civil law. As Spalek (2006, p35) 
notes, the roles of victim and offender can be interchangeable. Similarly various stakeholders of 
the company were regarded by the US courts as both beneficiaries and innocent casualties of the 
criminality. In calculating the penalties against the company, the court bore in mind the status of 
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these stakeholders as secondary victims (Spalek, 2006, p120): “…whether there would be 
disproportionate harm to the shareholders, pension holders, employees and other persons not 
proven personally culpable” (US Department of Justice, 2008). 
 
Corruption taxonomy 
 
The bureaucrats of the European Commission use the Transparency International (2011) 
definitions of fraud and bribery which places both crimes under the common banner of 
corruption (EC, 2013, p131). Combining Transparency International’s definition of corruption 
with the generally accepted distinction between corporate and occupational crimes (Clinard and 
Quinney, 1973, p188) produces the taxonomy in Figure 1.1. The figure is not a complete 
taxonomy of corrupt offences, nor occupational fraud offences. A more comprehensive list can 
be found in Button and Gee (2013, p11-13). The figure illustrates the interaction between bribery 
and fraud and shows that the convenient Clinard and Quinney (1973, p188) separation is not as 
neat as supposed. The blurring of this boundary dos not excuse researchers for unnecessarily 
conflating corporate and occupational fraud, for example Weisburd, Waring and Chayet (2001). It 
is important that researchers should describe the scope of their enquiries, clarify the unit of 
analysis and maintain conceptual consistency as far as is possible. Wherever ambiguities arise, 
they should be explained. The bounded area of Figure 1.1 represents the scope of the present 
research.    
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Figure 4.1: Organisational corruption taxonomy 
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Translating laws into local rules 
 
The foregoing has illustrated the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the formal definitions of 
fraud and in the associated perceived levels of egregiousness. This is probably a reflection on the 
strength of the common law system in England and Wales in that it can respond to evolution in 
social practices. Its weakness in the domain of fraud is that a myriad of laws designed to meet the 
control needs of specific emergent circumstances can cause confusion, misunderstandings and 
ultimately ignorance. This is anathematic to the fundamental rule of law as described by Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill (Thomas Bingham), the former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and 
the former Senior Law Lord of the United Kingdom (Bingham, 2006): 
 
“First, the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable. 
This seems obvious: if everyone is bound by the law they must be able without undue 
difficulty to find out what it is, even if that means taking advice (as it usually will), and the 
answer when given should be sufficiently clear that a course of action can be based on 
it.” 
 
In support of his analysis, Lord Bingham referred to a European Court of Human Rights case 
(Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245) which describes a fundamental purpose of 
the law in differentiating between normative social behaviour and behaviour which needs to be 
formally controlled: 
 
“…a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision 
to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct…” 
 
To put it simply, the law should clearly define society’s view of what is wrong and how wrong it 
is. This principle is especially important in the interpretation and application of the fraud laws in 
the organisational context. A special characteristic of occupational fraud is that it is to an extent 
legitimately contingent on localised norms. Gobert and Punch (2003) observed that murder 100 
years ago is murder now, but the nature of business continues to change and the nature of crime 
at work changes. Merton (1938) described this behavioural flux as innovative adaptive behaviour. 
The plethora of fraud related laws and regulations in Appendices 5 and 6 are certainly a 
testament to the innovative nature of free enterprise. Gobert and Punch’s (2003) point is that 
most criminal offences are fundamentally invariant to the social conditions. A responsible 
corporation cannot produce a rule book that permits burglary as legitimate business practice. 
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However laws designed to regulate commercial and employee conduct are subject to 
interpretation and local rules. Incorporating such innovative interpretations into the marketing 
procedures of banks tested the limits of permissibility and led to the payment protection 
insurance (PPI) mis-selling scandal (Thompson, 2012, November 2). 
 
Bribery rules 
 
Large organisations typically embody various interpretations of the Bribery Act 2010 or the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 into their rules. Jackson is semi-retired, he was previously the 
UK Managing Director of Alloy Group, a large engineering corporation headquartered in the USA. 
He is currently employed part-time as an ethics consultant and auditor. The role has allowed him 
to reflect on past corporate entertainment practices from an objective distance: 
 
“The question is when does it go too far? When I was MD of Alloy we used to hold events 
in Germany, usually associated with an exhibition or conference. We would invite along 
clients all expenses paid. In the evening I was the Master of Ceremonies and would divide 
the group of maybe 50 into three. Those who wanted a good meal, those who wanted a 
meal and beers, those who wanted sustenance and a strip club. I made it very clear 
beforehand so that no one felt pressured in any way or embarrassed. Those that wanted 
a meal got a very good meal and very good wines. Those that wanted the strip club, they 
went off, got something to eat and were entertained in the strip clubs.” 
 
Alloy’s corporate guidelines reinforce the conceptual connection between bribery, entertainment 
and gifts but then dissociate the latter from bribery through a narrative description of acceptable 
levels of entertainment and gifts. The following is an extract of from Alloy’s web site: 
 
“Simply put, bribery or corruption is when anything of value, be it in the form of cash, 
favours or even entertainment, is provided, or offered, to improperly obtain, or retain, 
business or some other improper advantage…..We limit how much and how often we 
give or receive gifts, meals and hospitality. We never provide, or receive, anything lavish 
or inappropriate. We always consider whether gifts, meals or hospitality are appropriate 
with regard to the identity of the recipient, or provider, and the circumstances in which it 
is being provided or received. Gifts, meals or hospitality we provide never compromise, 
or appear to compromise, the ability of anyone, including ourselves, to make objective 
and fair business decisions.” 
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For Alloy, the acceptable level of gifts depends on an interpretation of ‘how much’, ‘how often’, 
‘lavish’ and ‘inappropriate’ and is contingent on the identity of the recipient or provider and on 
the circumstances. The key criterion is not the potential influencing input, the level of the 
entertainment, but the outcome, whether or not it results in ‘improper advantage’ or 
‘compromises’ decision making. 
 
The ethics codes for some companies use similar techniques in explaining the key outcome 
criteria but are more specific in detailing the rules relating to the value levels of gifts and 
entertainment. The following is an extract from the BP code (BP, 2012). 
 
“We only give or accept gifts and entertainment that are for business purposes and are 
not material or frequent..…..They should never be offered or received in exchange for 
preferential treatment in any business dealing..…These include any gifts or 
entertainment that appear to be bribes, raise questions about conflicts of interest for you 
or BP, or would damage BP’s reputation.” 
 
Gift value Entertainment 
including meals value 
Approval 
requirements 
Recording 
requirements 
≤$50 ≤$150 No pre-approval 
required 
No recording required 
except for government 
officials >$20 
$50 to $250 $150 to $1,000 Line manager approval 
required 
Group Leaders may 
self-approve 
Must be recorded in 
the gifts and 
entertainment register 
>$250 >$1,000 Group Leader 
approval required 
Group Leaders may 
self-approve 
Must be recorded in 
the gifts and 
entertainment register 
 
The great problem with defining and identifying bribery is in detecting an influenced outcome 
and relating it to a bribe. The typical solution is to limit the value of gifts and hospitality at levels 
which are unlikely to affect decisions. In Alloy’s case, the level is vague and open to substantial 
abuse. The BP approach is to specify levels of value and transparency, but it still depends on 
position: a Group Leader’s gift is a Line Manager’s bribe for exactly the same behaviour. Similarly 
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an item regarded as a gift by Alloy could be viewed as a bribe at BP. Such paradoxes led to the 
peculiar situation where Gerhard Gribkowsky, a director of Formula 1 representing the interests 
of Bayerische Landesbank, was jailed for 8½ years in the German courts of receiving a $44mn 
bribe but Bernie Ecclestone remained innocent of giving the bribe (Le Blond, 2014). 
 
Employment contract rules 
 
In a similar vein organisations also set rules for payroll timesheets, overtime, accrued hours, sick 
pay, salary increments, expenses, allowances, staff discounts on product purchases, conflict of 
interest, second employment and use of company data, all of which can be exploited for 
fraudulent purposes (Button and Gee, 2013, p11-13). Complying with the rules cannot be 
fraudulent. Breaching the rules may constitute a fraud. A small company that can only afford to 
employ a specialist engineer on a part-time basis may explicitly allow the individual to work for a 
competitor. Under these transparent contractual conditions the specialist cannot commit fraud 
through a conflict of interest, abuse of position or misrepresentation. Presumably such a 
situation would be utterly intolerable for corporations like GSK and Pfizer for whom intellectual 
property is their lifeblood. Kieron runs a small engineering design house, Deflux. For many years 
he allowed his staff the use of the company’s facilities for producing the occasional, simple 
drawing as a favour to family or friends for their do-it-yourself projects. However he stopped the 
practice when he received a call from a client he had never heard of to progress a design project. 
It transpired that one employee had taken on private contracts and worked on them at home. 
The employee argued that he was entitled to do so because he had set up his own limited 
company, did the work in his own time and there was nothing in the employment contract to 
prevent it. Kieron took the view that the designer was stealing work from the company and 
dismissed him. Some universities allow their academic staff to undertake private consultancy 
work using the institutions’ time facilities. They are effectively paid twice for the same work. 
Other universities insist that the contracts are placed with the universities. Should one of these 
academics take on private consultancy work, he or she would be liable to charges of breach of 
contract, conflict of interest, abuse of position and fraud. 
 
Marks and Spencer allows staff discounts against product purchases for employees and their 
partners (Marks and Spencer, undated). It would be a fraud should a Marks and Spencer 
employee dishonestly purchase an item for a friend. On the other hand it would be perfectly 
proper for a friend of a Mazda employee to enjoy a 25% discount on the purchase of a car 
because it is allowed in the company rules (Mazda, undated). The author’s company requires its 
59 
 
employees to present receipts for any business related expenses incurred in the performance of 
their duties. Dishonest claims for non-business related expenditure would be regarded as fraud. 
However the company provides a post-tax allowance of £30/day to employees when they are 
required to stay away from home and they are allowed to spend the money on anything or 
nothing so that fraud is impossible. Some commentators suggest that MPs should simply be paid 
a higher salary to cover all personal expenses without scrutiny except travel (Toynbee, 2012). The 
EU follows this model, providing MEPs with a fixed allowance to cover office expenses (EC, 
undated). Though adopting such a structure would simplify the cumbersome 98 page 
bureaucratic formulation of the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA, 2014) and 
substantially circumvent accusations of unlawful fraud, using tax-payers’ funds to purchase duck-
houses would probably still be regarded as morally corrupt (Allen, 2009). 
 
Executive abuse at the SFO 
 
The challenges in differentiating between legal and illegal unethical behaviour in some form of 
continuous moral spectrum are illustrated by the governance failings at the Serious Fraud Office 
(SFO). Following reports from internal whistleblowers, Sir Alex Allan was tasked with investigating 
bribery, nepotism, mismanagement of consultancy contracts, excessive expenses and an 
inappropriate Civil Service grade promotion for Phillippa Williamson, the SFO’s Chief Executive 
(Allan, 2011). His inquiry was based solely on interviews with the various actors and did not 
employ any forensic examinations. He found no evidence of “improper conduct” though he was 
critical of the ruses employed by Christian Bailes, the SFO’s Chief Capability Officer, to avoid 
itemising large consultancy contracts in management reports and thereby evade the bureaucracy 
of seeking approval from the Law Officers or the Cabinet Office. Bailes renamed some 
consultancy contracts as “interim management”, divided contracts into sub-£20,000 units and 
breached the SFO’s own rules by awarding the contracts himself rather than delegating the 
arrangements to the Procurement Team. Sir Alex Allan did not name this behaviour deceit, but 
deceit it was. The author has seen this kind of manipulation many times. By way of contrast, 
Ewan, the Counter-Fraud Manager of BBR Services, takes a much more robust approach:  
 
“However we still view it [order splitting] as fraud because you can get a different value 
commercially when you put it all together and also we do not know, cannot realistically, 
have they divided the numbers up to get their friend’s business the job, so we will take 
the same action whether we could prove it was dishonest or which would be normally 
enough to remove the people from the business.” 
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In his report Sir Alex Allan concluded that to pursue the bribery allegations further “...would 
require an extensive and intrusive investigation that I do not believe is justified given the lack of 
any evidence provided” (Allan, 2011). A subsequent more forensic investigation was highly 
critical of Richard Alderman, the SFO’s director, who had agreed to inappropriate termination 
payments to Williamson and two other executives, Bailes and Ian McCall, of £870,000 in cash and 
pension contributions (Hurdle, 2012). The payments breached the Civil Service rules. Alderman 
was also berated for abusing his authority in recruiting Williamson, a former colleague at the 
HMRC, and was accused of abusing the public finances by allowing Williamson to work from 
home two days per week, 200 miles from the office, and charge £27,600 / year in travel 
expenses. Williamson was found to have lied to Sir Alex Allen about her promotion. Alderman 
tried to defend his decisions to the Public Accounts Committee but was eviscerated by Margaret 
Hodge MP (Public Accounts Committee, 2013): 
 
“It is shocking, just shocking. It is against every principle of how public service 
organisations should operate.” 
 
Had the Attorney General’s office ordered a thorough forensic investigation in the first place, it is 
more likely that at least one employee would have been sanctioned and nearly £1million saved. 
None of the termination payments could be recovered by legal means because the termination 
contracts succeeded the employment contracts. The case is a powerful demonstration of how 
local rules and legal instruments, in this case in the form of contractual arrangements, frustrate 
justice and unexpectedly protect unethical and fraudulent behaviour. The milieu of indulgence 
overseen by Alderman illustrates some of the paradoxes and difficulties in defining occupational 
fraud at the organisational level. It also demonstrates the challenges in differentiating between 
ethical, unethical and illegal behaviour. 
 
Fraud is a function of local rules 
 
The material argument induced from the examples presented is that, unlike most other crime, 
the definition of fraud in the occupational setting is a function of local contractual arrangements 
and rules. Behaviour that is defined as unethical in one company, or one department of a 
company, and could lead to criminal prosecution is legitimate, ethical and legal in another. 
Indeed the actions of the SFO’s former Chief Capability Officer in evading bureaucratic 
restrictions may be commended as goal-orientated innovation in some organisations. 
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Participants’ perceptions of the definition of fraud 
 
The uncertainties explicated by the foregoing analysis are reflected in the range of perceptions of 
the research participants which are informed, to an extent, by their professional backgrounds 
and experience. Tim is a financial auditor. His view of fraud is typical. He struggles to 
conceptualise fraud at all, but rationalises that whatever it is, it depends on value: 
 
“It depends what you mean by fraud. I’m not sure what fraud is. It depends really on 
whether the value, the amount is material to the accounts.” 
 
Kevin is a fraud consultant and he has a simple explanation which is contingent only on 
behaviour: 
 
“Fraud will always happen and fraud is not rocket science: I tell you a lie and you give me 
money.” 
 
Police officer Ralph strenuously objected to fraudulent loan applications being labelled fraud and 
brought to the police when the suspects fail service the loans: 
 
“If you take finance on a car and you fail to make the repayments, that, I would say, in 
the first instance, is probably a civil dispute, between you and them, it’s a private 
contract that you’ve taken out, but, it seems to be, now, that AVCIS [ACPO Vehicle Crime 
Intelligence Service] because it is being funded, are putting every car on PNC as stolen 
and, effectively, reality is, what’s happening is, finance company will find a lie in the 
application, somewhere in the application, whatever that be, be it mild or major, they 
will, then, say, ‘That’s a crime,’ AVCIS will say, ‘Yes, that’s a crime, we’re now putting that 
vehicle on as stolen.’.…the car is seized, that’s described as a fraud. 
 
For lawyer Nick, specific factual narratives provide the explanations for fraud rather than broader 
social concepts, defining fraud has little purpose. It is contingent on the evidence, the 
egregiousness of the alleged behaviour, the actionable outcome of an investigation, the relative 
expediency of the options and the choice of law. For him the observation of Sutherland (1945) 
that not all unlawful behaviour is criminal behaviour remains very relevant and is often ignored 
by counter-fraud specialists with a background in law enforcement: 
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“The criminal and civil law uses different terminology and concepts though the cases they 
are addressing crowd in on the same factual circumstances. In civil law fraud does not 
mean anything. It is a banner term covering many causes of action…..If fraud is of a 
criminal kind and not all fraud is crime then quite often organisations will feel bound and 
in fact will be advised to a certain extent by their lawyers to instigate an investigation so 
that they can be sure they understand the length and the depth and the breadth of the 
fraud, how much is involved, who’s involved and therefore what action should be taken.” 
 
Considering the variance in the definitions of their professional advisors, it is inevitable, as Nick 
observes of his clients, that there is little consensus amongst organisations on the definition of 
fraud:  
 
“In organisations anti-fraud policies have a variety of definitions to suit their own needs. 
It can include unauthorised behaviour, commercial misbehaviour and misconduct. Breach 
of fiduciary duty is a common cause of action in fraud which has civil law consequences. 
Fraud is seen through the lens of the particular organisation. Many organisations employ 
ex-policemen, therefore from a criminal background and their perspective is too narrow. 
It's frustrating that organisations employ ex-policemen in these positions because they 
don't have a grasp on the civil remedies available to them.” 
 
Imogen is a forensic accountant and, like the lawyer, her perception of fraud depends on the 
specific behavioural characteristics of suspects rather than generalised concepts. The key for her 
is to distinguish between fraud and error by identifying inconsistencies in narratives and 
consistencies in behavioural patterns: 
 
“It's intention really. It's how you work out the individual saying, ‘this is what I was told, 
this is why I did it,’ and their boss saying, ‘They were never told that.’  We're looking for 
inconsistencies in stories, where documents don't match what people are saying….We've 
all made mistakes, entered wrong amounts, but you have the trail in frauds. A credit note 
is raised and is authorised by someone else, then a new credit note is issued for a slightly 
different amount, maybe a different person. That often happens. It's the type of error 
and whether it's been covered up. If somebody has realised that they have made a 
mistake and then made a complete hash of covering it up so it looks like a fraud, if it's a 
one off you've got to query it, but when you have a consistent pattern, it's fraud.” 
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One key role of DEF Group’s’ Compliance Manager, Mark, is to distinguish between fraud and 
error, negligence and incompetence. Whenever such events arise he always references the 
objective legal definition but also considers the company’s rules, the attributes of the case and 
the characteristics of the employee. He has to believe with sufficient certainty that the employee 
has a guilty mind in order to recommend the most serious course of action, a criminal 
prosecution. It is not always immediately obvious: 
 
“We have a case on the go at the moment in York. The Manager has been fudging his 
stock count, his perpetual count. He's saying, ‘I've had no personal gain out of it, but I'm 
now up to the point where I need to put my hands up and I can't keep balancing all the 
balls in the air, it's all coming down on me, the roof's falling in and I'm £70,000 short on 
my stock.’ He will be negligent….So he would be a breach of procedures as opposed to 
fraud.” 
 
Though on a much smaller scale, this case has similar characteristics to R v Kweku Adoboli [2012] 
wherein the defendant caused the largest loss in British banking history, $2.25bn, at UBS. In his 
sentencing remarks, Mr Justice Keith accepted that Adoboli had intended to maximise profits for 
the bank and that his reputation as star trader, and his prospects for bonuses and advancement 
were a secondary consideration. Nevertheless the jury concluded that he had dishonestly abused 
his position of trust, breached the rules of the bank and then concealed his activities by booking 
fictitious trades. DEF’s Branch Manager also breached local procedures, in his case by 
deliberately falsifying stock transactions in order to maintain his earnings and position in the 
business. Although his deceit cost the company £70,000, the senior management rationalised the 
behaviour as negligent rather than fraudulent. The problem Imogen and Mark are wrestling with 
is the subjective definition of fraud: matching the observed behaviour with the objective legal 
definition. Sometimes it is obvious, but often it is not. 
 
Conclusions 
 
To summarise this chapter, there is no universal definition of fraud, it is contingent on the 
environment and the characteristics of the principal actors. A clear distinction between fraud and 
bribery, and between corporate and occupational fraud is not possible. This chapter has 
introduced the concept of the contract bribery fraud, a type of corruption script which involves 
both bribery and fraud in a collision of corporate and occupational crimes. It is a crime which 
challenges Clinard and Quinney’s (1973, p188) neat separation between corporate and 
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occupational crime, blurs the responsibility between the individual and the corporation and 
conflates the identities of the offender and victim. The ambiguity in the meaning of fraud is not 
helped by inconsistencies in the law wherein the objective definition of fraud and the 
egregiousness attached to its many guises is contingent on the context of the behaviour and the 
offender’s professional status. The boundaries on the moral spectrum between ethical, unethical 
and illegal behaviour are further blurred by local contractual arrangements and rules. Fraud in 
one organisation is perfectly acceptable behaviour in another. Re-arranging the local rules may 
appear to be a solution to decriminalise behaviour, however doing so may not promote cultural 
values if the revised arrangements permit or even protect morally corrupt behaviour. 
 
Distinguishing between error, negligence and fraud is important in three respects. Firstly, it is an 
onerous responsibility that can have a profound effect on an employee’s life. It requires the 
assessment of the employee’s actions and mens rea to determine whether the subjective 
definition of the observed behaviour matches the objective definition in law, a challenging task 
which really requires support and expertise of the courts and is probably beyond the competence 
of most managers. Secondly managers need to know where and how to allocate resources and 
for what purpose. Button, Gee and Brooks (2012) claim that organisations typically lose 5% of 
expenditure to fraud and error. How much should an organisation allocate to fraud reduction and 
how much to error reduction? Thirdly lack of clarity in the definition of fraud provides an ideal 
context for errant employees to rationalise their behaviour (Cressey, 1953) by denying the crime 
(Benson, 1985). The same ambiguities can also support managers in rationalising their decisions 
when they prefer to shrug off employee fraud as mistake, error or negligence rather than 
confront the problem. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Extent of Occupational Fraud 
 
Introduction 
 
One key reason that public bodies, companies and other organisations do not adequately address 
the fraud problem is also a major source of frustration for some of the research participants: 
organisations are unwilling to invest in counter-fraud programmes without empirical evidence of 
an economic benefit, a phenomenon noted by Button and Tunley (2015). It is a problem which 
Tunley (2014) believes can only be unlocked by mandating the measurement of fraud. Keith, a 
counter-fraud consultant who previously worked for the NHS, observed that the NHS began to 
invest in tackling fraud only when senior management understood the likely scale of losses and 
what that meant to patient care: 
 
“When I arrived, the NHS professional regulatory bodies were loathed to actually tackle 
fraud.  By virtuous measuring and exposing the real cost of fraud, and the extent to 
which patients were deprived of that resource, then we changed that, so they were 
willing to impose penalties.” 
 
Barry is a partner in a large London firm. He is an experienced litigation solicitor but prefers 
assisting organisations to develop counter-fraud systems so that they can avoid the expense and 
uncertainty of litigation. He struggles with the economic argument in his endeavours to convince 
companies to invest in fraud prevention: 
 
“Because it is seen as an unnecessary cost, even though any money they save goes 
straight onto their bottom line. It is a massively hard sell. Companies just are not 
interested.” 
 
The core of the economic inhibition is the insufficiency of reliable quantitative data. The available 
published macro-data does not inspire confidence. One commercially available alternative to the 
published research is the statistically robust fraud loss measurement exercise (FLM) as 
recommended by Button and Gee (2013, p69). However it is expensive and viewed by some with 
suspicion. Kevin, a fraud prevention consultant, recognises the commercial need for reliable 
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statistics and has been involved in fraud loss measurement exercises but would not recommend 
them to his clients. 
 
“It would be great to get that kind of cost / benefit figure because it would be a 
compelling argument. It would be great to be able to say, ‘Pay me this one year fee, and 
these are the savings over 5 years.’ But there is not a lot of science around it, loss 
measurement, it's a bit of a black art…. To me at a macro level, yes, but at a micro level I 
wouldn’t flog it to one of my clients. I just don't see the benefit in it.” 
 
Another consultant, Roger, believes that FLM exercises have value but he has difficulty in 
marketing them. He finds that managers are unwilling to spend money on even quantifying the 
problems in their organisations. The tortuous dilemma is that in order to justify funding the FLM, 
managers need to know the benefits but that prior knowledge obviates the need for the 
research, so they do nothing. 
 
“The private sector is only interested if it saves money. 80% of our work is public sector, 
the rest in the private sector is mainly in the financial sector…..There's a risk associated 
with doing the FLM. Is there a return on the money? Without a doubt, but how do you 
prove it?” 
 
The perceptions of these professional advisers is that managers, who are typically brought up on 
the utilitarian cost benefit calculus, do not regard fraud as a material financial threat. The aim of 
this section is to explore whether this view is justified. What are the problems with existing 
published data? Do we understand how often it happens and how much it costs? Where does the 
threat come from: a few determined high value offenders or many occasional offenders? 
 
Existing data 
 
One of the principal challenges in measuring the true level of fraud is the difficulties in the 
detection of a secret deception (Nelken, 2007). Detected fraud is just the tip of the iceberg 
(Shapiro, 1985; Tunley, 2011), perhaps just 1/30th of its true extent (Button and Gee, 2013, p72), 
such that the undetected dark matter is 97% of the total. Some victims of fraud may be unaware 
they have been a victim of crime, or that any fraudulent activity has occurred (ONS, 2014b). To 
complicate matters further, many reported frauds have not been counted at all by the police 
because there is “A lack of willingness by police forces to accept reports of fraud outright.” 
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(Attorney General, 2006, p69). This sentiment is supported by the ‘no-crime’ statistics (Home 
Office, 2012c) which reveal that 12.5% of frauds reported to the police are rejected after initial 
triage. The average for all other offences is 3%. Amongst a number of possible reasons for this 
weak performance, perhaps the most important, is the ‘malign influence of KPIs (Key 
Performance Indicators)’ (Button, 2011) which discourages fraud investigations. 
 
The second principal challenge, as expounded in Chapter 4, is the lack of consensus in what 
constitutes fraudulent behaviour. These descriptive complexities are further compounded by 
ambiguities in the unit of measure that constitutes a single fraud offence. Should twelve monthly 
instances of expense fraud by a single employee be measured as one or twelve frauds? One 
offence could have thousands of victims (ONS, 2014b). The Home Office crime statistics would 
count 1,000 fraudulent online ticket transactions perpetrated by a single offender as a single 
offence whilst the victims would describe 1,000 offences. For present purposes the solution is to 
define the unit of measure as the “fraud scheme” thus allowing for single or multiple incidents of 
the same type committed by the same perpetrator. The script concept introduced in Chapter 4 
describes the nature or operation of the scheme, whether it is a one-off event or is repeated 
many times. 
 
Financial loss 
 
Hitherto research into the extent of fraud has focused mainly on the aggregate level of financial 
harm (Levi and Burrows, 2008; ACFE, 2014; NFA, 2013). Four sources are frequently cited for 
estimates of loss to fraud as shown in Table 5.1: Kroll (2013), ACFE (2014) and Button, Gee and 
Brooks (2012) quote percentage so readers have to calculate the absolute losses, whilst the 
National Fraud Authority (NFA, 2013) quote absolute losses. 
 
Table 5.1: Published financial loss to fraud for the UK 
Source Percentage £ loss Typology 
NFA not provided 30bn to 73bn All frauds against all sectors 
Kroll 0.9% to 2.1% of sales 46bn to 106bn All frauds against corporations only 
ACFE 5% of sales 254bn Occupational fraud only 
Button et al 
(2012) 
4.57% of expenditure 212bn All fraud and error against 
organisations 
 
 
Before its demise in 2014, the NFA conducted four meta-analyses, drawing secondary data from 
available resources to produce four estimates of fraud loss in all economic sectors: public, 
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private, charity and individuals. The aggregate estimates are at £30 billion (NFA, 2010), £38 
billion (NFA, 2011), £73 billion (NFA, 2012) and £52 billion (NFA, 2013). To place this in 
perspective, the latest figure is, allowing for an inflation factor of 1.42 (Bank of England, 
undated), three times the £13 billion aggregate of all other acquisitive crimes (Brand and Price, 
2000). The broad spread in the NFA measures does not mean that the level of fraudulent activity 
has been oscillating wildly, rather it reflects the difficulties in quantifying fraud and the evolution 
of their methodologies. 
 
Kroll, a corporate security and investigations company, publishes an annual report on corporate 
fraud loss, derived from opinion surveys of corporate executives, expressed as a percentage of 
sales: 2.1% (Kroll, 2011), 0.9% (Kroll, 2012), 1.4% (Kroll, 2013). The total turnover of UK 
enterprises in 2013 excluding the financial sector was £3.35 trillion (BIS, 2013). The best estimate 
of the turnover in the financial sector is £1.04 trillion (ONS, 2010), giving a total UK enterprise 
turnover of £4.39 trillion. Adding the £675 billion government expenditure for 2013 (HM 
Treasury, 2011) gives a total UK turnover of £5.07 trillion. Thus the Kroll estimates for 
organisational fraud losses range from £46 billion to £106 billion per year.  
 
The only published macro-estimate that focuses on occupational fraud comes from the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). It conducts a biennial opinion survey of its 
members to estimate occupational fraud losses alone at 5% of turnover (ACFE, 2012) which 
equates to £254 billion per year in the UK. If losses to individuals and external frauds against 
organisations were added, the annual losses would be much higher. The ACFE percentage loss 
figure is probably the most cited in academic and practitioner circles (for example: Holtfreter, 
2004; Button and Gee, 2013; Ramamoorti, Morrison, Koletar, and Pope, 2013). However one 
must be wary of possible false paradigms that have become entrenched by their frequent re-
telling, particularly when they are based on data emanating from an institution that represents 
counter-fraud professionals. 
 
Button, Gee and Brooks (2012) analysed the results of 123 fraud loss measurement (FLM) to 
calculate the average fraud and error financial loss to organisations at 4.57% of expenditure. The 
total organisational expenditure in the UK is £4.63 trillion, calculated by subtracting the £0.44 
trillion gross operating surplus (ONS, 2014d) from turnover (£5.07 trillion). The FLM derived loss 
estimate for the whole economy is thus £212 billion per year. The FLM methodology used is 
statistically more robust than the NFA and Kroll data, but as the data includes error and is mainly 
sourced from the public sector, it is not based on a representative sample frame. 
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The summarised data in Table 5.1 clearly illustrates one powerful reason why counter-fraud 
professionals struggle to justify the implementation of systems based on economic benefit: the 
inconsistency in and the unreliability of macro loss data. The ACFE figure is the highest despite 
being based on the narrowest typological range. Conversely the NFA range is the lowest yet it is 
based on the broadest typology. The Button, Gee and Brooks (2012) estimate is close to ACFE’s 
but it includes error. Only ACFE attempt to quantify occupational fraud, but their estimate has to 
be viewed with the most caution considering their methodology and their marketing purpose. 
The root of the variance in the published data is the weak methodologies, in particular the 
reproducibility of opinion surveys is bound to be poor. The FLM method would be the most 
robust if it excluded error and the sample frame were representative of the whole economy. 
 
Activity levels 
 
Estimates of aggregate financial harm are insufficient to properly quantify the extent of the fraud 
problem. The four dimensions that characterise activity levels have received less attention: the 
number or volume of schemes, the number of events within schemes, the number of 
perpetrators and the number of victims. Effective counter-fraud strategies cannot be developed 
without some knowledge of these dimensions. For organisations, detecting one high value, 
habitual occupational fraudster is a completely different challenge to dealing with many, low 
value, occasional fraudsters. Unfortunately existing data is sparse. The following analysis focuses 
on the volume of schemes and the number of offenders. 
 
Official crime statistics provide one indication of the volume of detected offences. One indication 
of the volume of offences is the police recorded crime statistics. The number has oscillated from 
183,683 in 2002/03, down to 71,137 in 2007/08 and up again to 517,132 in 2013 (ONS, 2014b). 
The variability is due to changes in recording methods (ONS, 2014b), not to a seven fold increase 
in activity levels: the latest figures include incidents recorded by CIFAS and Financial Fraud Action 
UK. The data does not yet appear to be in a condition to warrant the confidence of users. 
 
Activity levels could be calculated using reliable estimates of aggregate and average fraud losses. 
ACFE (2014) estimate the median loss from occupational fraud at $145,000 per scheme with a 
median duration of 18 months. However the estimate is not representative as it is based on 
1,483 detected high value occupational cases investigated by ACFE members, of which just 98 
were located in Western Europe. Though the four audit reports produced by the Audit 
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Commission (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) offer a more representative mean estimate at £10,214 per 
scheme, it is also biased as it is based on 5,688 detected cases in local authorities. At an average 
of 1,422 cases per year this represents just 0.06% of the 2.542m people employed by local 
authorities (ONS, 2013). 
 
Button, Gee and Brooks (2012) estimated fraud and error event frequency at 4.28% of 
transactions, but the inclusion of error and an unrepresentative sample frame means the data 
cannot be generalised to the whole economy; furthermore it does not distinguish between 
internal and external fraud. A European Commission study estimated that 12.5% of public 
procurement contracts are corrupt, 37.5% bear the indications of corruption and mismanaged 
waste, whilst just 50% are ‘clean’ (EC, 2013). The report shows that the financial loss to 
corruption is on average 3.65% of expenditure. The international context and the narrow sample 
frame again precludes generalising the data to the whole economy. 
 
The Kroll reports highlight the risks associated with occupational fraud. The average proportion 
of frauds involving an employee is 60% (Kroll, 2010, 2011, 2012). PwC (2011) produced similar 
results with 57% of frauds perpetrated by insiders. In an examination of fairness at work, CIFAS 
(2010) reported in a of survey of 2,000 that 71% felt it was acceptable to exaggerate expense 
claims if the employer did not reimburse all costs, or if the employee did a lot of unpaid overtime 
(68%), or if the employer took a long time over reimbursements (36%), or if the employee was 
not paid a fair salary (24%). The research closely mirrored earlier work conducted by Leicester 
University which showed that 70% of people would commit fraud if they knew they could get 
away with it (CIFAS, 2004). In a similar vein Karstedt and Farrall (2006, 2007) reported that 61% 
of 1,807 adults surveyed had committed one fraud, 38% had committed two or three frauds and 
6% had committed more than nine. Finally in the largest self-reporting survey of its kind, 
Hollinger and Clark (1983a) found that one third of employees offend at least once per year. The 
evidence from this body of research suggests that between one-third and two-thirds of 
employees defraud their employers and at least one-third are active in any year. 
 
Analytical method 
 
Though burdened with a number of methodological weaknesses, the latest NFA (2013) data is 
the best constructed estimate of fraud in the whole of the UK economy at £52 billion. Its victim-
centric framework broken down into a broad typological range in all the economic sectors, 
public, private, charity and individual, represents the most comprehensive meta-analysis of 
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annual fraud losses. The analytical method involves extracting elements of the NFA (2013) data 
and combining them with Kroll’s average figure for employee fraud to estimate the annual 
financial loss to occupational fraud. The Hollinger and Clark (1983a) data is then used to develop 
the best estimates of fraud volumes and the number of offenders derivable from secondary data. 
Analysis of the Hollinger and Clark (1983a) data reveals a fraud distribution model which may 
have general application. The model is tested on secondary data relating to occupational fraud at 
Westco International and DEF Group. 
 
 
Financial loss to occupational fraud 
 
Table 5.2 is a schedule of the total fraud losses in each category extracted from the NFA (2013) 
report. The government payroll losses are assumed to be entirely due to employees. The 
procurement losses are adjusted by the 60% Kroll estimate for insider culpability. As the 
government sector estimate covers procurement and payroll only it under-represents the 
typological range and hence value of employee fraud. Consequently on the basis of this 
methodology, the £14.5 billion total is likely to be a conservative estimate. It is just 0.3% of the 
£5.07tr turnover in the UK and 1/17th of the ACFE (2013) figure. Nevertheless, allowing for an 
inflation factor of 1.42 (BoE), the estimate suggests that occupational fraud alone is worth more 
than the £13bn aggregate of all other acquisitive crimes (Brand and Price, 2000). 
 
Table 5.2: Financial loss to occupational fraud 
Sector Total fraud loss £  Employee fraud £ 
      Central government procurement 1,412,210,000 x60%   847,326,000 
      Central government payroll 180,700,000 x100%   180,700,000 
   Total central government 1,592,910,000    1,028,026,000 
      Local government procurement 876,000,000 x60%   525,600,000 
      Local government payroll 154,000,000 x100%   154,000,000 
   Total local government 1,030,000,000        679,600,000 
Government total 2,622,910,000  1,707,626,000 
Private sector 21,263,560,000 x60% 12,758,136,000 
Charity sector 147,300,000 x60%       88,380,000 
Total 29,279,590,000  14,554,142,000 
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Hollinger and Clark distribution 
 
The Hollinger and Clark (1983a) data provides the most representative insight into occupational 
offending. Their research was based on a large self-reporting survey sample of 9,175 employees 
of 47 organisations in three sectors, retail (16), hospital (21) and manufacturing (10). The survey 
instrument provided a list of employment misdemeanours and asked the employees to indicate 
how often they had committed each type. The respondents indicated their activity or event 
frequency associated with each offence type: never, 1 to 3 times per year, 4 to 12 times per year, 
weekly and daily. The response rates are reproduced in Table 5.3. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Reported involvement in occupational fraud 
 No. events / year - Class width 1-3 4-12 52 250 
 
 No. events / year - Class centre 2 8 52 250 Tot 
Retail  
n=3,567 
Misuse discount privilege 14.9% 11.0% 2.4% 0.6% 28.9% 
Take store merchandise 4.6% 1.3% 0.5% 0.2% 6.6% 
Timesheet frauds 4.0% 1.2% 0.4% 0.2% 5.8% 
Purposely under-ring a 
purchase 
1.7% 1.1% 0.3% 0.1% 3.2% 
Borrow or take money without 
approval 
2.0% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 2.7% 
Expense fraud 1.3% 0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 2.1% 
Damage merchandise to buy it 
on discount 
1.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 1.3% 
Hospital 
n=4,111 
Take hospital supplies 17.9% 8.4% 0.8% 0.2% 27.3% 
Take medication 5.5% 1.9% 0.3% 0.1% 7.8% 
Timesheet frauds 3.8% 1.6% 0.5% 0.2% 6.1% 
Take equipment, tools 4.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 4.7% 
Expense fraud 0.8% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 1.1% 
Manufacturing 
n=1,497 
Take raw materials 10.4% 3.5% 0.3% 0.1% 14.3% 
Timesheet frauds 5.6% 2.9% 0.5% 0.2% 9.2% 
Take tools, equipment 7.5% 1.1% 0.1% 0.0% 8.7% 
Expense fraud 5.6% 1.4% 0.6% 0.1% 7.7% 
Take finished product 2.7% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 
Take precious metals 1.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 1.8% 
       
 No. offenders 1,980 846 163 57 3,046 
 No. schemes 2,864 1,224 237 83 4,408 
 No. events 5,729 9,793 12,299 20,658 48,479 
 % schemes = % offenders 65.0% 27.8% 5.4% 1.9% 100% 
 % events 11.8% 20.2% 25.4% 42.6% 100% 
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Figure 5.1: Occupational fraud event distribution 
 
The frequency distribution of events and schemes is graphically displayed in Figure 5.1. It 
excludes the 67% of respondents who indicated that they were not involved in any of the 
schemes in the previous year. One weakness of the distribution is that it is organised into four 
classifications so that the abscissa is an imprecise, discontinuous variable. A second weakness is 
that it is based on a restricted range of offence types, which implies that the total level of 
reported offending would be higher if a comprehensive set of offences were presented to the 
participants. Thirdly insufficient data forces the assumption that the average event and scheme 
ratios above apply to all four classes, the corollary of which is that the percentage distribution of 
schemes equals the percentage distribution of offenders. Nevertheless the data points towards a 
distribution model of employee deviancy wherein the majority of harm is caused by the minority 
of offenders. 
 
The distribution is independent of population size, the number or proportion of offenders in the 
population and fraud value. If it is a generalized representation of the behavioural activity 
distribution of offenders it could be applied to any organisation irrespective of the aggregate 
scale, volume and value of fraud. Similar in purpose to the normal distribution, it could form the 
basis of a “standard fraud distribution”. Presenting the data in this manner illuminates the heavy 
skew in offending rates: just 7.3% of offenders are very active in causing 68% of fraud events, 
conversely 92.7% of offenders are less active in perpetrating 32% of events. Though the Hollinger 
and Clark (1983a) data does not include financial values, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the 
high frequency offenders cause the highest level of financial loss. 
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Estimate of occupational fraud activity levels 
 
The following simplified binary activity distribution in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2 categorises the 
Hollinger and Clark frequency data into two categories, low and high. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Occupational fraud binary frequency distribution 
Event frequency / value Schemes 
% 
Loss % 
Low 92.7% 32% 
High 7.3% 68% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Occupational fraud binary frequency distribution 
 
 
Applying this binary distribution to the £14.5 billion occupational fraud loss from Table 5.2 and 
the working population of 30,796,000 (ONS, 2014c), the volume of schemes (14.8m), the number 
of offenders (10.2m) and the average values can be calculated, Table 5.5. The resulting overall 
average scheme value is £987. The average value for the high frequency schemes turns out to be 
£9,194, remarkably close to the Audit Commission average of £10,214 for detected frauds, thus 
supporting the contention that the Audit Commission’s estimate is not representative of the 
whole offending population in local authorities, just of a detected sub-set. 
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Table 5.5: Occupational fraud metrics in UK 
  Low freq. / value High freq. / value Total 
V
al
u
e
 
% loss 32% 68% 100% 
£ fraud loss / yr 4,657,325,440 9,896,816,560 14,554,142,000 
% turnover 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 
£ / scheme 341 9,194 987 
£ / offender 494 13,331 1,431 
V
o
lu
m
e
 % schemes 92.7% 7.3% 100% 
No. schemes / yr 13,669,392 1,076,446 14,745,838 
No. offenders / yr 9,427,167 742,377 10,169,543 
% working population 30.6% 2.4% 33.0% 
 population 30,796,000   
 £ turnover / yr 5,070,000,000,000   
 
 
Occupational fraud losses at Westco International 
 
Appendix 7 is a ranked schedule of £2.6 million of contract bribery fraud losses within the 
engineering department of a large manufacturing company, Westco International. The detected 
fraud schemes had continued unchecked for at least 81/2 years. The department employed 
approximately 80 individuals. The data was furnished by Jeremy, a director of a supplier to 
Westco. He was deeply involved in the investigation into the schemes and was a witness for the 
prosecution which led to the conviction of three former Westco employees. The progress of the 
case is described in Chapter 10. The data is summarised in Table 5.6. The figures for ‘% loss’ and 
‘% schemes’ are close to the metrics predicted by the simplified binary distribution. At 27.5%, the 
proportion of offenders within the employee group is also comparable with the Hollinger and 
Clark (1983a) prediction. Whilst the similarity in the shapes of the distributions provides some 
confirmation of the fraud distribution hypothesis, the 14.7% overall loss is much higher than the 
0.3% for the whole economy in Table 5.2. It suggests a high tolerance of fraud within Westco’s 
culture. According to Jeremy, Westco authorised junior engineers to spend significant sums with 
little oversight or control. Management’s only concern was the budget: provided expenditure did 
not exceed approved budgets, no questions were asked. Jeremy quoted a Westco director: “We 
work on trust, we don’t want armies of accountants and innocent people being questioned.”  
Evidently trust alone is an adequate fraud control. 
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     Table 5.6: Westco occupational fraud metrics  
  Low freq. / value High freq. / value Total 
V
al
u
e
 
% loss 24% 76% 100% 
£ fraud loss / yr 72,566 235,958 308,524 
% of expenditure 3.5% 11.2% 14.7% 
£ / scheme 3,628 117,979 14,024 
£ / offender 3,628 117,979 14,024 
V
o
lu
m
e
 % schemes 91% 9% 100% 
No. schemes / yr 20 2 22 
No. offenders / yr 20 2 22 
% working population 25% 2.5% 27.5% 
 population 80   
 £ expenditure / yr 2,100,000   
 
 
Occupational fraud losses at DEF Group 
 
Jeremy’s experience contrasts sharply with those of Mark, the leader of the Security and 
Compliance Department (SCD) at DEF Group. The team focuses heavily on inventory shrinkage, 
responds swiftly when there is clear evidence of employee malpractice and energetically pursues 
civil recoveries and criminal prosecutions. A more detailed explanation of this company’s 
approach to dealing with fraud is in Chapter 7. Over a 10 year period to 2012 the company’s 
financial controls and substantial counter-fraud efforts reduced inventory shrinkage from 
£25mn/y (5% of cost of goods) to £5.9mn/y (1% of cost of goods). Fraud has reduced from 
£2.8mn/y to £0.7mn/y and occupational fraud has been driven down from £0.8mn/y to 
£0.2mn/y. 
 
Mark attributes the bulk of the shrinkage, £4.8mn, to unassignable random paperwork, stock 
allocation and account reconciliation errors. This does not mean that fraud was not present in 
the £4.8mn loss. It does mean that there were no fraud signals. SCD team continuously seeks out 
assignable causes of the shrinkage. In 2012 the team identified 646 incidents which led directly to 
losses of £1,082,479, 0.22% of the £484mn cost of goods. Mark provided a copy of the company’s 
database which captured every assignable shrinkage event such as fraud, theft and error for the 
year 2012 (Table 5.7). Each event is classified under crime type or against procedural error / 
negligence. The total loss to criminal behaviour across 549 of these incidents was £921,542. The 
loss to fraud was £655,708 across 278 events. Internal fraud was detected in 99 of the incidents 
leading to losses of £181,278, 3% of total shrinkage and 0.04% of the cost of goods. 
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Table 5.7: Summary of detected shrinkage losses at DEF Group 
 
No. 
incidents 
Direct loss £ 
% of 
loss 
% of cost 
of goods 
Identified 
offenders 
External fraud 179 474,430 44% 0.10% 8 
External theft 179 138,151 13% 0.03% 8 
Burglary 44 88,081 8% 0.02% 2 
Internal fraud / theft 99 181,278 17% 0.04% 80 
Theft - unknown 48 39,602 4% 0.01% 0 
Procedural errors / negligence 97 160,937 15% 0.03% 72 
Total 646 1,082,479 100% 0.22% 170 
 
 
DEF’s database records losses against 75 of the 99 occupational fraud incidents. The effort 
required to quantify losses cannot be justified in all of the apparently low value cases, particularly 
if the principal objectives of disabling the schemes and removing the fraudsters are achieved. 
Appendix 8 ranks the measured losses to show that 6% of schemes produced 69% of losses. The 
results are summarised in Table 5.8. The ‘% loss’ and ‘% schemes’ figures are again close to the 
metrics predicted by the binary distribution posited above, thus supporting the fraud distribution 
hypothesis. In this case however the relative value of loss is, at 0.04% overall, considerably lower 
than the 0.3% whole economy estimate. Consequently the number of offenders is much reduced 
at 2.8% of the 2,837 employees involved in the distribution and sales activities. 
 
The substantially lower level of occupational fraud at DEF (0.04%) compared to the engineering 
department of Westco (15%) demonstrates the value of a robust counter-fraud strategy which is 
integrated into its inventory controls. However it is unlikely that the company detects all fraud 
schemes and offenders due in part to the difficulties in discriminating between fraud, unassigned 
random errors and procedural errors: loss incidents are labelled procedural errors by default 
whenever assignable causal explanations elude the company’s investigators. More importantly 
an evident gap in the company’s counter-fraud strategy is the absence of fraud monitoring in 
other business activities such as payroll and purchasing. It was only by chance that the company 
discovered the largest fraud in its history in 2008, an £850,000 contract bribery fraud perpetrated 
by its Marketing Director over the previous six years. The occupational fraud losses and activity 
rates should therefore be regarded as minimum estimates. 
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     Table 5.8: DEF Group occupational fraud metrics 
  Low freq. / value High freq. / value Total 
V
al
u
e
 
% loss 31% 69% 100% 
£ fraud loss / yr 56,973 129,137 186,110 
% of cost of goods 0.01% 0.03% 0.04% 
£ / scheme 826 21,523 2,481 
£ / offender 791 16,142 2,326 
V
o
lu
m
e
 % schemes 94% 6% 100% 
No. schemes / yr 69 6 75 
No. offenders / yr 72 8 80 
% working population 2.5% 0.3% 2.8% 
 population 2,837   
 £ cost of sales / yr 484,289,000   
 
 
Cumulative fraud distribution model 
 
Further work is required to confirm the hypothesised binary fraud distribution model. The 
research should explore whether the binary model is a particular case of a general model which 
can be illustrated by plotting the primary research data in a continuous cumulative form. Figure 
5.3 shows the cumulative percentage of schemes against the cumulative percentage financial loss 
for Westco, DEF Group and the four points derived from the Hollinger and Clark (1983a) data. 
The curves are similar and conform with reasonable accuracy to the Weibull exponential curve 
(McCool, 2012): 
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝑠(1 − 𝑒(−
𝑥
𝛼)
𝛽
) 
 
The Weibull distribution is commonly used to describe highly skewed probability distributions for 
financial modelling such as insurance claim events (Eling, 2011) and equipment reliability 
(McCool, 2012). The model may have application in other behavioural contexts. 
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Figure 5.3: Cumulative fraud distribution 
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Conclusions 
 
The difficulties in quantifying all the dimensions of fraud, including occupational fraud, extend 
from the ambiguities in defining fraud as explicated in Chapter 4. The experiences of Mark at DEF 
Group demonstrate that, despite its sophisticated counter-fraud systems and its trained staff, 
distinguishing between fraud, error and negligence can be difficult unless decisions are 
supported by adequate investigations. For managers without adequate support structures and 
training, discriminating between a less than obvious fraud and error would be arbitrary. In such 
circumstances pressure, temptation or utility could readily prefer the error category. 
  
Just as there is no consensus in the descriptive definition of fraud, there is no consensus in the 
unit of measure, nor in the methodology to quantify it at local and society levels. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, fraud estimates in the literature cover a very wide range. The consequence is that 
users can subjectively interpret and manipulate the published data in any way that it suits 
themselves. An example is to be found in the NFA (2012) report. The NFA rejected results of a 
5,000 participant survey which indicated payroll fraud losses of 5%, and preferred the 0.2% result 
from a single, confidential FLM exercise. Perhaps, as a public body, the NFA rationalised that the 
lower “scientific” figure would be more palatable to senior civil servants and politicians. 
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As the interview participants explained, those managers who are not convinced of the reliability 
of the data or the methods can readily rationalise not implementing fraud prevention measures 
on the commercial grounds of no cost-benefit. Yet comparing the Westco International and DEF 
Group data demonstrates the economic value of effective counter-fraud strategies. The DEF data 
clearly supports the contentions of Schnatterly (2003) and Button and Gee (2013) that an 
integrated fraud prevention approach not only reduces direct fraud losses but also reduces other 
forms of cost waste. The annualised benefit for DEF is £19.1M in costs supported by a £2.1m 
reduction in fraud including a £0.6m reduction in occupational fraud. On the other hand, the 
Westco data illustrates the potential loss rates when management is totally blind to the problem, 
acquiesces to it or purposely mentors a criminal sub-culture. 
 
Though the fraud metrics presented need to be viewed with caution, all the evidence points 
toward occupational fraud being a major crime category in its own right with annual losses of at 
least £14.5 billion, larger than the aggregate of all physical acquisitive crimes. The best available 
research data suggests that two-thirds of adults have committed a fraud at some time (Karstedt 
and Farrall, 2006, 2007), and at least one-third of employees will transgress within a 12 month 
period (Hollinger and Clark, 1983a). There is no contradiction in these findings as it is a 
reasonable assumption that it is not the same third which offends every year, and the Hollinger 
and Clark (1983a) data is based on a narrow range of occupational offences. The analysis of the 
latest NFA (2013) data using the derived Hollinger and Clark distribution data has provided a 
deeper insight into the nature of the offending population. 
 
A minority of offenders (7.5%) cause the majority harm, 68% of losses through repetitive, 
systematic abuse of their employers. The majority of schemes (93%) involve just one or two fraud 
events perpetrated by one-off or occasional offenders, causing 32% of losses. The total number 
of offences is postulated to be at least 14 million/year perpetrated by at least 10 million working 
adults, 30% of the workforce in the UK, and 740,000 major offenders are active in any year, 2.3% 
of the workforce. These conclusions support the experimental research into cheating by Mazar, 
Amir and Ariely (2008) who found that, given the opportunity, approximately 1% of participants 
cheat to the maximum amount. Although further work is clearly required to improve confidence 
levels, the data provides a valuable range of benchmark statistics for hypothesis testing. The 
results suggest that fraud is a normal activity and beg the question, paraphrasing Hirschi (1969, 
p68), why don’t we all commit fraud? The corollary question is why don’t infrequent offenders 
offend more often? These questions will be addressed in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 6 
 
The Offender 
 
 “This, it would be claimed, is strong evidence that no man is just of his own free will, but 
only under compulsion, and that no man thinks justice pays him personally, since he will 
always do wrong when he gets the chance.” Adeimantus in The Republic, Plato (1974). 
 
Introduction 
 
Using the allegory of the Ring of Gyges, Plato’s character, Adeimantus, argued that given the 
opportunity and the power of invisibility any man would commit crimes to accumulate wealth 
and status and would be regarded as a fool if they did not unjustly exploit the power of invisibility 
granted to the owner of the Ring. Plato’s simple thought experiment is founded in the 
perceptions of the relationships between psychology, society, normative expectations and law 
over 2000 years ago that are as relevant today. Hirschi (1969, p68) expressed a similar sentiment 
when he asked: why don’t we all commit crimes? 
 
Like Sutherland (1940) and Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, p200), Weisburd, Waring and Chayet 
(2001, p139) believe that there are common underlying causes to both white-collar and other 
crimes. However measured in terms of life circumstances they found that most white-collar 
offenders do not fit the common criminal stereotype: they are in the main only distinguishable 
from law-abiding by their offending histories (Weisburd et al, 2001, p143). Using arrest records, 
sentencing reports and life circumstance details, they identified three categories of white-collar 
offender: the traditional perception of the chronic opportunist with unstable backgrounds and 
low self-control (Weisburd et al, 2001, p78), the respectable habitual offender and the 
respectable occasional offender (Weisburd et al, 2001, p143-146). They argue that the situational 
components of crisis and opportunity are the main explanations for white-collar criminality 
(Weisburd et al, 2001, p139). This stimulus dimension can be seen in the financially distressed 
embezzler (Cressey, 1953) and situational crime theory (Clarke, 1995). Weisburd et al (2001, 
p148) are content with the crisis explanation, but struggle to explain the respectable, occasional 
opportunist. They speculate that, because everybody breaks rules and conventions, many 
individuals are sufficiently comfortable in taking the extra step to capitalise on the fraud 
opportunities presented (Weisburd et al, 2001, p148). Their categorisation is similar to Pogarsky’s 
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(2002) deterrability scheme which groups people as incorrigible offenders, deterrable offenders 
and acute conformists. It is also similar to Wikstrom’s (2006) propensity typology which classifies 
individuals according to their morality: low morality habitual offenders, contingent morality 
offenders whose criminal behaviour depends on their circumstances, and high morality 
individuals who never offend irrespective of their circumstances. 
 
The normality of crime implied by the high offending rates in Chapter 5 challenges the 
assumptions inherent in a good deal of criminological research that crime is abnormal and white-
collar crime in particular is rare Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, p39). The aim of this chapter is to 
further understanding of the occupational fraud threat by exploring what this dry quantitative 
data means in terms of offender characteristics. The analysis uses the two dimensions posited by 
Weisburd, Waring and Chayet (2001) framed as frequency (occasional and habitual) and stimulus 
(opportunistic and crisis). Both of these dimensions are reflected in the observations of the 
research participants. Weisburd, Waring and Chayet’s (2001) concept of the opportunistic 
offender is the occasional, low value, psychologically normal person. The analysis expands this 
opportunistic group, dividing it into two sub-groups: high greed individuals who set out to exploit 
opportunities and low greed individuals who succumb to minor temptations. The analysis also 
seeks to draw the deterrability and propensity ideas of Pogarsky (2002) and Wikstrom (2006) into 
a single framework to more fully explain the occupational fraud challenge. 
 
 
Habitual offenders 
 
Habitual, high greed, opportunistic offender 
 
Jill, a Personal Assistant in a large retail business, Natstore, was not surprised that one of the 
senior managers she worked for, Carter, was involved in contract bribery with a supplier. 
However she was shocked at the scale of the fraud, worth over £8M. The manager was jailed. 
The participant described the fraudster as a non-conformist who frequently refused to attend 
arranged meetings and often disappeared without explanation. Her relationship with Carter was 
stable though not close. She described him as a vain, manipulative and selective in his treatment 
of employees, bullying some, charming others: 
 
“Carter was always a tricky one, secretive, ambitious, unpredictable. You never knew 
where he was, what he was doing. I couldn’t keep track of him. He used to disappear 
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from time to time and not turn up to meetings. I was always having to make excuses for 
him. He'd be mean to some people, a bit of a bully. I got on with him all right, he was 
very good to me, but I liked it better when he wasn't there. He put other people on edge 
because he could be temperamental. I knew something wasn't right. He had really 
expensive cars, expensive suits and liked to show off, boasting about what he had just 
bought, where he'd been on holiday or weekends, Grand Prix in France or wherever. 
People would comment, directors would, because he had a more expensive lifestyle than 
them. We wondered where he got the money from.” 
 
Lawrence is a Managing Director of a small manufacturing company. He previously held several 
positions as Finance Director within subsidiaries of large manufacturer, Hurn Group. In this role 
he had always been wary of a tendency for divisional Managing Directors, freed from local 
controlling influences, to abuse their positions for personal gain. Their personalities and positions 
led these characters to believe they were invulnerable so that, like the previous examples, they 
did not feel the need to hide the visible benefits of their behaviour: 
 
“It so often comes down to the MD who abuses his position. This MD [Davis] started off 
with a company car, a Daimler. We then acquired another company. With that company 
came a Jaguar XJS. He decided he should have that as well. The MD then cheated on his 
wife and pursued his secretary and she finished up with a Ford Escort Cabriolet. In effect 
he ended up with 3 company cars, a total abuse of the benefits and expenses policies. 
The policy of the plc was that you were entitled to just one company car. This MD was 
allowed to get away with things and people would turn a blind eye. So often individual 
MDs by virtue of their professional contacts, sometimes their performance, very often 
their strength of personality become so dominant that they render themselves almost 
untouchable. That always worries me as an FD with responsibility for implementing 
financial control within the bigger entity.” 
 
The largest fraud against DEF Group was a sophisticated contract bribery fraud perpetrated by 
Jefferson, its former Marketing Director, and colluding suppliers. Mark described the events 
leading to the detection of the fraud and the company’s success in recovering its losses: 
 
“Our largest ever fraud involved a Marketing Director about £850,000 which I hope is a 
career one-off. That occurred in April 2008 and it involved him and 5 other defendants, 
external suppliers. We completed the civil in 12 months with full recovery plus £0.25M 
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interest plus £420,000 costs…..The whistleblower was the husband of the Financial 
Controller who worked in one of the businesses working with our Marketing Director. 
The whistleblower's wife, as she was then, was having an affair with the MD of that 
business. He decided that having had all this pillow talk on evenings when his wife was in 
his own bed, saying, ‘I've a real job reconciling these payments.’ He tucked all this 
information away and rang up. That was his reasoning for it. At the time an anonymous 
whistleblower. That was his justification for ringing because his wife had gone off with 
the Managing Director. She was 37 and he was 60.” 
 
Terry is the Managing Director of a small company, HIJ Tubeline, providing engineering services 
to the NHS. Previously he was a regional Operations Director at a very large facilities 
management and construction company, Cardwell FM. The company lost over £1M to an 
employed Projects Buyer, Ajayi, over a four year period. Ajayi set up ghost companies on the 
corporation’s accounts system and paid the false companies against fabricated invoices through 
the purchase ledger: 
 
“It turned out that he was some African prince and he had been diverting monies to an 
African state….. It was a very professional scam, well organised and the money 
disappeared out of the UK as soon as it disappeared out of the account. That was a man 
in a professional, responsible position. His overall budget and pattern of expenditure was 
entirely consistent with the nature of the business, it was just that certain works were 
not getting done. According to the books the work was being done by companies which 
didn't exist….. This individual was very shrewd. He knew the organisation and how to 
disguise the frauds and obviously realised that within a period of time he would be found 
out. He knew that at the time of the audit he would be found out so he was doing small 
amounts for a long period of time then he went for it in his last year knowing that the 
audit would uncover it. He was gone by that period of time.” 
 
The senior management at Cardwell held Terry and a Project Accountant responsible for the 
fraud and both were forced to resign: “I was suspected of knowing and turning a blind eye to it. 
Ultimately the accusation was that I had no control of the budget, that expenditure outstripped 
the value provided.” The experience coloured Terry’s view on dealing with occupational fraud in 
his subsequent career (Chapter 10). He firmly believes that employee fraud should be dealt with 
quietly, behind closed doors. 
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The public sector is not immune from high value habitual fraudsters. Rose is an MoD police 
officer. She related how a senior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Jolleys, was convicted for 
defrauding the army of more than £200,000 over a seven year period. His children were at a 
private school, where the fees were partly paid by the army through the Continuity of Education 
Allowance (CEA) scheme. Services personnel are only eligible for the support if they are the 
primary carer. Jolleys was not the primary carer as he had separated from his wife, a successful 
neurologist, and the children lived with her. Moreover he continued to live in married quarters to 
which he was not entitled. He was charged with 36 offences relating to the fraudulent expense 
claims: he had not only failed to disclose his change in circumstances, he had also forged his 
wife’s signature on the CEA forms. Jolleys was an opportunistic offender who exploited a fragile 
bureaucratic system that allowed him to abuse the services’ housing and educational support 
services. 
 
Harrison was one of the directors of Banbury Engineering, the small business purchased by 
Jeremy. He and his co-director, Duncan, were jailed for bribery and conspiracy defraud their 
major client, Westco. His was not a crime of necessity: he was a millionaire and owned a 
sequence of Bentley cars and multiple properties, but he could not resist the opportunities 
offered by Westco’s employees to supplement his income by about £75,000 per year. Although 
three years in an open prison caused him to reflect upon and come to terms with his guilt in legal 
terms, he continued to ameliorate the immorality of his actions with a flurry of rationalisations 
which externalised the fault to the customer: 
 
“Look, I know I have done wrong. I'm not making excuses, I've been in prison for it, but 
we just did what the customer wanted, it's what they did. Just had to do it. It's the way 
business is done. You do what the customer asks, don't you? We didn't imagine the 
police or anyone would be interested in it. We just did what they wanted. Then the police 
got involved and they called it fraud. We were stunned, ‘What's this all about?’ You try to 
explain it but they keep calling it fraud. They said we'd defrauded Westco, but that's 
what they wanted us to do.” 
 
An interesting aspect of this script is how Harrison conflated the identities of the company 
(Westco) and its employees to construct his rationalisations. If the instructions had been issued 
by Westco’s directors or more especially its owners, the outcome of Harrison’s actions may have 
been different. This question of organisational personhood (McDonald, 1987) is beyond the 
scope of the present research. It is usually considered in relation to responsibility for corporate 
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crimes (Walt and Laufer, 1991; Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993; Cressey, 1995) but would make a 
fascinating line of enquiry in the context of victimhood and occupational fraud.  
 
Contract bribery fraud schemes require collusion between individuals, so are not the classic 
Cressey (1953) case of the lone embezzler. Sometimes the level of collusion goes much wider as 
explained by fraud investigator Kevin. In this case the corrupt supervisors of the car parking 
department of Southcity Borough Council, Victor and Merritt, identified an opportunity and drew 
the whole team into their scheme which had continued for six years: 
 
“It was a hell of an investigation. There was paper everywhere for literally months in this 
room, but we proved the £350,000. That was systemic within the department but you 
need everybody on board to do that. How that came about we never found out, but I 
suspect there were two supervisors involved and they cottoned on. Then they 
contaminated the rest of the crew. ‘We are doing this, you can do this and be a part of it 
if you want.’ It would take a long time to have that sort of conversation, but it worked 
and they were very successful.” 
 
Habitual, crisis offender 
 
The previous seven examples emphasise that occupational fraudsters do not all come to fraud 
through crises in their lives, some are just plain greedy and their greed combined with 
opportunity is the aetiology of their habitual offending. Other habitual offenders do comply with 
the Cressey (1953) model. The following case investigated by Kevin illustrates how addictive 
psychological traits can lead individuals to crises and thence to habitual fraud offending: 
 
“We had a good one last year. We had a telephone call on a Friday afternoon and it was a 
Finance Director. The Chief Exec had suspected that the FD was messing about with the 
funds. He did not know what was happening but he knew there was a big hole in the 
accounts. That was as much as he knew, so we sent in one of our investigators and one of 
our forensic accountants when he wasn't in, on a Friday. We literally just stopped 
everything and looked at everything. It was such an easy to spot because we just went 
straight into his internet activity and he was doing online bingo, constantly. I mean a 
bloke, online bingo. He spent over £700,000 of the company's money on online bingo at 
work. By the Sunday afternoon we had actually got his house signed over. We had gone 
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round to see him and basically said, ‘This is ugly, could go to the police.’ And he just said, 
‘OK’ and literally signed over his house to the company.” 
 
This fraudster, Campbell, was a successful professional and a family man who had developed an 
addiction to gambling. How the manager arrived at this position is not known, it probably started 
in a small, opportunistic fashion. However at the denouement, he had become overwhelmed by 
an accelerating crisis. The speed of the case suggests a person who had lost control of his life 
circumstances needed an external intervention to provide an escape route and regain control. 
 
John is an experienced fraud barrister who has worked on numerous criminal and civil cases. He 
has seen a range of motives for engaging in high value fraud schemes including financial crisis 
and grievances such as poor treatment and perceived unfairness. The grievances can stimulate 
internalised strains to crisis levels at which criminality is rationalised as a viable solution (Agnew, 
2005). It is John’s assessment that these people are not psychologically pre-disposed to crime, 
rather their criminality is a response to their life circumstances: 
 
 “When you have an employee or director inside a company it is often quite different. 
They are much more opportunistic fraudsters who see an opportunity, will quite often 
feel aggrieved about something that the employer does not give them, enough money or 
aggrieved in the way that they are treated at work, or feel that they have put their back 
into building this company but have not been rewarded. It can be a director or quite 
senior, but the business owners do not value them for all the effort that they have put in, 
bringing in the loot for the shareholder / directors, on seeing an opportunity will take it. 
Sometimes it's a feeling of what they deserve, sometimes it is just greed, sometimes it is 
need which has driven it, they are in desperate, dire straits at home, can't pay off their 
overdraft or whatever. It is different from what is just a cold, calculating, pathological 
desire to rip people off.” 
 
Occasional offenders 
 
Occasional, crisis offender 
 
At the other end of the offending scale are the occasional offenders. The Jefferson case described 
above is not typical of the cases that Mark deals with at DEF Group. Most cases are relatively low 
in value. Nevertheless their aetiologies are born from the same factors as the habitual offenders: 
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opportunity and crisis or greed. Opportunity is always a determinant and Mark described how 
occasional crisis offenders use the company’s facilities to solve their personal problems: 
 
“We are not a business which attracts thieves. I don't think anybody comes to us 
thinking, "I'm going to get a job in DEF because it'll be a fantastic opportunity to commit 
a crime." Nearly everyone that we deal with is a force of circumstances outside of work. 
We keep referring to in presentations as the Bank of DEF, lender of last resort. People 
have got to the end of their financial tether. They've used their other resources, they've 
used family and feel that they've got no other alternative than dip their hand in the Bank 
of DEF. It's drugs, credit card debts, gambling, sheer greed in some cases.” 
 
In another case investigated by Mark, a warehouseman, Dixon, rationalised that being caught 
and prosecuted for stealing cash from the company was far preferable to death threats from 
drug dealers: 
 
“The guy said, ‘Sorry, I've nicked it.’ It was £4,500 and just taken out of the banking. 
When we get behind it, he's taken it because he owes money for drugs and these drug 
dealers were threatening his life. So he decided his risk management was, he'd have 
£4,500 off us or dead. ‘There's a bit in the safe there, I'll take that for now.’ He still says, ‘I 
know I was going to lose my job, I know I've been caught, I know I'll get a criminal 
sentence.’ And he has, he's been in court this past couple of weeks and he's got a 
compensation order to repay us and he's got 200 hours community service. Then he 
keeps saying, ‘At least I'm alive.’” 
 
Some business owners are prepared to collude on the supply side in contract bribery frauds in 
order to maintain sales. Edward, the owner of SES Electrical, was uncomfortable with such 
schemes but rationalised that he was occasionally forced to do it to sustain his business. His 
business had a small number of customers, Northshire Group, a facilities management company, 
was one of the largest. Its employees demanded kickbacks for awarding contracts: 
 
“Look if I didn't I wouldn't get the job, and wouldn't get another one there. I need the 
work, I’ve got four employees to keep going. What am I supposed to do? Facilities 
companies are the worst, Northshire’s one. You just have to do it. If you don't they go 
elsewhere, not just for the job, you don't get a look in again. It would be difficult, 
wouldn't it? They couldn't look at me in the face again after turning them away on that.” 
89 
 
 
 
Occasional, low greed offender 
 
As with the high frequency frauds, not all occasional fraudsters are driven by crises. An example 
of opportunistic, low level greed described by Mark involved a DEF Branch Manager and his 
assistant stealing boilers, fires and other stock items to sell on the black market. The scheme 
came to light because the employees registered the receipt and sale of televisions on the stock 
control system, items which are outside the company’s product range: 
 
“No (DEF does not sell televisions), but they bought some, received them into stock and 
then sold them on the side. We also lost a fire. It was actually in his parent's house, that 
were in the (inaudible) and we actually went in the house and removed the fire off the 
wall. Repossessed.” 
 
Emma is an MoD police officer. Her criticism of the Services’ of the computerised Joint Personnel 
Administration (JPA) system illustrates how system weaknesses are a temptation for minor 
opportunistic fraud, which can then accelerate into habitual schemes: 
 
“The MoD is rife with it. It starts small, they find they can get away with it, then it 
escalates from a few pounds on expenses to millions on more sophisticated frauds. The 
JPA is designed for abuse. Expenses are paid in advance. You simply apply for an advance 
on expenses, it is rarely checked, so is automatically provided, there's simply no control. 
Claims are only randomly checked. You then have 3 months to submit expense claims. If 
you don't the advance is automatically recovered from salary. It's effectively used as a 
pay day loan scheme. The squadies use it instead of Wonga, because it's easy and 
interest free. You keep it rolling every 3 months, so you don't have to pay back for years. 
They used to rob the gaming machines at month end when they needed the money. Now 
they just apply for the advance. You have an administrative advance put into your own 
bank account, then by keying in different details, you have the expenses against 
somebody else's system account and you don’t have to pay back at all. It peaks at month 
end, when the service guys need the money.” 
 
The weaknesses in the system were known to the Chief of Defence Staff (The Telegraph, 2008) 
and the National Audit Office which refused to sign off on the MoD accounts in part due to the 
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JPA failures (National Audit Office, 2009). The problem in the public sector is not limited to the 
armed services. Part way through an engineering project at one government station the author 
attended the site for a regular progress meeting with the “GoStat” managers. The attendees 
gathered in an open-plan office where about six GoStat employees were at their desks. One of 
the GoStat managers, Thomas, approached the author and loudly asked for a £2,000 contribution 
to the team’s Christmas fund. Utterly befuddled by the request, the bold manner of Thomas and 
the casual yet expectant glances from the other GoStat employees, the author muttered a non-
committal, “We’ll see,” response.  Sensitive enquiries with other on-site contractors over the 
next few days revealed that they all contribute similar amounts to a “social fund” each 
December. They viewed the cash payments as a necessary marketing cost. The dilemma was 
resolved by asking one of the contractors to quietly inform Thomas that it was not possible to 
comply, and to politely suggest that if Thomas were caught he and his colleagues could at best 
lose their jobs. The “social fund” did not appear the following year. The most disturbing aspect of 
the incident was the brazenness of the request and how it seemed to be normalised, accepted 
practice. 
 
 
Habitual and occasional offenders at Westco International 
 
The foregoing examples represent a range of fraudulent events, a mix of circumstances, across a 
wide geography at different times. Three of the examples are products of the case study of 
company DEF Group, nevertheless they had no direct connections; they occurred at separate 
locations, at different times and the roles of the individuals were dissimilar. The experiences of 
Jeremy and Carson are based on one case, in one department, at the same location in one large 
manufacturing company, Westco International. Their stories thus provide the opportunity to 
briefly examine a spectrum of fraudulent behaviour within a narrowed range of environmental 
variables. The company is a major manufacturing entity. Jeremy was a director of a supply 
company and he was involved in the investigations. Carson was a participant in the fraud scheme 
and became a witness for an eventual prosecution. The case was exposed by a whistleblower. 
 
Appendix 7 is a schedule of the fraud loss rates associated with 22 employees at the company. All 
of the offenders were well paid engineers. None of them were at management grades, but all of 
them had significant purchasing authority which allowed them to raise falsified purchase orders 
on suppliers. The schemes required the collusion of the suppliers. Given that the contextual 
characteristics such as the culture, environment, the management structure, the remuneration 
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scales and the security of employment are invariable, the implication is that there is something 
different about the top two fraudsters who caused over 90% of the losses. They were eventually 
jailed. Jeremy provided some background to the case. The enthusiasm of George and Connor for 
exploiting the opportunities presented weak management oversight funded their millionaire 
lifestyles with large, gated homes, overseas properties, Ferraris and Harley Davidson 
motorcycles. They had settled family lives and were not typical crisis offenders. However they 
were far more organised than the others. Both set up companies to legitimise and launder the 
proceeds of their crimes. Connor used his wife, Kaileen, who also worked for Westco, to 
administer the paperwork. She fabricated invoices, banked the proceeds and even filed tax 
returns. She was jailed for colluding in the scheme. The other 20 offenders were more restrained. 
According to Jeremy all but one were dismissed, resigned or retired early. Just one, Norton, 
remains an employee of Westco; he was subject to personal financial and emotional strains due 
to a divorce.  
 
Carson agreed to be a participant in the present research by way of an unrecorded interview. His 
perceptions of George and Connor suggest that they were disagreeable colleagues who 
manipulated their working circumstances to avoid responsibilities, to remain in the shadows and 
to do as little work as possible. They flaunted their criminal gains, boasting of their wealth and 
exploits. Carson perceived a sense of invulnerability in their behaviour and demeanour. Their 
avarice motivated them to exploit thoroughly the opportunities presented by ineffective 
management controls. Carson claimed his own offending was not motivated by financial 
pressures, it was simply an opportunity to do as others were doing. His compliance with the 
values of a sub-culture which normalised and expected deviance reflects the social learning 
theories of esteemed scholars Bandura (1976), Jeffery (1965) and particularly Sutherland 
(Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947). Unsurprisingly, his principal rationalisations were that 
his behaviour was normal at Westco and tolerated by the company. He also used a comparative 
rationalisation to ameliorate perceptions of his immorality by contrasting his own low level of 
offending with the greed of George and Connor: 
 
“The shock was, not what was going on, but they did something about it. It had been 
going on forever and it was obvious. We all knew about George and Connor. They were 
nasty pieces of work. You only dealt with them if you had to. They would just as soon spit 
at you as look at you. Nothing was their fault. They spent most of their time just working 
out how to do less, keep their heads down, stay out of trouble and work up another 
scam. They turned up in identical, big four-wheel drive cars with number plates one after 
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the other. Obvious or what? George boasted about his Harley Davidson and his wife had 
one. They went off together on trips. Connor had a Ferrari, not a new one, second hand. 
Things you don’t get in maintenance. It made no difference to me really whether I got a 
few quid out of it now and again or not. But it was on offer, Bamford Electrical came to 
me, and I accepted it.  Who didn’t? It was nothing compared to George and Connor. The 
thing that bothers me is not getting the sack, but that I was set up for it, others got away 
with it. And they will be retiring soon at 52 with huge pensions. I’m not bitter about it. 
Leaving was the best thing for me. I’m doing my own thing now, sometimes with 
Charlton. We’re doing OK.” 
 
 
Offender matrix 
 
The offenders encountered in the research or described by the participants are identified by 
pseudonyms in Appendix 1. Borrowing from Weisburd, Waring and Chayet (2001), they are 
organised into the offender matrix in Table 6.1 using their pseudonyms. The matrix describes 
four idealised offender types based on two variables: stimulus and frequency. Though a blunt 
instrument, the matrix is an effective tool for conceptualising the types of internal offending 
behaviour that organisations must face. The classifications cannot accurately represent the entire 
offending population as the resolution of the frequency is broad. It is also inadequate in 
describing offenders who migrate between classifications. 
 
Ditton (1977, p20) observed that there is no return once an individual participates in fraud: “Even 
if he stops fiddling he knows about it. It is always on for the actor to re-indulge.” Levi (2008, p93) 
spoke of the slippery slope long-firm fraudster who starts off with a few white lies but then slides 
into habitual offending. Without an external intervention to stimulate risk perceptions in order to 
re-balance the rational choice calculus the one-off offender may develop a habit (Jeffery, 1965; 
Apel, 2012; Clarke and Cornish, 1985). Imogen, a forensic accountant, deals with cases where 
organisations’ failure to query early non-compliant transactions encourages nascent fraudsters to 
increase their offending: 
 
“Once they've crossed the line they can justify it. Going through that door must be quite 
difficult for most people because they have this feeling of what is right and wrong. But 
once you have stepped over it and found that you can do it and nobody has stopped you, 
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where I think businesses go wrong, if somebody had queried that action early on then 
they wouldn't have gone on again and again and again doing it.” 
 
For example, Campbell’s £700,000 fraud scheme described by Kevin may have started as an 
occasional opportunistic offender, but his addiction to gambling subsequently fuelled an ongoing 
crisis and habitual offending. Similarly, Mark at DEF Group described a case where a Branch 
Manager, Ricky, started out falsifying inventory account records to disguise his incompetency but 
then felt compelled to continue with the deception: 
 
“The Manager has been fudging his stock count, his perpetual count. He's saying, ‘I've 
had no personal gain out of it, but I'm now up to the point where I need to put my hands 
up and I can't keep balancing all the balls in the air, it's all coming down on me, the roof's 
falling in and I'm £70,000 short on my stock.’”  
 
Nicole, an investigator at Midton District Council noted the same phenomenon in the behaviour 
of a female employee, Devlin, a single mother under financial pressure, who fraudulently claimed 
£14,000 in housing benefit over a 12 month period: 
 
“Once she had got onto that railroad track of lying to the HMRC and then lying to the 
benefit section then she had to carry that all the way through.” 
 
The stimulus scale in Table 6.1 includes just two categories, opportunistic and response to crisis, 
and as such is particularly weak in describing the complete range of possible circumstances, 
strains, frustrations (Merton, 1938; Agnew,1992) and basic motivations (Maslow, 1943) that 
could lead to offending behaviour. For example, Imogen encountered an opportunistic offender 
who defrauded her employer because she was bored. Nothing can be read into the number of 
offenders in each quadrant of the matrix. The matrix is a consequence of the exploratory 
research, not from a statistically representative sample frame. Because the participants reference 
memorable events to illustrate their experiences and perceptions, the matrix is probably biased 
towards high value offenders. 
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Table 6.1: Occupational fraud offender frequency / stimulus matrix 
  Stimulus 
Opportunistic Crisis 
Frequency 
Habitual 
High greed 
 
Ajayi (Cardwell FM) 
Andreescu (DEF Group) 
Bernie (R&T Industries) 
Carter (Natstore) 
Connor (Westco) 
Davis (Hurn Group),   
Duncan (IFI Engineering) 
Ellis (Elam Sports) 
George (Westco) 
Granger (Westco) 
Haine (DEF Group) 
Harrison (IFI Engineering) 
Jefferson (DEF Group) 
Jolleys (Army) 
Jones (DEF Group) 
Kaileen (Westco) 
Merritt (Southcity BC) 
Spearman (DEF Group) 
Truman (SW Marketing) 
Victor (Southcity BC) 
 
Ongoing crisis 
 
 
Campbell (unknown) 
Devlin (Midton CC) 
Ricky (DEF Group) 
Wallace (DEF Group) 
 
Occasional 
Low level greed 
 
Soldiers’ JPA abuse 
Carson (Westco) 
Charlton (Westco) 
Thomas (GoStat) 
Wilson (DEF Group) 
18 employees (Westco) 
 
Short term crisis 
 
Dixon (DEF Group) 
Edward (SES Electrical) 
Norton (Westco) 
 
 
 
Psychology 
 
John, the fraud barrister, encounters two types of fraudster, the crisis responders and the 
avaricious black-hearts: 
 
“If he [the crisis responder] does tell somebody he is going to be arrested or lose his job, 
at the very least, and so they think that they can work their way out of the problem, but 
they never do. It just gets worse and worse and worse. Psychologically I have found those 
sort of characters very different. They are much more normal, they will often have 
absolutely no previous run in with the law, whilst your hard-bitten fraudsters will often 
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have a long record of infraction with civil courts or criminal courts and so on. I think many 
fraudsters are of a character which is distinct from your average human being. This does 
not apply to all of them, but as a general rule, having dealt with fraudsters for a number 
of years, almost exclusively at one time, they can be tricky customers. Assume you have a 
guilty fraudster, down deep in his black heart he knows he's guilty, but he is giving you a 
different story or shading his story. There does seem to be a difference. Although you 
spend longer with the fraud perpetrator than you ever would for someone who was up 
for a simpler crime, because the evidence and job you have to do is much more 
extensive, you will still have quite a difficult relationship with the client because 
fraudsters have a personality which the rest of human kind doesn't. Assuming you have a 
guilty perpetrator they can be very slippery…..They have a complete lack of empathy. It 
was not a crime of passion, it wasn't born out of a need, they're not a drug user with a 
heroin habit which leads them to shoplift or to snatch somebody's purse which is much 
more human and understandable. What a fraudster does, and I don't think people quite 
understand this, is do something in a really cold, calculating way. It's not a crime of 
passion, it's not done quickly, it's not a reaction like a pub fight.” 
 
John’s description of remorseless offenders reveals a third variable in addition to the stimulus 
and value scales. This personality trait variable, overlooked by Weisburd, Waring and Chayet 
(2001), also emerges as a theme from the testimony of participants in their descriptions of the 
high value, high frequency, opportunistic offenders. They describe bullying, ambitious, boastful, 
invulnerable, philandering, dominant, manipulative conspirators whose actions are by definition 
deceitful, risky, irresponsible, self-centred and display a reckless disregard for others. These traits 
are symptoms of dysfunctional personalities. They are frequently used in criminological literature 
to describe offenders, but often without reference to the psychological definitions, for example 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) and Bucy, Formby, Raspant and Rooney (2008). 
 
Felthous and Sass (2008, p22) describe a continuum of anti-social behaviour from that of normal 
people through to psychopathological abnormalities. They illustrate their idea using a Venn 
diagram (Felthous and Sass, 2008, p27), a form of which is in Figure 6.1. Robert Hare’s 
psychopathy checklist (PCL-R) (Babiak and Hare, 2007, p24) is also measured on a continuum, a 0 
to 40 point scale on which 30 to 40 is psychopathic, 20 to 29 is moderate, up to 20 represents 
zero to low psychopathy Hildebrand and de Ruiter (2004). 
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Fig 6.1: The sociopathic continuum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An alternative presentation of the continuum is proposed in Figure 6.2. The model is purely 
illustrative to assist in conceptualising the idea of a continuous ethical distribution that allows for 
Wikstrom’s (2006) moral typology with low moral individuals represented on the left of the 
diagram and people of robust high morality on the right. The rest of us with contingent morality 
are in the middle. 
 
Figure 6.2 Ethical distribution 
 
 
 
Dissocial 
behaviours  
Antisocial 
personality 
disorder (DSM-V) 
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According to Stout (2005, p6) 4% of the general adult population exhibit ASPD (including 
psychopathy), 1% are psychopathic (Babiak and Hare, 2007, p18), which means about 3% are 
lower level sociopaths. Babiak, Neumann and Hare (2010) found that 4% of corporate managers 
are psychopathic, four times that in the general population. They suggest that the very 
characteristics that reveal the unpleasant psychopath to subordinates facilitate successful 
careers; they are the source of the same skills that obscure their subpar performance and 
damaging behaviour from their seniors, peers and shareholders. The 4% level of ASPD (Stout, 
2005, p6) is sufficiently close to the 2.3% estimate of major offenders in the workforce developed 
in Chapter 5 to indicate that this habitually offending sub-group is dominated by sociopathic 
individuals, characters like George and Connor. As there is insufficient data to suggest a 
percentage of saints, those people who will never offend irrespective of opportunity, pressures, 
strains or crises, a symmetrical normal distribution is assumed for Figure 6.2. 
 
A typical trait of psychopaths is deceitfulness, but it is not limited to this group. Lying is normal 
human behaviour. It is a form of innovation that assists in avoiding negative consequences or 
obtaining goals. Levi (2008, p93) notes that for business people “…a few white lies is preferable 
to going bust…”. Investigator Kevin defined fraud in terms of lying: “I tell you a lie and you give 
me money.” The step from lying without causing harm to lying with the objective of causing 
damage is a short one for psychopaths with their simple greed motivation. For more morally 
developed persons, the path is longer, requiring noxious stimuli through criminal association 
(Sutherland, 1940), external pressures (Cressey, 1953), a perceived grievance or some form of 
frustration (Agnew, 1992; Langton and Piquero, 2007). Wikstrom and Treiber (2007) submit that 
it is only the individuals in this Everyman group who deliberate moral alternatives and make a 
rational choice about which action to pursue (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). It is only this fluid group 
of ‘ordinary’ people that need the support of neutralisation techniques to maintain their moral 
self-esteem (Murray, Wood and Lilienfeld, 2012; Lowell, 2012). Psychopathic offenders do not 
need to rationalise their behaviour, though they are likely to offer ex post facto excuses simply to 
avoid or mitigate sanctions (Hirschi, 1969, p208). For the habitually moral group, rationalisations 
are also irrelevant. For the Everyman group the amount of deliberation (Wikstrom and Treiber, 
2007) required to fashion one or more rationalisations is a function of their location on the 
ethical scale, a dimension that students of Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development (CMD) 
concept would recognise (Kohlberg and Hersch, 1977). The saints are predominantly those with 
high moral development, the habitual offenders are dominated by the lowest moral 
development individuals, the psychopaths and sociopaths, either due to genetic peculiarities or 
as a result of inadequate early years socialisation (Lykken, 2005). 
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The model expands on the notion of the deterrable offender Pogarsky (2002) by suggesting that 
deterrability is a far more complex continuous function of personality characteristics and moral 
development, whether due to a biogenetic predisposition, socialisation, immediate 
environmental influences or a combination of factors. In broad terms it suggests that the power 
of deterrence needs to be higher for those at a lower level of moral development. Which 
components of deterrence power, whether certainty, speed or severity are the most relevant at 
any point on the continuum and at what level they should be set is not understood. The present 
consensus that high levels of perceived certainty has the most profound effect (Parilla, Hollinger 
and Clark, 1988) needs to be challenged by controlling for personality traits. 
 
Model offender matrix 
 
The model of the occupational offender presented here is far more complex than the attractive 
simplicity of Cressey’s (1953) financially distressed lone embezzler. That the fraud triangle 
paradigm was the only criminological theory referenced by participants is not surprising as it is 
the stock in trade of practitioner texts (Comer, 2003; Giles, 2012; Vona, 2008; Wells 2007). The 
problem with this narrow teaching is that organisations are more likely to build counter-fraud 
strategies that address just one type of offender and are less likely to design strategies that deal 
effectively with the real complexities of the offending population. 
 
The offender matrix set out in Figure 6.3 is derived from the data in Figure 6.2. It focuses on the 
offender and sets out the principal characteristics that describe the range of occupational 
offenders under three roughly binary domains: personality (normal and psychopathic), stimulus 
(crisis or strain and opportunistic) and offending rate (occasional and habitual). Personality and 
stimulus are presented as the determinants of offending rate. They are however not the only 
determinants, the model does not adequately accommodate, for example, the contribution of 
differential association (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947, p88) nor immediate situational 
control and risk factors which influence rational choice (Clarke, 1995). Nevertheless the matrix 
provides a more comprehensive description of the offender types confronting organisations. The 
model also suggests the most salient controls for each offender type. 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Occupational fraud offender matrix 
 
  Stimulus Category 
Opportunistic Crisis 
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•  Personality traits dominate 
 
Principal stimulus 
-  High greed 
 
Personality 
-  Deterrence resistant socio-/psychopaths 
-  Rationalisations not required 
 
Most salient controls 
-  Recruitment due diligence 
-  Enhanced situation crime prevention 
    -  Maximum sanction deterrence 
 
•  External pressures / addictions dominate 
 
Principal stimulus 
-  Long term crisis / grievance 
 
Personality 
-  Deterrable, normal  / addictive individuals 
-  Rationalisations required 
 
Most salient controls 
-  Employee welfare monitoring 
-  Situational crime prevention 
    -  Moderate sanction deterrence 
 
O
cc
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n
al
 
•  Environment dominates 
 
Principal stimulus 
-  Low greed 
 
Personality 
-  Deterrable, normal individuals 
-  Rationalisations required 
 
Most salient controls 
 
-  Culture 
-  Situational crime prevention 
    -  Low level sanction deterrence 
 
•  External pressures dominate 
 
Principal stimulus 
-  Short term crisis / grievance 
 
Personality 
-  Deterrable, normal individuals 
-  Rationalisations required 
 
Most salient controls 
 
-  Culture 
-  Situational crime prevention 
    -  Moderate sanction deterrence 
 
 
 
The opportunistic category includes a narrow range of motivational stimuli based on greed. Anti-
social personalities, about 4% of the general population, are the most likely to offend in order to 
achieve their pecuniary goals. Members of this group do not need to formulate rationalisations in 
order to maintain their own moral self-esteem because they do not care (Murray, Wood and 
Lilienfeld, 2012). At the extreme of the spectrum, the psychopaths at 1% of the population are 
the highest risk individuals causing the most damage. Considering that up to 4% of corporate 
managers are psychopaths and these are the people with the power and access to the business 
systems, the highest risks are located in the executive suite. Counter-fraud strategies ought to 
focus special attention onto the boardrooms with enhanced recruitment (Johnston and Shearing, 
2003, p80) and situational crime prevention controls (Clarke, 1980) including the most powerful 
sanctions. It is therefore ironic that executives are typically allowed the highest levels of self-
authorised spending. In Chapter 4 we saw that senior managers at BP are permitted higher value 
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gifts. The matrix suggests that senior management should not be permitted any spending or gifts 
at all without advanced approval from their peer group and an ethics officer. 
 
The occasional, low greed opportunistic offenders ‘take what is on offer’. The aetiology of their 
offending is dominated by environmental factors: learning from or imitating others (Sutherland, 
1940), undefended opportunities (Clarke, 1980) and fraud is normal type rationalisations 
(Benson, 1985). The most salient controls for this group are the development of normative 
cultural values (Weaver and Trevino, 1999), situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1980) including 
a modest level of sanction deterrence to influence rational choice (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). 
 
The crisis responders are pressured by external forces (Cressey, 1953) or internalised strains 
triggered by frustrations or grievances build to crisis levels (Agnew, 1992). For some the crises are 
short term, for others the adverse conditions perpetuate the crisis. These extended crises can be 
due in part to personal challenges such as addictions (Campbell and Devlin) or shortcomings in 
work performance (Ricky). Rationalisations are to be expected with this group. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The observation by Levi (2008,) that “Fraudsters are sociopaths underestimates the incidence of 
fraud” is borne out in terms of the number of offenders, but the quantitative data in Chapter 5 
suggests that the ASPD group dominate the minority of habitual offenders, 2% to 3% of the 
working population, who cause two-thirds of the harm. The majority of fraudsters, about one 
third of the working population, are normal and cause the minority of harm. The implication for 
rationalisation theory is that a normative cultural programme which aims to dismantle offenders’ 
rationalisations should act on the majority of offenders, but is less likely to dissuade the 
sociopathic minority who cause the most damage. Employment screening, especially for risk 
sensitive roles, is a more effective strategy for this group (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p80). 
Similarly the general deterrence power of sanctions aimed at normal employees is likely to be 
less effective against sociopaths and psychopaths. This means that executives need to consider 
where to pitch their sanction strategies. It could be a single harsh policy that equitably applies to 
all employees or it could be differentiated according to role and opportunity risk with the 
strongest sanctions, including criminal prosecutions, applied to the executive suite without 
reservation. The power of deterrence question is explored further in the DEF Group case study in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
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So Adeimantus was nearly right. It appears that fraud is a normal activity that exploits a normal 
human attribute, lying, to make an unjust gain at the expense of others. Most fraudsters are 
normal but the greatest damage is caused by those who are not, and in this sense the analysis 
provides qualified support to Garland (2001, p185) that most criminals are associated with 
mundane, opportunist, deterrable offenders. 
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Chapter 7 
 
DEF Group Case Study Part I: Company Counter-fraud Strategy 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the white-collar crime and organisational ethics research landscape 
relevant to the examination of organisations’ susceptibility to employee fraud. The white-collar 
crime or fraud scholars are principally interested in the genesis of fraud through the individual 
fraudster (Cressey, 1953), the social context (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947) and 
organisational characteristics (Button and Brooks, 2009; Ditton, 1977). The ethics scholars 
emphasize the influence of ethical climate on compliant and deviant behaviour (Trevino and 
Weaver, 2003); they are concerned with the determinants of the ethical climate, those 
interactive attributes and characteristics of organisations, leaders and employees which produce 
consistency in ethical attitudes and behaviour. Both schools have produced a number of common 
themes relevant to the minimisation of non-compliant, deviant and criminal behaviour within 
organisations: 
 
 A code of conduct that sets out the organisation’s ethical values 
 The engagement of the leadership to maintain the values and standards 
 Counter-fraud policies that describes the organisation’s strategies and ambitions 
 Work procedures which detail how employees are to comply with the policies 
 Training and communications for fraud awareness and compliance with procedures and 
counter-fraud measures 
 Defined responsibilities and accountabilities 
 Mechanism for employees to report their concerns 
 Punishment and rewards for deviation and compliance 
 
Cressey (1995) commented on the 1970s the emergence of the corporate code of conduct in 
response to the popular re-conceptualisation of corporations as social actors, which emphasises 
the salience of good citizenship and corporate social responsibility relative to their narrow 
commercial objectives. However without effective enactment the espoused values become 
meaningless parchments (Gruys, Stewart, Goodstein, Bing, and Wicks, 2008). Increasingly, large 
organisations have moved on from mere bland aspirational statements and are introducing 
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formal compliance programmes to ensure that behaviour at work is lawful and ethical (Trevino 
and Weaver, 2003). The most important variable in ensuring the values resonate with employees 
is the quality and engagement of leaders (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999a, Jones, 1995; 
Paine, 1996), often referred to by the musical euphemism, ‘tone from the top’ (Holloway, 2012). 
The ethical codes that clearly specify organisational values and expected standards of behaviour 
must be incorporated into workplace policies and procedures with sufficient detail to remove 
moral ambiguity and uncertain choices (Schnatterly, 2003). This includes explicit counter-fraud 
policies and procedures that are a fundamental requirement of counter-fraud strategies (Button 
and Gee, 2013, p57) and, if sincerely implemented by fully engaged leaders, can reduce 
occupational crime levels by making it difficult for employees to rationalise prohibited behaviour 
(Schnatterly, 2003; Cressey, 1986). 
 
Compliance orientated organisations seek to elevate corporate codes beyond mere window 
dressing and give them meaning by consistent enforcement of the rules (Weaver and Trevino, 
2003, p68). For compliance organisations, probably led by transactional managers (Bass and 
Steidlmeier, 1999) the principal purpose of the instrumental controls is to reinforce standards, to 
act as a general deterrence and to coerce staff into compliant behaviour (Weaver and Trevino, 
1999). Values orientated organisations led by transformational leaders (Bass and Steidlemeier, 
1999) aim for voluntary compliance based on shared normative values (Weaver, Trevino and 
Cochran, 1999a) and seek the involvement of all employees in monitoring ethical standards 
(Weaver and Trevino, 1999). For these organisations the purpose of punishment is subtly 
different: sanctions are symbolically necessary to support employees’ ethical role identities 
(Weaver and Trevino, 1999) and to maintain the perception that the organisation is a just place 
which holds offenders accountable for their actions Trevino, Weaver, Gibson and Toffler (1999, 
p139). Management must enforce rules and hold offenders to account to avoid cynicism and 
distrust (Gruys, Stewart, Goodstein, Bing, and Wicks, 2008). 
 
The security governance concepts promulgated by Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Button 
(2007) use a slightly different language in that they describe security strategies as mentalities or 
ways of thinking about security. Nevertheless they reach similar conclusions that governance in 
organisations is typically achieved with the consent of the employees backed up by coercive 
sanctions which re-assert moral values, limit the harm of wrong-doers and dissuade others from 
doing wrong (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p16, p27). For the more enlightened organisations, 
consciousness of security involves all employees ‘….including the receptionist’ (Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003, p26) as ethical antennae (Braithewaite and Fisse, 1987). The nodal governance 
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idea of Johnson and Shearing (2003, p148) posits that islands of private policing or security 
governance are connected on an ever mutating network of communications and relationships. 
Some of the network relationships are stable, for example those with industry regulators and the 
state, and sometimes impermanent, such as with an insurer or bank. Effective use of the network 
can assist organisations to optimize their security arrangements (Johnson and Shearing, 2003, 
p148) particularly in regards to the prevention of losses to crime through the utility of sanction 
deterrence (Johnson and Shearing, 2003, p24). 
 
The present case study uses the framework derived from the criminology, business ethics and 
security governance schools to explore how a single, large private sector corporation manages 
the fraud phenomenon. The study is divided into two parts. This chapter examines the policies, 
structures and performance within the company. Part II in Chapter 8 focuses on the company’s 
sanctions policy, its leadership and its adaptive response to the state’s justice systems in 
maintaining ethical standards. The principal participant, Mark, is the head of the Security and 
Compliance Department. He provided insight into the company’s operations and methods over 
several unstructured interviews, supported by a wealth of documentary data such as written 
policies, procedures, contractual arrangements and investigation reports. He also kindly provided 
an electronic extract from the company’s  database, the Incident Log, which detailed every 
incident and relevant conversation recorded by his team over the full 12 month period of 2012. 
The log, rich in qualitative data, enabled a quantitative analysis of the team’s activities and was 
used for the analysis in Chapter 5. 
 
The company 
 
DEF Group is a large subsidiary of a European corporation, Eurocorp. Both the UK business and 
the parent company have very long histories. Eurocorp was formed in the 18th century. The core 
of DEF was established in the 19th century; it was acquired by Eurocorp in 2000. The company 
employs about 12,000 people and generates annual sales of £1.2bn. There are three principal 
elements to its growth strategy: expansion of its product range, new service offerings and the 
acquisition of complementary businesses. The company is a distributor, not a manufacturer, of 
mainly low value products. It adds value to the supply chain by providing a network of 1,000 
aggregating ‘one-stop’ branches at locations convenient to its customers throughout the UK. It 
buys products, holds a substantial inventory to enable a high level of customer service and sells 
mainly to professional trade customers. The key business drivers are thus sales volume and cost 
efficient inventory management. In common with all companies that rely on high sales volume 
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and substantial stockholding, an enduring problem is shrinkage (Greenberg, 1990), the reduction 
in stock between purchasing and sales caused by loss, damage, careless practices, theft and fraud 
(Shury, Speed, Vivian, Kuechel and Nicholas, 2005). The highest fraud risks for DEF centre on sales 
transactions, credit card frauds, fraudulently arranged credit accounts and inventory 
transactions. Ethical compliance is thus seen by the company’s management as an important 
foundation of its business controls and its economic welfare (Button and Gee, 2013). However 
before continuing, it is important to note that procedural compliance is not the only motivation. 
The European Commission imposed a very large fine on the parent company, Eurocorp, for cartel 
offences. It was, according to DEF’s Security Manager, a “severe jolt”. Eurocorp’s responded to 
the administrative sanction with substantial investments in a transformational ethical 
programme throughout its worldwide operations. This case study examines the outcome of that 
programme in the corporation’ UK subsidiary business. 
 
What the company sets out to do: codes, policies and procedures 
 
In common with the majority of large, mature organisations (Gruys, Stewart, Goodstein, Bing, 
and Wicks, 2008) Eurocorp and its subsidiaries share a written ethical code, its General Principles 
of Conduct and Action. The five principles of conduct are described as basic values that are 
shared by management and employees alike: 
 
 Professional commitment 
 Respect for others 
 Integrity 
 Loyalty 
 Solidarity 
 
The four principles of action are instrumentalist themes:  
 
 Respect for the law 
 Care for the environment 
 Worker health and safety 
 Employee rights 
 
This dichotomous grouping of the principles accords with the observations of Cressey and Moore 
(1983) that corporate codes can be broadly categorised into metaphysical and legal-political 
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principles, an arrangement that also reflects the dual consensual and coercive mentality 
described by Johnston and Shearing (2003, p27). The principles of conduct are an aspirational 
appeal for shared, internalised values that apply equally to everyone in the company (Weaver, 
Trevino and Cochran, 1999a). The principles of action are formal controls (Hollinger and Clark, 
1982) that require management and employees to obey the law (Cressey, 1995); they are 
admonishments to comply with the minimum standards of behaviour in caring for each other and 
the outside world. The anti-corruption and anti-fraud messages sit under the ‘respect for the law’ 
heading. 
 
The company uses a broad palette to convey its values. It communicates with external parties, 
shareholders, customers, suppliers and business partners through its website, brochures and 
visual displays in reception areas. Internally the values are disseminated through induction and 
training programmes, visual displays, topics in team briefings and formal procedural documents. 
All the training and procedural documents are available to all employees on the company’s 
intranet. 
 
Employee handbook 
 
The codes, rules and general procedures that apply to all employees are collated into the 
company’s professionally bound sixty-six page employee handbook. The handbook forms part of 
the company’s standard contract of employment, thus creating a link between the ethical codes, 
universal rules and the contractual obligation (Button, 2007, p13). It begins with the principles: 
 
“These principles are outlined below and are designed to help achieve the highest ethical 
and legal standards…They should be regarded by all employees as a requirement for 
belonging to the Eurocorp group.” 
 
The handbook describes the mutual responsibilities of the company and its employees including 
general terms and conditions, sickness and injury, dress code, equal opportunities, volunteering 
and public duties, health and safety, environment and security. The handbook has a lengthy 
section on internal formal disciplinary controls. It carefully explains the purpose of disciplinary 
procedures, the rights of the employees and their application to both performance and conduct 
issues: 
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“The disciplinary rules and procedures help promote fairness and order in the treatment 
of individuals….the process utilized to restore acceptable standards in both conduct and 
performance issues is essentially the same although the corrective measures or emphasis 
may vary.” 
 
Recognising that performance and conduct may be affected by personal problems and external 
pressures, employees are encouraged to discuss such matters before they get out of control with 
their line manager, the HR department or the Employee Assistance Helpline, “…experienced, 
professional counsellors outside the company who can help with a wide range of personal and 
work related problems day and night”. The range of counselling services available to staff include: 
drugs and alcohol abuse, bereavement, health and financial. He estimated that in any year 
twenty to thirty employees receive advances on their wages to assist with financial difficulties. 
Such counselling programmes are recognised by both scholars (Bierstaker, Brody and Pacini, 
2005) and practitioners (Giles, 2012, p 217) as an effective counter-fraud control measure that 
abate motivations and neutralise the rationalisations of prospective offenders (Cressey, 1986). 
 
The dual consensual and coercive model expressed by the company’s Principles of Conduct and 
Principles of Action follow through into the company’s disciplinary procedures. The stated 
purpose of the four-stage disciplinary framework described in the handbook is to encourage an 
improvement in work performance or personal conduct. The first three outcome stages are 
warnings: verbal, written and final written. The fourth stage, dismissal, is applied in intractable 
cases or instances of gross misconduct. The handbook defines gross misconduct as behaviour 
that destroys trust to the extent that it justifies the omission of the warning stages and leads 
straight to dismissal. Twenty seven examples of gross misconduct are listed, headed by four types 
of acquisitive crimes: theft, falsification of company documents, fraudulent misuse of company 
property and fraudulent behaviour including fraudulent claims for sick pay. The list continues 
with discrimination, bullying, violence, substance abuse, IT abuse, malicious damage, serious 
insubordination, gross negligence, careless stewardship and serious breach of procedures.  
 
Continuing with the instrumental theme, the handbook warns that the employment contract 
enables the company to recover losses caused by dismissed employees by way of deduction from 
final salary or other due payments, including recovery of money from the company pension 
scheme. This is an efficient means to obtain compensation for low level damage but, as Mark 
explained, is ineffective in high value cases where the losses exceed the residual contractual 
obligations: 
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“So the majority of people that we deal with, whether it might be the £250 theft of some 
product or a cash refund or whatever it might be, then almost certainly we will recover in 
full from a final salary deduction. So a month's salary is £2,000 tops for most people. We 
catch a lot before it runs out.” 
 
Not only does the handbook speak directly to each employee in setting the boundary between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, it also emphasises the responsibilities of all employees 
in preventing and avoiding injury and damage by others. It requires that employees report any 
personal conflicts of interest and any circumstances involving others that raise suspicions of 
potential harm, either through line management or via an externally administered 
whistleblowing line, a key feature in supporting ethical values (Weaver and Trevino, 1999), a 
consensual element of security governance (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p27) and a practical 
detection tool (Giles, 2012, p241).  The power of the section is threefold. Firstly, defining the 
reporting of suspicions as a contractual obligation, effectively a codified witness rule, symbolises 
its value and importance to the organisation. Weaver and Trevino (1999) describe this as 
‘watching out’ for ethics role identity as a feature of values orientated organisations that support 
the justice motives of their staff. They warn, however, that in the absence of management 
support, employees see reporting on colleagues as ‘snitching’ rather than part of the job Weaver 
and Trevino (1999). Secondly, for those who waver due to a perceived role conflict, the 
contractual term provides a ready mechanism for rationalising the reporting of suspicions as 
necessary to avoid inviting disciplinary action upon themselves. Thirdly, it signals to any person 
perpetrating fraud or any other proscribed behaviour that colleagues are likely to report them. 
 
Counter-fraud policy 
 
A specific counter-fraud policy is a basic anti-fraud requirement (Comer, 2003; Brooks, Button 
and Frimpong, 2009). DEF’s policy title reflects a prevention and deterrence mentality typical of 
modern corporations (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p16): “Policy implemented to avoid or 
discourage any fraud in Eurocorp Group.” It begins by referencing and emphasising the shared 
values encoded in the General Principles of Conduct and Action throughout the global group of 
companies: 
 
“All members of staff are personally bound to implement the Eurocorp Principles of 
Conduct and Action, applying them being a pre-requisite for belonging to the Group.” 
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The policy references external authorities to justify its legal and moral basis, the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the OECD Anti-bribery Convention. Citing the 
international bodies emphasises the gravity of the principles, locates the company as a 
responsible citizen within the wider social environment and places the organisation in august 
company. It also maintains the parallel coercive and consensual mentalities running through the 
governance regime (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p27). The policy then makes two statements 
which express the company’s aspirations: 
 
“The Eurocorp Group will not tolerate any fraud in the exercise of its activities or its 
operations.”  
 
“Any case of fraud must be reported quickly and will lead to an in-depth investigation; 
disciplinary action will be taken against the guilty parties and the appropriate legal 
measures will be taken to recover the misappropriated funds.” 
 
The policy outlines the responsibilities of management and staff in preventing fraud, anti-fraud 
awareness training, conducting fraud risk assessments, co-operating with investigations, 
reporting suspicions and protecting any person ‘expressing their legitimate suspicions’. Without 
confidence that they will be protected from reprisals, employees are unlikely to raise their 
concerns or use whistleblowing arrangements (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). Several routes are 
available to employees for reporting suspicions: to any level of management or to a confidential 
hotline, which is manned 24 hours per day. Sanctions of some form are a necessary component 
in the development and maintenance of an ethical climate (Trevino, Weaver, Gibson and Toffler, 
1999; Bandura, 1976, p121). Button and Gee (2013, p131) urge organisations to use all sanctions 
legitimately available to them, including parallel sanctions, in order to underpin counter-fraud 
strategies. DEF’s fraud policy explicitly stipulates that disciplinary, civil recovery, criminal 
prosecution or a combination of actions will be pursued against employees implicated in fraud. 
The policy requires the submission of reports on all detected frauds and counter-fraud activities 
to senior management weekly, monthly and twice yearly. Regular reports are important for 
securing counter-fraud strategy support at the highest level (Button and Gee, 2013, p160). 
 
The ‘Fraud Response Plan’ is appended to the counter-fraud policy. It is similar to the framework 
recommended by Comer (2003, p105). The document describes the various liaison roles of line 
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management, investigators, HR, auditors and the police in the nodal network (Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003, p138). The plan details the required contents of investigation reports: 
 
- when and how the suspicions were reported 
- how the investigations were conducted and by whom 
- the facts and evidence 
- the measures taken to recover the misappropriated sums 
- the measures taken against the persons accused 
- the action plan to avoid recurrence 
 
Beneath the fraud response plan is the Fraud Investigations Procedure. The procedure is 
necessarily not prescriptive in providing an outline guide of how a suspected fraud incident is 
taken on and processed. The document describes the role of the investigators and their authority 
to access all forms of information belonging to the business including paper, electronic and 
verbal through formal interviews. 
 
Incorporating counter-fraud into other procedures 
 
Building elements of fraud policies and procedures into other company procedures and contracts 
is a fundamental requirement of a successful counter-fraud strategy (Comer, 2003). DEF’s ethical 
codes are reinforced internally by repetition and interpretation in appropriate policies and 
procedures.  The first sentence of the Purchasers Charter, for example, specifically references the 
Principles of Conduct and Action: “This document is a supplement to the Eurocorp Principles of 
Conduct and Action and represents an application of these principles to the Purchasing function 
in the Group.” It then goes on to describe how the principles are applied to the management of 
the supply chain: 
 
 compliance with anti-corruption and conflict of interest policies 
 regular job rotation of the buyer to avoid close personal relationships 
 formally record all discussions with suppliers 
 communicate internally justification for purchasing decisions 
 avoid dependency on single suppliers 
 no unfair practices to obtain business secrets from others 
 compliance with environmental, health and safety standards 
112 
 
 use only suppliers which comply with conventional standards for labour, environmental, 
health and safety (International Labour Organization Conventions, ISO14001 and 
ISO18001 or equivalents) 
 supplier audits to identify and manage ethical and commercial risks in the supply chain 
 
A notable feature of the Charter is that it is substantially a series of instructions and rules. At the 
procedural level, the abstract value concepts of the Principles of Conduct are too ambiguous, 
interpretable and context dependent. Ultimately in order to give the values tangible meaning and 
relevance to employees’ daily lives, they are interpreted through the legal principles of the 
Conduct of Action into formulaic procedures and formal rules that govern the workplace 
(Schnatterly, 2003). Deviation from the values is thus measured by non-compliance with the 
formal rules of governance. 
 
How the company delivers its intentions: the Security and Compliance Department 
 
Security and compliance functions 
 
The nature of the business and its geographical spread provide numerous opportunities for 
internal and external fraud in purchasing, payroll, inventory manipulation, cash and credit 
transactions. A key business focus is inventory shrinkage. Consequently the management has 
developed a sophisticated strategy and range of tools to protect its physical and stockholding. 
The structural core of the strategy is the Security and Compliance Department (SCD) team based 
in the head office. It is a substantial department, employing 41 people. The team is a 
manifestation of the nodal security governance model promulgated by Johnston and Shearing 
(2003, p138). It sits on a network of internal and external relationships. Internally it works closely 
with Finance, Audit, Operations, Human Resources, and Health, Safety and Environment and is 
accountable through the local directors to the directors of the parent company, Eurocorp. 
Externally it has developed a network of relationships with police forces throughout the country 
and a small number of law firms. Mark, the team’s manager, described the purpose of the 
department in functional and information sharing terms: 
 
“The pillars of the whole team are business support, business compliance, investigations 
and security investigations so we have a lot of information flowing up and support across 
the teams. The teams work very closely together.” 
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Adding the physical security aspect of the department’s work to these three pillars, the four 
principal components of the company’s security and compliance strategy are illustrated in Figure 
7.1: physical security, business support, compliance control and enforcement. The integrated 
approach promotes knowledge and information exchange between support, detection and 
enforcement functions means that the BCP team not only reacts to all allegations of 
misbehaviour including fraud, it also pro-actively seeks signs of fraud, error and process failures 
through two key indicators of inventory: stock accuracy and cash reconciliation.  
 
Figure 7.1: DEF - Security and Compliance Department functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With a future orientated prevention mentality in mind (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p24), the 
team manages the physical security systems throughout the organisation, performs security risk 
assessments and arranges for installations, improvements and upgrades where required. The 
company does not employ manned guards; it relies on physically secured buildings, CCTV, remote 
monitoring and alarm systems for perimeter protection and internal space control (Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003, p79). 
 
An unusual attribute of the team compared to typical security departments as described by 
Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Button (2007) is the business support function. The team has 
evolved beyond the prevention model described by Johnston and Shearing (2003, p16): its staff 
write business procedures with the cooperation of the user departments, for example sales, 
purchasing and inventory procedures.  Thus security risk attenuation is central to the mentality in 
the organisation of these core business processes. The team is thus well placed to train the 
operational staff and provide advice on security, inventory management, standards and 
procedures to branch, area and senior management. The business support role also involves 
continuously monitoring and analysis of the inventory through the computerised business 
systems to optimise stock levels. It uses the resulting data to identify abnormalities in the 
inventory, sales and cash. The analyses are supported by periodic physical stock counts, 170 
every month so that every branch is audited twice per year. The business investigations role is 
Physical security 
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Infrastructure 
 Access control 
Internal space 
control 
Risk assessments 
Security planning 
Detection 
Business support 
Write procedures 
Training 
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Data analysis 
Discovery stock audits 
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distinct from the crime investigations. Its purpose is to identify the causes of abnormal 
circumstances, such as unexplained stock movements, unusually high customer refunds and 
disproportionate credit levels, and to recommend solutions. 
 
The primary purpose of the third element, compliance control, is to support the company’s 
commercial and ethical objectives by promoting, monitoring and ensuring adherence to the 
company’s principles and policies. The prevention of fraud and corruption is just one objective. 
The function acts as an information clearing house. All intelligence and incidents are logged and 
then subjected to a triage and tasking process which determines what happens next, if anything, 
and allocates the job to an appropriate member of the team. It receives information from the 
physical security and business support activities concerning apparent discrepancies, non-
compliances and indicators of crimes. It acts the central contact point for any employee who 
wants to report their concerns and suspicions about any matter that involves unethical conduct 
such as health and safety breaches, bullying, theft and fraud. It also receives referrals from the 
hotline operator. The company’s bank has proved to be an important network relationship 
Johnston and Shearing (2003, p148) for the compliance function. The bank cashiers advise the 
company of every discrepancy between cash deposits and the deposit slips. They also call when 
they find counterfeit notes. Just such an incident led to a request from a Branch Manager for 
advice:  
 
“Branch reported that they had been notified that 4 forged £20 notes had been found in 
banking from 18th June. Branch took £1720 on £20 notes on that day.Branch also stated 
they required information regarding detecting counterfeit notes” 
 
The enforcement function is principally a private investigation role which deals with the 
suspected crime incidents issued from the triage process. The investigators prepare evidence 
bundles according to the disposition of cases, whether disciplinary, civil or criminal. They then 
activate the security network (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p148) and liaise with the police, the 
Crown Prosecution Service, criminal lawyers, civil lawyers, banks, insurance companies and other 
businesses or internally with the operational management and HR. They frequently report 
incidents to the police or Actionfraud to share intelligence rather than in the expectation of an 
arrest. In 2012 the company made out 346 reports which led to 29 arrests, an attrition rate of 
92%. The team also responds to requests for assistance from other members of the broad 
security network. In 2012 the team responded to three Data Protection Act 1998 requests for 
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employee and customer information, allowed the police to conduct a surveillance operation from 
one of its offices and assisted the HMRC in a large fraud investigation. 
 
Organisational structure 
 
The organisational structure of the SCD team is in Figure 7.2. The team comprises three sub-
groups: 26 people monitor and analyse data, develop procedures, 7 undertake critical inventory 
audits and investigate failings, 7 are dedicated security and crime investigators. The security and 
crime team comprises trained professionals, both former police officers. All three groups provide 
advice and support to all areas of the business. 
 
Figure 7.2: DEF – Security and Compliance Department organisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following description of a “model” case by Mark illustrates the interactions between the 
components of the BCP department and the shift in responsibilities depending on the level of 
offending uncovered. The illustration commences with the detection of a problem through the 
business systems and concludes with a complaint to the police. 
 
“If it's a low level cash refund problem, we will investigate it using the investigation team. 
They come along, go to site, look at the evidence there. It might be breach of procedures, 
just not complete on signing them off or whatever it might be. It will just be a short 
report and operations management can decide whether any disciplinary is needed or 
some retraining to do; we might use some of our own business support team to follow 
  Business Controls and    
  Procedures Manager   
  (PSM20) 
  26 employees 
  Business controls 
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  ISO standards 
 7 employees 
 Business investigations   
 Stock accounting 
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through and make sure that the branch are aware of what they are signing off and what 
documentation should be kept, that process side of it. 
 
But if there is then a breach and evidence of multiple cash refunds going somewhere, a 
credit card or whatever then we will go that much further with it, identify the individual 
and then it will be through a disciplinary process. If we then find there's fraud or 
employee theft, we'll build the evidence packages and the exhibits and report it to the 
police. We do have a policy that every crime we find we report to the police.” 
  
Training 
 
Training is an essential attribute for ensuring procedural compliance (Braithwaite and Fisse, 
1987), gaining commitment to crime prevention programmes (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, 
p80), introducing counter-fraud cultures (Button and  Brooks, 2009) and developing a high 
functioning ethical climate (Trevino and Weaver, 2003). Training and advice is a key responsibility 
of all areas of the BCP team. The training takes two forms: formal input training and the “on-the-
job” feedback training described in the “model” case. The formal training material focuses on 
three interrelated operational objectives which are defined as follows: 
 
Prevention = remove the opportunity / rationalisation element through risk assessments, 
whistleblowing, embedding tone from the top, fraud indicators and checklists 
 
Protection = robust controls and procedures, compliance checking, training and 
awareness, monitoring 
 
Pursuit and detection = central tasking and support, convert intelligence into evidence, 
preserving existing evidence, swift and concise action, police and legal liaison, 
prosecution advice, confidentiality 
 
The prevention objective references the removal of the opportunity and rationalisation elements 
of the fraud triangle (Cressey, 1953). All the training materials are available on the company’s 
intranet. The overheads produced for the training package include screenshots of the intranet 
showing how to access procedures, and how to report crimes through the computer system or 
through the confidential hotline. The company uses an external provider for on-line training in 
anti-bribery, corruption and competition law. 
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Publicity, recognition and reward 
 
The SCD team promotes its visibility and activities through its contributions to team briefings and 
a column in the company newsletter under the strap-line “Security Watch”. Short articles 
describing fraud events and examples of behaviour to be aware of refresh the anti-crime 
message and its perceived value to the business. By co-locating the articles alongside features on 
business initiatives, health and safety, environmental programmes and charitable activities, crime 
prevention is set in the context of positive social values. Mark uses the newsletter along with 
training, visual displays and team briefings to stimulate attention to the anti-fraud message. The 
articles affirm the normative value of engaging with the SCD team by recognising the 
contribution of named employees who have stepped forward to report their suspicions. This 
simple, no cost reward by recognition technique publicly acknowledges the value of the 
individual and their contribution to the company. It is the sort of management technique 
advocated by scholars of organisational ethics (Brown, Tevino and Harrison, 2005), that is to 
reward ethical behaviour and not just focus on punishing unethical behaviour. Employees’ 
contributions to the compliance and crime prevention climate are also recognised at 
performance appraisals and when considering promotion opportunities (Weaver, Trevino and 
Cochran, 1999a). 
 
Delivering the company’s intentions: detection, watchers and learning opportunities 
 
In addition to the procedural documents that proclaim the values and behavioural expectations 
of the company, working documents and reports were provided as evidence that the company 
does what it says. The most powerful evidence is the ‘Incident Log’ and the ‘Offender Outcome’ 
reports. The Incident Log is a server database that records brief details of every security related 
incident brought to the attention of the SCD team and every prevention intervention by the 
team. The annual ‘Offender Outcome’ report lists all the offenders and associated sanctions. 
Mark provided the records for 2012. Table 7.1 summarises the data from both reports. Of the 
1,475 events recorded, 310 are prevention and administrative activities, the remaining 1,153 
entries are records of actual and potential incidents of damage, harm and financial loss. Of these, 
646 are actual financial loss episodes (see Table 5.7 of Chapter 5). The total number of detected 
fraud loss incidents is 278 worth £655,708; 179 are external fraud events (£474,430) and 99 are 
employee frauds (£181,278). 
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Table 7.1: DEF Group - summary of security incidents 2012 
 
Category of harm Incidents 
External 
arrests 
Internal 
dismiss 
& 
arrests 
Employees 
disciplined / 
dismissed 
No 
outcome 
No 
outcome 
% 
Direct 
shrinkage 
loss £ 
Net loss 
£ 
Admin 310 - - - - - - - 
         
Accident - fire 3       3 100%     
Accident - RTA 1   
 
  1 100% 
 
  
Arson 4   
 
  4 100% 
 
  
Bad debt 5   
 
  5 100% 
 
  
Burglary 44 2     42 95% 88,081 88,081 
Burglary - attempted 43   
 
  43 100% 
 
  
Careless stewardship 4     5 / 2 0 0% 902 0 
Drugs / alcohol 2   
 
1 / 0 1 50% 
 
  
Drugs / alcohol - RTA 1   1   0 0% 
 
  
Fraud - external 179 8   43 / 2 140 78% 474,430 434,432 
Fraud - external - 
attempted 
108   
 
  108 100% 
 
  
Fraud / theft - 
internal 
99   13 67 / 24 33 33% 181,278 150,591 
Harassment by 
management 
5   
 
1 / 1 4 80% 
 
  
Health and safety 8   
 
3 / 0 5 63% 
 
  
Procedures breach - 
incurred loss 
93     59 / 13 48 52% 160,035 114,851 
Procedures breach - 
no loss 
193   
 
  193 100% 
 
  
Smoking 1   
 
1 / 0 0 0% 
 
  
Intelligence 106   
 
  106 100% 
 
  
Theft - external 179 8   1 / 0 171 96% 138,151 135,069 
Theft - unknown 48     1 / 0 47 98% 39,602 38,387 
Theft - unknown - 
attempted 
36   
 
  36 100% 
 
  
Threats / assaults by 
public 
3       3 100%     
         
Totals 1,165 18 14 182 / 42 993 85% 
  
         
Total detected 
shrinkage 
646 18 13 176 / 41 481 74% 1,082,479 961,411 
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Crime and compliance patrols 
 
The 310 recorded prevention activities include responding to false and real security alarms, 
arranging new security systems and attending branches for stock loss investigations, branch 
reviews, risk assessments and security audits. These branch visits provide opportunities for 
engagement with operational staff, emphasizing the company’s policies and raising the profile of 
the supportive and enforcement functions of the SCD team. Their primary purpose is not crime 
detection. Just as the police patrol is an ineffective means of crime detection and prevention 
(Button, 2002, p110), branch visits rarely stumble upon criminal activity, but when they do they 
can be very valuable. The following is a summary of an SCD case report. 
 
David, a Business Support Analyst visited the Middlemarch branch to review 
stock location identifiers. He overheard a customer making a complaint 
regarding goods she had ordered. David decided to examine the relevant sales 
transaction on the sales system. He found that a cash deposit refund had been 
generated in October and the money credited to a Visa Debit card under the 
operator user code “AA”. He searched for further sales transactions related to 
the same card and found that Sales Assistant Angela Andreescu had made a 
staff purchase using the card. Suspicions raised, David extended his search on 
the system and found a number of refunds totalling £1,993 credited to 
Andreescu. He called the Crime Investigations Team. Investigator Harris 
attended the branch the following day and interviewed Andreescu. She 
immediately admitted to the frauds and named a customer, Tom O’Reilly, as a 
conspirator. O’Reilly would arrange for trade colleagues to purchase goods from 
the branch. Andreescu would charge these customers the full price but show a 
discount on the sales system. She credited the difference as a deposit refund to 
her personal account and shared the proceeds with O’Reilly. Andreescu was 
immediately suspended, reported to the police and arrested. Harris continued 
his investigations the following day and discovered 391 fraudulent transactions 
using the same script dating back to August 2009 with a total value of £34,718. 
Andreescu was charged with eight counts of fraud in the following February. 
O’Reilly admitted his role in the conspiracy and became a witness for the 
prosecution. 
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The report concluded that Andreescu’s discount refund fraud resulted from 
inadequate supervision. She had manipulated her line managers by giving the 
impression of being a trustworthy, keen and ambitious member of staff. The 
report recommended that line managers pay more attention to staff members 
who are working remotely to prevent abuse of trust. 
 
The characteristics of the case are worth exploring. Andreescu was a habitual, opportunistic 
offender who was not under financial pressure and conspired with others to exploit an 
unforeseen weakness in the company’s controls. Her husband was a successful businessman and 
she admitted using the money to finance the building of a house close to her family in Romania. 
The Middlemarch outlet was a small branch normally run by two sales staff. However the second 
employee was frequently absent whilst covering absences at another branch. The regional 
management’s control thus rested on trust. Management need to be continuously alive to the 
potential implications of changes at branches. The management also needs to be aware of the 
potential damage from a high volume of low value frauds. The scheme had remained below the 
radar for over two years because the average value of each event was just £89. Nevertheless once 
detected, the SCD team and the business systems proved their worth in encouraging a rapid 
admission of guilt: the total time from detection to arrest was just two days. 
 
Business analytics 
 
Whilst the constant monitoring of the core business processes through the company’s computer 
systems is an efficient means of identifying problems, human intervention is required to identify 
the cause.  The analytical methods are not data-mining techniques designed to detect fraud 
Button and Gee (2013, p109), rather they direct the Business Investigation Team to examine 
significant sales and inventory problems which may then expose fraud as the cause. For example, 
during 2012 the cashiers detected 149 incidents of cash discrepancies worth £317,717. The 
majority were simple counting and processing errors, but 12 incidents worth £15,697 were 
classified as fraud. Two of these incidents valued at £8,612 resulted in the arrest of two 
employees. Culpable individuals could not be identified in the remaining 10 cases. 
 
In the following case a SCD analyst detected a credit refund problem at their Ayr branch.  
 
In January 2011, an analyst identified a significant increase in refunds to 
customers. A member of the Business Investigations Team, Matthew Hunt, was 
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despatched to conduct a review of the credits. He found a number of suspicious 
refunds to several customers, but all credited to just two credit cards, and 
neither card had been used in any original purchase. The investigation identified 
54 events over a 30 month period. The total loss was £27,576. Two days later a 
member of the Crime Investigations Team, Michael Harris, attended the branch 
and interviewed the Sales Manager, Gerry Wallace, under caution. Wallace 
admitted to the frauds, citing pressure due to a gambling addiction. He claimed 
he had claimed he intended refunding the money. He was immediately 
suspended and then dismissed 17 days later. He was finally arrested 20 days 
after first detection. The company quickly recovered £7,004: Wallace returned 
£4,630 to the company and £2,374 of final salary was retained. 
 
The investigation report concluded that the offences occurred as a result of 
poor supervision and controls. The Branch Manager resigned. The report 
recommended that all card refunds must be returned to the original card of 
purchase. 
 
This case was similar to the Andreescu’s discount refund scheme. A key difference was the level 
of refund. The average event value in the Ayr scheme was £511, sufficient to alert the analysts of 
a potential problem. The investigators responded within two days to identify the scheme and the 
perpetrator. The police would not be able to act so quickly. Because the internal team knows the 
business, the procedures and the operation of the systems, they are able to build accurate 
evidence very quickly. The rapid momentum of the Andreescu and Harris investigations 
overwhelmed the defendants and led to speedy admissions of guilt. Once a fraud has been 
detected, SCD’s business system becomes a powerful tool for the investigators. In the Wallend 
case described later in this chapter, the investigators used the business system to monitor the 
sales out of the branch to a prohibited customer. The Branch Manager and his assistant were 
oblivious to the risk of detection through the keyboard. It appears that employees become so 
accustomed to the ever-presence of the inert computer screen that they forget that it creates an 
indelible record of transactions that become evidence for subsequent investigations: 
 
“Whilst some of the cases can be quite complex in the way that they do things, they are 
never that bad that you can't build a good solid case out of the evidence with a good ERP 
[Enterprise Resource Planning] system at the back of it. Some people have the visions 
that if they rip the piece of paper up in the branch, that's the evidence gone. We have 
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that mentality of people in the branches sometimes. So it is very easy to build a case and 
present the file for it.” 
 
An important product of the work of the analytical function is a cleaner database. The reduced 
error noise levels assists the investigators to identify and extract cogent evidence. Interview 
participant Eric, a former police officer and current security consultant, explained how weak 
transactional controls and poorly maintained computer records frustrates investigations: 
 
“If I go to the Police with a case and there's so many loopholes, no controls, balances or 
systems whatsoever, and the computer records were all over the place, the chances of 
getting a successful prosecution would be very, very difficult. So if there's nothing in 
place there would be no evidence to prosecute. Some of the local authorities are a bit 
like that: they do not have systems and controls in place and something goes missing and 
allegations are made, but there is no real record.” 
 
Watchers and informants 
 
The Incident Log contains 148 entries that are initially classified as ‘Information’, records of 
intelligence gathering from anonymous internal and external whistleblowers (informants), and 
concerns, complaints and suspicions raised by identified managers and other employees 
(watchers). The following is a typical example that illustrates the value of responsible managers 
flagging problems early. In this case a new branch manager suspected the previous manager, 
who had relocated to another branch, of a £3,120 fraud loss. The manager was dismissed: 
 
“GM John Smith reported that ex BM Harry Wilson several months ago requested to 
return to his old branch of Cardiff. His transfer has taken place and John Smith has found 
that 6 boilers value £3000 are missing and Harry Wilson has given goods valued £120 to a 
customer free of charge.” 
 
The security team receives about 40 calls each year on the confidential hotline. However a close 
examination of the database reveals that 80% of the 1,153 recorded harm and loss episodes are 
not detected by confidential whistleblower reports, cold analytics or proactive forensics, rather 
they are brought to the attention of the security team by employees through normal 
management channels. This form of ‘speaking up’ is encouraged by the company, not only in 
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respect of concrete allegations but also in relation to more indeterminate intelligence and 
questionable, attitudes and behaviour of employees which could signal fraud: 
 
“One thing that we keep pushing is knowing your staff. The number of times that you 
hear that Fred in the warehouse has been caught and the manager then says, ‘I always 
wondered about him because every time I see him he's not doing this or is doing that… 
But you get two types of people. Those who accept what's going on around them, and 
those who wonder.’” 
 
The willingness of the employees to act as ethical monitors or watchers is a reflection of the 
positive ethical climate of the organisation (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). The support of 
management is crucial in empowering a greater number of employees to question observed 
behaviour and not simply accept it as normal. The following is an Incident Log entry that 
illustrates the value of the intelligence gathering and security alerts that the climate promotes. In 
this instance a fraud was prevented by a previous security alert: 
 
 “Branch reported that on 24th September a male who gave his name as Hugh Bullock 
(sic) contacted the branch claiming to have a Smith Builders account and wants to 
convert to a Dennis Plumber acc so he can purchase bulk Vaillant boilers. Staff aware of 
Security circulation in June that this male is a fraudster.” 
 
Because speaking truth to power requires moral courage (Ramamoorti, Morrison, Koletar and 
Pope, 2013, p109) or enhanced internal locus of control (Rotter, 1966), complaining about the 
behaviour of line managers can be very difficult for employees. A feature of organisations with 
strong ethical climates is their employees’ confidence that such complaints will be handled 
effectively and sympathetically. In the following case a DEF supervisor attempted to coerce two 
employees into a fraudulent conspiracy to misappropriate boilers. The drivers rightly felt that 
they would receive management support when they reported the incident. The supervisor was 
subsequently sacked: 
 
“Area Director Colin Farley reported that 2 Drivers from the branch had both reported 
that the Warehouse Supervisor had approached them individually and asked them if they 
would take boilers out of the branch without paperwork. Both Drivers refused and the 
Supervisor then stated goods could be left in their cab (without paperwork) which they 
would take out of the branch and then they would be in real trouble.” 
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Though the majority of the records are related to financial loss from criminal activity, Table 7.1 
shows the range of misbehaviour the security team deals with, from arson, traffic accidents and 
substance abuse to breaches of health and safety procedures. The important observation is that 
DEF’s management respond to all reports in the same proportionate way irrespective of the 
nature of the alleged behaviour. Fraud is not addressed more leniently or aggressively than any 
other offence. The safety incidents include a branch manager warned for keeping an air rifle in 
his office and a fork lift truck driver disciplined for refusing to wear a seat belt. Seven of the 
complaints brought to the attention of the SCD team describe the offensive behaviour of 
managers towards staff and customers. In the following example the manager was dismissed: 
 
 “Area Director Lorne George who reported that staff have complained about the 
behaviour of BM Frank Rollins who is constantly swearing at staff in front of customers. 
He also has been sexual harassing Sales Assistant Amanda Brown.” 
 
Although classic anonymous whistleblowing is much rarer than reports through normal 
management channels, it does expose fraudsters. The Jefferson case introduced in Chapter 6 was 
the largest fraud detected by the SCD team worth £850,000. The scheme was brought to the 
attention of Mark in 2008 by an initially anonymous whistleblower, but in due course turned out 
to be the aggrieved husband of the Financial Controller of one of the corrupt suppliers. His wife 
was having an affair with the Managing Director of the supplier. A more recent example is the 
following complaint received in 2012 and logged onto the incident register. It was a relatively 
minor payroll fraud and led to one final written warning and five verbal warnings. 
 
“Letter received from an employee who wished to remain anonymous making numerous 
allegations against the BM and the way he manages the branch, allowing drivers not to 
work the Saturday rota, allowing another staff member to drive the branch lorry in 
absence of driver, allowing Tool Hire staff to claim hours not worked, allowing staff to 
fraudulently alter their time sheets.” 
 
Procedural non-compliance: sanctions and on-the-job training 
 
Referring to Table 7.1, the number of employees disciplined for recklessness in their handling of 
the stock and sales processes illustrates the prominence of procedural compliance in the 
governance of the company. In total 109 employees were disciplined including 17 dismissals. 
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Included in these numbers is the apparently paradoxical statistic, the 43 employees disciplined 
for external fraud incidents. The statistic reflects the particular importance the management 
attach to procedural compliance for the maintenance of fraud defences. All 43 employees were 
sanctioned for failing to comply with customer verification and credit procedures. Their offences 
were not the original crimes but the lack of the required vigilance which amounted to a serious 
breach of internal controls. The following summarises a report by a DEF investigator. It illustrates 
how the company uses fraud incidents to reinforce internal controls through disciplinary 
procedures and on-the-job training. The investigators learnt of the frauds through its nodal 
relationship (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) with a bank. The script is a simple credit card fraud.  
 
Two Assistant Branch Managers, Stuart Jones and Jim Furnis working at the 
same location in Wallend accepted telephone orders from a customer using a 
Visa Debit card. The two orders worth £441.36 and £480.68 were placed within 
four days of each other. The goods were collected from the branch on the same 
days as the orders were placed. The bank called seventeen days after each sale 
to advise that the transactions had not been authorised by the cardholder. 
 
The SCD investigator attended the branch 6 days later to examine the 
transactional paperwork. Both invoices failed to show any means of identifying 
the customer: no customer details, signatures or vehicle registration numbers. 
Both employees admitted in interview that they did not ask to see the Visa 
Debit card when the customer attended the branch. Stuart Jones admitted that, 
with his experience, he should have known better. Jim Furnis had only been 
with the company for two weeks, was unaware of company procedures and did 
not think to ask for the debit card. 
 
The investigator reported the case to the police and passed it to the Branch 
Manager, Dennis Brown, for appropriate internal action. Jim Furnis received 
verbal counselling from Dennis Brown. Stuart Jones received a verbal warning. 
The investigator recommended that staff should be made aware of the 
company’s policy and procedures that require that credit card customers must 
attend the branch for an identity check before the goods are released. Any 
other person collecting the goods must pay by an alternative, legitimate means. 
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Conclusions 
 
Henry’s perception of the ethical climate of DEF is summarised by the epithet, “They live it.” As 
the head of the Crime Investigations Team and a former police officer, he clearly sees 
correspondence between an ethical climate and effective security governance and expresses this 
alignment in terms of the setting and acceptance of rules, including keeping to the speed limits. 
He also strongly associates the identity of the UK subsidiary (DEF) with the global group identity 
(Eurocorp):  
 
 “I was a police officer, worked in private investigation and now for Eurocorp. I have no 
hesitation in saying that Eurocorp displays the finest ethical behaviour I have ever seen of 
an organisation. They live it and that is very important. I was TUPE'd into DEF when they 
took over the investigation company I worked for. I travel from Scotland. It used to take 
4¼ hours. Since becoming an employee it's 5 hours. That's because they told me, ‘You 
stick to the speed limits.’ I'm a trained police driver so I know how to drive fast, but I 
don't, because that's how Eurocorp are. Ethical issues are very important to the board 
and that's been driven by the CEO in the UK and in France. Health and safety is the first 
agenda item at all board meetings.” 
 
A hard-nosed accountant’s measure of the development in the ethical climate of the company is 
the reduction in inventory shrinkage from £25M/y to £5.9M/y, 61% of which is fraud of all types 
and 16% is occupational fraud. The figures support the contention that counter-fraud work is a 
sound economic investment (Button and Gee, 2013, p181). From the sociological perspective a 
further meaningful metric is that nearly 1,000 recorded harm and loss episodes are reported in a 
year by identified employees through normal management channels and just 40 originate from 
anonymous whistleblowing. These figures suggest that, reflecting the social values of the 
organisation, ‘watching out for ethics’ (Weaver and Trevino, 1999) has become normalised 
behaviour within DEF. Braithewaite and Fisse (1987) describe such organisations as being full of 
‘antennae’ with a culture that is alert to compliance problems. The evidence suggests that the 
company, which really means its leadership and management, are sincere in that they enact what 
they espouse. (Gruys, Stewart, Goodstein, Bing, and Wicks, 2008) identify such values enactment 
as a cornerstone in the integration of ethical values into employees’ work lives. 
 
The company’s counter-fraud strategy is not an isolated endeavour, it is integrated within the 
broader security and ethical compliance programme (Greening and Gray, 1994). Management 
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deals with occupational fraud in the same way as any other serious offence. It is not ignored, 
brushed aside or covered up, irrespective of role or seniority.  It is not an unmentionable dirty 
word or disease, rather it is carefully defined, labelled, exposed and confronted. Consequently 
fraud’s perceived equivalence to external theft, burglary and other similar criminal acts 
empowers employees to escalate their concerns through normal reporting mechanisms with the 
expectation that they will be addressed. The company’s management maintains these 
perceptions by using the sanctions toolbox (Button and Gee, 2013, p133) in a proportionate 
manner for specific and general deterrence purposes (Maguire, 2002). Disciplinary warnings are 
used alongside on-the-job training to encourage improved behaviour and work performance, 
dismissals remove risk and criminal prosecution is the principal general deterrence tool. The 
external state justice systems have become an integral feature of the DEF’s counter-fraud 
strategy. Chapter 8 provides an insight into some of the difficulties the company encounters in 
accessing the justice systems.  
 
As elucidated in Chapters 5 and 6, most of the occupational fraud offenders are occasional 
offenders who fit the Cressey (1953) model, individuals pressured by personal circumstances. A 
minority are habitual, high value offenders. The nature and structure of the business with 
approximately 1,000 branches distributed throughout the country means that the vast bulk of 
the operational staff operate in small groups remote from central control and from each other. 
Occasionally therefore, following the differential association model, local climates emerge which 
stimulate corrupt groups. 
 
Inevitably the company’s influence in shaping the social universe outside is negligible. 
Consequently it relies on a situational crime prevention mentality (Clarke, 1980) to protect itself 
against external fraudsters. These defences rely to a great extent on the vigilance of its people 
and, to a lesser extent, its external security network. However the important observation is that 
its emphasis on shared ethical values and on compliance with fraud resilient procedures has 
proved to be an effective security mentality (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p29) in relation to 
both internal and external fraud. 
 
One of the strengths of DEF’s approach is that it uses core business activity metrics, relating to 
inventory shrinkage to detect fraud. Monitoring sales, refunds, cash and inventory for 
abnormalities exposes process failures which are investigated and dealt with, whether fraud, 
error or negligence. The major shortcoming is that similar methods have not been rolled out to 
other business processes, such as purchasing and payroll, which are not perceived to be key 
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business drivers. The management team appears to have a blind spot in relation to these “back 
office” functions that can generate particularly high hazard risks as illustrated by the Jefferson 
contract bribery fraud case. Indeed, in observing that ethical complaints from suppliers were 
rare, Mark suggested that those they have received were motivated by an unwarranted selfish 
grievance: 
 
“We don't get very many from suppliers but where they are it's usually because they've 
lost a contract and somebody else has got it so they're a bit suspicious about why they've 
lost it.” 
 
That none of the incidents logged in 2012 originated with reports from suppliers indicates that 
management has not reached out sufficiently in communicating its ethical values to suppliers in 
order to harden its security defences against contract bribery frauds. Just as Weaver and Trevino 
(1999) and others argue that the grand ethical themes can be decoupled from the normal 
activities of an organisation, so elements of a theme can be decoupled, perhaps through 
ignorance, oversight or deliberate intent. The dangers of ignoring the supply chain are examined 
further in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 8 
 
DEF Group Case Study Part II: The Sanctions Toolbox 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 7 traced the values of DEF Group from its proclaimed ethical code through its structures 
and written procedures to the behavioural responses of its employees. The attributes and traits 
of the business suggest a values orientated organisation (Weaver and Trevino, 1999) with an 
integrated ethics programme (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999b). An important component of 
its security and compliance strategy is the use of sanctions to signal its opprobrium towards fraud 
and corruption, to support the justice motives of its employees (Weaver and Trevino, 1999) and 
for deterrence purposes (Maguire, 2002; Bandura, 1976, p121).  
 
Classical theory states that punishment should be certain, quick, understandable and 
proportionate to the offence (Newburn, 2007, p115). As much of the empirical crime research, 
particularly white-collar crime, that has attempted to measure the deterrence efficacy of each of 
these dimensions has been based on unrepresentative recidivist statistics (Weisburd, Waring and 
Chayet, 1995; 2001) and vignette perception studies (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001; 2003) the results 
are inconsistent. There is consensus that certainty of detection has a deterrent effect, but the 
evidence in relation to speed and severity is inconclusive (Maguire, 2002; Paternoster, 2010). 
Maguire (2004) concludes that sentencing has a limited capacity for reducing recidivism, but his 
research data is based on street crimes and active, repeat offenders. A common weakness of the 
studies is their failure to isolate the personality trait variables of the participants or the 
individuals behind the statistics. Deterrence theorists have generally assumed that everyone is 
motivated rationally by their perceptions of risk (Paternoster, 1987). Yet people do not all 
perceive risks in the same way. Jacobs (2010) defines deterrability as the willingness to engage in 
rational choice calculations. Pogarsky (2002) describes three types of people: the acute 
conformists who would not contemplate fraud, incorrigible offenders who are impervious to 
dissuasion and the deterrable majority. Referring to the ethical distribution (Figure 6.2) in 
Chapter 6, it may be expected that those in the deterrable majority (Pogarsky, 2002) with higher 
levels of cognitive moral development (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977) would be put off by the 
prospect of detection, dismissal and stigmatisation penalties (Nagin and Paternoster, 1994), 
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whilst those at a lower stage of moral development would require firmer sanctions. Chapter 6 
posited that most occupational fraudsters are not sociopaths, they are psychologically normal 
people. As such they ought to be susceptible to the conditioning effect of visible sanctions. 
 
Button and Gee (2013, p133) describe the available range of sanctions as the “sanctions toolbox” 
and provide an extensive list of criminal, civil, regulatory and private sanctions. This chapter 
explores some of the problems associated with criminal, civil and disciplinary routes. The 
examination of DEF’s sanctions policy and the company’s interaction with its security network 
(Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p138), including the state justice systems, provides an insight into 
the difficulties, frustrations and unexpected consequences experienced by the company’s 
management as they strive to maintain an effective counter-fraud climate.  
 
Attrition 
 
One measure of the effectiveness of DEF’s control and prevention strategy is illustrated by 
achieving a reduction in shrinkage over a decade from £25M/y (2.1% of sales) to £5.9M/y 
(0.49%), of which 88% is losses from criminal activity, 61% is fraud of all types and 16% is 
occupational fraud. A second measure is the attrition rate. Referring to Table 7.1, the incident 
attrition rate for external frauds is 97% including the 108 prevented frauds; the lower attrition 
rate for internal fraud / theft is 33%. Evidently the company’s management are able to intervene 
far more in the deceitful behaviour of employees than external parties, even if it is just 
disciplinary warnings: 43 of the employees implicated in internal frauds received warnings, 
principally because there was insufficient evidence to justify dismissal and reporting to the police. 
Management’s specific deterrence (Maguire, 2002) aspiration in these circumstances is to use 
social learning theory to adjust employees’ behaviour to the normative values of the group 
(Bandura, 1976). Of the 37 employees who were dismissed and reported to the police, 13 were 
arrested, an attrition rate of 65%. For just the external burglary, fraud and theft categories, the 
police were called 309 times leading to 18 arrests, an attrition rate of 94%. Expressed in fractions, 
the arrest rate for internal crimes is 1 in 3, for external crimes it is 1 in 17. 
 
Ethical distribution and the sanctions toolbox 
 
The axiomatic conclusion that can be drawn from the attrition data is that the organisation is 
virtually powerless in influencing the morals and behaviour of people outside of the company 
through the use of sanctions. There it relies on wider social norms, the law enforcement agencies 
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and hardening its defences (Clarke, 1980). However the ready access to evidence, available 
witnesses and a relatively small pool of possible suspects makes occupational cases easier to 
investigate and conclude. Consequently management should be able to exercise more choice 
over the appropriate justice route when dealing with errant employees. Reflecting on the ethical 
distribution and offender models developed in Chapter 6, management needs those options, a 
sanction toolbox (Button and Gee, 2013, p133), to ensure a proportionate response to each 
incident (Newburn, 2007, p115), one that reflects the organisation’s ethical values (Trevino, 
Weaver, Gibson and Toffler, 1999) and governance mentality (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p7). 
A disciplinary slap is insufficient for an habitual, low moral offender; a criminal record is perhaps 
too severe for the falsification of one stock record to hide a mistake. A sanctions policy should 
reflect that even minor frauds are more serious than poor work performance. One size does not 
fit all. However in the following sections we learn that ready access to evidence is not the sole 
determinant of accessible justice. 
 
 
Justice rationalisation: judicial, internal or none at all 
 
The person responsible for administering the justice processes within the company depends on 
the nature of the offence. For lower level infractions, disciplinary proceedings are administered 
by the immediate line manager. However the SCD team is authorised to intervene and 
investigate any case which appears to involve criminal behaviour. The trigger for the Crime 
Investigation team to completely take over a case is the decision to dismiss. Once an employee 
has been dismissed, the line manager’s responsibility naturally evaporates. The case is then 
administered at the head office and decisions to actively pursue civil or criminal justice sits with 
the Crime Investigation team. Of the three justice routes pursued by Mark, criminal sanctions are 
the lowest priority: 
 
“We tell ops [operations] there are three principles really: get the guy out of the business 
so remove the risk, which is why we tend to get the suspension and disciplinary process 
over as quick as we can, recover any losses, then look for the criminal.” 
 
Mark’s perception of the purpose of sanctions accords with the observations of Johnston and 
Shearing (2003, p24). They suggest that security governance strategies typically only seek 
punishment for past events to bolster future prevention through enhanced general deterrence. 
Following classical Beccarian theory (Newburn, 2007, p115), Mark seeks the general deterrence 
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utility of a sanction that is proportionate to the egregiousness of the crime. For him the message 
that the sanction symbolises is important. Consequently the company’s policy is to report all 
employee fraud incidents to the police: 
 
“Consistent policy and consistent message that people then know in the business that if 
we are going to find something then we are going to report it. There is no reconciliation 
or negotiation on the exit of a person, saying, ‘You can resign and we won't police it.’ It's 
very clear, ‘If you offend, we will report it and we will go through the disciplinary 
process.’ It's a non-negotiable process.” 
 
 
Criminal prosecution 
 
An important aspect of the “always report fraud” policy is in its symbolic discrimination between 
fraud and poor work performance. We have already seen in Chapter 7 that DEF’s security and 
ethical values are maintained by disciplining non-compliance and poor work performance, and it 
occasionally leads to dismissal. If the strongest sanction applied to fraudsters were only ever 
dismissal, it would signal to the workforce that fraud is no more serious than poor performance. 
The risk in the policy is its reliance on the police and prosecution services to give it meaning. In 
the Jefferson case the positive messages from Jefferson’s dismissal and the recovery of losses 
were undermined by the negative message broadcast by the failure of the criminal prosecution: 
 
“No criminal record. Should he serve a prison sentence? From a personal and corporate 
point of view, yes. From a tax payer point of view, I'm not quite sure because I suspect he 
will never re-offend.…….The negative bit for us is the negative message it sends out 
internally in the business: Jefferson’s got off.” 
 
Mark’s concerns can be interpreted in organisation ethics theory terms (Trevino, Weaver, Gibson 
and Toffler, 1999): in the absence of any prosecutions, the promise to report all offenders to the 
police would be empty rhetoric. It would undermine the management’s credibility and threaten 
the sustainability of the organisation’s espoused values (Gruys, Stewart, Goodstein, Bing, and 
Wicks, (2008). In deterrence theory terms (Maguire, 2002), Mark is anxious that a lack of 
successful prosecutions would subvert the organisation’s parochial deterrence ambitions. Though 
the company’s ambitions are narrower in scope, they nevertheless align with the utilitarian 
objective of the state’s prosecution and punishment apparatus to suppress criminality in the 
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wider society (general deterrence) and to reform the criminogenic behaviour of convicted 
individuals (specific deterrence) (Maguire, 2002). An eager organisational victim with ready 
access to evidence and witnesses would seem to provide the law enforcement agencies with a 
rich vein of opportunities to deliver these objectives. However Mark’s experience concurs with 
the observations of Doig and Levi (2013) that the state bodies have a different view and their 
priorities frequently lie elsewhere:  
 
“We had a case down in Surrey last year and we dismissed him, recovered the costs, 
about £1,800, and we got a letter from the police saying that they would not be 
progressing it any further because currently fraud was not one of their agenda items, 
they were concentrating on domestic violence and burglaries. So thanks very much and 
off we go.” 
 
 
His perception is that police interest declines when the reported offences are low in value or 
some form of private justice has already been secured. He sees these instances as missed 
opportunities for the criminal justice system to apply an effective specific deterrence before 
neophyte offenders develop into habitual criminals. 
 
“[The police say] ‘What do you want us to do with that? He's lost his job, you've got your 
money back. What do you want?’ I'd like the guy to have a criminal record because now 
that he is free on the streets, we have dismissed him, then there's every chance that he 
will go and work for a competitor of ours, get a job there and refine his technique and 
next time there'll be a £5,000 or £50,000 fraud. They say, ‘Surely when they employ him, 
don't get a reference?’ They might ask for a reference but in lots of cases we'll say that 
this person worked from date A to B, no more comment. That's the reference.” 
 
The neutral employment reference is indicative of an organisation’s unwillingness to label 
individuals unilaterally, even with a non-specific ‘gross misconduct’ or ‘poor performance’ 
description. Internally the individual’s employment record may be marked “fraudster” but to the 
outside world he is just an ex-employee. Organisations need the support of the courts in order to 
attach the fraudster label to an ex-employee, without it organisations risk libel claims. The result 
is that dismissal most often remains an unqualified, secret sanction. It fails to discriminate 
between fraudsters and those who were simply in the wrong job. Without a criminal record, or 
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indeed a successful civil claim, the power of dismissal as both a specific and general deterrence is 
substantially diminished. 
 
For a nationwide organisation such as DEF Group, the lack of consistency across the police forces 
is a significant problem. Mark cannot predict whether the police will take on a case. It depends 
more on local priorities, workload and competencies than the merits of the case:  
 
“That's a bit of a roulette, you get somebody who is quite keen and has heard about 
fraud and is a bit financial minded anyway and they get a case and go, ‘Fantastic, a fraud 
to get my teeth into.’ On the other hand you get a guy who has just come off traffic, 
‘What's all this? Debit is what?’ They are inconsistent. That's the problem that we have 
with them. We at times still come across officers that are not aware of the Fraud Act and 
who still talk about the Theft Act. We say, "What about abuse of position in the Fraud 
Act?" and they say, "Yes, that would be quite easy wouldn't it." We still get that in forces. 
We have this inconsistency of approach that the type of officer that gets to deal with it, 
the access to the CPS through the police, the agenda that the local force has.” 
 
The following case illustrates Mark’s frustration with the criminal justice system. The SCD team 
conducted two internal investigations, produced substantial evidence and laid out the case 
against two employees in detailed reports. DEF’s management took the view that the value and 
the conspiratorial nature of the frauds justified prosecution. Although the police took on the high 
value case, procedural competency escaped them. 
 
The Dennis Plumber branch was under close monitoring by the Business 
Investigations Team (BIT) because it had sold goods to customers whose 
accounts were on stop. The monitoring detected the continued sale of goods to 
the same customers. The BIT investigation was initiated in January 2011. It 
unearthed a profound failure in the local governance: 24 missing boilers, sales 
of televisions, false invoices, non-payment of goods, theft of cash and 
“deliberate and sustained attempt at manipulating the previous two stock 
counts”. The report made twelve detailed recommendations for ensuring 
compliance in the sales order processing and inventory management processes. 
The investigation calculated losses of £138,000 and immediately triggered a 
security investigation. 
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The subsequent crime investigation identified four fraud scripts: 
 
 Purchasing standard stock boilers and selling them for cash 
 Purchasing televisions which are not normal stock items and selling 
them for cash 
 Diverting goods from inter-branch transfers and selling them 
 Raising false sales orders followed by false refunds and selling the goods 
 
The investigators discovered that the goods were illicitly sold on Saturday 
morning and the inventory records falsified to disguise the crimes. Their report 
euphemistically refers to the arrangement as a ‘Saturday Club’. Three 
employees were dismissed and one received a written warning. As the two 
principal offenders, the Branch Manager (Austin Haine) and his Assistant 
Manager (Broderick Jones), were habitual offenders who were particularly 
innovative in using the company’s resources to fraudulently purchase and sell 
televisions, the Crime Investigations Team sustained the complaint made out to 
the police. The Branch Manager and his assistant were both arrested, charged 
with false accounting and theft. The Court hearing commenced one year later. 
However the case came to an abrupt halt and the defendants were discharged 
because, as reported in the local press, “…evidence and paperwork from Notts 
Police had not yet been completed and received by the court.”  
 
Mark finds that the response and level of engagement from the Crown Prosecution Service is, like 
the police, also unpredictable and inconsistent. The willingness of some CPS offices to engage 
early with DEF leads to more effective and efficient case management: the network nodes are 
brought closer together. Other offices refuse to engage with the victim and insist on routing all 
communications through the police. The stretched network links then rely on the motivation, 
competency and efficiency of the police. The conflux of weak policing and a remote prosecutor 
inevitably increases the risks of failure.   
 
“We get various responses from the CPS across the country even after going to the 
police. Some CPSs will not talk to us at all because they see it as a conflict between them 
and the police and some smart barrister will turn up at the end of the day and claim that 
this is a private prosecution being funded by the public. They will take that view if we get 
too cosy with the CPS. Some CPSs will say, ‘Come talk to us because we don't quite 
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understand this." When we've done that it has always worked to the benefit of 
everybody. We just think that if we can get in with a package in the first place to the CPS 
and present it and they can then decide whether there is enough there to go charge 
straight away or task an officer to go and do a bit more work. That's where we think we 
would have a better route. We think we lose something in the interpretation between 
what we give the officer and what the officer tells the CPS. You are then down to the 
officer's understanding of it to be able to relate it to the CPS. If they don't understand it 
then the CPS will just switch off because they've got too much on their desks as well.” 
 
Mark’s complaint of lack of support from the police and prosecution services is echoed by the 
observation of the company’s Group Security Manager, Henry, a former police officer, who 
succinctly characterised four problems with the police: lack of competent resource, prioritise 
cases under POCA 2002 where the police can share the recovered proceeds, no interest in private 
companies and internal incentives, a phenomenon characterised by Button (2011) as the “malign 
influence of KPIs”. 
 
“The CPS is not a strong organisation, not standing up when it should. It is easily put off 
from pursuing prosecutions. A lot of this is because they don't have strength in depth…. 
They [County A Police] are only interested in cases with no victims so they can get their 
share of the recoveries. But [County B Police] is only focusing on personal, individual and 
public money cases. They are not interested in private companies. The police inspectors 
and supers are targeted with bonuses. It's just wrong. It creates their own priorities, not 
public priorities. They're entrusted with public funds and it's just not the right way to use 
public funds. That's why they use all these speed cameras. They're looking for easy hits 
for Home Office targets. Totally short-sighted.” 
 
Dissatisfaction with the performance of the police was a very common complaint amongst the 
interview participants; for some participants their perceptions of the KPI culture within the police 
had deteriorated to contempt. One major building society has given up calling the police, their 
counter-fraud manager, Paul, also an ex-policeman said: 
 
“We have actually, this is confidential isn't it? We've got to the point where we have 
given up with the police. Because they're useless. I have told them that and they know 
it.... They are not interested in this at all. The government, my belief is this, they have 
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KPIs which are set at dealing with serious crime..... Oh, Christ, yes, you can go there, 
we've had £600k odd and they [the police] laugh at you.” 
 
The perception that the police occasionally re-define fraud and other crime incidents as non-
criminal to improve their clear-up statistics and meet management targets is a symptom of this 
KPI culture (HMIC, 2013, 2014). DEF’s Crime Investigations Team frequently receives job numbers 
rather than crime reference numbers when they report cases to the police. Issuing job numbers 
may be a sensible mechanism for logging and tracking complaints before they are formally 
classified as criminal or non-criminal, but it would seem to allow abuse of the police crime 
recording obligations (Home Office, 2012a).   
 
“Most forces will give you a report number, but that's different to a crime reference 
number. We get that a lot. They give you a reference number. It's almost like a job 
number because someone is assigned the job. He has to take it back and see his sergeant 
or whoever in the structure and say, ‘I've got this’, to decide whether it will be recorded 
as a crime. I'm surely it's partly due to statistics. If you take them something to do with 
electronic payments, they will think, ‘Well we'll never get anybody.’ They don't want to 
know because it will be an unsolved crime, it will be on their statistics. Take them a job 
and a body, then, ‘OK, here's the crime number.’” 
 
A full crime reference number is important for DEF irrespective of the subsequent involvement of 
the prosecution services. Firstly it assists with any insurance claims. Secondly it expedites money 
tracing investigations through weaker nodes on its security network (Johnston and Shearing, 
2003, p148). The client relationship with DEF’s bank facilitates the release of transactional 
information relating to DEF’s business. Other banks are less forthcoming. They require 
information requests relating to private investigations to comply with the Data Protection Act 
1998 and, though the Act does not require it, in practice they invariably ask DEF for a crime 
reference number to prove that the information is in support of a legitimate investigation, even if 
that request is channelled through DEF’s bank. A £40,000 account redirection fraud failed to 
attract police interest because the police refused to acknowledge the location of the crime and 
the victim. DEF owed a Scottish haulier £40,000. An employee of the haulier instructed DEF to 
transfer the money to a new account he had previously set up with Lloyds Bank. The Scottish 
Constabulary refused to take on the case claiming that it was not in their jurisdiction. Their 
argument was that the haulier was not a victim of the crime because it remained a creditor to 
DEF; the haulier’s victim status could only be realised if the money had transferred into its 
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account prior to the fraud. The West Yorkshire police also denied jurisdiction by claiming the 
reverse, that DEF was not the victim because transfer of the money in good faith from its account 
to one arranged by the haulier’s employee meant it was no longer a debtor to the haulier. Lloyds 
Bank refused to disclose information to DEF, Barclays and the haulier without a police crime 
reference: 
 
“We need the banks talking to each other. We can't believe the banks won't look at it 
without a crime reference because we would have thought they would want to put some 
sort of suspicious activity alert on it. We need to get the banks involved to see what else 
he's got in his accounts, to see what that opens up and where it's been routed to since. 
They are hiding behind the fact that it hasn't got a crime reference. Barclays won't talk to 
Lloyds, which surprises me.” 
 
The case raises two important definitional issues which impede efficient investigations within 
DEF’s security network. Two police forces exploited the ambiguity in identifying the victim to 
rationalise not accepting the case. Consequently, without the crime reference number, the bank 
washed its hands of the problem. 
 
The starkest evidence of poor support and performance from the prosecution services has to be 
the Jefferson case previously referred to. The company instigated civil and criminal proceedings 
against the Director and five fellow conspirators. The civil proceedings were settled out of court 
within a year. The company recovered all its principal losses (£850,000), interest (£250,000) and 
subsequent costs (£420,000). The criminal case was eventually brought to court in 2012 but was 
subsequently dismissed because the prosecution failed to disclose relevant material to the 
defence, as required by Part 1 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, despite a 
second opportunity to correct the failure. 
 
“So we'd already had one disclosure so we got to the stage where, doing the disclosure, 
we had one counsel for the prosecution appointed from St Philips Chambers in 
Birmingham, a guy called Heggarty. Because there was an abuse of process, they had to 
start again on disclosure. So Heggarty was dismissed of the case. They appointed new 
counsel in Number 5 Court who was a new Silk and in order to oversee the disclosure 
they appointed a junior barrister, Liz Power, in the same Number 5 Court to oversee the 
disclosure to make sure it was right. So they went through this whole disclosure process 
before court in September. Then somewhere they made an error in the second disclosure 
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process as far as we can determine now. So they got to the stage at the beginning of April 
this year where they had this case management conference again with the judge and the 
CPS turned up and said, ‘Sorry, your Honour, we are not going to offer any further 
evidence.’ The CPS withdrew on the basis of disclosure abuse again.” 
 
The most frequent complaint amongst the interview participants in respect of the prosecution 
process relates to the burden of disclosure. Bill, a CPS solicitor, explained that though the vast 
majority of the material gathered during fraud investigations fraud is irrelevant, it still has to be 
organised and disclosed to the defence. 
 
“In fraud cases and other serious crimes such as in murder or drugs, there is an 
enormous amount of material. You might speak to 100 people in a murder investigation. 
98 are irrelevant and only 2 are relevant. The 98 statements still have to be in the unused 
material disclosure.” 
 
Participant Ross, a police officer, prefers the disclosure regime used in civil proceedings: 
 
“Disclosure is a big thing that needs reviewing. My issue there is why we can't have it as a 
civil disclosure. If it's going to affect your case then you should disclose it if it's defence or 
prosecution. Now the defence will probably not disclose anything. But it should be made 
easier….. If you read disclosure, it's all right if you've got a shoplifter, a burglar or 
something along those lines. But when you've got a fraudster with 100,000 documents 
and third party disclosure where someone else has got a load more documents, where 
do you draw the line? We've got third party disclosure now and if someone else has got 
something and millions of documents, how is that going to affect the case because it 
takes years and years to go through and then all of a sudden the defence, instead of 
being helpful in the disclosure process look to hinder it.” 
 
Colin is an anti-fraud officer with a Local Authority. Despite seeking advice from the police and 
the CPS he remains uncertain about the proper protocols for evidence gathering and disclosure. 
He is afraid that his private investigations fatally compromise prosecutions by the Crown. He 
sought clarification from the CPS and follows their advice though remains sceptical as to whether 
it is correct: 
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 “I even contacted them [the CPS] in my own capacity, the head office in London, they 
could never give me the rationale for it, but it was quite clear to me that they would 
always, always say, ‘You must not investigate because you may corrupt the PACE 
investigation, the police investigation, because you...,’ well they would never, ever tell 
me, I don't think they knew really why.” 
 
Consequently he decides at the outset whether cases are disciplinary or prosecutable. If 
disciplinary cases turn out to be more serious he does not transfer them to the prosecutable pile 
and call the police. If he decides they are prosecutable he calls the police in the first instance and 
waits, often for months. Meantime, without any intervention, the fraudster is able to continue 
with his nefarious activities.  
 
The judiciary is fully aware that disclosure problems undermine the efficient administration of 
justice but it has failed to act in any meaningful way. A formal review of the performance of the 
Serious Fraud Office is highly critical of the criminal disclosure regime (de Grazia, 2008). The 
report recommended the American model of providing the defence with the “keys to the 
warehouse”, that is free access to all the material gathered, rather than forcing the police or 
prosecution services into spending many months or years cataloguing irrelevances. The de Grazia 
report and an increasing number of complaints from the police and prosecution services led to a 
review of the disclosure process by a senior judge (Gross, 2011). He concluded that the fine 
traditions of English law should not be fundamentally altered to meet the challenges of fraud and 
dismissed the “keys to the warehouse” way of the Americans. He recommended more training, a 
recommendation that hardly encourages the police and the CPS to allocate more than token 
resources to fraud. The justice bottleneck (Button, Blackbourn, Lewis and Shepherd, 2015) 
inevitably leads to some form private justice or no justice at all. One corporate lawyer, Andrew, 
advises his clients against reporting cases to the police because they are unlikely to act and the 
passage of time is fatal to civil remedies: 
 
“They would sit on it for months and then tell you, ‘Not for us.’ Then it’s too late for a 
civil remedy so they [corporations] just get them out of the business.” 
 
Civil recovery 
 
DEF has more success in pursuing civil litigation, probably because it has far more control over 
the investigation and preparation of claims. Nevertheless management has learnt to be selective 
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in its use. The three key variables are all cost-benefit related: whether the defendants are “men 
of straw”, the size of the loss and the complexity of the fraud script. A judgment for liability is 
pyrrhic if the defendant has no assets or if he consumes his assets in raising a defence. Similarly, 
complexity could easily escalate the cost of litigation beyond the residual assets of an accused 
former employee, so that claiming for a loss of even a few thousand pounds becomes 
uneconomic:  
 
“The civil, when we use it, is generally quite good. I think it needs to be cost effective. It's 
difficult to go perhaps with a £6k, £7k case to civil and justify spending £3.5k to £4k on it 
because the judge just says, "It's disproportionate, you're going to spend too much here, 
it's ridiculous." So we try and make sure that whatever we do is proportionate. We'll do 
some stuff through the small claim track but it's hard getting through a small claim on a 
fraud, employee theft. Some of them are more straightforward but where you get 
complexity of moving money around between accounts or, a straightforward cash refund 
fraud is not too bad but if they've used a customer's deposit and put some money on 
that deposit, utilised it perhaps for the genuine sale but skimmed some off and moved it 
into a deposit account and accrued it in there, then skimmed it off to their own account, 
the complexity of that is beyond a small claims court. It's too much for them. It's almost 
like trying to get it through the CPS guys.” 
 
The principal of proportionality at the heart of Mark’s considerations reflects the overriding 
justice objective of the civil courts. The Civil Procedure Rules (CPR Part 1) require judges to deal 
with cases in ways which are proportionate to the loss, the importance of the case, complexity of 
the issues and the financial position of each party. Mark’s observation that junior judges struggle 
with the complexity of fraud even in low value cases is reflected in the organisation of the courts 
in England and Wales. The courts use three judicial processes or tracks depending mainly on 
value and complexity. Claims of less than £10,000 are generally allocated to the small claims 
track. However the judiciary’s expectation that allegations of dishonesty are more complex, and 
therefore more time consuming and expensive, means that fraud is allocated to the “fast track” 
for all claims up to £25,000 or to the “multi track” for over £25,000 (Civil Procedure Rules Part 26 
and Practice Direction 26). Mark has considerably more respect for the specialist Senior Circuit 
Judges who sit at the regional Mercantile Courts and hear the more complex multi-track civil 
cases. He has a rather dim view of Crown Court judges: 
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“When you go in the Mercantile Court, you have a judge there who specialises in the 
relevant law, who doesn't need somebody to read out the rule book to him all the time. 
Whereas with a criminal judge these days it's a production line, then all of a sudden he'd 
got this awkward case in front of him for a couple of weeks and he doesn't understand 
it.” 
 
As sensible as these arrangements may be, the problem for fraud claims of less than £25,000 is 
that they are unlikely to be listed in the Mercantile Courts and will therefore flounder before the 
inexperienced junior judges. So it appears that the organisation of the civil courts and the 
distribution of judicial experience are not conducive to low value fraud claims. John is a very 
experienced fraud barrister. In his view the courts are far more effective in dealing with 
substantial fraud cases, but still warns that they are very expensive and likens them to a betting 
shop: 
 
“Litigation, if you’re the one doing the claiming, is like walking into a betting shop. For a 
client it is essentially gambling on a 50, 60, 70% probability that he will get £1million back 
by spending £0.5million.” 
 
The incongruity of the courts is that those who can afford the gamble do not need the money, 
those who need the money cannot afford the gamble. 
 
Justice rationalisation and the tone from the top 
 
Informed by their negative perceptions of the criminal justice system and the economics of civil 
litigations, DEF’s management has developed a set of priorities and guidelines for the selection of 
the appropriate justice route for proven frauds. The overarching order of priority is firstly 
dismissal, then recovery of loss and finally criminal sanction. However due to the perceived 
efficacies of the formal criminal and civil justice systems the priorities are dependent on value, 
Table 8.1. 
 
    Table 8.1: DEF justice priorities 
Fraud value 1st priority 2nd priority 3rd priority 
<£2,000 Dismissal Final salary deductions Criminal 
£2,000 to £20,000 Dismissal Criminal Civil litigation 
>£20,000 Dismissal Civil litigation Criminal 
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The pragmatic rationale applied to the selection of the justice route in each detected case means 
that the lowest value offenders are dealt with quietly by way of low level disciplinary sanctions, 
the mid-range offending group is the most likely to be prosecuted but not sued, whilst the high 
value, habitual offenders are the most likely to be sued but not prosecuted. The company has 
never considered private prosecutions due to cost and the perception that it is not the taxpayer’s 
responsibility: 
 
“In the market that we are in and the sort of experiences that we get it just doesn't make 
a lot of sense on the numbers. Plus that if you are talking to my FD or CEO, he'd be 
saying, ‘Hang on a minute. We pay £90M a year in business rates, an element of that 
goes to the police, what are they doing for it?’ Why should we have to fund private 
prosecutions?” 
 
Although the selection of the appropriate justice route is influenced by the merits of each case, 
the objective assessment of three key commercial variables, risk, cost and outcome, takes 
precedence. However the most important variable and the necessary precursor is the decision to 
pursue any form of justice at all. It is not inevitable in all cases, particularly when there are 
divergent views on the most appropriate course. On such occasions Mark and his team see their 
duty as defending the moral integrity of the organisation. In one case the Manager of the 
Barnsworth branch was implicated in a fraud conspiracy involving a customer and had been 
allowed to resign. He then joined a competitor. Three years later DEF acquired the competitor 
pursuant to its growth by acquisition strategy: 
  
“I had to work hard to convince line management to let him go again. He had turned the 
branch around for the previous owners. The Regional Director interviewed him and was 
keen on him because of his sales performance. Eventually they were convinced of the risk 
and the negative message if we had kept him on, and we let him go again. If the staff had 
found out about his background, there would have been a free-for-all. The problem was 
that the HR file closed before the investigation had concluded, so there was no record of 
his fraudulent activity.” 
 
Similar tension emerged between operations and the security team when a Branch Manager, a 
successful salesman, was found falsifying his accounts to cover £70,000 worth of fraudulent 
sales. 
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“So this guy in Millchester, there's a lot of noise about him because he's a brilliant 
salesman and it's a very, very competitive area, lots of other merchants around and if we 
lose him out of the business because he's got a relationship with the customers, then 
commercially it could be damaging, so they are already talking about putting him out on 
the road as a rep. Then he's not responsible for looking after the paperwork, booking 
stuff out. He's bringing orders in and hand them over to somebody else who makes sure 
they are documented and charged out. He's got that relationship with the customer that 
might bring in business.” 
 
In both examples the commercial imperative of making sales was weighed against the ethical 
consequences of forgiving the behaviour of the employees. Ultimately the rationalisation 
arguments were defeated and the employees were dismissed. An important influence on the 
negotiations is the perceived prospect of censure by the company’s leadership. The diligent 
reporting methods not only expose aberrant behaviour, they also lay bare the rationale for 
management decisions. Allied with a management structure, wherein the monitoring and 
investigations team is independent of all other departments and its manager reports directly to 
the board of directors, it is Mark’s view that such rationalisations would not pass muster with the 
executives. Perhaps this is the true meaning and test of the oft quoted phrase ‘tone from the top’ 
(Holloway, 2012), that the leadership dig in their heels and refuse to accept any excuses or 
rationalisations for employee fraud:   
 
“It get's back to corporate pretty soon and there's plenty of guys in the Execs, my boss is 
the FD and he would start jumping on heads if we wanted to keep a fraudster in the 
business. The CEO is very, very clear with us. We keep saying we do well with tone from 
the top messages, it is quite clear from those sort of guys.” 
 
Torpedoes and boomerangs: security clout and HR 
 
Braithwaite and Fisse (1987, p226) observed that effective self-regulators ‘give a lot of clout to 
the compliance department’. They suggest that without clout compliance functions cannot resist 
being pushed aside by operations people who see them as obstacles. The SCD team’s ability and 
authority to deal with fraud is derived from the enforcement power vested in it by the company’s 
leadership. Without clout it could struggle to dismantle the rationalisation arguments of the 
operations managers. In many organisations the HR department has the lead role in such 
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matters. DEF’s HR department has been relegated to an administrative support role, drafting 
letters and arranging dates for disciplinary hearing. The HR department and indeed the 
profession is seen by the business as slow and ineffective due to its paralysing fear of the 
Employment Tribunal: 
 
“That's [HR taking the lead] when you end up with people suspended for ever and a day. 
They won't make a decision because they are very risk averse. Our primary objective is 
get the person out, get some money, do the criminal. The HR objective is don't get 
embroiled in a tribunal, it's expensive.…..Yes, we call them pink and fluffy. Some of them 
are pinker and fluffier than others. You can understand that they don't want to get to 
tribunal, it's not the best of situations to be in. So they become risk averse to that, and 
the HR profession scares itself so they refrain from doing things when there's no need to 
be like that.” 
 
Particular tensions arise between the SCD team and HR when accused employees submit their 
resignations to avoid the disciplinary process. The SCD team objects to accepting resignations 
because it avoids justice, neutralises the deterrence effect of sanctions and sends out the wrong 
message. On the other hand, the HR department is inclined to accommodate the expediency of 
resignations. But in doing so they destroy all records of incomplete disciplinary matters, again out 
of fear of employment laws. It can have damaging consequences. An example is the Barnsworth 
case in which the Branch Manager, having been allowed to resign before the completion of the 
disciplinary process, subsequently returned to the business through a company acquisition. A 
similar but potentially far more serious event occurred in 2012.  
 
“We will push quite hard on HR to get it as a dismissal, not a resignation. We've had 
some of that in the past. A guy in Westing in 2002, a Branch Manager, and we allowed 
him to resign, an Area Director did, no longer with us. He then went off and did his own 
thing and we lost about £75,000. It was a £50,000 debt with a company he was involved 
with and about £25,000 legal costs. Then at the back end of last year he's bounced back 
as a Branch Manager in London so different patch, nobody knew him and different guy 
interviewed him and everything. Now he checked with HR saying, ‘This guy used to work 
with us.’ HR looked on the system and says, ‘10 years ago, oh yes, he resigned.’..…..So 
one of my guys, one of the business support team, goes into the branch one day and 
rings up, ‘You'll never believe who's back in the business.’ ‘Who?’ ‘It's so and so.’ ‘You're 
joking. What the hell are you doing getting this guy back?’ ‘I didn't know anything about 
146 
 
it.’ So we looked [on the web]. The guy, Spearman and 4 others from the Gloucester, 
Bristol area sentenced between them for 20 odd years for revenue, Spearman in 
particular, £600,000 POCA for VAT on importing cigarettes. ‘Do you really want this guy 
in your business?’ So we took him out during his probationary period just before 
Christmas.” 
 
The Spearman incident exposes a number of problems. An effective recruitment process is 
necessary to filter out higher risk individuals (Johnston and Shearing, 2003, p80), especially 
sociopaths who are likely to cause the greatest damage. However expunging the records of 
incomplete investigations and disciplinary procedures means that prospective employers are 
served with false positive references. The failure to label and impose an effective deterrence 
sanction encourages offenders to continue their wrongdoing elsewhere (Holtfreter, 2005), 
particularly the sociopaths: the torpedo is fired at the competition. The risk for the first 
employer, especially if it is a larger, de-centralised organisation, is that the individual could 
become a boomerang, re-employed at a later date somewhere in the organisation either through 
normal recruitment processes or through business mergers. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The normalised social values within DEF Group do not appear by chance. They originate in the 
instrumental and value principals set by the company’s leadership. The deontological themes are 
embedded in the company’s policies and cascaded through its procedures. They are reinforced 
through repeat messaging, bound into employment contracts and given meaning by 
enforcement. The key criminological themes which support the ethical climate are situational 
crime prevention (Clarke, 1980) and rational choice (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). The management 
continuously learn from their experiences to harden the defences, improve procedures and 
increase the risks to potential offenders. The consequences of breaching the values are 
deliberately visible so that employees learn their meaning through both direct experience and 
vicarious disciplinary consequences (Bandura, 1971). The ethical climate is not self-sustaining in 
that once learnt the employees adhere indefinitely to the organisation’s values. Without 
continuous vigilance and effective response to aberrant behaviour, the climate would regress. 
One can characterise the Security and Compliance Department’ role as an ethical maintenance 
team. Its primary duty is to ensure the ethical climate does not regress, and indeed progresses, 
monitoring, defending and repairing damage whenever it occurs.  
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The direct support of the executive gives the team the necessary clout (Braithwaite and Fisse, 
1987) ensure compliance through a dual coercive and consensual mentality (Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003, p27). It acts like an internal, private police force described by Johnston and 
Shearing (2003): it patrols, it gathers intelligence to seek out problems and it responds to reports. 
A notable feature of the department is that its purpose is not solely about enforcement. It is 
involved in the development of business procedures in cooperation with the user departments to 
bolster defences and minimise fraud risks. It also provides training and advice, identifies 
improvement opportunities and responds to individuals’ concerns. 
 
The inherent weakness of internal sanctions is their limited scope: the strongest sanction usually 
available for all behavioural issues is dismissal. However, only dismissing an employee for fraud 
risks sending out the message that it is no more serious than poor performance. DEF’s 
management uses three additional sanction tools to differentiate occupational fraud: it seeks 
financial restitution through final salary payments, it pursues litigation for high value frauds and it 
reports all detected offenders to the police. The company needs the support of the criminal 
justice system to differentiate fraudulent behaviour, attach the criminal label and apply 
meaningful, proportionate sanctions. Many companies eschew prosecutions to avoid negative 
publicity and because they fear the discovery of evidence that would implicate senior 
management (Gill and Hart, 1997). It is a measure of DEF’s ethical values that the management 
actively seeks the assistance of the police, irrespective of the status of the accused employee. As 
an eager, professional victim DEF would appear to be an ideal hunting ground for the police. It is 
therefore unfortunate that DEF’s integrated ethical and security framework is impaired by an 
unresponsiveness criminal justice system which effectively decriminalises all but the most 
heinous frauds, undermines normative values and thereby lends weight to offenders’ no crime 
rationalisations (Benson, 1985). 
 
An important aspect of the SCD’s work is in dismantling line management’s utilitarian 
rationalisations for excusing those employees perceived as valuable to the business. It also 
argues against the HR inclination to accept the expediency of resignations. Too often the absence 
of an adequate specific deterrence accompanied by a neutral employment reference and 
inadequate personnel records launches the undetectable fraud torpedo onto new employers and 
risks the unexpected corrupt boomerang. The support of the leadership as an ethical anchor in 
deconstructing these rationalisations is seen by the Security and Compliance Department as 
essential. Though the ‘de-rationalisation’ debates, which arise between the SCD team, HR and 
line management, may be a source of frustration for the team, they are probably a healthy 
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feature. Such tensions serve to ensure that the climate of the organisation does not shift too far 
in one direction, that is, either towards an unethical malaise, a normless, unregulated anomie 
(Durkheim, 1957), or in the direction of an overbearing internal policing structure like the Ford 
Motor Company nurtured in the 1920s and 1930s (Weiss, 1987). 
 
A critical attribute of DEF’s ethical programme is the written reports supplied to the executive 
management (Gee, Button and Cook, 2011). The information flow is crucial in maintaining the 
attention and support of the leadership (Coleman, 1995). The directors set the ethical values and 
demand employee engagement at all levels. In return, the SCD team engages the directors by 
providing them with regular security and inventory reports which are both qualitative and 
quantitative. The reports expose the type and nature of the fraud risks, and allow knowledge 
based adjustments to policy and strategy. Crucially they quantify the financial value of the 
company’s investment in its ethical programme. 
 
It would be an error to laud DEF Group as an entirely ethical organisation as the research focused 
on one area of the business. However through the effective engagement of the leadership and 
the employees it not only strives to ensure legal and procedural compliance, its values 
orientation brings meaning to its ethical code. In this way both leaders and employees learn an 
excess of definitions favourable to upholding the law over definitions favourable to violating the 
law (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947, p88). 
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Chapter 9 
 
R&T Industries - The Window Dressing Corporation 
 
Introduction 
 
Public and private organisations are increasingly expected to operate in socially acceptable ways 
(Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999). How organisations seek legitimacy by conforming to these 
expectations varies and depend to a great extent on the nature and strength of regulatory and 
social pressures (Oliver, 1991). Business ethics scholars differentiate between two types of 
organisational approaches: compliance orientated controls that rely on coercion and restraint 
and values orientated cultures that aim for employee commitment to organisational goals and 
values (Trevino and Weaver, 2003). Similarly, in her discussion of the relationships between 
organisations and wider society, Swanson (1995) differentiates between the deontological and 
utilitarian approaches to corporate social responsibility. The duty-aligned perspective places 
greater emphasis on values, duties, obligations and positive efforts of corporate enterprise to 
help others; the utilitarian perspective focuses on the overriding social benefit of the 
corporation’s economic purpose and its increased propensity to justify deliberate breaches of 
societal norms or regulations Swanson (1995). David Bermingham, one of the convicted ‘NatWest 
Three’ commented on ethics in the financial industry (BBC, 2011, March 22), “Our case lay at the 
intersection of morality and capitalism and capitalism was always going to win.” 
 
Utilitarianism can also lead to expediency in the application of internal controls. At a Home 
Affairs Committee inquiry into police standards Sir Hugh Orde, the President of Association of 
Chief Police Officers in the UK, was asked by Lorraine Fullbrook MP whether officers accused of 
misconduct were allowed to resign or take early retirement rather than face immediate 
suspension and a proper investigation (Home Affairs Committee, 2013). He agreed without 
hesitation: 
 
“It would be a very expensive option. I take a pragmatic view, my primary objective is to 
remove them from the police service and if the likely outcome of a disciplinary process is 
a lower sanction or a very drawn out, complex legal process, because these things are, I 
would rather lose the individual. The problem is keeping track of the individual. There 
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needs to be a national register of those who have left under such circumstances to make 
sure they do not come back into the service, somewhere, sometime later.” 
 
It is striking that the Committee accepted this utilitarian rationalisation without further 
challenge. The passiveness of the police to internal wrongdoing seems incommensurate with the 
nature of their public office. It is also concerning that short-term pragmatism and inadequate 
personnel records leads to the boomerang problem identified at DEF Group in Chapter 8. Sir 
Hugh Orde’s perspective indicates a compliance rather than values orientation (Weaver and 
Trevino, 1999): doing the least necessary to maintain the public perception of the police as an 
ethically disciplined organisation.  
 
Organisations are more likely to conform to social expectations when those expectations are 
buttressed by government regulations and reinforced by high levels of external scrutiny (Oliver, 
1991). Conversely weaker levels of enforcement encourages organisations to develop 
concealment strategies that promote the appearance of regulatory compliance (Oliver, 1991). 
This adaptive response to external restraints (Greening and Gray, 1994) allows organisations to 
decouple illegitimate activities from their conforming structures and use impression 
management techniques to focus attention on their socially normative achievements (Elsbach 
and Sutton, 1992). Such decoupled “window dressing” strategies permit organisations to 
vigorously pursue some ethical themes whilst disregarding others (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 
1999b). The European Commission’s long list of companies fined for conspiring in price-fixing 
cartels (EC, 2015) illustrates how high profile corporations’ espoused ethics too often diverge 
from practice. 
 
The strongest determinant in ensuring that organisations enact what they espouse without such 
window dressing concealment is the ethical commitment of their leaders (Jones, 1995; Paine, 
1996) and their influence on individual employees’ perceptions of their own moral agency or 
locus of control within their management structures (Trevino, 1986). Trevino and Youngblood 
(1990) found that locus of control exhibits a stronger influence on ethical decision making than 
cognitive moral development, and the greater the internality, the stronger the ethical outcomes. 
Followers with an external locus of control look to their leaders to decide what constitutes 
appropriate behaviour (Forte, 2005). By providing higher levels of management support, the 
values orientated organisation overcomes any inhibitions associated with an internal locus of 
control, reduces “moral muteness” and gives voice to employees’ ethical concerns (Weaver and 
Trevino, 1999). This is borne out by the observations in Chapter 7 where DEF Group benefited 
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from a high number of “watchers” reporting their concerns through normal management 
channels. The role of leaders is not just important in encouraging employees’ general support for 
an ethical climate, this chapter’s ethnographic case study will show that it is crucial in supporting 
employees as they make specific ethical decisions. The study examines the circumstances around 
the type of contract bribery fraud defined in Chapter 4. It involved a contract employee of a large 
manufacturing corporation, R&T Industries, and one of its engineering suppliers, Northwick 
Projects. The opportunity to observe the events came about through my role as the manager of a 
competitor of Northwick and my involvement in exposing the fraud to R&T’s management. 
Firstly, however, a brief description of the contractor market is required to contextualise the 
contract staff market in terms of its susceptibility to fraud and corruption. 
 
Contract staff 
 
Professional project engineers are only valuable when an organisation has projects underway, at 
other times they are an expensive drain. In the engineering and manufacturing sectors a very 
common solution to the variable demand patterns is to maintain a skeleton crew of permanent 
engineers and engage individual contractors to accommodate the peak loads. Companies usually 
source engineers through specialist contractor agencies. There are a variety of agency types, 
depending on the services and range of contractual relationships that they offer. A key influence 
on the relationships is the “intermediaries” legislation introduced in 2000, known as IR35. The 
purpose of the legislation is to counter tax avoidance by preventing companies from engaging 
individuals as contractors through intermediary agencies when the relationship between the 
individual and the company is really one of employment (HMRC, 2014). Without the legislation 
companies and contractors would pay less tax. 
 
Furthermore, by defining the individual as an employee or sub-contractor of the intermediary 
agency, the organisation avoids the responsibilities and liabilities of an employer defined in a 
welter of legislation: Nairns (2008, pxxxii) lists 64 relevant statutes, 85 statutory instruments and 
20 European Directives. The most obvious benefits are cost and flexibility: the company does not 
pay Employers National Insurance, there is no holiday pay, sick pay and other benefits. Most 
importantly, it can dismiss the contractor at any time without redundancy. This chapter will show 
that organisations ought to consider these advantages against the insecurity of the agency 
employee’s role which may create a financial pressure motivation for engaging in corrupt or 
fraudulent behaviour (Cressey, 1953).  
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The IR35 legislation does not oblige individuals to incorporate limited companies, sole trader 
status is perfectly acceptable, nevertheless limited company status has become de rigueur in 
order to reinforce the perception of the client-supplier relationship. The contractor is then a 
director, shareholder and employee of his own company. The structure results in three 
contractual relationships that distance the worker’s financial arrangements from the company: 
one between the individual and his own company, the second between the individual’s company 
and the agency, and the third between the agency and the client company. One self-employed 
engineering contractor, Matt, explained how contractors invariably engage accountants to 
legitimise their tax arrangements and use the tax savings to cope with idle periods and illness: 
 
“We all have accountants and let them sort it out. The tax may look good to you but 
you’ve got to remember we have to put money aside for a rainy day and we’re all getting 
older. Last year I was out with the back for ten days and you never know when they’re 
going to say, ‘Come back in a month or two.’ So I kind of put the tax saving to one side for 
when I’m not working.” 
 
It appears that the rules continue to be abused by corporations. Westco International introduced 
in Chapter 6 has continuously employed individuals for decades using these structures, including 
engineers and, most surprisingly, buyers. R&T has also retained engineers for many years on this 
basis. Before 2000 the companies engaged the contractors directly with no intermediary. After 
the introduction of IR35 all contractors were required to sign up with agencies nominated by the 
companies. The contractors are effectively permanent employees but the company pretends and 
rationalises the legitimacy of the arrangements by pointing at the contractual remoteness of the 
individual. These permanent contractors rationalise their involvement in the pretence, by 
defence of necessity (Minor, 1981), due to their dependence on the relationship. The 
contractors’ sense that they are locked into an insecure, unfair, exploitative relationship creates 
internalised strains and antagonism towards the employers. The words of James, just one of 
many permanent agency staff working for Westco reflect the condemnation of the condemnors 
neutralization technique (Sykes and Matza, 1957): 
 
“I’ve worked there for over 25 years and in all that time I’ve been laid off for maybe four 
weeks in total. But you always know that next week may be the last. They have got rid of 
contractors before. Richard West was there for 35 years. They had a round of 
redundancy a few years ago and a purge on contractors to reduce costs and he went. 
They got more volunteers [for redundancy] than they needed, but sacked half a dozen 
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contractors anyway.…..You’re treated differently to the associates [employees]. You work 
longer hours, weekends, have to turn in when they can’t be bothered or pulling a sickie 
or away on some corporate bonding charabanc. And you have to put in the hours 
because you don’t get sick pay or holiday pay. Sometimes they tell us we’re to get a short 
contract elsewhere so we don’t look like employees, but when we do find something, 
they won’t let us go, something is urgent. They objected when I picked up a job at [……] 
because it was a competitor, so it never happens.”  
 
In Chapter 8 we saw how individuals dismissed for fraud can, with their relevant qualifications 
and experience for a particular industry, turn into torpedoes to further their felonious careers 
elsewhere. Worse still as experienced at DEF Group and observed by Sir Hugh Orde, torpedoes 
can turn into boomerangs. These individuals are launched onto the employment market probably 
with a neutral reference, bearing a grievance, armed with fraud skills and under financial 
pressure. The risks to subsequent employers are significant. Should these individuals enter the 
contracting market described here, which by nature is insecure and rich with rationalisation 
formulae, the risks are amplified. The risks are further intensified where contractors work in 
finance related departments such as purchasing or accounts, or with access to intellectual 
property assets. The implication is that vetting processes for contractors ought to be at least as 
thorough as for permanent staff. Unfortunately, as the Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development report, temporary and sub-contract staff are rarely vetted to the same degree as 
permanent staff either by the employer or the agency (CIPD, 2012, p26).  
 
The company 
 
R&T Industries is a large multi-national corporation that has been established for over 200 years. 
The parent company remains close to its origins in northern Europe. It has operations in 80 
countries and employs over 50,000 people. It is a technology based manufacturer of popular 
consumer products. From the early 20th century the UK subsidiary operated as a substantial 
independent corporation until recently acquired and rebranded by R&T. Symbols of the 
company’s heritage greet employees and visitors in the spacious, opulent reception lobby that 
leads to the local corporate offices of the UK subsidiary. High quality hardback books depict pride 
in the company’s continuous rise from humble beginnings to dominance in its sectors. Obsolete 
cast iron machinery presented as artworks firmly fix the UK company’s innovative engineering 
origins in the early 20th century whilst boasting aesthetic sentiments. Wholesome poster images 
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of happy employees proclaim company values and ambitions in respect of citizenship and the 
planet. 
 
The corporate website repeats the ambitions, focusing on human values, the importance of its 
employees and extolling the value of teamwork. However behind the glossy public façade 
symptoms of underinvestment and diminished pride is abundant in the production areas: acres 
of hard-standing betray evidence of numerous demolished buildings, corroded structures, aged 
equipment is spotted with pigeon droppings and flaking paintwork suggest a disregard for 
employees. The overwhelming impression is of an unloved factory with an insecure future, an 
aged cash-cow with assets driven hard to maximise short-term profits. 
 
Like DEF Group in Chapter 7, R&T is a signatory to the UN Global Compact, an ethical framework 
covering human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption (United Nations, undated). 
Its espoused principals are also similar to DEF’s, based on abiding human values and imposed 
regulations, thus reflecting both the normative values and compliance orientations (Trevino and 
Weaver, 2003): 
 
 Safety 
 Integrity 
 Sustainability 
 Customer focused 
 Deliver on commitments 
 Passion for excellence 
 Teamwork 
 
To have meaning and credibility ethical polices have to be clear and detailed (Schnatterly, 2003). 
However R&T’s written code of conduct is ambiguous. The business integrity principle is defined 
as compliance with the laws of the countries in which it operates. It prohibits bribery in the form 
of offering money but allows gifts of a limited value without specifying the limit. Facilitation 
payments are prohibited only in countries where they are unlawful, elsewhere payments are 
permissible but need to be recorded. Fraud is defined as the theft, falsification or omission of 
data, money or goods, the deliberate provision of incorrect information and breaches of the 
employment contract. The policy goes on to define the three principal responsibilities of 
employees as protecting the company’s image, protecting its intellectual property and preventing 
the disclosure of inside information which may result in illegal insider share deals. It explicitly 
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stipulates that any suspected or detected fraud must be reported to a local line manager who in 
turn reports it to the Group Audit department. 
 
The definitions of corruption and fraud convey an ambiguous, mixed message. They reflect a 
compliance orientation (Weaver and Trevino, 1999) but one with sufficient utilitarian flexibility to 
accommodate commercial priorities, regional laws and local cultures. In other words they are 
contingent on circumstances and not on unified values. The language suggests a particular focus 
on dishonest information which may relate to experiences of dishonest management reports or, 
considering the technological nature of the business, falsified research data. Insider trading 
appears to be a sensitive issue and may be because directors of the original UK company were 
accused of insider dealing in relation to its acquisition by R&T.  
 
The parent company has a Compliance Committee led by a Compliance Director based in its 
European headquarters. The Committee manages a computer based ethics training package, 
examines serious misconduct cases, ensures compliance with share dealing rules and provides a 
hotline for employees. It also produces four ethical key performance indicators (KPI): in 2013 it 
investigated 22 cases of serious misconduct, 98 employees (0.2% of workforce) were dismissed 
across the world for code violations, intranet ethics training had reached 96% of the workforce 
and 100% of the executives complied with share dealing statements. The last KPI is unusual, but 
perhaps again reflects the executive’s sensitivity to previous insider dealing allegations. 
 
At the local level, R&T actively engages with suppliers, especially engineering businesses, on the 
regulated health and safety and environmental issues. Work risk assessments are produced 
almost daily, compliance monitoring is continuous and any breaches are dealt with immediately. 
The engineering contract firms working on site are well aware that any infringements can be very 
costly: at the very least work is delayed and on occasions firms have been expelled from site and 
the reasons shared with the remaining contractors. The company encourages contractors to air 
their safety and environmental concerns and invites complaints. A positive feature is the pre-
printed pads it issues to contractors so they note down observations. They can also be used to 
report concerns anonymously. However there is no engagement at all in respect of corruption. 
The written codes and reporting procedures are directed solely at employees, who are virtually 
unaware of their existence. There is no prescribed route for suppliers or other third parties to 
raise their concerns. Corruption is an invisible, de-coupled ethical theme (Weaver, Trevino and 
Cochran, 1999b).  
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Engineering operations 
 
The Engineering Department occupied a large open-plan office, but, reflecting the general lack of 
infrastructure investment, two long rows of uninhabited desks indicated a decline in innovation 
and capital investment. Nevertheless the remaining team of four engineers remained under 
pressure to introduce a complex array of process modifications to accommodate new 
environmental regulations. Without the new processes the plant would have closed down. The 
Projects Manager, Ethan, aged about 30, led the small team. He was under significant pressure to 
understand, test and develop the technologies behind the plant upgrades and to deliver the 
projects speedily at the lowest cost. 
 
Ethan had joined the company just two years earlier and was keen to build a reputation to 
further his career. Unfortunately he received little support from his immediate boss, Conrad, the 
Engineering Manager. The Engineering Director, Gordon, was an invisible figure based in the local 
corporate offices. Ethan spoke to Conrad about once per week at a scheduled progress meeting. 
He saw the Director once a month.  
 
“I see Conrad once a week for project progress. His only interest is plan attainment, not 
the problems. Then we go together to the monthly Gordon arse kick.” 
 
Seeking out deviations and mistakes is a discernible characteristic of active management by 
exception, a transactional leadership style (Bass, 1985). Ethan’s principal problem was employing 
sufficient skilled engineers. R&T’s policy is to accommodate variable project demands by 
engaging individual contractors when required. Unfortunately Ethan received no support from 
HR, purchasing or anyone else in sourcing an appropriate contractor. He was obliged to use the 
one agency approved by the company despite the inadequacy of the candidates it offered. The 
culture of the organisation demanded full accountability from its young, impressionable 
managers, that they should stand or fall on their own resourcefulness, yet the rules limited their 
powers. In such circumstances the manager’s locus of control (Rotter, 1966) would have to be 
strongly internal to confront or defy senior management. Other peer level managers, their 
confidence bolstered by several years in the business, did not hide their antipathy to the 
company’s management. The last remaining facilities engineer was nearing retirement having 
worked at the site since a teenager. He tried to encourage Ethan to stand up to his line managers. 
His comments suggested an exploitative authority management style (Likert, 1967): 
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“He lets them bully him so they get away with it. I tell him, Philip [Safety Manager] tells 
him, but it just doesn’t seem to be in him.” 
 
Ethan had pedalled the recruitment cycle several times with R&T’s single preferred agency, and 
had tried a few individuals with no success. Bernie was the last one he engaged, the final throw 
of the die. He is an inconspicuous middle-class, over 50, married homeowner who describes 
himself as a project engineer. Ethan was critical of Bernie’s professional skills: 
 
“He's not bright and he's given me problems to deal with because he's not a capable 
engineer. But he’s not like Vincent [previous engineer], I never knew where he was, 
where he'd got to on projects, so I'd get it in the neck from Conrad weekly and Gordon 
every month. At least with Bernie you can tell him what to do and you know what he's 
doing, what you've told him. I was never sure with Vincent. Great engineer, but a loose 
cannon. I haven't been able to find anyone else, so I'm sticking with Bernie.” 
 
Following his experience with the unpredictability of Matt, Ethan’s management style changed 
noticeably and quickly. In a process of direct social learning (Bandura, 1976), he developed the 
transactional (Bass, 1985) and exploitative (Likert, 1967) characteristics of his senior role models. 
He began to thrust the entire responsibility of delivering the projects onto each member of his 
small team, now numbered five, and he retreated from any responsibility himself. Previously, for 
example, he had been central to the selection of suppliers, now he was set on avoiding any 
involvement, including Bernie’s projects. It was his ‘scapegoating’ survival strategy: 
 
“You need to deal with each of them individually. It’s up to them to put out tenders and 
select the suppliers. It could be you or another company. I’m not making that decision for 
them. Vincent took the can for the delays in the “Horizon II” project. I kept my job 
because of that. I’m not going through that shit again, it’s down to them, I can’t get 
involved in the detail.” 
 
 
Emergent suspicions 
 
The first encounter with Bernie was an invitation to quote for one of the technology interface 
projects. He revealed an unusually aggressive style. Amongst his first words were: 
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“I don’t know what you’ve done here before but I don’t allow variations. I will not allow 
variations. You will not get variations from me. If you ask for a variation just once, you’ll 
never work for me again. You will get a complete specification so there will be no 
variations. You’re here now only because Ethan said you could do it.” 
 
In discussing the scope and specifications of the project it rapidly became apparent that Ethan’s 
views of Bernie’s limited engineering skills were well founded. Any kind of technical probing 
made him uneasy and led to the defensive mantra: “You’re the experts, you tell me how to do it.” 
He soon announced that he had brought in another contract engineering company, Northwick 
Projects, to provide a competitive alternative. It is unusual that a contract employee is allowed to 
introduce new suppliers, especially after such a short time in post. However it reflected Ethan’s 
desire to shift all accountability onto his team members. Natural queries about any previous 
working relationship with Northwick were flatly denied: “I just want to bring in some fresh faces 
to keep everybody’s pencils sharp.” The new company then won three consecutive tenders 
worth about £250,000 in as many weeks; the last one, Horizon III, was regarded as business 
critical in creating compliance with the revised regulations and was worth £150,000. Any one of 
these observations would not stimulate suspicion on its own, but the conflation of a new, 
incompetent contract employee, a new supplier and sequential contract awards, including a 
critical project, signalled that other forces might have been at work. 
 
Disturbed by Northwick’s success, the gossip machine went into overdrive as the established 
engineering suppliers with a virtually permanent presence on site, including my company, 
became anxious about their future prospects. Accusing fingers pointed inevitably at Bernie and 
possible manipulation of the tender process. Two engineering companies, Orbit Projects and 
Foster Engineering, had a permanent presence at R&T, based external portacabins. Orbit’s 
Contract Manager, Sean, contacted the author to discuss a “sensitive matter” and a meeting was 
arranged with Sean and Douglas, the Contract Manager for Foster, in Orbit’s portacabin. They 
were both convinced of a corrupt relationship between Northwick and Bernie. Sean believed that 
Bernie was manipulating the tender process by editing suppliers’ quotations. He showed me how 
it could be done. Sean had access to R&T’s intranet from his portacabin. He demonstrated how 
he was able to access the system to view and edit supplier quotations. He even brought up on his 
screen a quotation submitted by the author. It spurred the author into a background 
investigation of Northwick and Bernie. It revealed that Northwick Projects had a few weeks 
earlier been formed out of the ashes of a previous company with a very similar name, Northwick 
Engineering. Northwick Engineering had entered administration shortly after submitting 
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quotations to R&T and just two weeks prior to winning the first contracts. Its assets were 
acquired in a dubious “pre-pack” arrangement to phoenix the new company free of creditors 
and, crucially, with the impetus of substantial orders from R&T. Suspicions hardened that 
Northwick were bribing Bernie to ensure their survival. 
 
 
The dilemma 
 
In such circumstances the commercial and ethical challenges facing the supplier’s management 
are profound. They require a cold assessment of whether the relationship and the associated 
revenue stream is likely to be damaged more by speaking up than by acquiescing to the 
suspected corruption: the whistleblower’s fear of retribution dilemma (Francis, 2015; Public 
Concern at Work, 2013). Would the new contractor continue to win all tenders? Is it paranoia 
and bitterness driving the suspicions? Who might be involved? Do the customer’s management 
care? Might there be a negative reaction? The suppliers’ fear is that in reporting their concerns 
they become responsible for inviting additional damage to their businesses, possibly leading to 
innocent employees losing their jobs. The predicament provides an enticing rationale for doing 
nothing. 
 
The key issue in these circumstances is less in the evidential merits of the allegation but in 
predicting the reaction of the customer’s management. Perhaps R&T’s proclaimed values and 
published policies would provide a clue. As described earlier, the company’s literature and 
website provided encouraging signals. However, less encouragingly, it was noted that the written 
codes and reporting procedures are directed solely at employees. There is no engagement with 
suppliers through the glossy brochures, nor a prescribed route for third party ethical complaints. 
Perhaps most disturbingly, an examination of published judgments revealed characteristics of the 
classic rogue corporation (Sutherland, 1940): the company is a repeat offender having been 
caught and fined by European and American authorities for cartel and bribery offences on seven 
separate occasions between 2000 and 2010. The author debated these issues with colleagues, 
Sean and Douglas, and came to the conclusion summarised by Douglas: “We can sit here and get 
shafted or we can do something about it and get shafted but at least we’ve tried.” A collective 
sense of injustice and group reinforced indignation, fuelled the courage to approach Ethan. 
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Case chronology 
 
A meeting was arranged with Ethan to air the suspicions. Ethan was asked whether he was aware 
of Northwick’s history. That he allowed Bernie to sign up Northwick with the knowledge of their 
recent demise and phoenix rebirth betrayed a naïve mentality towards ethical and commercial 
risk management: 
 
“Bernie reckoned we need fresh suppliers. He’s right. He found them on the internet and 
we brought them in. They did a good pitch and explained what was going on. They’ve 
started up again with the support of new shareholders. We’ve met with them and 
they’ve given us good enough assurances. They obviously need the work to get going 
again and they’ve come in cheap because they want us as a new customer. So good for 
us, we save some money.” 
 
Sean voiced his suspicions that Bernie was exploiting insecure access to the server to interfere 
with quotations in favour of Northwick. Ethan maintained a defence and denial posture, insisting 
the server was secure and demanded evidence to support the suspicions. 
 
“No one can see them there, they're secure, passworded….How do you know this? What 
evidence have you got? You can't go accusing people without evidence…… I can't believe 
Bernie is corrupt, even got the brains to be.” 
 
Sean logged on to Ethan’s terminal and demonstrated how easily he could gain unauthorised 
access to sensitive commercial areas of the company’s server. Stunned by the demonstration, 
Ethan immediately shifted his stance and began to verbally dissociate himself from Bernie. He 
had recently considered dismissing Bernie, but decided to give him the opportunity to prove 
himself: 
 
“I talked to Rob [the Engineering Director] before I went away [on holiday] that we might 
have to let Bernie go. I gave him once last chance, to do the things on the list I gave him 
while I was away. He did them so I kept him on.” 
 
At this juncture the contract had not yet been placed with Northwick for Horizon III, so Ethan 
promised to reconsider the allegation and review the tender quotations.  The following day, and 
clearly at Ethan’s request, Bernie telephoned all the suppliers which had submitted quotes for 
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the Horizon III project to explain that the provisional tender award to Northwick was under 
review due to the importance of the project. Considering the corruption allegation against him, 
this was a markedly odd and unexpected event. With compounding strangeness, the next day 
Bernie called again to announce the result of the swift review, that the contract would indeed be 
placed with Northwick. Within a week, Ethan met Sean, Douglas and the author separately to 
explain his reasoning. He defended the integrity of the tender process. To emphasise his 
conviction and to prove that Northwick’s quote was the cheapest, he revealed their price. It was 
£150,000. 
 
It was evident that Ethan had not reported the allegation to anyone, not to his boss nor to the 
Compliance Director. It was painfully clear that Ethan needed help and support from people with 
the skills and experience to deal with the allegations. He had simply compared the tender 
submissions to evaluate the cost justification for awarding the contract to Northwick and had 
even involved Bernie in that review. The author showed Ethan a copy of his quotation, valued at 
£140,000. Unfortunately it had been submitted on an editable word processor document. Ethan 
showed me his copy, printed from R&T’s server. The price had been adjusted upwards to 
£155,000. Ethan was clearly disturbed, could not explain it, suggested the author had made a 
mistake and brushed the information away: 
  
“We've awarded the contract now, we need to get on with it, it's running late. There's 
nothing else I can say.” 
 
The dismissive response to the apparent manipulation intensified the author’s indignation and 
encouraged further investigations. Fortuitously, due to its recent insolvency, the administrators 
of Northwick Engineering had published management accounts including a schedule of creditors. 
The author examined the creditor list for any clues as to a possible relationship with Bernie. A 
check of Companies House records revealed that the Bernie and his wife were the directors and 
owners of one of the listed creditors. Bernie was in the pay of Northwick. Emboldened with the 
new evidence, a further meeting was arranged with Ethan, who, bewildered by the unfolding 
events and probably conscious of possible repercussions, turned ashen and visibly nervous. After 
lengthy, silent deliberation he decided that he had to report it to Conrad, his line manager. 
Conrad swiftly ducked the issue and directed him to the Engineering Director who in turn passed 
him onto the Human Resources department. Herein lies the nebulous ambiguity in the definition 
of the contractor’s role: is he a supplier under the purview of the purchasing department or an 
employee with oversight from HR? Two weeks later Ethan arranged a meeting to explain the 
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company’s position. It appeared to the author that Ethan had been rehearsed but the crafted 
company narrative was quickly replaced by self-justification: 
 
“HR consulted legal and they have considered it and thank you for your assistance in this 
matter but they say you don't have sufficient evidence to justify dismissing Northwick 
and Bernie in the middle of the project…..They've basically left it to me to decide what to 
do. So this is what we're going to do. We have agreed that once Horizon III is finished 
we'll let him go and we won't use Northwick again, but we've got to finish it, if we're to 
push back delivery again, I'll lose my job.” 
 
This was a very unsatisfactory outcome. It was important to determine whether Ethan had 
discovered for himself whether Bernie had been dishonest in denying a previous relationship 
with Northwick. Ethan’s response demonstrated that he and R&T were prepared to tolerate 
Bernie’s dishonesty and corruption: 
 
“I asked Bernie again if he’d worked for Northwick before and he said not. I spoke to 
Eddie [Northwick supervisor], and I asked him whether he'd worked with Bernie before 
and straight up he said, ‘Yes, it’s our job to keep him out of trouble.’ But really, there's 
nothing I can do.” 
 
It was apparent that in their utilitarian pursuit (Swanson, 1995) the senior management had 
abandoned Ethan, leaving him to decide on the outcome of the amateur investigation and with 
the impression that his job depended on the ‘right’ decision. Discovering for himself that Bernie 
had been dishonest appeared to have been a convincing discovery for Ethan. Nevertheless, 
clearly uncomfortable with the burden of the ethical conflict, he rationalised that he had to 
acquiesce to the corruption out of personal necessity (Minor, 1981). He placed the blame on 
senior managers who had the power and, in his perception, the inclination to dismiss him. In the 
absence of ethical support (Weaver and Trevino, 1999) and with insufficient internal locus of 
control (Rotter, 1966) he succumbed to the pressures of the work situation (Trevino, 1986). 
Ethan suppressed notions of any discussions with the local company directors. Using a rehearsed 
phrase, he made it plain that they would be unwilling to discuss the case: “No, they thank you for 
your assistance in this matter.” The desire to conceal the events was underscored when I asked 
whether the European head office had been informed: 
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 “No, it’s local. I’ve been guided by our directors and they’ve said it’s a [local site] matter 
and doesn’t concern them.” 
 
Clearly the directors of the UK business had steered the trajectory of this particular moral issue. 
Their pronouncements in respect of integrity, bribery and frauds proved to be insincere window 
dressing (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999b).  
 
A few weeks later, after the completion of the project, Ethan dismissed Bernie. Though the 
physical engineering had been completed successfully, the technical and commercial 
documentation was in disarray. Ethan faced the daunting prospect of disentangling dishonesty 
from incompetency in order to justify very large cost variation claims from Northwick that 
doubled the original contract value to £300,000. Far more relaxed than he had been for a good 
while, Ethan told me: 
 
“I've kicked him out finally and he won't be back. The paperwork, that's all he had to do, 
was a mess. He only went and agreed £150,000 of variations with Northwick. I'm now 
having to negotiate with them to reduce it. Some of it may be justified, particularly with 
the way Bernie worked, but no way is it double the original contract. But I'm on the back 
foot and realistically there's no way round it. I guess we'll probably just have to pay up 
and move on.” 
 
Ethan did not confront Bernie with the allegations, indeed as an independent contractor, he had 
no legal obligation to do so: 
 
“What for? There was no point. We didn't have to give any reason so I just told him there 
was no more work for him. Thankfully he's not my problem any more.” 
 
However that was not the end of the case, it had one final twist. Three months later Bernie called 
the author. He had secured a permanent position as the Engineering Manager of Wallace 
Ingredients, a medium sized food manufacturing company, and was seeking a quote for a project. 
It would be a competitive tender and would include Northwick. A site meeting was arranged for 
the following week. In a bizarre turn of events, the Finance Director of the company, Helena, 
called on the day prior to the meeting to postpone it because “…the tender documentation is 
incomplete”. It was an unusual conversation because Finance Directors do not keep the diaries of 
Engineering Managers. Two weeks later Helena called again to explain that Bernie had been 
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dismissed. She only required a little pressing to disclose it was due to an “….unhealthy 
relationship with Northwick and we don’t tolerate that sort of thing.” It appears that Bernie is an 
habitual offender. Though the company had failed in its initial recruitment due diligence, perhaps 
deluded by the R&T brand on Bernie’s curriculum vitae, the emergent corruption was soon 
detected and, unlike R&T, promptly dealt with. Whither the torpedo now? 
 
Conclusions 
 
Comparing the two case study organisations, DEF Group and R&T Industries, both companies are 
large subsidiaries of international corporations that project sincerity in their ethical values 
through carefully considered and crafted principles and policies. The principles proclaimed by 
both companies, which describe abiding human values and adherence to the legal framework, 
are typical of large corporations (Van Lee, Fabish and McGaw, 2002). However there is clear 
water between the companies in the how they respond to allegations of fraud and corruption. 
DEF pursues allegations with enthusiasm, encourages employees to speak up and proactively 
seeks out fraudulent behaviour. It uses a situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1980) and rational 
choice strategy (Clarke and Cornish, 1985) to minimise non-compliance and to support its ethical 
values. These are alien concepts to R&T’s management. R&T’s response is driven by fear and a 
utilitarian calculus (Swanson, 1995). Ethan was reluctant to report the corruption allegation to his 
managers because he was afraid he would be blamed for delaying a business critical programme. 
The climate of fear at R&T does not encourage responsible, ethical behaviour (Ashkanasy and 
Nicholson, 2003). 
 
The progress of the case did not improve when Ethan involved the company’s senior 
management. They did not take charge, engage an investigator, escalate the matter to the 
Compliance Director or even meet with the complainant. They chose the opposite course, 
maintained a silence, avoided their responsibilities and abandoned the inexperienced manager to 
deal with a very significant, emotionally charged dilemma by himself. Their purpose in doing so 
was wrapped up in a higher loyalty rationalisation, but the heart of the issue for them was 
probably the same as for Ethan, avoiding any personal repercussions. DEF’s management strives 
to dismantle rationalisations for tolerating corruption, R&T’s encourage it. Because his moral 
agency (Bandura, 2004) and locus of control (Rotter, 1966) was insufficient to defy unsupportive 
senior managers, Ethan rationalised that the necessary outcome for him would be to postpone 
dismissing the project engineer and the engineering contractor until a convenient commercial 
juncture. Assigning responsibility for the outcome to the senior management further neutralised 
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any self-blame. The diffusion and displacement of responsibility allowed the entire management 
collective to obscure their personal moral agency (Bandura, 2004).  
 
At no point did the harm caused to the honest suppliers, the loss of a valuable contract, appear 
to register in their deliberations. Equally at no point did any of the managers consider that the 
maintenance of ethical standards is a valuable end in itself and of long term financial benefit 
(Weaver, Tevino and Cochran, 1999a). The irony is that the company itself was damaged by 
funding crime and excessive contractual overrun claims. This outcome was an almost inevitable 
consequence of two specific organisational failures. Firstly, management’s lack of awareness and 
understanding of the raised fraud and corruption risks associated at the intersection of un-vetted 
agency contractors and financially strained suppliers; secondly, its failure to comply with the 
organisation’s codes and procedures. This compliance failure was in turn caused by the 
convergence of a remote, ethically weak, exploitative management team (Likert, 1967) with a 
misguided utilitarian pursuit of commercial goals (Swanson, 1995).  
 
It would be wrong to define R&T as an entirely unethical company. It is sincere, for example, in its 
safety and environmental principles. However its ethical programme in respect of corruption in 
the supply chain is decoupled from these other ethical practices (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 
1999b), rendering it mere window dressing, much like the symbolic artefacts that welcome 
visitors but camouflage the dilapidated hinterland. The use of the contract staff agency as a 
concealment strategy (Oliver, 1991) in an adaptive response (Greening and Gray, 1994) to the tax 
regulations demonstrates a willingness to evade tax and an unwarranted lack of respect for the 
individuals concerned: they are good enough to work there but not good enough to join. 
 
Perhaps the most telling, publicly visible characteristic of the company, one that I chose to 
ignore, is symbolic of the company’s selective tolerance to crime: in contrast to DEF’s 
management, who responded positively to a cartel conviction and introduced a robust culture 
change programme, R&T’s management have continued with their corporate crimes. An 
ambiguous corruption policy, defiance of regulatory interventions and a tolerance of tax evasion 
signal an asocial, criminogenic window dressing orientation that is indifferent to internal 
corruption that harms itself and others. 
 
The methods used to gain an insight into DEF Group and R&T Industries are different. DEF was 
viewed through the perspective of its counter-fraud team. R&T was observed closer to the 
ground as events unfolded. One has to acknowledge the challenge to the internal validity of 
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comparing the two organisations. An ethnographic observation of a branch of DEF, for example, 
may reveal similar local circumstances to those at R&T. Similarly a case study of R&T’s internal 
audit department may have painted a more positive picture of the company. However this is 
doubtful because the most senior people in the UK group were made aware of the allegations 
and chose to duck the issue. Furthermore from the research ethics perspective, the probable 
harm caused to Ethan and possibly others would have been unpalatable. The possibility remains, 
therefore, that the ethical climates at other sites are different, and, as Chapter 11 will show, sub-
cultural variations within the same organisation can be substantial. 
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Chapter 10 
 
 
Differential Rationalisation 
 
“Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do 
nothing.” John Stuart Mill, 1867. 
 
Introduction 
 
Rationalisation theory has emerged as a pivotal principle in the explanation of abnormal 
behaviour within psychology (Jones, 1908; World Health Organisation, 1992), criminology 
(Cressey, 1953; Sykes and Matza, 1957; Benson 1985), dissonance theory (Murray, Wood and 
Lilienfeld, 2012) and identity theory (Turner, 2013). Cressey (1953) asserted that occupational 
fraudsters must apply rationalisations to neutralise internal, psychology conflicts between their 
actions and society’s normative standards. The reference to normative standards is crucial: if 
errant behaviour is perceived as a social norm within a sub-culture, moral conflicts do not arise 
and there is no need to construct bridging rationalisations. Even if the group recognises the 
values of the wider society, differential association theory asserts that individual members 
reference the behavioural standards of the sub-culture and learn the rationalisations through 
close contact with the group (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947, p88). It explains how 
neophytes are eased into their nefarious ways (Braithwaite, 1989). 
 
Ethical role identity is an important concept to business ethics scholars (Weaver and Trevino, 
1999): the stronger and more widespread the identity is held by employees, the more ethical the 
organisation. Identity theory is also an interactionist theory. It holds that people develop multiple 
identities or internal self-designations and legitimacy based on their positions within social 
structures (Turner, 2013, p331-355). Although the two strands of identity theory are closely 
related doctrines, social identity theory emphasises the more macro-social structural sources of 
identity, whilst role identity theory focuses on internal, cognitive identity processes (Stryker and 
Burke, 2000). Social identity is concerned with the perception of the self through the meanings, 
expectations and values derived from membership of identifiable social categories, the in-groups, 
and the attendant differentiation from others in the out-groups (Tajfel, 1982). Role identity is 
concerned with the internalised meanings and performance expectations associated with the 
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many roles an individual occupies within any social context (Stets and Burke, 2000). The two 
analytical perspectives meet at behaviour that is an external expression of identities in 
interaction with other people: their purpose is to determine why, given membership of multiple 
social networks and multiple role expectations, people choose one particular course of action 
(Stryker and Burke, 2000). The theory states that individuals are motivated by situations which 
activate and reinforce identities, especially the most salient core identities; conversely emotional 
stress ensues from situations which challenge salient identities (Turner, 2013, p347). One range 
of responses to such situations is the adaptations and defences invoked for the maintenance of 
self-perception, for example, withdrawal from social contexts that do not support important 
identities, switching role identities, diminishing the salience of identities and rationalisations such 
as denial of responsibility and blaming others (Turner, 2013, p335-338). 
 
The inference that can be drawn from theory is that countering rationalisations should be an 
effective component of crime reduction strategies (Nettler, 1974; Cressey, 1986). Sellers and 
Akers (2006) disagree, suggesting such an approach would have little practical value because 
offenders would innovate new creative excuses. It is an oddly fatalistic argument. It may hold for 
those with sociopathic personalities or those so pressed by powerful motivations that they are 
determined to ignore countervailing narratives and values. It may also be an impractical national 
crime prevention strategy. However, as demonstrated by DEF Group in Chapter 7, it offers 
opportunities within the controlled environment of organisations where ordinary people respond 
to cultural values and working conditions, and both of these characteristics are susceptible to 
management influence and direction. There are two possible approaches. The first is the 
development of normative group values. In this regard Klenowski (2012) suggests that 
organisations introduce workshops that focus on the consequences of white-collar crime and 
which teach “counterlinguistic phrases” to offset the rationalisations. The second approach is to 
address the overt characteristics of the organisation which could provide some justification to 
the rationalisations, for example by ensuring that staff are fairly treated and remunerated Gill 
and Goldstraw-White (2012, p24). 
 
Hitherto research has focused mainly on the offender to explain the aetiology of fraud. Indeed 
the focus of differential association is the biographies of offenders and not the role of the victim 
(Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947, p94). There is an absence of cogent research into how 
organisations, or more precisely responsible persons in organisations, conclude that counter-
fraud efforts are unimportant or irrelevant, both in relation to planned governance strategies 
(Johnston and Shearing, 2003) and in their response to detected fraud events. This chapter 
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explores the participants’ narratives using rationalisation and identity theory as a conceptual 
framework to show how managers’ avoidant rationalisations for not dealing with internal fraud 
mirror the crime engagement rationalisations verbalised by offenders. Just as some offenders 
resolve their internal conflicts by formulating rationalisations, there is a similar tendency 
amongst managers and employees to rationalise their motives for avoiding, ignoring or devaluing 
fraud, both strategically and in response to specific events.  The theoretical implications both 
support and advance Sutherland’s seminal differential association framework (Sutherland, 
Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947).  
 
Reputation 
 
Corporate reputation 
 
The one avoidant rationalisation that does frequently arise in the criminological literature is the 
sanctity of corporate reputation (Braithwaite and Fisse, 1987; Button and Gee, 2013, p28; 
Ramamoorti, Morrison, Koletar, and Pope, 2013, p9). Levi (1993, p6) refers to the stigma involved 
when people supposedly skilled in looking after their money are defrauded. Touby (1994) 
describes the Judas Effect, whereby embarrassed employers fear the negative commercial 
repercussions in the public exposure of poor accounting practices, poor controls and inadequate 
selection procedures. Holtfreter (2005) suggests employers are unlikely to involve the police for 
fear of disrupting relationships, undermining productivity and garnering bad publicity. These 
views are founded on an a priori presumption that occupational fraud actually causes 
reputational and financial damage, yet there is no supporting empirical evidence. Indeed Levi and 
Sherwin (1989) found that there was no impact. Clearly research is required to address the two 
variables: whether there is any impact and whether corporate managers believe there is any 
impact. The following two examples provide an insight into the risks perceived by two business 
leaders and the circumstances which give rise to those risks. 
  
Terry is the Managing Director of HIJ Tubeline, a small business that provides specialist 
engineering services to hospitals. His belief in the reputational risk is based on three perceptions 
relating to trust and management responsibility. Firstly, Terry is a typical small company director 
in his reliance on trust rather than robust operating procedures. Terry dismissed the need for 
internal policies and procedures relating to fraud and corruption “….because trust is important 
here.”  Secondly, Terry believes that managers are responsible for the behaviour of employees 
and must share the blame for their fraudulent behaviour, a denial of victimhood rationalisation 
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(Sykes and Matza, 1957). Thirdly, he believes that customers and regulators would, by default, 
hold management responsible for internal criminality: 
 
“There is a corporate responsibility as well as an individual. We are guilty for not having 
audited the expenses properly or we haven't made checks to make sure that was 
reasonable expenditure on behalf of the company. I don't think anything is ever black 
and white and you can completely blame one party. When something like that goes 
wrong, there is shared blame and if you invite the regulatory authorities in to do their 
work properly, that shared blame will become evident.” 
 
Terry’s views are undoubtedly influenced by the incident earlier in his career when he was an 
Operations Director at Cardwell FM, where he was blamed for allowing an employee in his 
department to defraud the company of £1 million. The particular circumstances which heighten 
Terry’s concerns are typical of small businesses with a small customer base. Because HIJ is 
dependent on one large customer, the NHS, Terry is afraid that his business would be destroyed 
should the NHS become aware of occupational fraud within the company. Terry’s anxieties about 
reputation are further fuelled because he is trying to reduce this dependency risk by expanding 
the number of customers. This means due diligence questions are asked about the company’s 
ethical practices: 
 
“Almost every prequalification of any form we have asks us to set down an honest 
declaration as to whether we have had such issues. Therefore you have to assume that if 
we had invited a regulatory authority to get involved in one of these issues we would 
have had to declare that at some stage and it would have counted against us for 
contracting purposes.” 
 
Vendor appraisals are a requirement of the Quality (ISO9001), Health and Safety (ISO18001) and 
Environmental (ISO14001) management systems. More recently, in response to the introduction 
of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 and the Bribery Act 2010, these appraisal exercises have 
been supplemented with corruption inquiries. Terry’s reputational anxieties have led him to 
ignore minor payroll fraud incidents, such as falsified sickness and overtime claims, and created a 
determination never to involve the police or civil lawyers. The legislation enacted to combat 
corruption has ironically encouraged the suppression of events, dishonesty at the 
commencement of business relationships and above all the utilitarian determination to avoid the 
authorities. 
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These concerns are not limited to small companies. Robert is the Managing Director of a large 
food manufacturing company, ETS Produce, which employs about 1,000 people. Like HIJ the 
company relies on the small number of major retail customers in the UK. Robert’s experience of 
occupational fraud is limited to a few minor incidents of expense and payroll fraud. He is unsure 
how these incidents are handled but assumes they are dealt with by Human Resources. Asked 
how he would deal with a more substantial occupational fraud, Robert was adamant he would 
not involve the police or other external agencies. He illustrated his reasoning by recounting a 
profound experience involving manufacturing standards: 
 
“We are audited annually by the major supermarkets for quality, health and safety, 
finance, environmental, but also pest control because you don't want little creatures in 
your flour. We try to maintain very good, exemplary, health and safety, quality and pest 
control systems. One day an employee thought he'd spotted a little furry creature run 
across the car park and reported it, as he should. We got a team together and diligently 
followed the procedures: checked all sensors and traps and found no evidence of pests. 
We recorded the incident properly in the log, but had nothing to say really. We decided 
to follow up two weeks later with a second check and when we did that, found nothing 
again. Then Retailco arrived for an audit. They got three quarters of the way through the 
audit when they came across the pest report. They immediately stopped the audit and 
announced that Retailco would immediately cancel the contract. They just said, ‘We can't 
risk any pests in our bread.’ That was it, very sorry and all that, but it left a big hole in 
demand, but we were able to fill it from elsewhere fortunately otherwise we would have 
been in severe difficulty. It caused us problems. After that we were less diligent in 
reporting and recording incidents. It compromised our standards and caused confusion. I 
had one senior quality controller, who was very good, declared one day that he just 
couldn’t do it any longer and left. He'd learnt one way and was now doing it another and 
he couldn't come to terms with it.” 
 
Robert’s story shows how transparency and resolute compliance could be fatal to business 
relationships. Because ETS’s market is dominated by about six major supermarkets, Robert could 
not risk losing another customer. Consequently he suppressed reporting of hygiene incidents. He 
regrets the erosion of the company’s values and the adjustment in his ethical role identity but 
feels he had no option.  
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In both of these cases the complexity of the pressures on the two participants activated their 
utilitarian leadership role identities with greater salience than their ethical role identities 
(Weaver and Trevino, 1999). In the ETS case a quality controller was unable to reconcile the 
misalignment between his role identity and the adjusted ethical group identity. It caused such 
internal dissonance that he felt his only solution was to leave the business (Turner, 2013, p338). 
 
Personal reputation 
 
Dependency on a small number of customers provides a powerful motivation and an externalised 
higher loyalty rationalisation for managers to suppress events which could threaten key 
relationships. Companies with thousands of customers, such as DEF Group, and government 
bodies do not have such survival dependencies. The reputational impetus in the public sector is, 
according to investigator Imogen, less related to the corporate identity and more personal: 
managers fear reports of fraud and other employee illegalities in their department will reflect 
poorly on them and threaten their prospects (Friedrichs, 2010, p243). This was the type of 
situation confronting Ethan at R&T Industries in Chapter 9, one which fomented an internally 
focused defence of necessity rationalisations (Minor, 1981). 
 
Terry’s corporate reputational concerns mentioned above are compounded by personal 
reputational fears. Terry was an Operations Director at Cardwell FM, a substantial facilities 
management and construction company. A Projects Buyer within his department embezzled 
£1million over a four year period, using non-existent ghost companies and falsified transaction 
documents. The fraud was detected by chance at a random internal audit. The buyer immediately 
followed the money to Africa. Criticisms of lack of control levelled against Terry blighted his 
prospects within the company so that he subsequently resigned. The department’s Projects 
Accountant was also accused of incompetency and resigned. The lack of support for both 
individuals fractured their group identities and led to withdrawal (Turner, 2013, p338). The 
experience induced a shift in Terry’s role identity, reducing the salience of ethics and inducing 
defensive behaviour. It convinced him to deal with any detected frauds quietly unless they are 
“…big enough, obvious, to come to the attention of the accountants.” 
 
One consequence of this defensive behaviour, whether learned directly or vicariously, is that 
lawyers are sometimes frustrated by uncooperative line managers because, as barrister Nazim 
observed: “They can be somewhat revisionist as to how the frauds occurred.” Defensive 
strategies can cause managers to abandon, at least temporarily, their corporate role identities so 
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that even their roles as witnesses are compromised. Solicitor Barry described the consequences 
when a manager, duped by an employee who was feeding a gambling habit, strove unnecessarily 
to protect his position by lying to the investigators: 
 
“We spent a lot of time and costs on working out why he [the manager] was telling lies. 
All the time we had to test what he was telling us to work out, when he was in the 
witness box, what the result would be. So we were spending more time testing what we 
did not believe to be true.” 
 
Proof ratchet 
 
Sometimes a manager’s first thought when receiving a fraud complaint is that the complainant 
must have an ulterior motive, that the complaint is a proxy for some other form of grievance. The 
group identity activates and triggers defensive behaviour, especially when the complainant is an 
external party, a member of the out-group (Tajfel, 1982). Defensive suspicions are further 
heightened when the complainant is a supplier alleging a contract bribery fraud. Paul is a building 
society counter-fraud manager. His first reaction is to be suspicious of the supplier’s motive:  
 
 “It is quite a bold person who does that. We do treat it seriously, we don't just rub it out, 
but the first thing I'd be thinking is, ‘Why's he doing that, it's like committing suicide, 
there's obviously something gone wrong here. Has he or she [employee of building 
society] pissed him off?’” 
 
This appears to be a common reaction. Even the counter-fraud team at DEF Group, which thrives 
on whistleblower reports, are initially wary: “It's usually because they've lost a contract and 
somebody else has got it so they're a bit suspicious about why they've lost it”. The typical 
corporate solution is to demand evidence to justify the internal inquiries. Such was Ethan’s initial 
reaction to allegations of contract bribery at R&T: “How do you know this? What evidence have 
you got? You can't go accusing people without evidence.” Denial of crime is easy without 
supporting evidence and very convenient when reputational concerns are in mind. In the R&T 
case, Ethan only treated the allegations seriously when he was presented with compelling 
evidence. 
 
The Westco International quantitative data in Chapter 6 was provided by Jeremy. He was the 
Manging Director of a company that purchased a small engineering business, Banbury 
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Engineering, as part of its growth strategy. Banbury supplied engineering services to Westco, an 
international manufacturing corporation which boasts of its ethical values at every turn: on its 
website, in its literature, on office walls, even in the internal telephone directory. Shortly after 
the acquisition Jeremy was approached by Westco’s employees asking whether he would 
continue participating in contract bribery fraud schemes. Jeremy faced a complex dilemma. 
Firstly Banbury’s business relied on sales from Westco but contracts appeared contingent on 
corruption. Secondly any claims under the tort of deceit, the civil version of fraud (McGrath, 
2008, p11), against the previous owners of Banbury relied on proving the corruption within 
Westco. Jeremy assumed that Westco’s management would welcome the opportunity to 
eradicate internal fraud and would co-operate in developing the evidence for his litigation, so he 
reported the corrupt requests to Westco’s local management. The local managers ignored the 
allegations. With sales demand falling away, Jeremy became desperate and contacted Westco’s 
owners in the USA. They instructed the local Purchasing Manager, Granger, to meet Jeremy. 
Eager to assist Westco, Jeremy prepared some evidence which showed had suffered a fraud loss 
of about £50,000. Westco’s employees had falsified purchase orders to buy personal goods such 
as gardening equipment, sheds, power tools, cameras, computers, a conservatory and materials 
for an extension. He expected the evidence to stimulate Wesco into a thorough investigation 
“…to rid the organisation of the cancer”. He did not anticipate Granger’s response, that the 
evidence was insufficient to instigate a formal inquiry: 
 
“I really thought it was enough to get them going, that they’d see it as helpful. I just 
wanted to hand it over to them so they could deal with it. We didn’t know how to go 
about it. What I didn’t anticipate was the demand for more evidence. Fortunately 
Banbury’s accounts and invoices were intact so we were able to produce evidence of 
what was going on. I produced a report which identified employees, how it worked and 
some document trails. But it was still not enough, they said, ‘It’s not proof. We need 
proof and you don’t have it.’ By this time I was sensing evasion because the evidence was 
strong, at the very least to warrant proper investigation.” 
 
Jeremy investigated further. His evidence was rebutted several times before Westco’s 
management accepted that the evidence justified an investigation. The new evidence identified a 
fraud loss of £2.6million through Banbury over an 8 year period. A short internal inquiry by 
Westco’s Engineering Director supported by the Purchasing Manager, Granger, and Human 
Resources led to the dismissal of three employees for minor fraud infractions. Westco’s 
management subsequently issued a company-wide briefing to remind employees of their 
175 
 
contractual obligations. It referred to the case as an “isolated incident”, so deliberately denying 
the wider infection and the company’s own victimhood. Jeremy complained to Westco’s 
management that by only addressing the tip of the iceberg, they were undermining his civil claim 
against Banbury’s previous owners. He also produced evidence that the criminality was 
continuing. Nevertheless they refused to expand the investigation or entertain external 
investigators: 
 
 “The Operations Director said at one meeting, ‘We work on trust, we don’t want armies 
of accountants and innocent people being questioned.” He said we didn’t have enough 
proof and they wanted more. I didn’t understand it. It was still going on and they didn’t 
seem to care. They didn’t care that it was damaging us. They reckoned it was our fault 
because we’d bought a business without doing enough due diligence and it was our fault 
because we hadn’t found enough new customers to replace their business. And that’s 
what they kept doing: every time we offered more evidence they’d raise the high bar.” 
 
In frustration Jeremy called the police and handed over the evidence. It was sufficient to convict 
five individuals, the two former directors of Banbury and three former Westco employees. The 
involvement of the police woke Westco’s management to the reputational risks if they were 
found acquiescing to internal criminality. They dismissed over twenty employees for gross 
misconduct. Two of the employees were dismissed after they became witnesses for the 
prosecution. 
 
The proof ratchet phenomenon is a rationalisation mechanism for the avoidance of investigating 
and sanctioning occupational frauds. The supporting motivation could be the higher loyalty 
desire to protect corporate reputation, to defend group identity. However in Westco’s case the 
management knew that corruption was endemic in the organisation. One of the dismissed 
witnesses, Carson, said in interview, “The shock was, not what was going on, but they did 
something about it. It had been going on forever and everyone knew.” The £2.6 million detected 
level of losses through one department, in one location, using just one supplier is the 
consequence of normalising corruption and is likely to be a gross underestimate of the true level 
of losses. 
 
Nolan, the Managing Director of another engineering supplier to Westco was pressed by the 
Purchasing Manager, Granger, to reveal what he knew about corruption within the company and 
who was involved: 
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“...he said, ‘If you don't give me names you will never work for Westco again.’ That really 
annoyed me.....Then [Westco junior buyer] came over about something else but he asked 
me about Granger's demand anyway. He knew about it. He asked me if I was going to 
answer it. I told him I had one name. ‘Who's that?’ ‘Granger and I'm sending it to 
[Westco’s US head office].’ So he ran off and told Granger. He [Granger] called me 
straight away and said, ‘Don’t bother, I’m resigning.’ And he did.” 
 
Jeremy faced an uphill struggle because Westco’s management were determined to conceal the 
normalised corruption within the company. Westco’s management accentuated their in-group 
identities (Tajfel, 1982) and deliberately diminished their ethical role identities (Weaver and 
Trevino, 1999). Their aim was to avoid the curiosity of external investigators for fear of what else 
they may have discovered (Bucy, Formby, Raspant and Rooney, 2008). They utilised the proof 
ratchet to deny the occupational frauds against the company, to deny Jeremy’s victimhood and 
to hide personal culpability. How was Jeremy to know who was involved and whom to trust? The 
denial of crime rationalisation inherent in the proof ratchet tactic is effective in defending a 
window dressing ethical culture by wearing down all but the most persistent accusers. 
 
Cost calculus 
 
Whilst every justification for not dealing with internal fraud can trace ultimately to a cost benefit 
calculus, the rational manager role identity is directly relevant to two decisions: the strategic 
decision to implement a fraud prevention strategy and the tactical response to a fraud event. As 
explicated in Chapter 5, the common perception that fraud in general and occupational fraud in 
particular is an insignificant problem leads inevitably to the conclusion that there is little or no 
value in implementing counter-fraud systems. Jackson, the former Managing Director of Alloy 
Group, typifies the doubt: “If it costs more to control it than it's worth, what's the point?” 
 
Managers’ perceptions that fraud is immaterial or non-existent within their organisations may be 
due to their ignorance and, as described in Chapter 5, inadequate quantitative research, but 
sometimes it is wilful blindness. Tony, a counter-fraud specialist in a local authority, expressed his 
frustration that colleagues are in denial of the crime: 
 
“I hear that a lot, ‘We haven't got a fraud problem in our council’, which can't be right.” 
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The consequence of the confluence between ignorance or denial of crime with the utilitarian 
perspective (Swanson, 1995) is the failure to implement prevention controls. It is unsurprising 
that one large law firm struggles to sell its counter-fraud and anti-bribery services until 
organisations have directly experienced the risks: 
 
“They see that fraud losses are zero, that is, until it happens. They cannot put the 
justification together to spend the money on something which might never happen….It is 
a massively hard sell. Companies just are not interested.” 
 
The emphasis on cost also frequently dictates the response to detected frauds. The consistent 
sentiment expressed by lawyers, consultants and business managers participating in the research 
is that the most expedient, cost-effective assertive response is through rapid disciplinary 
processes and dismissal. Although criminal investigations are ostensibly free of cost to the victim 
organisation, the demands on management time and the direction of cases are outside 
management’s control, both anathematic to cost conscious transactional managers. 
Management may have more control over civil litigation, but its unpredictability in terms of 
effort, cost and outcome means that it is invariably too costly for losses under £20,000. A forensic 
accountant observed: 
 
“A lot of the motivation is cost / benefit. If they have been caught nicking only £1,000 of 
expenses, it is going to cost more than £1,000 of management time to investigate it. 
What's the point, just do a disciplinary and get them out, but then not talk about it.” 
 
These commercial arguments not only quash investigations and broader inquiries, which could 
benefit from external, professional scrutiny, they also suppress valuable opportunities for 
strengthening fraud resilience (Button and Gee, 2013, p51) and reducing waste. The irony is that 
the apparently rational choice exercised by loyal managers concerned to avoid wasting money in 
the present risks long term financial damage, especially that caused by high frequency 
sociopathic offenders. 
 
Denial of responsibility 
 
The utilitarian perspective (Swanson, 1995) running through this analysis can, if uncontrolled, 
lead managers into completely excusing detected fraudulent behaviour. In Chapter 7 we saw how 
the security team of DEF Group challenges the rationalisations formulated by line managers to 
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ensure that those internal fraudsters perceived as valuable to the company are investigated and 
appropriately sanctioned. Conversely the response of R&T’s senior management to the exposure 
of the contract bribery frauds by an agency employee was to deny the crime and conceal it from 
the corporate executives in order to maintain the necessary momentum on a critical engineering 
project. The utility of their decision was justified by rationalisations which mirror the defence of 
necessity (Minor, 1981) and higher loyalty, group identity neutralisations (Sykes and Matza, 
1957). Conveniently their rationalisations also preserved their personal reputations within the 
company. The young manager, Ethan, was reluctantly coerced in to continuing the employment 
of the corrupt individual for fear of losing his own job, an understandable defence of necessity. 
The senior management diffused their responsibility by “allowing” Ethan to make the final 
decision. In turn Ethan further diffused his responsibility by blaming his senior management. His 
ethical role identity (Weaver and Trevino, 1999) was perverted by the narrative of his senior 
management and, unable to reconcile the discrepancy to the group identity defined by the senior 
management, he resigned shortly thereafter (Turner, 2013, p338). By ignoring the standing 
instructions from the corporate head office that all frauds must be reported to them, the 
managers decoupled themselves from their corporate role identities in order to focus on more 
parochial and personal performance objectives.  
 
Such diffusion is a relative form of denial of responsibility and is an easy response when policies 
and expectations are poorly defined and weakly enacted: it allows employees to hide behind 
their ignorance and deliberately keep themselves uninformed (Kaptein, 2008). It is a problem 
that Kevin, a counter-fraud specialist, sees more frequently in the public sector: 
 
“In the public sector you get more, ‘That bit’s not in my department.’ The accountability 
gets spread, controls are over there, systems are over here, that's a bit of IT. It dissipates 
as does the blame. Whereas in the private sector it's, ‘Shit, if I don't get this sorted, my 
necks on the block. So I'll get it sorted.’ In the public sector no one takes responsibility. In 
the private sector you find you are dealing with one person….. I’ve been called into public 
sector frauds that were known about and gone on for months and months and months, 
even from the point of disclosure; it’s just not got round to actually investigating it. It’s 
almost, ‘We don’t quite know what to do with this. We haven’t got an investigations 
team.’ It could go to audit, it could go to legal, it just rattles around....People say, ‘It's part 
of the budget, it's nothing, it's nothing. These things happen.’” 
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Malign influence of the budget 
 
Button (2011) asserts that the malign influence of KPI (key performance indicators) enables 
police officers to rationalise not taking on fraud cases. One of the most important KPIs in any 
organisation is the financial performance relative to its budget. It is evidence of managers’ ability 
to control their departments and frequently involve bonus incentives, even in non-profit public 
bodies (CIPD, 2010). The denial of victim rationalisation, which Kevin refers to above, is that fraud 
is not a problem if it does not cause overall spending to exceed the budget. Fraud consultant, 
Steve, goes further in his observation that the problem is dealing with detected frauds not the 
frauds themselves: 
 
“There is far more interest where external fraud is the target, insurance, mortgages and 
the like, but not internal expenditure. Managers are set budgets, meet their targets, 
where's the problem? If you introduce fraud detection, they then have a problem they 
didn't have before and they've now got to address it.” 
 
Very often budgetary control involves the transactional management technique of management 
by exception (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999) so that departmental expenditure is only scrutinised if 
it exceeds the target set in the previous financial year. This means that low level frauds are 
unlikely to trigger budget inquiries. The corollary is that fraud losses are unwittingly budgeted 
into superficially prepared incremental budgets (ICSA, 2005, p210). Police officer Emma 
described such an instance in the MoD. It concerned a civil servant whose job was to manage the 
army’s fleet of covert cars: 
 
 “He regularly purchased cars for himself, family and friends. When he wanted a change 
he just bought another car. He never bought a car or any petrol for 10 years [using his 
own money]. He even had private number plates… Management don't check what 
they're doing provided the employee is getting on with their job, not causing any hassle.” 
 
A peculiarity of the traditional annually fixed budgeting process is that surpluses cannot be 
carried forward and are ‘wasted’ unless spent in a frenzy of activity prior to the year end (ICSA, 
2005, p210). The motive for spending to the limit is reinforced where management accountants 
impose the incremental budgeting process as any under-spend automatically decrements 
subsequent budgets (ICSA, 2005, p210). In the worst cases the denial of victim rationalisation 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957) alloys with this budget protection motive and shifts management from 
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acquiescence to the positive encouragement of fraud. Performance to budget is of greater 
salience to the manager’s role identity than ethical performance (Stets and Burke, 2000). One 
Project Manager, Oliver, who works for a city borough described how the council’s management 
normalises occupational fraud in order to protect budget allocations. 
 
 “We have to make sure our fees for projects are at budget. We submit our fees schedule 
and it's signed off when we get the job. But it makes no difference if we do better 
because we spend the money anyway, not like the contractors. And it makes no 
difference because we have to spend it. If we don't spend it, we won't get the money 
budgeted next year so guys are told to rack up the overtime after six o’clock, to come 
back at weekends. We don't need them but it gets to the budget.” 
 
Empathy 
 
The difficult circumstances of offenders are principal motivations (Cressey, 1953) and defence of 
necessity rationalisations (Sykes and Matza, 1957). They can also induce empathetic responses in 
those representing victim organisations. Nicole, the fraud investigator at Midton District Council, 
sympathised with a benefits fraudster who was also a council employee and a single mother: 
 
“Yes, it's awful really. We're not out here to hang people. There's a human being at the 
end of all this. And you do have to take all that into context…… It's the children as well. 
You know, she has got herself into a pickle and it's just compounded.” 
 
Nevertheless Nicole did not waver from her role identity and eschew her responsibilities for the 
council. She pursued a full set of parallel sanctions: dismissal from the council, a successful 
criminal prosecution and compensation through an attachment of earnings order. For others, 
whose ethical role identity is secondary to their social identity, empathy can induce a tolerance 
to in-group fraudsters. Paul, a building society counter-fraud manager conceptually divides 
criminals into two groups. The out-group comprises malingering street criminals who deserve 
punishment and public humiliation: 
 
“What we really want, and let's be honest about it, we want to see these people put in 
stocks, like they used to back outside of the Old Bailey when it was Newgate Prison, so 
the public can go there and jeer at them. That was their entertainment in those days. 
That's what we want now if we're true.” 
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On the other hand Paul has a default defence for offenders who come from his own socio-
economic in-group based on uncharacteristic mistake and force of circumstance. Social identity 
theory suggests that the ultimate purpose of these rationalisations is the defence of Paul’s 
perception of himself: 
 
“They are very decent people who are not going to be a burden on this society. Their life 
is blighted now because they were convicted for drink-driving and I dare say if they were 
having a fag at the same time, they might as well be hung, drawn and quartered. What 
I'm saying is that the punishment for that type of crime is blighting the wrong 
people…..And the person who works in a financial institute or a commercial industry and 
falls by the wayside because her teenage son needs a pair of designer trainers and she 
thinks she will do the teeming and lading. We know the story and some never get out of 
the spiral, some do and some don't get caught. We are not that clever that we get all of 
them. But when we do catch them we want to hang them out to dry so I think we've lost 
some compassion……Where do you draw the line? I know for a fact that [minor fraud] 
happens, not because I work round here, I know because I was a police officer and from 
conversations with other people and that's what happens. People are kidding themselves 
if they think you've got people that are morally trained, so morally conscious that ‘I 
couldn't possibly do that, oh no.’ They do. Are we going to arrest them all? No. Who’d be 
left standing?” 
 
Unsurprisingly the building society’s narrow focus on mortgage and other external customer 
frauds means it rarely, if ever, deals with employee and supplier frauds. Its management excuses 
this failure by deploying the same defence of necessity and ‘fraud is normal’ rationalisations used 
by the fraudsters. Similar empathetic responses is also apparent in the engineering sector at the 
supplier interface. Alec, an agency employee working on large projects for a construction 
company, described how the company’s employees rationalise engaging in contract bribery 
frauds: 
 
“They see it, the sort of guys I deal with, as helping the contractor (engineering supplier). 
With contractors beaten up on prices, they reckon it's helping them get the right price 
and getting a bit of reward for helping them....To some extent there's truth in it, 
contractors are not paid enough, so when someone makes the right offer, you take it.” 
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Keegan is a contracts manager at a firm of construction consultants. He sees the same kind of 
practice: 
 
“I now work for Synco putting those tender packages together. It's all about insulating 
the client from any risk laying off the risk to the contractors by littering the packages with 
disclaimers about the design and specs.......The client hides behind our indemnity and 
stacks of paperwork, we hide behind the disclaimers, the main contractors know how to  
run the jobs but they don't know  how to do them and  they shove the risks straight on to 
the M and E contractors [mechanical and electrical], the QSs [quantity surveyors] bully 
the M and Es who know how to do the job but get the lowest pay. They're bound to 
fudge the costs and variations to cover the risks and make it up anyway they can. They 
have to do deals with the QSs and project managers to get the variations approved. Then 
the QS fudges the cost and the main contractor fudges the cost and the client, who 
hasn't got a clue, ends up paying for it. That's how the game goes.” 
 
The absence of formally specified ethical responsibilities in the governance structures supervising 
Alec and Keegan diminishes their ethical role identities (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). It allows 
them to maintain the role of passive, sympathetic witnesses of contract bribery fraud, 
rationalising that it is an inevitable consequence of unfair practice. The insiders know the rules of 
the game, rules that reflect Mars’ (1973) entitlement rationalisation, normalising criminality 
within the construction sector as a means of ensuring an equitable profit distribution through the 
supply chain. 
 
Social bonds 
 
John Hughes, a colleague of UBS rogue trader, Kweku Adebole, failed to inform the bank’s 
management that Adebole repeatedly exceeded his financial trading limits: because "I went to a 
school where people didn't grass,"  (BBC, 2012). The normative definitions within UBS’s ethical 
climate failed to develop Hughes’ ethical role identity (Weaver and Trevino, 1999) sufficiently to 
overcome rules of group membership acquired in childhood. Only the intervention of prosecutors 
caused Hughes to adjust his role from one of passive observer to active witness. 
 
Hamish is a former Project Manager at Banbury Engineering. He observed the operation of the 
corrupt conspiracy between Westco’s employees and Banbury’s former directors over many 
years. He became a witness for the prosecution. For him corruption was an everyday business 
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practice he had grown up with. It was a means to ensure those in his charge kept their jobs, a 
higher loyalty rationalisation (Benson, 1985). His close relationship with the Westco employees 
normalised the corruption and prevented him from snitching on his friends:  
 
“It's what went on all the time. It was the way business was always done with them. It 
was the same when I worked for Renchest. Everybody knew about it. They were the 
customers and we got work out of them and it kept the boys in a job, that's what I 
wanted. I worked with them every day. You knew they were customers, but they weren't 
just that but, yes, friends, good guys. I played golf with them, went to Ascot, Carson got 
tickets for the rugby, curry once a month, that sort of thing. Yeah, if they're a scummy 
bastard, I might report them, but when it's someone you've worked with for a long time, 
get on with, that's different, hard.” 
 
Kyle described the well-paid General Manager, Ellis, at his local private sports club as 
professionally competent, very amicable but a compulsive “Walter Mitty” liar who would lie 
about the most mundane things.  Ellis was dismissed for a fraud scheme perpetrated over many 
years: he used the club’s facilities, staff and money for his own purposes in organising events at 
private locations. His activities had been the subject of gossip amongst members for years, but 
ignored by the club’s trustees and committee members until a new Finance Director was 
appointed. Kyle explained that trustees and committee members are volunteers appointed from 
the club’s membership on fixed two year terms and no one wanted to burden their period in 
office by confronting Ellis and upsetting the social atmosphere of the club. 
 
Brian is a financial auditor, working for a large audit firm. He spoke of a particular taboo in the 
industry called “phantom ticking” whereby auditors falsify their tests: 
 
“If he's tested 150 invoices and 148 are fine, 2 of them are wrong and it has taken him 4 
days and those 2 errors bigger than the template allows, what would you do? You can 
really imagine some people going, ‘I'm going to pick 2 others. OK, they agree.’ It's called 
phantom ticking for us. It definitely, definitely happens, I'm afraid….You go into prior year 
files to get an idea of what work was done before and try and agree to it and you just see 
that it got too complicated so they just didn't bother doing it….Once you've seen it once, 
you've seen it a hundred times. 
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It is an interesting definitional conundrum. The auditor is breaking the rules and deceiving his 
employer, an occupational fraud, but only if there is a loss or risk of loss. He is also deceiving the 
client, which could be a corporate fraud if the auditor’s managers knew of the practice or 
negligence if they did not. Most seriously, he is deceiving investors, customers and suppliers 
which rely on the quality of audited annual financial statements. Nevertheless Brian would not 
“snitch” on a colleague caught phantom ticking. 
 
“I'm not going to grass my mates up but how would I do it? I wouldn't accuse them of 
phantom ticking, I would just ask them, ‘Why are you happy that you can prepare this 
EGA? Why are you happy that you have ticked this? Perhaps you've made a bit of an 
oversight.’ Or what I might do is think that it is an honest mistake and go and help him.” 
 
The strength of social bonds is most evident in family businesses. Greig and Lauren, owners of a 
SW Marketing, repeatedly excused their son’s fraudulent use of the company’s credit card to 
finance an excessive lifestyle. Truman was eventually dismissed when Iain, the Marketing 
Director, and the Finance Director exhausted their patience and threatened to resign. Iain 
explained: 
 
“Greig had warned him and warned him, but it's difficult being his Dad, and every time he 
got close to sacking him, Lauren would take Darren's side and persuade Greig to give him 
another chance…Me and Cohen threatened to leave, we'd just had enough…We reckon it 
saved us £150,000 a year.” 
 
In both of the above cases external interventions became necessary to countervail the social 
bonds of colleagues, friends and family, which allowed offenders to sustain their known 
criminality. DEFs counter-fraud manager, Mark, frequently finds that colleagues and managers 
need to be confronted with the hard evidence and meaning of fraudulent behaviour in order to 
break those bonds: 
 
“You go through that typical mixed emotion field of early days it can be quite protective 
of what they saw as one of their team, whether it was a colleague or the manager being 
very protective of one of his team: ‘He's a good guy, he gets loads of business in for me. 
There can't be anything wrong with him. I'm not going to do anything here.’ To the point 
of doing the investigation and getting the facts and show the information to the 
manager, and then it's: ‘I want to kill him.’” 
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Conclusions 
 
Two overriding themes emerge from the observations and accounts of the research participants. 
The first is the broad perception that there is little value in developing counter-fraud systems as 
it is an insignificant problem. Robust quantitative research would address this perception. The 
second and far more complex theme is that managers and employees fear the consequences of 
dealing with frauds. For some managers these fears arise from experience which has taught them 
that exposing fraud or similar compliance issues can be painful. For others it may be a general 
fear of the unknown. The feared consequences can be broadly divided into two interacting 
categories, consequences to the employing organisations and consequences to the individuals, 
which reflect the two strands of identity theory, social identity and role identity (Stryker and 
Burke, 2000). The result of weak ethical identities is that the organisation develops a passive 
tolerance to its victimhood. The ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system discussed in 
Chapter 8 de-toxifies the fraud label and makes the passive rationalisations more palatable. 
 
The organisational concerns are altruistic, higher loyalty considerations (Sykes and Matza, 1957), 
which support individuals’ group and fiduciary role identities. They are utilitarian estimations of 
how the unknown benefits to the organisation might weigh up against the unquantifiable costs: 
the cost of investigating and pursuing a case through the courts, the cost of losing a valued 
employee, the cost of destabilising a key objective and the cost of a damaged organisational 
reputation. 
 
The personal concerns are equally complex. They include the offending manager who fears 
detection and the manager who fears charges of incompetency with the attendant reputational 
and career damage. Perhaps the most unpredictable and powerful personal influence, which can 
cause managers and colleagues to look the other way is the strength of social bonds embedded 
in those social relationships that they see as superior in the hierarchy of identities. 
 
Conceptualised here as a weaker social bond, empathy operates through social identity to permit 
the construction of avoidance rationalisation. The contracts manager in the engineering sector 
justified contract bribery frauds between managers and suppliers as a means of ensuring just 
entitlements (Mars, 1973). The building society counter-fraud manager condemned those of a 
lower socio-economic group but sympathetically identified with the middle class drink-drivers 
and white-collar fraudsters. His perception that punishments unfairly ruin their lives was based 
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on a cocktail of rationalisations that they are no threat to society, their errant behaviour is a 
product of financial pressures (Cressey, 1953) and, in any case, everybody commits minor frauds.  
 
The potential danger associated with attitude of managers and employees which justifies 
colleagues’ frauds is that it can lead to its positive encouragement. In the city borough case, for 
example, the unintended result of incremental budgeting was a flurry of activity to spend money 
by fraudulent means in order to protect the subsequent year’s budget. The manager’s role 
identity had decoupled from his corporate role identity and his attention was focused on 
personal concerns, the protection of his own interests as a budget holder rather than the 
interests of his employer. Superficially prepared budgets hide the cost of fraud and the tyranny of 
the budget KPI allows managers to call upon denial of injury rationalisations to justify their 
avoidant strategies. 
 
Whether the reasons for not dealing with fraud inside organisations are called excuses, 
justifications, apologies (Benson, 1985), motivations (Coleman, 1992) or rationalisations (Cressey, 
1953) is immaterial. The germane point is that managers and employees use the same 
rationalisations as occupational offenders, at times mixed into an aggregated cocktail to reinforce 
their justifications.  
 
Sutherland advises us that people become criminals because of their exposure to a sub-culture 
wherein the definitions favourable to the violation of law are in excess of the definitions 
unfavourable to the violation of the law (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947). Sutherland’s 
teaching is constructed from the perspective of nascent offenders and their relative association 
in sub-cultures with practising criminals who teach the methods and the justifications. In the 
employment context we can supplement the differential association theory by placing greater 
emphasis on the role of the victim organisation and its members: employees are more likely to 
become occupational fraudsters when the organisation’s rationalisations for not enforcing the 
law are in excess of the organisation’s reasons for enforcing the law. By connecting the 
acquiescent rationalisations of the victim organisation with the motivations of the fraudster, the 
differential rationalisation theory posited here states: 
 
Employees are more likely to become occupational fraudsters when the organisation’s 
rationalisations for not enforcing the law are in excess of the fraudster’s rationalisations 
favourable to fraud. 
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The more that the victim organisation rationalises excusing fraud in both frequency and type, the 
more fraudgenic the climate and the lower the need for fraudsters to rationalise their criminality. 
The organisation has done it for them. Such a culture is an invitation for the occasional offenders 
described in Chapter 6 to supplement their earnings and is a ripe opportunity for sociopaths to 
get rich. This differential rationalisation addendum to Sutherland’s theory accommodates 
Cressey’s embezzler and recognises the influence of cultures which excuse and justify 
acquiescence to crime. In a more general context we might then say: “Bad men need nothing 
more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and rationalise doing nothing.” 
 
Cressey (1986) refers to Sutherland in suggesting that “…in the long run, the incidence of 
management fraud will decline only as neutralizing verbalizations supporting these crimes are 
themselves neutralized.” The differential rationalisation theory presented here informs us that 
organisations’ security governance strategies (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) will be more 
successful if they first concentrate on the avoidant rationalisations of managers and employees, 
rationalisations that are twin reflections of the offenders’ rationalisations. By doing so 
organisations promote the salience of group identity and the meanings of an ethical role identity, 
one that is intolerant of fraud irrespective of any relationship with the offender or the context of 
the offence. 
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Chapter 11 
 
Organisation Ethical Development 
 
Introduction 
 
The themes introduced in the previous chapters elucidated some of the conceptual and practical 
challenges of dealing with occupational fraud and identified some of the characteristics which 
differentiate the more fraud resilient organisations from the less capable. The aim of this chapter 
is to organise these characteristics thematically into a typological structure which addresses the 
core research question: what is it about some organisations that inhibits countering internal 
fraud whilst others are far less reticent? The analysis uses the insights derived from the primary 
and secondary research data to expand the window dressing, compliance and values orientated 
typology set out by Trevino and Weaver (2003). It draws on Kohlberg’s cognitive moral 
development (CMD) model to arrange the typology into a progressive organisation ethical 
development (OED) model. The differential rationalisation concept introduced in Chapter 10 is 
mapped onto the OED model to illustrate the primary role of regressive differential 
rationalisation in the institutionalisation of fraud in the work place, and conversely the power of 
progressive differential rationalisation in developing ethical counter-fraud cultures. 
 
Kohlberg’s interactionist theory describes how individuals’ moral reasoning develops through 
three levels sub-divided into six stages (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977) as illustrated in Figure 11.1. 
Sequential, irreversible progression through the stages is spurred by exposure to new situations 
of moral conflict which demand new and more complex reasoning. Positive interaction with 
others by way of education and guidance supports the development, particularly when 
individuals are confronted by difficult dilemmas (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977). Because the 
capacity for the expansion of empathy and feelings of guilt is at the centre of CMD (Kohlberg and 
Hersh, 1977), its scope is limited to individuals who have the capacity for socialisation and 
specifically excludes individuals with higher levels of psychopathic traits (Kohlberg, 1968). 
 
The developmental approach to understanding moral reasoning is concerned with the form and 
process of reaching moral decisions, not whether principled reasoning inevitably translates into 
moral action (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977). The theory does not claim that CMD is the sole 
determinant of moral behaviour, only that moral choices are more consistent with the higher 
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stages (Kohlberg, 2000, p602). The influence of other factors, such as pressures, motives, 
emotions and “ego strength” means that, unlike CMD itself, moral behaviour in specific situations 
is temporarily “losable” or reversible  (Kohlberg, 2000, p602). On these occasions one would 
expect cognitive dissonance to be aroused by the threat to the person’s moral self-concept or 
moral identity (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Murray, Wood and Lilienfeld, 2012). According to 
dissonance theory and neutralisation theory, the individual must then seek to eliminate or 
reduce the dissonance (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Lowell, 2012;) in order to bring about 
correspondence between self and behaviour (Fastinger and Carlsmith, 1959) through self-
justification and rationalisation (Lowell, 2012; Sykes and Matza, 1957; Cressey, 1953). 
 
In the organisational context, where the individual is subjected to group pressures, dissonance 
can occur when the individual’s own cognitions or core identity (Turner, 2013, p347) is out of 
step with the corporate groupthink (Toft and Reynolds, 2005, p6) and resulting normative 
behaviour. There are a number of ways to ameliorate the dissonance. One solution, according to 
identity theory, is to remove oneself from the situation (Turner, 2013, p500), that is transfer or 
resign. Another is to seek organisational change, but this requires a degree of moral agency 
(Lowell, 2012) and an organisation that is receptive to change. Perhaps the most common 
solution for those with a more externally orientated locus of control (Rotter, 1966; Trevino and 
Youngblood, 1990) is to realign one’s own cognitions and role identity to that of the group 
(Turner, 2013, p500; Janis, 1973) using rationalisation techniques such as attributing 
responsibility to others and acting under instruction (Lowell 2012) in order to conform to in-
group expectations (Turner, 2013, p344). 
 
This process of socialisation can have a deleterious effect on employees’ ethics, especially 
ambitious managers, as it orientates them to the norms and narrow performance objectives of 
the organisation. In this way organisations can become a malign influence which creates immoral 
managers out of previously moral individuals (Lowell, 2012). The managers become 
institutionalised into the negative ethical climate (Lowell, 2012) and, in turn, add weight to the 
inertial ballast which resists ethical development. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is not to force fit the metaphor of the organisation as a person 
(McDonald, 1987) onto the Kohlbergian model. Others have tried to do so, for example Logsdon 
and Yuthas (1997) and  Snell (2000), but they have failed to address adequately the fundamental 
problem that the organisation is not a cognitive human being with a unique conscience, but is a 
seething flux of individuals bound temporarily by a common membership and group identity. 
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Rather the aim of this chapter is to reflect on the common aspects and the important differences 
between individual moral development and organisational ethical development, with a particular 
emphasis on the influence of leadership and how the differential rationalisation concept 
introduced in Chapter 10 maps onto each organisational type. 
 
 Figure 11.1: Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development model 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pre-conventional level 
 
Stage 1: Punishment and obedience  Act to receive rewards and avoid punishment. 
 
Stage 2: Instrumental-relativist  Act to further selfishly satisfy one’s own needs, 
occasionally others. 
 
Conventional level 
 
Stage 3: Interpersonal concordance  Recognise self as member of a wider society with normative  
values, conform to peer expectations and seek approval. 
 
Stage 4: Law and order   Recognise duties and obligations, respect authority and seek  
to maintain the social order through the existing rules. 
 
Post-conventional level 
 
Stage 5: Social contract, legalistic   Recognise the prior rights of others, seek consensus on  
conflicting issues for the greater good. 
 
Stage 6: Universal ethical principles Right is defined by personal and social values which go beyond 
written laws and rules, universal principles of rights, justice, 
equality and human rights apply to all individuals. 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Organisational ethical development framework 
 
The analysis proposes an idealised organisational ethical development (OED) framework based 
on the work of Trevino and Weaver (2003) and the data from the present research (Figure 11.2; 
Figure 11.3). The typology should not be regarded as sharply delineated categories, but as a 
series of irregular, amorphous fields. The organisational types introduced in the following 
sections are illustrated by the anonymised examples encountered in the primary research and a 
few high profile cases found through searches of the media and regulatory websites. It is notable 
that whilst the searches produce many examples of corrupt organisations, convincing examples 
of ethical organisations are far more elusive. The membership pages of Transparency 
International UK (undated) and the Institute of Business Ethics (undated) websites were 
examined for examples of ethical organisations but both lists include numerous financial and 
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other organisations that have been roundly condemned by regulators. The validity of the lists as 
ethical benchmarks for present purposes is further undermined as they also include three 
companies criticised by participants for weak controls and corrupt behaviour.  
 
The list of organisational characteristics in Figure 11.2 is derived from the present research and, 
as such, is not complete. The characteristics are arranged into two domains, attributes and fraud 
risk. It cannot be claimed that the attributes are certain determinants or precursors of fraud 
levels, only that the lowest levels of fraud are consistent with the most positive attributes, which 
in turn are consistent with Trevino and Weaver’s (2003) concept of a values orientated ethical 
climate. It is notable that most of these attributes are techniques of situational crime prevention 
(Clarke, 1980; Button and Gee, 2013, p85). It implies that situational crime prevention is a 
necessary component of a progressive ethical climate. 
 
Delinquent organisations 
 
Delinquent organisations are led by managers who deliberately or negligently ignore laws, rules 
and social norms relating to ethical corporate practices and employee behaviour. They do not 
attempt to profess compliance through their published policies and codes of conduct (Gruys, 
Stewart, Goodstein, Bing and Wicks, 2008). The groupthink and organisational culture at this level 
of ethical development are characterised above all by an instrumentalist orientation similar to 
Kohlberg’s pre-conventional level: right action is that which satisfies the organisation’s own 
needs and is regulated only by useful transactional reciprocity or the intervention of external 
authorities. The delinquent category covers a broad spectrum from naïve companies to criminal 
enterprises, such as boiler room and long firm fraudsters (Levi, 2008). The range reflects a 
compass of intent, from a criminal mens rea to negligence, recklessness and ignorance. In all 
these cases the result is the same regressive differential rationalisation: the organisation’s 
rationalisations for not enforcing laws are in excess of the fraudster’s rationalisations favourable 
to fraud. 
 
Small organisations 
 
The management of naïve companies lack knowledge and awareness of regulatory and ethical 
issues, and tend to rely on trust as the principal ethical control mechanism. The naïve label is 
typically associated with small start-up companies. In 2014 at least 344,340 new companies were 
formed with up to 19 employees (BIS, 2013; BIS, 2014). Founders may well be armed with the 
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appropriate trade skills, but probably have no training in how to govern companies, possess 
limited knowledge of the regulatory environment and rarely consider the threat of employee 
fraud. The founder’s overriding concern is getting sales orders. Then they learn that competition 
is not fair: of the 26 participants from SMEs, 19 complained of corruption in their markets and 5 
admitted to colluding in contract bribery demanded by customers. In all cases the source of the 
corruption was junior or middle managers in large customer organisations, people with access to 
substantial funds and the means to hide the schemes. 
 
Iain, the Marketing Director and minority shareholder of SW Marketing, a small £3million 
turnover family business typifies the SME director. He perceives his company as honest, ethical 
and caring. He complains about corruption in his target market, the sports industry, but he had 
no idea that his routine habit of agreeing pricing structures with competitors is a fraud offence 
under the Enterprise Act 2002 until a neighbour who happened to be a former director of the 
Office of Fair Trading told him so at a dinner party. Also typical of small businesses, the 
company’s internal controls are based on trust. Unfortunately Truman, the son of the founders, 
fraudulently abused the company credit card with losses running into £10,000s. The 
management tolerated the frauds for several years until Iain and a co-director threatened to 
resign. 
 
I4U Computers is another example of a small, delinquent organisation that was both a fraud 
offender and victim. The company was a £6mn turnover company that supplied hardware, 
software and support services to schools. It was acquired by a facilities management company, 
Midland FM, and a new Managing Director, June M, was appointed. Unfortunately it stumbled 
under her stewardship, so within 18 months she was dismissed and replaced by a Midland 
director, Norman, to “…kick the management into shape, cut the spending and set the sales 
targets.” 
 
Norman deliberately distanced himself from the daily running of the subsidiary and relied on 
monthly reports from the small management team. He knew that corruption was endemic in the 
industry sector and believed that I4U had to play along by offering computer equipment and 
software as inducements to school governors, head-teachers and IT managers to win contracts. 
To support his rationalisation Norman named five competitors he believed were corrupt. A 
subsequent web search corroborated his assertion: one of the companies had been fined £2.4mn 
for copyright abuse of Microsoft licences (Kunert, 2010) and a second had been involved in a VAT 
carousel fraud (Kunert, 2011). Nevertheless Norman allowed the bribery to continue provided 
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the costs were added to the contract values, a typical contract bribery fraud scheme. Norman 
hoped that by disassociating himself from the minutiae of the business he could dissociate 
himself from corruption: 
 
“I would always turn a blind eye to that because that's the way they've done the business 
how they've operated. As long as the costs were covered in the gross profit, I was happy 
for them to do that as long as I wasn't aware of it, personally. I was implicated in it 
because I was aware of it, but I wanted some plausible deniability and that was my 
plausible deniability.” 
 
Norman also knew the company habitually defrauded its bank through abuse of its invoice 
discounting bank finance. The facility is similar to a variable overdraft; it allows businesses to 
borrow money against invoices for completed contracts and the higher the level of sales, the 
more that can be borrowed. The abuse arose from the manipulation of the incremental 
budgeting process typical of public bodies (Chapter 10). In order to protect their budgets the 
schools’ annual financial ritual involved demanding supplier invoices for work scheduled for the 
following summer break. Presenting these invoices prematurely to the bank to increase 
borrowings was an accounting fraud. 
 
Unbeknownst to Norman, the Sales Manager, having learnt how to deceive the bank, extended 
the fraudulent scheme to raise £350,000 worth of wholly falsified sales invoices. The Sales 
Manager’s motivation was twofold: it accelerated the cash flow into the business, a corporate 
fraud, and it falsely increased his sales bonus, an occupational fraud. Inevitably the scheme 
unravelled when the bank became suspicious, investigated the company and forced its closure. 
The matters were reported to the police but they decided not to prosecute because I4U was the 
author of its own downfall, the banks recovered most of their losses and the head teachers of the 
schools refused to co-operate with the investigations. 
 
The I4U case contains features previously encountered: how the rules of incremental budgeting 
trigger deceitful innovations by budget holders to overcome its strictures, a financially stressed 
business, a corrupt market that normalised corrupt behaviour as legitimate business tools, the 
use of contract bribery fraud to generate sales, rationalising fraud as borrowing, trust controls 
and a dysfunctional, transactional leadership. It is not surprising that the criminogenic culture 
was exploited by at least one junior manager. Norman invoked the classic denial of crime, denial 
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of fault and borrowing rationalisations to excuse his role in the affair (Sykes and Matza, 1957; 
Cressey, 1953): 
 
“Being ignorant to fraud, no I didn't think it could happen to us. I knew the sales ledger 
had to be manipulated to make it work but I didn't know it was fraud. We had every 
intention of paying it back. I trusted people. I have a different perception now, but at that 
time these were my staff and I trusted my staff to carry out their duties.” 
 
Large organisations 
 
A tiny fraction of small companies develop into large corporations that wield enormous power 
and influence. There are 5,243,135 businesses in the UK but just 6,745 (0.1%) are defined as large 
by employing more than 250 people; they employ 40% of the private sector workforce and earn 
53% of the total turnover (BIS, 2014). The risk is that, as a small business grows into a large 
corporation, the absence of correspondent ethical development permits small company 
mentalities to amplify into archetypal white-collar crime corporation (Sutherland, 1940). 
 
Erwin was until recently a senior manager of CA Technologies (CA), a listed $4bn software 
business headquartered in New York. Erwin explained that he was hired by its interim Chairman, 
Bill McCracken, to assist with the restructuring of the business following catastrophic failures of 
governance. The company and its executives had been subject to several high profile legal claims 
for theft of intellectual property, bribery, breach of duty and false accounting in the 1990s and 
2000s. The false accounting scheme was an occupational fraud and the most serious offence. It 
led to the prosecution of eight executives and a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) against 
the company (USA v CA Technologies 2004). The DPA required the company to establish a 
Compliance Committee, compliance programmes and imposed an independent examiner to 
monitor regulatory compliance. The company appointed a former examiner of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to the board. 
 
To support the sanitising programme, McCracken set up a special committee of the board to 
investigate the frauds and to learn from the experience (McCracken and Zambonini, 2007). The 
core of the fraud scheme bore close resemblance to that at I4U, the overstatement of sales 
revenues. However in CA’s case the problem was over 4,000 larger at $2.2bn (McCracken and 
Zambonini, 2007, p1). The executives’ primary motivation was to plunder $1bn from the business 
in bonuses, one of the largest known occupational frauds ever detected. The company never 
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outgrew the start-up mentality and had been run by the Chief Executive, Charles Wang, as if 
“…out of his garage” (McCracken and Zambonini, 2007, p5). His dysfunctional leadership had 
created a toxic atmosphere which embedded fraud in the company’s “see no evil, hear no evil” 
culture since its inception and those who did not acquiesce were fired (McCracken and 
Zambonini, 2007, p5, p17) 
 
Erwin described the new culture at CA in terms of regulatory compliance rather than a broader 
ethical compliance orientation: “All the staff are now very aware of the need for regulatory 
compliance….but the European operation is registered in a small office in Switzerland to make 
use of low taxes.” In 2014 the company paid 18% tax in the US and 3% in overseas jurisdictions. 
The Vaud canton where CA is registered boasts of its liberal economic controls and special low 
tax rates for international companies including Starbucks (Vaud, undated). The parent company’s 
New York headquarters is also remote from its registered address in Wilmington, Delaware, 
where regulatory control is so purposely weak that “… company managers gain huge leeway to 
do what they want at the expense of other stakeholders” (Shaxson, 2012, p140). It appears that 
opening the corporate window to the inspection of the law has blown away the company’s 
garage mentality and spurred the development of its culture, but only to a utilitarian legal 
compliance orientation based on the most expedient regulations. 
 
The window dressing organisation 
 
The window dressing organisation exhibits the same behavioural characteristics as the 
delinquent organisation except that its management profess compliance with regulations and 
normative values through its policies and pronouncements (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999). 
Like the wholly delinquent organisation, the executive’s ethical expectations are superficial and 
its typical response to deviance is loaded with rationalisations to justify dysfunctional behaviour. 
Management’s awareness of its social environment, regulations and business practices has 
developed to the extent that it sees the reputational advantages of portraying the organisation 
as a law-abiding citizen, though its ethical structures are a constructed pretence that hides 
regressive differential rationalisations for tolerating delinquent behaviour. We saw in Chapters 9 
and 10 how both R&T and Westco fit this category. Despite their ethical proclamations, the 
management of both companies readily rationalise employee fraud and are repeat corporate 
fraudsters with multiple successful actions taken against them by European and North American 
authorities for cartel offences between 2000 and 2010. Inzco is a similarly sized multi-billion 
dollar Japanese manufacturer with a significant presence in the UK. Despite published policies 
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that proclaim anti-corruption values, Peter, the young Inzco sales representative, described 
without any hesitation or hint of embarrassment how the company secures high value contracts 
from large corporate and public sector clients: 
 
“We find out what his wife wants: car, holiday, whatever. And we do a deal. If we can, we 
stick his cost on the job, what we can, but it depends what we can get away with, what 
his budget is like. It's just doing what you need to. A bit under the table, you know. It's 
not really wrong, not like it's a crime, it just helps everyone along to get the deal done. 
It's part of the package you put together, isn't it?......Yes [it’s commonplace in the sector], 
at [company A and B], I worked for them before, it was just the same. The product has to 
be right, the price needs to be good and the client should get something out of it so the 
whole package is right. Why? Do you have a problem with it? You'll go nowhere if you 
don't.” 
 
Having been apprenticed into the corporate groupthink view of corruption, Peter rationalises 
that inducing clients into occupational corruption is not a crime, is approved by Inzco’s 
management and is a normal, necessary survival practice within the market sector. Without 
some form of external regulatory intervention or a change of leadership, these corrupt practices 
will continue unchecked. 
 
Nigel is a partner in Farewell Consultants. He audits the ethical practices of large corporations, 
mainly those with extensive overseas operations or suppliers. He finds that some business 
leaders are sincere in their attitudes to ethics, but others are only interested in image, reputation 
and avoiding bad publicity. The ethical leaders want to know what is right and wrong about their 
companies. The image conscious leaders are less interested in whether unethical practices occur 
in their organisations, they are more concerned that the practices may come to the attention of 
the authorities or the media. These leaders engage Nigel and his colleagues for defensive 
purposes. Should allegations of maltreatment of employees, poor health and safety conditions or 
bribery arise, the leaders aim to distance themselves and their companies from the allegations by 
citing their engagement of Farewell as evidence of their commitment to ethical practices. 
 
The windows compliance organisation is possibly the highest risk type as its ethical proclamations 
are frauds in themselves that misrepresent the organisation’s integrity and deflect serious 
scrutiny. The deregulation of the Savings and Loan market in the USA in the 1980s (Coleman, 
1995) led to industrial scale occupational frauds and the conviction of 1,000 managers (Pontell, 
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Black and Geis, 2014). The 2008 financial meltdown exposed the corrupt activities of long-
established, well-respected banks, yet too often they are still unable or reluctant to excise the 
habit. Barclays, for example, was condemned by the Financial Conduct Authority (2015) for its 
repeated failure to remedy its ineffective management controls and flawed bonus culture despite 
multiple regulatory interventions. The UBS bank is a particularly apposite example of a 
dysfunctional leadership that espoused compliance but secretly rationalised the utility of 
corporate fraud (The Telegraph, 2012): the bank inevitably fell victim to a £1.3bn occupational 
fraudster, Kweku Adoboli (Warner, 2011), and the machinations of trader Tom Hayes, who was 
motivated by greed and huge bonuses to manipulate LIBOR interest rates whilst at UBS and 
subsequently at Citigroup (BBC, 2015, May 26 ; BBC, 2015, May 28b). 
 
FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) is a not-for-profit organisation based in 
Switzerland. Its mission is to “…develop football everywhere and for all, to touch the world 
through its inspiring tournaments and to build a better future through the power of the game.” 
(FIFA, undated). Its leadership claims that it “…has played a pioneering role amongst 
international sporting federations in the area of governance.” (FIFA, undated); its Code of 
Conduct proclaims zero tolerance to corruption (FIFA, 2012a); its Code of Ethics prohibits 
anything other than trivial gifts (FIFA, 2012b). It earns on average $1.4bn per year, spends 
$1.3bn, has $1.5bn in cash reserves and employees 474 people with an average remuneration of 
$243,000 (FIFA, 2015). However its executives were greedy for more and abused their positions 
to plunder well over $150mn from the organisation and its associates (US Department of Justice, 
2015). It is not surprising that the President of FIFA, Sepp Blatter, presents psychopathic 
characteristics such as power hungry, ruthlessness, Machiavellian, manipulative and a sense of 
impunity (BBC, 2015, May 28a), and that he learnt his craft from FIFA’s former President 
Havelange, himself accused of corruption by the Swiss authorities (Kiernan, Jelmayer and 
Magalhaes, 2015). 
 
Compliance organisations 
 
Weaver and Trevino (1999) refer to ethical control programmes that emphasise rule compliance, 
coercion and punishment as compliance orientated. The compliance organisation has evolved 
ethical and security mentalities (Johnston and shearing, 2003, p29) that orientate it towards a 
law-abiding citizenship culture that resembles Kohlberg’s conventional level. Its management 
recognises the organisation’s position within the wider community and the sustainable value of 
alignment with an external regulatory environment that protects it from law-of-the-jungle chaos. 
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At this level the organisation’s internal ethical structures adopt the instrumental rule and 
punishment mechanisms exercised by the regulators: the threat of a sanction response is its 
primary control mechanism. The research suggests two types of compliance orientated 
organisations. Both types set out to comply with the rules, but the contingent compliance 
variants adopt a utilitarian perspective and rationalise the relaxation of the enforcement of the 
rules depending on the context and circumstances. On the other hand the unconditional 
compliance organisations are far more likely to enforce rules irrespective of the circumstances. 
 
Contingent compliance 
 
The response of contingent compliance organisations to rule breaking is dependent on 
management’s utilitarian assessment of who is involved, the value of the offence, the 
consequences to the organisation and whether there is external regulatory oversight. A 
contingency switch wired into a utilitarian perspective and lubricated by regressive 
rationalisations allows the organisation to oscillate between window dressing and compliance 
orientations. The Midhouse Building Society’s counter-fraud team, for example, expends 
substantial energy on regulatory compliance and external mortgage frauds perpetrated by 
customers, but it pays little attention to employee fraud because, according to counter-fraud 
manager Paul, it is common, low value and the perpetrators are not real criminals. Lawrence, the 
corporate Finance Director introduced in Chapter 6, described his frustration with the groupthink 
(Janis, 1973) of the executives at Hurn Group that led them to overlook the minor errant 
behaviour of subsidiary Managing Directors because of their perceived value contribution: 
 
“Providing the subsidiary is contributing to the group, they [the parent company 
executives] would rather not know. Because they don't see it as a major wrong and it's 
just a cost of operating a business, provided it doesn't get out of hand. Dealing with it is a 
great distraction from what they are there for and they've got enough to contend with. 
At least for the small fiddles. And people don't like a serious confrontation, when it's 
minor things. When it materially impacts on margin, they have to address it.” 
 
All the lawyers and counter-fraud specialists participating in the research suggested that 
reputational concerns tend to inhibit the response of organisations to crimes of dishonesty. Fear 
of corporate reputational damage or career repercussions can cause managers to ignore 
fraudulent activity, to displace management responsibility to others or to inhibit co-operation 
with investigations. The Managing Directors of HIJ Tubeline and ETS Produce (Chapter 10), are 
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reluctant to pursue internal fraudsters because they fear having to disclose the frauds to 
prospective clients through their vendor due diligence systems. Ewan, the Counter-Fraud 
Manager at facilities management company BBR Services, is wary of the potentially corrosive 
relationships between managers and subordinates that can result from these situations: 
 
“Realistically, it won’t always [be reported to the compliance function] because a lot of 
the time their site management, will probably turn around to a person and say, ‘You 
shouldn’t have done that, I should be reporting you up. You know what happens if he 
comes down there, you now owe me your loyalty.’” 
 
The Serious Fraud Office and the Attorney General’s Office displayed contingent compliance 
characteristics when they acquiesced to multiple abuses by the SFO’s executives: abuse of the 
recruitment processes, circumvention of the purchasing systems, abuse of expenses, serious 
breaches of civil service termination payment rules by its senior management which cost 
£870,000 and dishonesty in subsequent investigations (Allan, 2011). The Attorney General 
decided not to pursue the miscreants (Attorney General, 2013) despite the collective breach of 
fiduciary duty. Similarly the Sir Hugh Orde, the President of Association of Chief Police Officers 
prefers allowing officers to resign or take early retirement at the tax payers’ expense rather than 
face immediate suspension and a proper investigation (Home Affairs Committee, 2013). These 
attitudes are perhaps not surprising as the contingency mentality lies at the heart of the criminal 
justice system: decisions to prosecute offenders are contingent on a multitude of factors 
including the seriousness of the offence, the level of culpability of the offender and the harm 
caused (Crown Prosecution Service, 2013). 
 
Unconditional compliance 
 
The unconditional compliance organisation always enforces the rules irrespective of the context 
and circumstances of detected events. The ethical identity of the organisation as a social citizen 
and the ethical role identities of its managers as protectors of the group identity dominate the 
response to fraud and corruption. The collateral fallout of confronting fraud is subsidiary to the 
management’s overriding justice motive, consequently it never rationalises tolerating fraud or 
avoiding punishing offenders. The uncompromising response of Midton District Council to the 
housing benefit fraud perpetrated by one of its employees was described in Chapter 10. Despite 
sympathising with the stressed financial circumstances of the single mother, the council pursued 
criminal prosecution, recovered the losses and dismissed her. That the council has a counter-
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fraud department with the resolve and clout (Braithwaite and Fisse, 1987) to enforce the rules 
undoubtedly buttresses its resolute stance. 
 
Lawrence contrasted his disquiet with Hurn Group, described above, with his experiences as a 
Finance Director at a subsidiary of Qintek Industries. In this example, the company focused its 
opprobrium on the act of rule-breaking behaviour by a director, not the value of the expense 
fraud or the august position of the offender: 
 
“Certain companies are tolerant, other companies are intolerant of dishonest behaviour. 
One of my co-directors at Qintek had been visiting subsidiaries in the USA and he had his 
flights booked by head office. On two occasions when he was returning from the USA the 
flights were full and people were invited to be bumped off the flight in return for cash. 
He agreed and took the cash. The company took a very dim view and sacked him, 
summary dismissal, even though it hadn't actually cost them, other than his late return to 
the office.” 
 
Ewan at BBR believes the company is “…very aggressive in what we view as dishonest”. Unlike 
the SFO (Allan, 2011), BBR is intolerant of order splitting, a common practice in many 
organisations for avoiding the higher level authorisations required for higher value purchases. 
Ewan categorises the practice with fraud because it could signal a manager’s intent to evade 
oversight in order to “…get their friend’s business the job.” In BBR the practice usually leads to 
dismissal. Just like Mark at DEF Group in a similar role, Ewan believes that without the support of 
the company’s leadership, this robust approach would not be possible: “In my role you need 
support from somebody with a lot of clout otherwise you become toothless.” 
 
By casting the definition of fraud beyond a narrow legalistic interpretation and by setting no 
minimum loss value, Qintek and BBR ensure that all species of fraud are covered by the 
organisation’s compliance controls, especially in relation to the exemplary behaviour expected of 
its leaders. They are examples of progressive differential rationalisation cultures which seek to 
excise any hint of passive tolerance to fraudulent behaviour. 
 
Values orientated organisations 
 
The values orientated organisation has developed its collective groupthink beyond the rule-
punishment ethical control of the compliance organisation (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). Led by 
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transformational leaders who are fully engaged in steering the ethical climate of their 
organisations (Trevino, Brown and Hartman, 2003), the values orientated organisation 
emphasizes support and shared values. However this does not mean that compliance controls 
are abandoned. By aiming for both values and compliance, the organisation internalises within its 
employees’ voluntary adherence to values and rules (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999a). The 
key distinguishing feature of values orientation is manifest in the level of ethical engagement of 
employees. Compliance orientated organisations rely almost entirely on the instrumental 
effectiveness of their structured management systems to detect and control non-conforming 
behaviour, though they may receive the occasional anonymous whistleblowing report. In values 
orientated organisations employees’ ethical role identities are engaged to the extent that they 
voluntarily and continuously watch out for and report signs of dysfunctional behaviour through 
normal reporting channels (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). 
 
The organisation most closely aligned to the values orientation encountered in the research is 
DEF Group. Its management do not hide detected fraud, excuse and rationalise it away, rather 
they endeavour to expose it, measure it and learn from every detected event. Consequently its 
counter-fraud team have developed an expert knowledge of the subject and a professional 
capacity to pursue all justice routes available to it, disciplinary, loss recovery and criminal 
prosecutions. But most of all, its employees’ ethical role identities are observable in their 
willingness to speak up and report aberrant behaviour. This is the characteristic above all which 
distinguishes DEF from the compliance orientated subjects. The results, detailed in Chapter 7, are 
significantly reduced levels of fraud of all types: corporate, customer and occupational.  
 
Organisation ethical development 
 
A key difference between any kind of OED model and CMD is Kohlberg’s claim that human 
cognitive moral development is spurred when individuals confront, consider and resolve moral 
dilemmas (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977). Too often the management of even very mature 
delinquent organisations only reflect on their ethical responsibilities when prompted by a 
sufficiently powerful external intervention. Westco and R&T illustrate how some management 
teams remain defiant when the intervenor is a mere whistleblower. The power of the 
whistleblower is simply inadequate to penetrate the shield erected by its groupthink (Janis, 1973) 
and its collective regressive differential rationalisation mentality. Such organisations require the 
power of regulators. 
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Figure 11.2: Organisational ethical development model 
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Figure 11.3: Organisations located onto OED model 
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It took the intervention of external regulators in Germany and the USA, the exposure of 
institutional corruption and record fines of $1.3bn to trigger ethical development at Siemens. The 
company now funds a £100mn Integrity Initiative that “….supports organizations and projects 
fighting corruption and fraud through collective action, education and training” (World Bank, 
2009). In some cases leaders, whose personal immorality is a determinant factor in organisational 
failings, have to be excised as a prerequisite to ethical development, otherwise they would 
stubbornly remain at the delinquent level. Both Siemens and CA Technologies purged the 
delinquent individuals from their management teams (US Department of Justice, 2008; 
McCracken and Zambonini, 2007). 
 
Similarly DEF’s ethical journey did not occur by natural development. The key trigger was, 
according its Security Manager, a “severe jolt”, a very large fine imposed by the European 
Commission on its parent company, Eurocorp, for cartel offences. Its response went beyond just 
adjusting the behaviour of its marketing team. It invested in a transformational ethical 
programme which disseminated normative values throughout its worldwide operations. It 
introduced situational crime prevention techniques (Button and Gee, 2013, p85), recruited 
compliance staff, created training programmes and distributed revised policies, detailed 
procedures and reporting systems. The two features which clearly distinguish the company are 
the leadership’s progressive differential rationalisation mentality and the substantial engagement 
of its staff in supporting the programme. The leadership refuses to accept any excuses for 
tolerating fraud or corruption of any type and reporting aberrant behaviour is perceived as a 
normal duty rather than uncomfortable snitching. 
 
The Property Services Agency (PSA) was an example of a public sector body that was forced to 
develop its ethical climate following an inquiry into corrupt practices between employees and 
suppliers in the 1980s (Doig, 1993). The agency was subsequently rebranded and split into 
several parts, some of which were privatised. BBR was one of the private sector partners that 
inherited a portion of the PSA structure. According to Ewan, their Counter-Fraud Manager, it took 
time, resilience and considerable effort to incrementally change the inherited culture: 
 
“So the start of the anti-fraud culture wasn’t bad, but without going into too much 
history l think in the PSA days dishonesty was rife in some areas and of course we 
inherited some PSA staff so some of those would have been difficult to get into the 
correct culture but bit by bit we managed it.” 
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Ursula is a Compliance Manager and Luke is a Project Manager at one of the public sector 
successors to the PSA. The RTA inherited elements of the PSA and is responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of government assets. One of its principal roles is managing 
contractors including BBR. Ursula is adamant that the organisation is now free of occupational 
corruption due to the deterrence effect of stringent financial controls and random audits, and a 
strong, co-operative counter-fraud relationship between the RTA and its contractors. However 
she expressed deep concerns that the present direction of the organisation may lead to ethical 
reversal as discussed below. 
 
Organisation ethical regression 
 
Kohlberg asserts that the cognitive moral development of humans is irreversible, an idea that 
resonates with the immutable core personal identity postulated by identity theory (Kohlberg and 
Hersh, 1977; Turner, 2013, p347). However the ethical development of an organisation can 
regress: its membership changes, new leaders are recruited, they take new directions and 
reinvent themselves. Every example of organisational ethical development in Figure 11.3 displays 
a common characteristic of progression: that they do not lose the core features of earlier stages, 
rather each level adds an ethical layer. The values orientated organisation has the instrumental 
purpose of the delinquent organisation, the compliance proclamations of the window dressing 
orientation become true and the rule enforcement structures of the compliance organisation 
remain. Regression occurs when commitment and investment to an ethical stage wanes, an 
ethical layer is cast off and the organisation reverts to a lower stage. Barclays and UBS are just 
two of many examples in the banking sector that have regressed. Ursula’s fear is that all the good 
work and ethical investment at the RTA is now being undone. The RTA has recently changed its 
leadership and its executive team has been contracted out, including the CEO, to a private sector 
consortium. Their mission is to save money. The counter-fraud team has been reduced from a 
staff of sixteen to one. BBR has been replaced by a lower cost contractor which has halved its 
counter-fraud team and Ursula is singularly unimpressed with their operational methods: 
 
“Trenton hide everything, Trenton won’t tell us about anything they don’t have too. Their 
first option would be to lie about something rather be open and honest and I'm not used 
to that with BBR. I'm not saying they were perfect, but Trenton are absolutely appalling. 
They will tell you something and you know it's a bare faced lie.” 
 
 
205 
 
Ethical decoupling and lag 
 
Weaver, Trevino and Cochran (1999b) note how some organisations focus their programmes on 
certain ethical themes whilst others are ignored or decoupled. The categorisation of the subject 
organisations in Figure 11.3 is based solely on their orientations in respect of fraud and 
corruption. One cannot draw conclusions about other ethical themes within the organisations. 
R&T and Westco, for example, have very active and strictly enforced health and safety and 
environmental programmes. Similarly one cannot draw conclusions about all operational 
locations of an organisation from the examination of one.  The climate in the RTA’s operations 
based in the UK appears to be unconditional compliance orientated. Unfortunately the cultural 
evolution failed to gain traction in the RTA’s German operations. Ursula compared the UK with 
Germany: 
 
“It’s visible culture-wise how much we have improved in the UK with it because the RTA 
is also abroad as well, not just England and the UK. In Germany we have a huge fraud and 
corruption problem, it was the culture, they didn’t see it as fraud, it was accepted. We 
know when we uncovered it, it was massive.” 
 
Her perceptions are based on a secondment to the German office, which is predominantly 
staffed by German nationals and where there is “…a defiant hangover from the PSA days.” The 
corruption involves white goods, motorcycles, kickbacks from local contractors, price-fixing 
cartels and paying millions of Euros to non-existent shell companies. It was at such a level that it 
warranted police raids at four RTA sites and eight German suppliers. The offenders included both 
German and UK nationals. Ursula’s evident frustration arose because her team had previously 
discovered evidence of fraud and referred it to the line management in Germany who did 
nothing: “So it was all white-washed, big white wash.” It turned out that the local counter-fraud 
team were involved. Ursula described them as “The biggest crooks going, you know.” There are 
three key lessons here. Firstly, the perceived ethical climate in one organisational location is not a 
reliable predictor of the climate elsewhere. Secondly, the perceived climate associated with one 
theme is not an indicator of the climate associated with other themes. Thirdly, due to the 
complexities of organisational structures and local cultural norms, particularly in respect of multi-
nationals, one cannot assume that the rate of ethical development is uniform across locations, 
divisions, departments and themes.  
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Conclusions 
 
Although the organisation ethical development model elucidated here resembles the Kohlbergian 
CMD concept, it is not the same. The OED model represents an idealised typology of ethical 
stages that organisations can attain depending on a multitude of influences including history, 
normative expectations of the operating sector, external regulations, interventions of external 
regulators and leadership. The experiences of DEF Group and RTA in the UK and CA Technologies 
in the USA show that ethical climates can develop to reduce the levels of occupational fraud, but 
it demands hard work and a commensurate commitment to resources from the leadership. 
Ethical energy is required to shift the climate from the instrumental orientation of the delinquent 
organisation towards the values orientation level. It is no coincidence that the ethical 
development of DEF, RTA and CA Technologies has been supported by the introduction of 
compliance structures and situational crime prevention mentalities. The OED model does not 
mean that values orientated organisations never stray, never have internal ethical failures and 
are never victims of occupational crime. It does mean that ethical conduct is more consistent 
with the higher stages, that fraud is less likely. 
 
Because regressive differential rationalisation promotes ‘fraudgenic’ cultures which allow both 
occupational and corporate fraud to become institutionalised in organisations such as I4U, SW 
Marketing, R&T, Westco and previously at CA Technologies, progressive differential 
rationalisation has to be a primary focus of ethical programmes. The programmes must de-
rationalise corporate fraud to set a credible values reference otherwise the individual and 
collective dissonance created by rationalising the utility of corporate fraud would undermine any 
progressive differential rationalisation programmes in respect of occupational fraud. Put simply, 
dishonesty must not be allowed to breed dishonesty. 
 
The OED model suggests that ethical energy has to be maintained to avoid ethical reversal. The 
pull of the instrumental orientation that defines the functional purpose of the organisation is a 
powerful, continuous force somewhat like a tension spring that, if not resisted, draws the 
organisation down to the lowest ethical energy level, promotes regressive differential 
rationalisation and leads back to delinquency. A primary function of the counter-fraud team is to 
sustain the ethical climate by maintaining a progressive differential rationalisation mentality. The 
role of the leadership is to provide the team with the necessary clout (Braithwaite and Fisse, 
1987) and the anchor from which it can resist the tensile forces of the instrumental orientation. 
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Counter-fraud teams should have a prominent role in the planning of significant organisational 
changes, restructuring, mergers and acquisitions to deal with inevitable cultural misalignments, 
conflicts and anomie. The ethical energy at these pivotal moments should be enhanced, not 
diminished. It is unfortunate that the structural changes within RTA and its supply chain have 
resulted in a drastic reduction in counter-fraud investment. If its ethical energy levels are not 
supplemented by some other means then the model predicts ethical delayering and regression to 
a windows dressing culture or worse. Should this happen, it is virtually certain that there will be 
an increase in corporate, third party and occupational fraud. Whilst this outcome may not be 
intentional, it results from their inability to tune into the collective memory of the bad old days of 
the PSA and more recent experiences in Germany. It is probably inevitable that the salience of 
profound experiences and the associated, absorbed isomorphic learning (Toft and Reynolds, 
2005) will diminish or disappear entirely when an entire management team is replaced. 
Corporate managers should be alive to these risks when contemplating structural changes, 
acquisitions and mergers. Politicians and senior civil servants should be especially tuned into 
these risks when overseeing privatisations or transforming the governance of public bodies to 
government-owned, contractor- operated (GOCO) organisations.  
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Chapter 12 
 
Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
 
The limited enthusiasm for occupational fraud since the ground breaking work of Sutherland 
(1940) and Cressey (1953) is puzzling. It has a stunning capacity to cause harm, manifests the 
audacious criminal ingenuity of apparently respectable people and has an ancient pedigree. The 
unbridled greed and wilful negligence of his senior managers allowed Nick Leeson to play 
Monopoly, accumulate fraudulent losses of £827 million and destroy Barings Bank (Stein, 2000). 
History was repeated with the £1.4bn of unsupervised fraudulent trading by Kweku Adoboli at 
UBS (R v Kweku Adoboli [2012]). Sometimes a herd mentality in an entire sector produces 
devastating consequences. Pontell and Calavita (1992) characterise the savings and loan scandal 
as collective embezzlement. It involved 543 sales and loan companies, resulted in 839 convictions 
(Calavita and Pontell, 1994) and cost the American taxpayer $1 trillion (Pontell and Calavita, 
1992). In AD 193 the Praetorian Guard committed probably the most audacious occupational 
fraud on record when it sold the Roman Empire to Senator Didius Julianus (Gibbon, 2001, p137). 
 
These are extreme examples of occupational fraud. Usually, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, 
occupational fraud involves low value incidents, the undetected dark matter (Shapiro, 1985) that 
rarely triggers management interest, never mind the attention of the media, historians or 
academics. Even when it is discovered, organisations often avoid thorough investigations and 
rarely pursue judicial remedies. The Attorney General failed to properly investigate the abuse of 
trust and the dishonesty of the senior management at the SFO (Hurdle, 2012). It clearly caused a 
deal of angst amongst the SFO’s employees which led to a whistleblower complaint. It enriched 
three executives to the tune of £870,000 and enraged the Public Accounts Committee (2013) but 
no one was held to account and the wound was not repaired. Why did the SFO not prevent this 
abuse in the first pace and why did it not respond effectively to the complaint? 
 
This research was stimulated by personal experience which prompted the primary research 
question: what is it about some organisations that they do not tackle occupational fraud and 
sometimes seem to intentionally avoid dealing it? The natural corollary is to ask why other 
organisations are robust in confronting the problem. In the absence of directly relevant previous 
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research, this inquiry has utilised a mixture of methods and has drawn upon a range of 
sociological theories to explore the control structures, social influences and cultural 
characteristics of organisations which lead either to active prevention or passive tolerance. 
Chapters 3 to 5 examined the nature of the occupational fraud threat and the nature of the 
challenge it poses to organisations. Chapters 6 to 11 then examined the attributes and cultural 
dynamics of organisations which lead either to a criminogenic fraud tolerant orientation or an 
ethical fraud intolerant orientation. This final chapter follows a similar structure in summarising 
the research findings. It concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the research and the 
opportunities for further research, including potential application of the findings in other 
sociological fields. 
 
The nature of the occupational fraud threat 
 
The difficulties in addressing the occupational fraud problem begin with its definition. Chapter 4 
described how ambiguities in the objective and subjective meanings of fraud create difficulties 
for organisations trying to prevent it and for researchers seeking to understand it. The objective 
meaning is defined by the formal, generalised legal description of the type of behaviour that can 
be properly labelled as fraud. It is an abstract concept, a reference standard for measuring real, 
observable behaviour. The subjective meaning arises when an observer, a manager or colleague, 
encounters real behaviour or specific evidence and assesses whether it meets the reference 
criteria. 
 
The problems continue with the law. The role of the legislators is to provide a clear, 
understandable objective definition, to clearly define society’s view of what is right and wrong 
and to give meaning to wrongful behaviour by setting proportionate sanctions. The criminal 
justice system then has a social learning purpose to reinforce that meaning by enforcing the law 
(Bandura, 1976, p121). However the state systems falls short in all three respects. The statute 
book contains numerous deceit offences which are context dependent, carry wildly varying levels 
of sanctions and target either the individual or the organisation, rarely both. Thus for similar 
behaviour, the meaning of fraud depends on the immediate circumstances of the offence, 
whether the offender is a real person or an organisation and on the profession of the human 
offender. However the most salient problem described in Chapter 8 is the distinct lack of interest 
and weak performance of the law enforcers and prosecutors. Their indifference signals to both 
offenders and victims that only the most audacious fraud is a crime. It dissolves the immorality of 
the act and effectively de-criminalises lower value offences (Duffield and Grabosky, 2001). As an 
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alternative the civil regime offers little prospect of justice. It is poorly designed for low value 
frauds and as for substantial claims, one experienced fraud barrister characterised the courts as 
no better than a betting shop. The overall message broadcast by the state apparatus is that fraud 
is not a real crime and employers need to find their own ways of both preventing it and 
responding to incidents. 
 
Although the analysis of occupational fraud in Chapter 4 set out to provide a clear definition, it 
failed, rather it amplified the difficulties in clearly defining fraud. The chapter introduced the 
concept of the offence script as an analytical means of describing the chronology of events and 
the roles of actors that it may be properly understood and labelled. The method illustrated the 
significant overlap between employee theft and employee fraud. It also showed how a bribe paid 
in order to win a contract is a type of fraud because the money for the bribe is sourced from the 
client organisation by way of a fraudulent addition to the contract value. This is the most 
frequent type of fraud I have seen in business and to emphasise its dual nature, I have named it 
“contract bribery fraud”. This fraud type illustrates how the clear delineation between corporate 
and occupational fraud suggested by Clinard and Quinney (1973, p188) is often not possible and 
depends on the unit of analysis: the supplier is the briber committing a corporate offence, the 
bribee is an employer of the customer committing an occupational offence. To add to the 
confusion, Chapter 4 also showed how occupational fraud, unlike most other crimes, is 
contingent on local organisational rules. Behaviour prohibited by contractual arrangements in 
one organisation is perfectly acceptable in another. The fraud is not intrinsic to the actions but 
arises from the breach of contract. This may explain why the police, and indeed employers, are 
prone to regard employee fraud as civil disputes or disciplinary matters, but not crimes. 
 
Other acquisitive crimes do not suffer from the same level of subjective interpretation, it is 
peculiar to fraud. Consequently employers are unsure how to distinguish between fraud, error 
and negligence and therefore whether to respond to events with assistance, training, systems 
improvement, disciplinary measures or prosecution. Even organisations like DEF Group 
introduced in Chapter 7 struggle to distinguish between fraud and error. The fundamental issue is 
that the difficulties in producing an objective definition of fraud are as nothing compared to the 
difficulties in subjectively defining observed behaviour as fraudulent. The organisation is an 
environment wherein deliberately false interpretations of fraud can readily be lost amongst 
genuine misunderstandings. It is an ideal context for both offenders and employers to construct 
“no-crime” and “normal behaviour” rationalisations (Benson, 1985).  
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From the researcher’s perspective this bubbling milieu of definitional uncertainties and 
typological intersections creates problems in clearly identifying the unit of analysis: the broad 
offence genus, a particular type of offence, the employee, the organisational victim, individual 
events or schemes. The difficulties in defining the unit of analysis is reflected in the white-collar 
literature where the organisation, the employee and non-work related offending are often mixed 
together. Although clear and consistent delineation of the unit of measure is difficult, if not 
impossible, it is important that researchers apply more rigour in scoping and describing their 
work programmes to ensure their conclusions are more precisely related to the environments 
and phenomena in question. 
 
The purpose of Chapter 5 was to develop an understanding of the extent of the occupational 
fraud threat. If the threat is small then there is little need for preventative measures but if the 
threat is large, organisations need to know whether the challenge is many employees committing 
many low value offences or a small number of high value offenders. Many offenders would 
emphasise the role of the organisation and indicate a systematic failure of its culture and controls 
which leads to normalising deviant behaviour (Kaptein, 2008). Rare, high value offending would 
emphasise the role of the offender and the need to identify, control or excise these individuals. 
The chapter is a meta-analysis of the best available secondary data and primary data collected 
from research participants; it uniquely quantifies the value and frequency of the offence and of 
the offender. The chapter arrives at a number of important conclusions. Firstly, that measuring is 
a hard task, not least because it is difficult to identify, detect and define with confidence. 
Secondly, with annual losses in the UK at £14.5bn, larger than the aggregate losses of all physical 
acquisitive crimes, occupational fraud poses a significant threat to organisations. Following the 
work of Hollinger and Clark (1983a) and Karstedt and Farrell (2006, 2007), the indications are that 
occupational fraud is a normal activity and in any 12 month period, at least one third of 
employees will commit at least one offence. This amounts to 10 million adults in the UK. The 
implication is that the problem cannot be addressed by the law alone, it requires a significant 
adjustment in normative structures. These statistics need to be viewed with caution because 
they are not derived from a random, representative sample frame, nevertheless they are the best 
available statistics for further hypothesis testing. The most interesting finding, however, is the 
statistical distribution of frauds. By focusing on the event as the unit of analysis rather than the 
aggregate scheme it becomes apparent that most fraudsters, over 90%, are infrequent offenders 
causing about one-third of the damage, whilst less than 10% are frequent offenders causing 
about two-thirds of the losses. Clearly the minority pose the major financial threat. The data 
supports the analysis of arrest histories by Weisburd, Waring and Chayet (2001, p78) which 
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showed that some white-collar criminals are occasional offenders and others are habitual. The 
data in the analysis correlated strongly with the Weibull distribution which is typically used by 
engineers to analyse equipment reliability. Further work is required to test this hypothesis, but it 
implies that fraudulent behaviour may follow a standard statistical distribution. If this proved to 
be the case, it could assist in the statistical modelling of not only fraud, but also other 
behavioural phenomena within criminology and wider sociological fields. 
 
The final chapter in this section, Chapter 6, completes the picture of the occupational fraud 
threat by examining the nature of the occupational offender. The analysis builds on the offender 
typologies of Weisburd, Waring and Chayet (2001), Pogarsky (2002) and Wikstrom (2006) and 
proposes that people can be described by a continuous ethical distribution. The two minorities at 
either end of the distribution, the saints and the psychopaths, are not susceptible to 
management controls, normative values and deterrence strategies, but the behaviour of the 
majority is contingent on these environmental influences. The implication for organisations is 
that their counter-fraud strategies need to recognise that the offending population is not 
homogeneous and they need to be alive to the threat from ordinary, mundane people as well as 
from those with higher levels of psychopathy. The majority of offenders are psychologically 
normal. They are stimulated by crisis or by pure opportunity and their offences are more likely to 
be occasional and lower in value. Because their moral sensibilities are rooted in socially 
normative values, offenders in this group need to construct rationalisations to maintain their 
moral self-perceptions. The psychopathic fraudsters are in the minority but cause the greatest 
harm through their greed and habitual offending. They care little about normative expectations, 
so do not need to construct rationalisations. The implication is that counter-fraud strategies 
should include organisational ethical development programmes to reduce the number of 
occasional offenders and robust controls to disable or remove the undeterrable, habitual 
psychopaths. For criminologists these observations also mean that the aetiology of occupational 
fraud cannot be described by a single, universal theory: situational and cultural theories are the 
most apposite for the majority of offenders whilst psychology theories appear to be the most 
relevant springboard for the individuals causing the greatest harm. 
 
Culture and characteristics of organisations 
 
The case study of DEF Group in Chapters 7 and 8 provided an insight into the structures and 
dynamics of an organisation which is sufficiently proud of its counter-fraud culture to expose its 
workings to a nosey researcher. The performance of DEF sits in stark contrast to that of R&T 
214 
 
Industries described in Chapter 9. At first sight both companies share similar characteristics. They 
are both very large European corporations operating in similar sectors, indeed DEF distributes 
R&T’s products, they have both been fined very substantial amounts by the European 
Commission for cartel offences and they both proclaim ethical corporate values. The differences 
emerge in the gap between rhetoric and reality. DEF responded to regulatory intervention by 
investing in its ethical culture. The study identified four key attributes which distinguish DEF. Its 
counter-fraud systems are fully integrated into its business systems and ethical structures. Its 
security team acts like an independent internal police force. The team has the support of its 
leadership and the consequent clout to monitor and respond to fraud incidents. The leadership’s 
refusal to rationalise excuses for fraudulent behaviour whatever the consequences or the station 
of the offender distributes a powerful ethical message. Finally and as a result, employees’ ethical 
identities are actively engaged in watching out for ethical problems including fraud. It is this last 
feature which most clearly sets the company apart and locates it within Weaver and Trevino’s 
(2003) idealised description of a values orientated organisation. On the other hand R&T sits 
squarely within the definition of the window dressing organisation, one which does not practice 
its espoused values (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999b). R&T’s fraudgenic culture is evident at 
a high level in its multiple prosecutions for cartel and corporate bribery, and at a local level in its 
indifference to tax evasion and internal bribery. The absence of ethical leadership and its 
emphasis on utilitarian commercial objectives distorts the values of junior managers thus 
creating psychological dissonance and the construction of rationalisations for tolerating corrupt 
behaviour. For R&T’s management fraud is not the problem, the problem is the perceived threat 
to commercial objectives and careers posed by the exposure of the crime. For them the 
consequences of exposure hold more sway than the damages and immorality of the crime. 
 
The regulatory environment in which organisations of all types operate has evolved incrementally 
by way of significant thematic steps. The extent and depth to which these regulations are 
meaningfully implemented depends to a great extent on the intent and enforcement powers 
afforded to the regulators (Coleman, 1992). Four major ethical themes have emerged over the 
past thirty years: employee welfare and equality, quality of products and services, health and 
safety and the environment. Each are supervised by specialist regulators with significant powers 
to intervene in the operations of organisations. The consequence is a library of British and 
European Standards and an army of consultants and employed regulatory officers advising 
management teams how to comply with the regulations. Another manifestation is the vendor 
appraisal system whereby mainly large organisations set out their ethical expectations and check 
the ethical practices of suppliers. Those companies which fail to comply or reform are excluded 
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from approved supplier lists. In this way the law acts through the coercive agency of large 
corporations to disseminate compliance through the supply chain. Conversations and debates 
between employees and between organisations on these particular issues is now a normal, 
everyday occurrence. 
 
The Bribery Act 2010 was introduced with a similar intent and is becoming a more regular feature 
of vendor appraisal packs, but it is not yet a topic of conversation between businesses. The 
difference is the absence of a clearly identifiable agency responsible for enforcement. Employee 
fraud, including contract bribery fraud, suffers from the malaise of a weak regulatory 
environment, an indifferent police service and an ineffective Serious Fraud Office. Consequently 
the policing of employee fraud is essentially a private exercise that requires a robust security 
mentality (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) to fill the regulatory vacuum and prevent lawlessness. 
However organisations’ private powers are rightly restricted to preventative, civil law, 
contractual and above all disciplinary mechanisms. The perceived immorality attached to fraud, 
as measured by the level of sanction, is thus detoxified to the equivalence of a civil dispute or 
weak job performance. Poor performance may be a dismissible circumstance but it is not a 
sanctionable offence. The failure of the law limits the effective scope of sanctions policies and 
stymies access to the general deterrence power of criminal sanctions required to dissuade the 
lower morality opportunistic offenders, those people who may develop into habitual offenders. 
The opportunity for specific deterrence is also lost, thus encouraging “no-crime” rationalisations 
in the minds of deterrable individuals who see dismissal as a fresh opportunity to defraud a new 
employer. Indeed Chapter 8 highlighted how these torpedoes can become boomerangs, 
returning to the first employer to resume their nefarious ways. 
 
Chapter 10 brought together a thread running throughout the thesis, how managers’ 
rationalisations for not dealing with fraudulent behaviour reflect offenders’ rationalisations for 
engaging in fraud. Some of their excuses are exactly the same as the offenders’: it’s not a crime, 
higher loyalty protection of corporate reputation, empathy and social bonds, defence of 
necessity in protecting one’s job or personal reputation, it’s not a crime, denial of responsibility, 
it is normal and a form of denial of injury in a utilitarian sense whereby the cost of dealing with 
fraud is perceived as in excess of the losses associated with the offence. The differential 
rationalisation theory set out in Chapter 10 borrows from Sutherland (Sutherland, Cressey and 
Luckenbill, 1947, p88) but places greater emphasis on the role of the organisation and its 
members in the aetiology of occupational fraud. The theory postulates that employees are more 
likely to become occupational fraudsters when the organisation’s rationalisations for not 
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enforcing the law are in excess of the fraudster’s rationalisations favourable to fraud, both in 
type and frequency. It is an interactionist theory that identifies a key responsibility of leaders in 
shaping the ethical climate and reinforcing positive normative values: it is to deconstruct the 
rationalisations of managers and employees for excusing and tolerating occupational fraud. 
 
Unethical organisations are characterised by regressive differential rationalisation. The increased 
range of types and frequency of rationalisations for excusing fraud expressed by leaders, 
managers and their subordinates normalises aberrant behaviour. These culturally borne 
expressions are external agents in reducing the moral dissonance and inhibitions in the minds of 
individual potential offenders. Ethical organisations are characterised by progressive differential 
rationalisation: the range of type and frequency of tolerating rationalisations is reduced thus 
placing greater emphasis on the agency, choices and rationalisations of the individuals who are 
contemplating fraud. Cressey (1986) teaches that crime can be reduced by deconstructing 
offenders’ rationalisations by, for example, providing an equitable environment which does not 
foment crime rationalisations (Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2012, p24). Differential rationalisation 
suggests that organisations should first focus on dismantling the acquiescent rationalisations of 
law-abiding managers and employees. Progressive differential rationalisation operates on the 
group identity by shifting the ethical distribution of members to a higher level of morality thus 
reducing the number of deterrable offenders. It reduces the risk of law-abiding excusers slipping 
silently into excusing their own emergent criminality. It ensures that pathologically immoral 
offenders are held accountable irrespective of their station, punished and excised from the 
organisation. Differential rationalisation can be applied to any ethical concept involving 
organisations and sub-cultures, issues such as health and safety, environmental responsibility and 
equality. A progressive differential rationalisation climate is more likely to promote isomorphic 
learning from negative experiences and catastrophic events (Toft and Reynolds, 2005, p65). On 
the other hand, members of a regressive differential rationalisation culture are more likely to 
excuse the circumstances and those responsible for immoral, negligent or reckless behaviour and 
therefore lose the valuable learning opportunities. 
 
Inspired by Kohlberg’s (1968) ideas of cognitive moral development (CMD), Chapter 11 continued 
the discussion of ethical climate to propose a five stage organisational ethical development (OED) 
model. It is fundamentally incompatible with CMD. The two most important departures are that 
the ethical climate of organisations, especially large, complex organisations, are not 
homogeneous. The cultural norms in one location, division or department can be profoundly 
different to others. Secondly, Kohlberg holds that, barring physical or psychological damage, an 
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individual’s moral journey cannot regress to lower levels; organisations and internal sub-cultures 
can regress with changes in leadership, personnel, structures, ownership and external pressures. 
Nevertheless the OED model provides a typological framework for exploring how these variables 
influence an organisation’s progressive or regressive journey. External regulations are an 
important influence, especially when they are enforced: regulatory intervention triggered the 
development of DEF Group (Chapter 7), CA Technologies and the PSA in the UK but it failed in 
respect of R&T Industries (Chapter 9) and the German division of the RSA agency. Research is 
required to isolate the variables and understand their relative power in influencing ethical 
development. 
 
The OED analysis proposes some of the identifiable organisational characteristics relevant to 
occupational fraud at each level, one of which is differential rationalisation. As the list of 
characteristics is based on the exploratory research data it is far from complete. However it does 
suggest that situational crime prevention is a necessary component of progressive ethical 
climates. Further work is required to extend the list of characteristics and correlate it with each 
stage of development. One of the correlates suggested by the research data is that criminogenic 
cultures prone to perpetrating corporate fraud are more susceptible to occupational fraud. The 
conclusion that corporate criminality breeds criminal cultures which feed on the corporate body 
is not new. It follows differential association theory (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1947, 
p88) and the observations of early criminological research that inner-city criminal sub-cultures 
victimise their own communities. 
 
Limitations of research and further work 
 
This research programme set out to explore how organisations deal with occupational fraud and 
why some organisations avoid tackling the problem. The exploratory nature of the research using 
mixed methods means that the results need to be viewed with some caution. The data and ideas 
generated need to be regarded as hypotheses for further testing. The variables identified do not 
constitute a comprehensive list. Further research is required to identify the internal and external 
variables which influence organisations’ decisions to invest in counter-fraud strategies, how they 
develop their security mentalities and how they respond to detected incidents. In order to 
minimise bias, these questions call for ethnographic research by insiders or observers in the 
tradition of Mars (1973, 1974) and Ditton (1977). A key issue is gaining access to organisations 
and, when the door is open, gaining complete access. The present research has been constrained 
by the limitations of time resource and the inaccessibility of organisations by ethical means. 
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Consequently the observations of the participant organisations were restricted to a short time 
period and a specific location. The experience of the RSA in Chapter 11 illustrate that the 
researcher cannot assume that observations in one location or country are representative of 
other locations. 
 
Quantitative research is required to develop the ideas so that they may prove to have 
generalised application. There is a desperate need to undertake robust research into the extent 
of the fraud problem on order to convince Chief Executives and policy makers of the significance 
of the threat and the need for investment in prevention strategies. Conducting fraud loss 
measurement exercises (Button and Gee, 2013, p71) alongside qualitative assessments of the 
characteristics and ethical cultures of participant organisations would expose causal attributes 
which affect fraud resilience. Examining organisations’ histories would identify the influences and 
triggers which has led them to their current level of ethical development. The fraud distribution 
data suggests that occupational fraud is a normal activity but the minority of offenders cause 
most of the damage. Further representative testing is required to prove the hypothesis. The 
thesis induces that the minority of offenders display higher levels of psychopathic traits. However 
in order to substantiate the hypothesis a psychological research programme is required that 
diagnoses the personality characteristics of employees and correlates these traits with offending 
frequency. From the sociological perspective, the most interesting research is possibly also the 
least difficult to undertake, to test the differential rationalisation theory using survey and 
interview methods. It would also be fascinating to apply the research to other ethical themes 
such as health and safety, environment and patient care in the NHS. 
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Appendix 1.1: Schedule of participants 
 
Individual 
pseudonym 
Organisation 
pseudonym 
Sector Size 
Organisation 
type 
Role Notes 
Participant 
type 
Recorded 
Alec Farland Group Private sector SME 
Self-employed 
contractor 
Engineer 
Contract bribery fraud tolerated to distribute 
profit through construction industry supply 
chain. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Andrew Solicitor Firm B Private sector Large Law firm Solicitor 
Definition of fraud - an umbrella term covering 
many causes of action. Advises clients not to 
use police. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Barry Solicitor Firm C Private sector Large Law firm Solicitor 
Can't show cost-benefit of counter-fraud 
investment. Managers can be defensive, 
uncooperative witnesses. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Bernie R&T Industries Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
Agency 
employee 
Habitual, opportunistic occupational fraudster. Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Bill Prosecutor Public sector Large Prosecutor Solicitor 
Disclosure difficulties - most material is 
irrelevant. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Brian Wendever Private sector Large 
Accountancy 
firm 
Auditor 
Would not "grass" on colleague for phantom 
ticking. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Carson Westco International Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
Maintenance 
engineer 
Occasional, opportunistic occupational 
fraudster. Admitted to fraud and was 
prosecution witness against George and 
Connor 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
Colin Midton DC Public sector Large Local authority 
Fraud 
investigator 
Confused about evidence and disclosure in 
parallel investigations. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Conrad R&T Industries Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
Engineering 
Manager 
Rationalised occupational fraud by Bernie. Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Douglas Foster Engineering Private sector SME 
Engineering 
company 
Contract 
Manager 
Corruption at R&T Industries. Reference Ethan, 
Bernie. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Edward SES Electrical Private sector SME 
Network cabling 
company. 
Supplier to 
Northshire 
Managing 
Director 
Coerced into contract bribery fraud by 
Northshire. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Emma Police Public sector Large MoD Police Detective 
Habitual low value fraudsters in the military 
abuse JPA (payroll and expense) system. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
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Individual 
pseudonym 
Organisation 
pseudonym 
Sector Size 
Organisation 
type 
Role Notes 
Participant 
type 
Recorded 
Eric Police Public sector Large Police Detective 
Good business systems and controls makes 
investigations easier when fraud does occur. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Erwin CA Technologies Private sector Large 
Software 
company 
Vice-
President 
Marketing 
Delinquent company, very large occupational 
fraud by executive. Forced by regulatory 
intervention into compliance orientation. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Ethan R&T Industries Private sector Large Manufacturer 
Projects 
Manager 
Ethan managed Engineering Department. 
Contract bribery fraud involving Bernie and 
Northwick Projects. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Ewan BBR Services Private sector Large 
Facilities 
management 
company. 
Supplier to RSA. 
Counter-fraud 
Manager 
Definition of fraud - order splitting is fraud. 
Took years to overcome corruption climate 
endemic at the PSA. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
FM R&T Industries Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
Facilities 
engineer 
Colleague of Ethan - Ethan bullied by 
management. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Gordon R&T Industries Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
Engineering 
Director 
Rationalised occupational fraud by Bernie. Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Hamish Banbury Engineering Private sector SME 
Engineering 
company 
Project 
Manager 
Social bonds prevent reporting fraud. Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Harrison Banbury Engineering Private sector SME 
Engineering 
company. 
Supplier to 
Westco. 
Director 
Convicted of fraud and bribery involving 
Westco. Co-director of Duncan.  
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Helena Wallace Ingredients Private sector SME 
Manufacturing 
company 
Finance 
Director 
Disclosed corrupt relationship between Bernie 
and Northwick. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Henry DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution 
company, 
subsidiary of 
Eurocorp 
Security 
Manager 
Robust counter-fraud systems 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Iain SW Marketing Private sector SME 
Marketing 
agency 
Marketing 
Director 
Social bonds prevent tackling fraud. Unaware 
that he was involved in illegal price fixing. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
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Individual 
pseudonym 
Organisation 
pseudonym 
Sector Size 
Organisation 
type 
Role Notes 
Participant 
type 
Recorded 
Imogen JJW Private sector Large 
Accountancy 
firm 
Forensic 
accountant 
Need to distinguish between fraud and error. 
Early detection and intervention would prevent 
offender developing into habitual offender. 
Encountered fraudster motivated by boredom. 
Personal reputation more salient than 
corporate reputation. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Jackson Alloy Group Private sector Large Manufacturer 
Ethics 
consultant, 
retired MD of 
Alloy Group 
Code of ethics - gifts and entertainment. Observational 
Not 
recorded 
James James Private sector SME 
Self-employed 
contractor 
Engineer 
Insecurity and pressures of self-employed 
contractors. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
Jeremy Banbury Engineering Private sector SME 
Engineering 
company 
Director Involved in Westco investigation. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
Jill Natstore Private sector Large Retail company 
Personal 
Assistant 
Described character of habitual fraudster, 
Carter. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
John Barrister Chambers A Private sector SME Law firm Barrister 
Bribery is fraud under common law. 
Opportunistic employee fraudsters motivated 
by financial pressure and unfairness. Avaricious 
psychopathic offenders. Civil court is only 
useful for high value frauds, but even then it is 
a betting shop.  
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Keegan Synco Projects Private sector Large 
Construction 
consultancy 
firm 
Contract 
Manager 
Contract bribery fraud tolerated to distribute 
profit through construction industry supply 
chain. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Keith Fulsome Private sector Large 
Accountancy 
firm 
Fraud 
consultant 
NHS invested in counter-fraud only when 
benefit proved by FLM exercises. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Kenneth Barrister Chambers B Private sector SME Law firm Barrister Bribery is fraud under common law. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
Kevin JJW Private sector Large 
Accountancy 
firm 
Fraud 
consultant 
Definition of fraud - fraud is lying. No 
compelling cost benefit data for counter-fraud 
investment. Does not recommend FLM 
exercises. Investigated FD Campbell. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
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Individual 
pseudonym 
Organisation 
pseudonym 
Sector Size 
Organisation 
type 
Role Notes 
Participant 
type 
Recorded 
Kieron Deflux Private sector SME 
Engineering 
design company 
Managing 
Director 
Employment contract rules - conflict of 
interest. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Kyle Elam Sports Private sector SME 
Privates sports 
club 
Club member 
Described habitual fraudster, Ellis. Club 
members avoided confronting Ellis. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Lawrence Hurn Group Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
Finance 
Director of 
Hurn 
subsidiary 
Abuse of position by directors of corporate 
subsidiaries - overlooked at Hurn Group 
provided directors are delivering results, but 
not tolerated at Smiths. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Lawrence Qintek Industries Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
Finance 
Director of 
subsidiary 
Unconditional compliance orientation. Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Luke RTA Public sector Large 
Government 
agency 
Project 
Manager 
Ethical regression in UK and corruption lag in 
Germany. Unimpressed with contractor 
Trenton. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Mark DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution 
company, 
subsidiary of 
Eurocorp 
Security and 
Compliance 
Manager 
Robust counter-fraud systems 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Matt Matt Private sector SME 
Self-employed 
contractor 
Engineer 
Use tax benefit of self-employed status to 
cover idle and sick periods. Abused by 
employers. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
Nazim Barrister Chambers C Private sector SME Law firm Barrister 
Managers are defensive and revisionist 
witnesses. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
Nick Solicitor Firm A Private sector Large Law firm Solicitor 
Definition of fraud - defined so suit 
organisations' own needs. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Nicole Midton DC Public sector Large Local authority 
Fraud 
investigator 
Enforced parallel sanctions against female 
employee despite sympathy that offender was 
a single parent. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Nigel Farewell Consultants Private sector SME 
Consultancy 
firm 
Ethics auditor 
Some leaders are sincere about ethics, but do 
not know what is going on in their companies. 
Others are insincere, just wanting to project an 
ethical image. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
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Individual 
pseudonym 
Organisation 
pseudonym 
Sector Size 
Organisation 
type 
Role Notes 
Participant 
type 
Recorded 
Nolan Monk Engineering Private sector SME 
Engineering 
company. 
Supplier to 
Westco. 
Director 
Caused Westco Purchasing Manager, Granger, 
to resign by threatening to reveal his corrupt 
practices. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Norman I4U Computers Private sector SME IT company 
Managing 
Director 
Tolerated bribing of customers and defrauded 
by Sales Manager. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Oliver Eastown DC Public sector Large Local authority 
Project 
Manager 
Fraudulent overtime encouraged to maintain 
budget expenditure. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Paul Midhouse BS Private sector Large Building Society 
Counter-fraud 
Manager 
Given up on the police. Empathy with low 
value occupational fraudsters because it is 
normal and cannot lock up everyone. Should 
be heavily punishing street criminals. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Peter Inzco Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
Sales 
Executive 
Contract bribery fraud is normal at Inzco. Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Philip R&T Industries Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
H&S Manager 
Colleague of Ethan - Ethan bullied by 
management. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Ralph Police Public sector Large Police Detective 
Definition of fraud - often civil not criminal 
matter. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Robert ETS Produce Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
Managing 
Director 
Suppress non-compliance to protect business 
contracts. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Roger AF Consultants Private sector SME 
Fraud 
consultancy 
Fraud 
consultant 
Difficult to prove value of counter-fraud 
investment. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
Rose Police Public sector Large MoD Police Detective 
Habitual high value fraudster Colonel Robert 
Jolleys. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
Ross Police Public sector Large Police Detective Significant difficulties with disclosure. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Sean Orbit Projects Private sector SME 
Engineering 
company 
Contract 
Manager 
Corruption at R&T Industries. Reference Ethan, 
Bernie. 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Steve AB Data Private sector SME 
Fraud 
consultancy 
Fraud 
consultant 
Organisations interested in external fraud, not 
internal fraud. The manager's problem is not 
the fraud itself but dealing with it after 
exposure. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
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Individual 
pseudonym 
Organisation 
pseudonym 
Sector Size 
Organisation 
type 
Role Notes 
Participant 
type 
Recorded 
Terry HIJ Tubeline Private sector SME 
Engineering 
company 
Managing 
Director 
Suppress non-compliance to protect business 
contracts. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Terry Cardwell FM Private sector Large 
Manufacturing 
company 
Former 
Operations 
Director 
Blamed for allowing £1mn occupational fraud 
by Ajayi at Cardwell FM. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Tim Smiths & Co Private sector Large 
Accountancy 
firm 
Financial 
auditor 
Not sure what fraud is, but it depends on value, 
whether it is material to the statement of 
accounts. 
Planned 
interview 
Not 
recorded 
Thomas GoStat Public sector Large 
Government 
agency 
Operations 
Manager 
Requested £2,000 contribution to "GoStat" 
"social fund". 
Observational 
Not 
recorded 
Tony Midcity BC Public sector Large Local authority 
Counter-fraud 
Manager 
Some local authorities simply deny any fraud 
problem. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
Ursula RTA Public sector Large 
Government 
agency 
Compliance 
Manager 
Ethical regression in UK and corruption lag in 
Germany. Unimpressed with contractor 
Trenton. 
Planned 
interview 
Recorded 
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Appendix 1.2: Schedule of individuals and organisations referenced by participants 
 
Individual 
pseudonym 
Organisation 
pseudonym 
Sector Size Organisation type Role Notes 
Ajayi Cardwell FM Private sector Large FM company Projects Buyer 
Habitual opportunistic occupational fraudster 
worked for Terry. 
Angela Andreescu DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution company, 
subsidiary of Eurocorp 
Branch Manager 
Habitual, opportunistic occupational fraudster. 
From DEF investigation report. 
Austin Haine DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution company, 
subsidiary of Eurocorp 
Branch Manager 
Habitual, opportunistic occupational fraudster with 
Jones, £138,000 loss. From DEF report. 
Broderick Jones DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution company, 
subsidiary of Eurocorp 
Assistant Branch 
Manager 
Habitual, opportunistic occupational fraudster with 
Haine, £138,000 loss. From DEF report. 
Campbell N/A Private sector Large Unknown Finance Director 
Habitual crisis occupational offender. Described by 
Kevin. 
Carter Natstore Private sector Large Retail company Senior manager 
Convicted of occupational fraud at Natstore. 
Described by Jill. 
Charlton 
Westco 
International 
Private sector Large Manufacturing company 
Maintenance 
engineer 
Occasional, opportunistic occupational fraudster. 
Colleague of Carson. 
Connor 
Westco 
International 
Private sector Large Manufacturing company 
Maintenance 
engineer 
Habitual, opportunistic fraudster at Westco. 
Convicted of fraud. Described by Carson. 
Davis Hurn Group Private sector Large Manufacturing company 
Managing Director 
of subsidiary 
Occupational fraudster, abuse of position. 
Described by Lawrence. 
Devlin Midcounty DC Public sector Large Local authority Administrator 
Habitual crisis offender. Convicted of benefits 
fraud against employer. Investigated by Nicole. 
Dixon DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution company, 
subsidiary of Eurocorp 
Warehouseman 
Occasional crisis occupational fraudster. Described 
by Mark. 
Duncan 
Banbury 
Engineering 
Private sector SME Engineering company Director 
Co-director of Harrison. Convicted of fraud and 
bribery involving Westco. 
Ellis Elam Sports Private sector SME Private sports club General Manager 
Occupational fraudster at Elam Sports. Described 
by Kyle. 
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Individual 
pseudonym 
Organisation 
pseudonym 
Sector Size Organisation type Role Notes 
George 
Westco 
International 
Private sector Large Manufacturing company 
Maintenance 
engineer 
Habitual, opportunistic fraudster at Westco. 
Convicted of fraud. Described by Carson. 
Gerry Wallace DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution company, 
subsidiary of Eurocorp 
Sales Manager 
Habitual, crisis occupational fraudster. From DEF 
investigation report. 
Granger 
Westco 
International 
Private sector Large Manufacturer Purchasing Manager 
Occupational fraudster at Westco. Threatened 
Nolan. Resigned when Nolan threatened to reveal 
him. 
Greig SW Marketing Private sector SME Marketing agency Director and owner 
Social bonds prevent tackling fraud. Unaware that 
he was involved in illegal price fixing. Referenced 
by Iain. 
Harry Wilson DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution company, 
subsidiary of Eurocorp 
Branch Manager 
Occasional, opportunistic occupational fraudster. 
From DEF report. 
Jefferson DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution company, 
subsidiary of Eurocorp 
Marketing Director 
Habitual opportunistic occupational fraudster. 
Described by Mark. 
Kaileen 
Westco 
International 
Private sector Large Manufacturing company Administrator 
Habitual, opportunistic fraudster at Westco. 
Connor's wife. Convicted of fraud. Referenced by 
Carson. 
Lauren SW Marketing Private sector SME Marketing agency Director and owner 
Social bonds prevent tackling fraud. Unaware that 
he was involved in illegal price fixing. Referenced 
by Iain. 
Malcolm Smith DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution company, 
subsidiary of Eurocorp 
Branch Supervisor 
Occasional, opportunistic occupational fraudster. 
From DEF report. 
Merritt 
Southcity 
Borough Council 
Public sector Large Local authority 
Car parking 
supervisor 
Habitual, opportunistic occupational fraudster. 
Norton 
Westco 
International 
Private sector Large Manufacturing company 
Maintenance 
engineer 
Occasional, crisis occupational fraudster. Colleague 
of Carson. 
Ricky DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution company, 
subsidiary of Eurocorp 
Branch Manager 
Habitual crisis occupational fraudster. See DEF 
Group case study. 
Spearman DEF Group Private sector Large 
Distribution company, 
subsidiary of Eurocorp 
Branch Manager 
Habitual, opportunistic occupational fraudster. 
Convicted of tax fraud. Described by Mark. 
Appendix 1.2 
 
 
Individual 
pseudonym 
Organisation 
pseudonym 
Sector Size Organisation type Role Notes 
Truman SW Marketing Private sector SME Marketing agency Supervisor 
Habitual, opportunistic fraudster. Son of directors / 
owners. 
Victor 
Southcity 
Borough Council 
Public sector Large Local authority 
Car parking 
supervisor 
Habitual, opportunistic occupational fraudster. 
Vincent R&T Industries Private sector Large Manufacturing company Project Engineer Dismissed by Ethan for poor performance. 
N/A 
Bamford 
Electrical 
Private sector SME 
Engineering company. 
Supplier to Westco. 
N/A 
Involved in contract bribery fraud with Westco. 
Referenced by Carson. 
N/A Eurocorp Private sector Large 
Construction products, parent 
company of DEF Group 
N/A 
Corporate ethics programme triggered by very 
large EC fine for cartel offences. See DEF Group 
cases study. 
N/A Northshire Private sector Large 
Facilities management 
company 
N/A Contract bribery fraud. Referenced by Edward. 
N/A 
Northwick 
Projects 
Private sector SME 
Engineering company. 
Supplier to R&T Industries 
N/A 
Contract bribery fraud with Bernie at R&T 
Industries. 
N/A Renchest Private sector SME 
Engineering company. 
Supplier to Westco. 
N/A 
Contract bribery fraud with Westco. Referenced by 
Hamish. 
N/A Qintek Industries Private sector Large Manufacturing company N/A 
Unconditional compliance company - director 
dismissed for accepting cash for bumped flight. 
N/A Trenton Private sector Large 
Facilities management 
company 
N/A 
Dishonest management at Trenton. Referenced by 
Ursula. 
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Appendix 1.3: Schedule of individuals and organisations referenced in the public domain 
 
Individual Organisation Sector Size Organisation type Role Notes 
Bernie Ecclestone Formula 1 Private sector Large Sports Chief Executive Innocent of giving $44mn bribe to Gerhard Gribkowsky. 
Christian Bailes SFO Public sector Large Fraud prosecutor 
Chief Capability 
Officer 
Corruption at the SFO. From government reports. 
Gerhard Gribkowsky 
Formula 1, 
Bayerischen LB 
Private sector Large Sports, Bank Director 
Jailed for 81/2 years for receiving $44mn bribe from Bernie 
Ecclestone. 
Ian McCall SFO Public sector Large Fraud prosecutor IT Manager Corruption at the SFO. From government reports. 
Kweku Adoboli UBS Private sector Large Bank N/A 
Habitual, opportunistic occupational fraudster. Convicted 
of $2.25bn occupational fraud. Company guilty of 
corporate fraud. From FCA and press. 
Phillippa Williamson SFO Public sector Large Fraud prosecutor Chief Executive Corruption at the SFO. From government reports. 
Richard Alderman SFO Public sector Large Fraud prosecutor Director Corruption at the SFO. From government reports. 
Robert Jolleys MoD Public sector Large Army Lieutenant Colonel 
Habitual opportunistic occupational fraudster. Described 
by Rose. 
Sepp Blatter FIFA Private sector Large Sports federation President Delinquent organisations. Corrupt leadership. From press. 
N/A Barclays Bank Private sector Large Bank N/A 
Window dressing organisation. Guilty of corporate fraud. 
From FCA and press. 
N/A BP Private sector Large Petro-chem company N/A Code of ethics - gifts and entertainment. From website. 
N/A Citigroup Private sector Large Bank N/A 
Window dressing organisation. Guilty of corporate fraud. 
From FCA and press. 
N/A Mazda Private sector Large Car manufacturer N/A 
Employment contract rules - staff discount rules. From 
website. 
N/A 
Marks and 
Spencer 
Private sector Large Retail company N/A 
Employment contract rules - staff discount rules. From 
website. 
N/A PSA Public sector Large Government agency N/A 
Property Services Agency (PSA), corrupt forerunner of RST.  
Referenced by Ursula (RST) and Ewan (BBR). 
N/A Siemens Private sector Large Manufacturing company N/A 
Compliance orientated company after change programme 
following fines for industrialised bribery. From press and 
DoJ judgment. 
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Appendix 2: Research ethical risk analysis 
 
Research activity Participant risks Researcher risks Control arrangements 
Interview professionals – 
lawyers, accountants, 
investigators 
Breach client confidentiality. 
Breach employer’s governance / 
disclosure rules. 
Participant recalls data. 
Data ethically unusable. 
Participants will be professionals: self-employed, partners or directors 
with fiduciary responsibilities and trained in governance and 
confidentiality issues. 
Disclose risks and control measures in participant invitation 
information form (Form 005/inv). 
Obtain signed consent (Form 006/inv). 
Participants can withdraw at any time and can withdraw permission to 
use data up to end of data gathering phase. 
Remind participants of risks at start of interview. 
Detect potential breach risk in interview and adjust focus of dialogue 
or stop interview. 
Participant is anonymous. 
Employing organisation is anonymous. 
All data not in the public domain is anonymous. 
Data in the public domain which is traceable to an anonymous 
participant has to be anonymised or discarded. 
As last resort, discard data as unusable. 
Interview law enforcement Breach case confidentiality. 
Breach employer’s governance / 
disclosure rules. 
Participant employee discloses 
career limiting criticisms of 
organisation. 
Participant recalls data. 
Data ethically unusable. 
Participants will be lawyers or department heads or authorised by 
department heads and trained in disclosure issues. 
Disclose risks and control measures in participant invitation 
information form (Form 005/inv). 
Obtain signed consent (Form 006/inv). 
Participants can withdraw at any time and can withdraw permission to 
use data already obtained. 
Remind participants of risks at start of interview. 
Detect potential breach risk in interview and adjust focus of dialogue 
or stop interview. 
Participant is anonymous. 
Employing organisation is anonymous. 
All data not in the public domain is anonymous. 
Data in the public domain which is traceable to an anonymous 
participant has to be anonymised or discarded. 
As last resort, discard data as unusable. 
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Research activity Participant risks Researcher risks Control arrangements 
Interview public or private 
sector body 
Breach client confidentiality. 
Breach supplier confidentiality. 
Breach employer’s governance / 
disclosure rules. 
Participant employee discloses 
career limiting criticisms of 
organisation. 
Disclosure of proscribed 
organisational behaviour. 
 
Participant recalls data. 
Data ethically unusable. 
Disclosure of proscribed organisational 
behaviour could cause breach in researcher / 
participant confidentiality. 
 
Participants will be owners, executives or senior managers with 
fiduciary responsibilities to the organisation and trained in governance 
and confidentiality issues. 
Disclose risks and control measures in participant invitation 
information form (Form 005/inv). 
Obtain signed consent (Form 006/inv). 
Participants can withdraw at any time and can withdraw permission to 
use data already obtained up to the end of the data gathering phase. 
Remind participants of risks at start of interview. 
Detect potential breach risk in interview and adjust focus of dialogue 
or stop interview. 
Participant is anonymous. 
Employing organisation is anonymous. 
All data not in the public domain is anonymous. 
Data in the public domain which is traceable to an anonymous 
participant has to be anonymised or discarded. 
As last resort, discard data as unusable. 
Case study Breach client confidentiality. 
Breach supplier confidentiality. 
Breach employer’s governance / 
disclosure rules. 
Management power - reluctant 
employee participant. 
Disclosure of proscribed 
organisational behaviour. 
Participant employee discloses 
career limiting criticisms of 
organisation. 
 
Participant recalls data. 
Data ethically unusable. 
Disclosure of proscribed organisational 
behaviour could cause breach in researcher / 
participant confidentiality. 
 
Not covert observation. 
Disclose risks and control measures in participant invitation 
information form (Form 001/inv). 
Obtain executive signed consent (Form 002/cons). 
Designate senior manager as Case Study Representative (CSR). 
Employee participation is voluntary. 
Employee participants are at professional management status. 
Disclose risks and control measures in employee participant invitation 
information form (Form 003/inv). 
Obtain employees’ signed consent (Form 004/cons). 
Employee participants can withdraw at any time and can withdraw 
permission to use data up to end of data gathering phase. 
Participating organisation can withdraw at any time and can withdraw 
permission to use data up to end of data gathering phase. 
Detect potential breach risk in interview and adjust focus of dialogue 
or stop dialogue. 
Employee participant is anonymous except to organisation. 
Employing organisation is anonymous. 
All data not in the public domain is anonymous except to organisation. 
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Research activity Participant risks Researcher risks Control arrangements 
Release of company documents is authorised by CSR. 
Data in the public domain which is traceable to an anonymous 
participant has to be anonymised or discarded. 
As last resort, discard data as unusable. 
Participant observation: 
participant-as-observer 
Breach client confidentiality. 
Breach supplier confidentiality. 
Breach employer’s governance / 
disclosure rules. 
Disclosure of proscribed 
organisational behaviour. 
Subject participant discloses 
career limiting criticisms of 
organisation. 
 
Subject participant recalls data. 
Data ethically unusable. 
Disclosure of proscribed organisational 
behaviour could cause breach in researcher / 
participant confidentiality. 
 
 
The participant is the overt researcher. 
Employees and colleagues of researcher are not subject participants, 
nevertheless ensure researcher’s colleagues and employees are aware 
of research. 
The research focus is the participant’s response to events relevant to 
the research. 
Subject participants will be owners, executives or senior managers 
with fiduciary responsibilities to their employers. 
Not covert observation so declare research interest immediately. 
Verbally warn subject participants of ethical risks. 
Obtain verbal agreement to use data. 
Follow up with information which discloses risks and control measures 
(Form 007/inv). 
Obtain signed consent (Form 008/cons). 
Employee participants can withdraw at any time and can withdraw 
permission to use data up to end of data gathering phase. 
Employing organisation is anonymous. 
All data not in the public domain is anonymous. 
As last resort, discard data as unusable. 
 
 
Summary of ethical risks 
 
Inappropriate disclosures: 
Breach of confidentiality by improper disclosures. 
Disclosure of career limiting criticisms. 
Disclosure of proscribed behaviour of organisation. 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
 
Summary of ethical control measures 
 
Participant characteristics 
All participants are voluntary including case study employees. 
Ensure minimum vulnerability participants: engage participants of professional status with appropriate fiduciary positions. 
 
Informed consent 
Verbally warn observational participants of risks. 
Warn participant of risks in invitation information form. 
Remind participants of risks at start of interview. 
Inform participants that data will be published but will be untraceable and anonymous. 
Obtain signed consent. 
Allow participants to withdraw at any time and withdraw permission to use data already obtained up to end of data gathering phase. 
Provide participants with University supervisory details for making complaints. 
 
Dialogue management 
Detect potential breach risk in interview / dialogue and adjust focus of dialogue or stop interview / dialogue. 
 
Anonymity 
Participant is anonymous. 
Employing organisation is anonymous. 
All data not in the public domain is anonymous. 
Data in the public domain which is traceable to an anonymous participant has to be anonymised or discarded. 
Ensure case study employee participants are fully aware that their participation is known to the employer and data gathered is visible to employer. 
As last resort, discard data as unusable rather than breach confidentiality. 
Raw data is not shared with anyone else including University colleagues. 
Raw data is destroyed after completion of thesis. 
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Appendix 3.1: Invitation / briefing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
St Georges Building  
141 High St  
Portsmouth 
PO1 2HY 
 
T: 023 9284 8484 
  
1st January 2013 
Form 005/inv 
Occupational Fraud Research 
Interview Invitation and Information Sheet 
 
Dear YYYYY, 
 
 
Following our recent (telephone) conversation, please find further details of the research 
and how you could assist. I am a mature student undertaking a part time PhD at the Centre 
for Counter Fraud Studies within the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies at the University of 
Portsmouth. The subject is occupational fraud, a topic which has enjoyed very little 
research yet a phenomenon with major consequences. 
 
Research method 
 
 I am conducting a series of approximately 30 interviews with managers and executives in 
the private and public sectors, representatives of the legal and accountancy professions 
and law enforcement. The aim is to generate an understanding of the difficulties 
organisations face in dealing with employee fraud. 
 
Business address of participant 
- 
- 
- 
- 
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The interview would involve a 1 hour interview, preferably recorded at your place of 
business or other location of your choice. I can take notes if recording is not possible. The 
interview would be more of a discussion with a few prompt questions.  
 
 
Data management 
 
Statements that you make may be referenced or quoted verbatim in the PhD thesis and in 
academic journals.  However your anonymity and that of your organisation will be 
maintained by use of an alphanumeric code and a description of your role and business 
type, such as (senior manager) of (company/law firm). Please let me know if you wish to 
see the results of the research or any published journal articles. 
 
The ethical risks have been assessed and there is a low residual risk of inappropriate 
disclosures. You should not disclose information which would cause ethical difficulties, such 
as breaching client confidentiality or admitting behaviour which is proscribed in law or by 
relevant regulators. Any inappropriate disclosures will be expunged from the research. 
 
All data collected will be protected in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Only I 
will have access to the original data which will be stored electronically. It will be destroyed 
on completion of the PhD thesis. 
 
 
Consent 
 
Participation is entirely voluntary and you may withdraw at any time. You may also 
withdraw permission to use the data at any time prior to the data analysis phase of the 
project; should you wish to do so, please contact me at the above address or by e-mail. 
 
Please find a copy of the consent form attached (Form 006/cons), which you should 
complete and sign if you wish to participate in the study. Please keep a copy of this letter 
and the consent form for your records. 
 
Research governance 
 
The research is being undertaken at the University of Portsmouth. I am supervised by 
Professor Mark Button at Portsmouth and governed by an ethics committee to ensure that 
the research remains entirely ethical. The study methods have been reviewed and 
approved by the Faculty of Humanities and Social Science Ethics Committee. 
 
 
If you have any further queries or concerns, at any time, about the study or your 
participation in it, please contact me or Professor Mark Button at the University. Should 
you have any complaints please contact Professor Button at the above address or the 
University Complaints Officer at the following address: 
 
University of Portsmouth 
University House 
Winston Churchill Avenue 
Portsmouth 
PO1 2UP 
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T: 023 9284 8484 
 
mark.button@port.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
David Shepherd 
david.shepherd@myport.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3.2: Participant consent form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
St Georges Building  
141 High St  
Portsmouth 
PO1 2HY 
T: 023 9284 8484 
david.shepherd@myport.ac.uk 
1st January 2013 
Form 006/cons 
CONSENT FORM - Interview 
Research: Occupational Fraud 
Researcher: David Shepherd 
Please initial box  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the invitation & information sheet  
(Form 005/inv) dated …………………….  for the above study. I have had the opportunity 
 to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
 satisfactorily.  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
 withdraw at any time without giving any reason and can withdraw permission 
for use of the data up to the start of the analytical phase of the research. 
 
3. I understand that some of the data collected will be incorporated into a PhD 
thesis, journal articles and academic presentations, and that this data will be 
anonymised and made untraceable. I give permission for general access to this 
published data. I understand that the original data will not be shared with any 
other person and will be destroyed 12 months after completion of the thesis. 
 
4. I agree / do not agree (delete) to the interview being recorded. 
 
 
 
 
XXXX business address 
of participant 
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5.  As (...position in organisation..) I have the authority to consent to participation 
 In this research. 
 
 
 
6.  I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
 
Name of participant: 
 
   ………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Participant’s signature: 
 
   ……………………………………………………………… Date: 
 
Name of researcher: 
 
   …………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Researcher’s signature:  
 
   ……………………………………………………………… Date: 
 
If you have any further queries, please contact me at the above address or by e-mail; 
alternatively you can contact my research supervisor, Professor Mark Button at the same 
postal address or at mark.button@port.ac.uk. 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.1 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.1: Extract from qualitative data analysis spreadsheet 
Asys 
ref 
Or ref Pseud Topic Discussion Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4 Comment 
CFSM5-
1-186 
JJW Imogen 
Occupatio
nal fraud 
Once they've crossed the line they can justify it. 
Going through that door must be quite difficult 
for most people because they have this feeling of 
what is right and wrong. But once you have 
stepped over it and found that you can do it and 
nobody has stopped you, where I think 
businesses go wrong, if somebody had queried 
that action early on then they wouldn't have 
gone on again and again and again doing it. 
Psychology Rubicon   
Offender 
rationalisation 
Once people have crossed the 
fraud threshold, it becomes 
normal behaviour - occasional 
then habitual. People need to 
be stopped crossing the 
threshold.  
LB1-1-
100 
Barrister 
Chambers 
A 
John Law 
Litigation, if you’re the one doing the claiming, is 
like walking into a betting shop. For a client it is 
essentially gambling on a 50, 60, 70% probability 
that he will get £1million back by spending 
£0.5million.  
Access to 
justice 
Litigation 
Cost 
benefit  
Litigation is like betting. If you 
can't afford to lose it, don't do 
it.  
LS1-1-
54 
Menhutt Nick Law 
Because there could be nothing more damaging 
then trying to shove it all under the carpet and 
pretend nothing’s gone wrong.  And it is quite 
popular for organisations just to want to sack an 
individual who’s involved and move on, not 
pursue them for any compensation and not refer 
it to a prosecutor. 
Fraud 
definition 
Disciplinary   
Victim 
rationalisation 
It is common to simply dismiss 
a defrauding employee without 
pursuing compensation or 
criminal sanctions. 
Organisations avoid deep 
investigations. Not all fraud is 
seen as criminal. 
PSM20-
4-70 
DEF 
Group 
Mark 
Occupatio
nal fraud 
We have a case on the go at the moment in York. 
The Manager has been fudging his stock count, 
his perpetual count. He's saying, "I've had no 
personal gain out of it, but I'm now up to the 
point where I need to put my hands up and I 
can't keep balancing all the balls in the air, it's all 
coming down on me, the roof's falling in and I'm 
£70,000 short on my stock." He will be negligent.  
Fraud 
definition 
 Work 
performance 
  
Victim 
rationalisation 
Fraud euphemism - fudge. 
Employee dishonestly records 
stock to cover poor personal 
performance and to hide losses 
to employer. Compare with 
Kweku Adoboli, UBS, Jerome 
Kerviel, Societe General 
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Appendix 4.2: Analytical Coding Structure 
Initial Topic 
 
Coding Labels 
 
Themes 
  
 
Offender Rationalisations Detection 
 
  
  
 
Psychology Budgets Audit performance 
 
  
  
 
Occasional/crisis Cost benefit Business systems 
 
  
  
 
Habitual/greed Denial of responsibility Due diligence 
 
  
  
 
Psychopath Empathy Error v fraud 
 
Organisation types 
  
 
Lone offender Social bonds Evidence 
 
Compliance contingent 
  
 
Collusion KPI Investigation 
 
Compliance unconditional 
  
 
Rubicon Necessity Local rules 
 
Delinquent 
  
  Negligence error Prevention 
 
Values orientated 
CJS 
 
Fraud types No crime Employment screening 
 
Window dressing 
  
 
Fraud abuse of position Normal Whistleblower 
 
Leadership 
Definition 
 
Fraud asset No fraud   
 
  
  
 
Fraud benefit Proof ratchet Justice 
 
Rationalisations 
Occupational fraud 
 
Fraud breach trust Reputation organisation Access to justice 
 
Offender rationalisations 
  
 
Fraud cartel Reputation personal Police performance 
 
Victim rationalisations 
Policies procedures 
 
Fraud contract bribery 
 
CPS performance 
 
  
  
 
Fraud corporate Ethics climate SFO performance 
 
Justice effectiveness 
Prevention 
 
Fraud definition Ethics development Crim court performance 
 
CJS effectiveness 
  
 
Fraud expense Ethics dilemma Criminal sanctions 
 
Civil effectiveness 
Detection 
 
Fraud occupational Ethics industry DPA 
 
Disciplinary effectiveness 
  
 
Fraud payroll Ethics lag Litigation 
 
  
Response 
 
Fraud purchasing Role ID Civil performance 
 
Offender types 
  
 
Fraud redirection Watchers Injunctions 
 
Crisis 
Investigation 
 
Fraud sales Group ID Lawyer performance 
 
Greed 
  
 
Fraud tax 
 
Lawyer specialism 
 
Habitual 
Law 
 
Fraud theft Other Loss recovery 
 
Occasional 
  
  
Attrition POCA 
 
Psychopath 
Sanctions 
 
Management Other regulations Standard of proof 
 
  
  
Budgets Personhood Disclosure criminal 
 
Social identity 
  
 
Compliance control Statistics Disclosure civil 
 
Group identity 
  
 
Leadership transactional Work performance Admin penalties 
 
Role identity 
  
 
Leadership transformational 
 
Disciplinary 
  
  
 
Management competence Externals 
  
  
  
 
Management knowledge Contract staff 
  
  
  
 
Management structure Customer 
  
  
  
 
Policies procedures Supplier   
 
  
  
 
Security network   
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Appendix 5: Home Office fraud offences 
 
Act Section Offence Penalty 
Companies Act 
1985 
s70 
It is a criminal offence to issue a prospectus for a share issue with 
untrue statements. Reversed burden of proof. 
7 years prison 
Companies Act 
2006 
s119 
It is a criminal offence to provide false, misleading or deceptive 
information in response to a request for disclosure of the index of 
company members as allowed by s116.  
2 years prison 
Companies Act 
2006 
s993 
It is a criminal offence for individuals to be involved in fraudulent 
trading in a company.  
10 years prison 
Companies Act 
2006 
s387 
It is a criminal offence to fail to maintain proper accounting records 
as required by s386.  
2 years prison 
Companies Act 
2006 
s389 
It is a criminal offence to fail to maintain accounting records in the 
UK, available for inspection at any time for up to 3 years (private 
company) or 6 years (public company) as required by s388.  
2 years prison 
Companies Act 
2006 
s414 
It is a criminal offence to knowingly or recklessly sign company 
accounts which do not comply with the statutory provisions.  
Fine 
Companies Act 
2006 
s450 
It is a criminal offence to knowingly or recklessly sign abbreviated 
company accounts which do not comply with the statutory 
provisions. 
Fine 
Theft Act 1968 s17 
Criminal offence of false accounting by destroying, defacing, 
concealing or falsifying accounts records. 
7 years prison 
Theft Act 1968 s19 
It is a criminal offence for an officer of a corporation or association to 
publish or concur in the publishing of statements or accounts which 
are to his knowledge misleading, false or deceptive.  
7 years prison 
Agricultural 
Credits Act 1928 
s11 
Frauds by farmers. It is a criminal offence to dispose of or sell 
property which is subject to a loan charge.  
3 years prison 
Cheating HM the 
Queen and the 
Public Revenue 
CL 
It is a criminal offence to defraud HM the Queen and the Public 
Revenue.  
Life 
imprisonment 
Cheating the 
Revenue 
CL 
Common law criminal offence of cheating the revenue; knowingly 
intend to deprive the HMRC of legitimate tax revenue. It is not 
necessary to prove loss to HMRC or gain to the offender. Failing to 
register for taxation or failing to account properly for taxation is 
sufficient.  
Life 
imprisonment 
Computer Misuse 
Act 1990 
s1 It is a criminal offence to access a computer without authorisation.  2 years prison 
Computer Misuse 
Act 1990 
s2 
It is a criminal offence to access a computer without authorisation in 
order to facilitate other crimes.  
5 years prison 
Computer Misuse 
Act 1990 
s3 
It is a criminal offence to impair a computer in order to facilitate 
other crimes.  
10 years prison 
Computer Misuse 
Act 1990 
s3A 
It is a criminal offence to make, adapt or supply equipment for the 
accessing or impairment of computers under s1 to 3.  
2 years prison 
Criminal Justice 
Act 1993 
Part 5 Criminal offence of insider dealing.  7 years prison 
Enterprise Act 
2002 
Part 6        
s190 
It is a criminal cartel offence (Part 6, s188) if a person dishonestly 
agrees with others to price fix, bid rig etc.  
5 years prison 
Land Registration 
Act 1925 
s116 
It is a criminal offence to fraudulently procure, to attempt to 
fraudulently procure or to be privy to the fraudulent procurement of 
the erasure or alteration of the land registry.  
2 years prison 
Law of Property 
Act 1925 
s183 
It is a criminal offence for a person or an agent, including a solicitor, 
to sell property (land, building) whilst concealing or falsifying 
documents which are material to the title of the property.  
2 years prison 
Public Stores Act 
1875 
s5 
It is a criminal offence to obliterate or otherwise disguise marks 
which identify ownership of property in government stores. 
7 years prison 
Social Security 
Administration 
Act 1992 
s111A 
Criminal offence of dishonestly making a false representation or 
dishonestly failing to provide prompt notification of change of 
circumstances to obtain benefit.  
7 years prison 
Theft Act 1968 s20 
It is a criminal offence to destroy, deface or conceal any valuable 
security, will or document filed in court or deposited in any 
government department resulting in gain to the offender or another 
7 years prison 
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and loss to a victim. 
Theft Act 1968 s24A 
It is a criminal offence to dishonestly retain a false credit made to a 
bank account.  
10 years prison 
Theft Act 1978 s3 
Criminal offence of dishonestly making off without payment for 
goods or services which require on the spot payment.  
2 years prison 
Conspiracy to 
defraud 
CL 
Common Law conspiracy to defraud offence. Penalties are the same 
as the original offence. 
10 years prison 
Fraud Act 2006 s2 
Criminal offence of dishonestly making a false representation for gain 
by the offender or others, or causing loss or the risk of loss to victims. 
10 years prison 
Land Registration 
Act 2002 
s123 
It is a criminal offence to suppress information with the intention of 
concealing a person's rights or falsely substantiating a claim in 
proceedings under the Act relating to registration.  
2 years prison 
Land Registration 
Act 2002 
s124 
It is a criminal offence to dishonestly induce another to change the 
land registry or to change the land registry.  
2 years prison 
Fraud Act 2006 s3 
Criminal offence of failure to disclose information when legally 
obliged to for gain by the offender or others, or causing loss or the 
risk of loss to victims.  
10 years prison 
Fraud Act 2006 s4 
Criminal offence of abuse of position for gain by the offender or 
others, or causing loss or the risk of loss to victims.  
10 years prison 
Fraud Act 2006 s11 Criminal offence of obtaining services dishonestly.  5 years prison 
Fraud Act 2006 s7 Criminal offence of making or supplying articles for use in fraud.  10 years prison 
Fraud Act 2006 s6 Criminal offence of possession of articles for use in fraud.  5 years prison 
Fire and  Rescue 
Services Act 2004 
s34 
It is a criminal offence to deliberately cause illness or injury in order 
to obtain a pension, allowance or gratuity.  
2 years prison 
Fraud Act 2006 s9 Criminal offence of fraudulent trading by sole traders.  10 years prison 
Company 
Directors 
Disqualification 
Act 1986 
  
Compulsory disqualification for up to 15 years for an indictable 
offence in relation to the management of the company or fraudulent 
trading, for up to 5 years for persistent breaches of company 
legislation.  
Disqualification 
Deeds of 
Arrangement Act 
1914 
s17 
It is a criminal offence for a trustee, under a deed of arrangement, to 
pay a creditor a preferential sum out of the debtor's assets a sum 
larger in proportion to the creditor's claim than that paid to other 
creditors.  
2 years prison 
Insolvency Act 
1986 
Part 4 
s206 
Fraud in anticipation of winding up a company. It is a criminal offence 
within 12 months preceding winding up to conceal any property 
worth more than £500, debt or credit; to fraudulently remove any 
property worth more than £500; to conceal, destroy, mutilate or 
falsify documents; to make false entries or make fraudulent 
omissions in documents; to dispose of property not paid for.  Burden 
of proof is reversed.  
7 years prison 
Insolvency Act 
1986 
Part 4 
s207 
Transactions in fraud of creditors. It is a criminal offence at company 
winding up to gift or transfer company property; to conceal or 
transfer company property within 2 months prior to a money 
judgement order against the company. Burden of proof is reversed.  
7 years prison 
Insolvency Act 
1986 
Part 4 
s208 
Misconduct in winding up. It is a criminal offence at company 
winding up to fail to disclose all company property or to fail to 
disclose details of any property transaction; to fail to deliver up 
company property or company documents; to fail to identify false 
debts; to prevent the production of any documents. Burden of proof 
is reversed.  
7 years prison 
Insolvency Act 
1986 
Part 4 
s209 
Falsification of company books. It is a criminal offence at company 
winding up to destroy, mutilate, alter or falsify company documents 
with the intention to defraud or deceive.   
7 years prison 
Insolvency Act 
1986 
Part 4 
s210 
Material omissions in statements. It is a criminal offence at company 
winding up to make any material omission in any statement of 
company affairs. Burden of proof is reversed.  
7 years prison 
Insolvency Act 
1986 
Part 4 
s211 
Malpractice before and during liquidation. It is a criminal offence to 
make a false representation or other fraud in obtaining any 
agreement with a creditor.  
7 years prison 
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Insolvency Act 
1986 
Part 4 
s216 
It is a criminal offence to contravene the restrictions on re-use of a 
company name in insolvent liquidation.  
7 years prison 
Insolvency Act 
1986 
Part 7 
s251O 
to 
s251S 
Malpractice before and during liquidation - Debt Relief Orders. 
Sections 251O to 251S provide for various criminal offences involving 
fraudulent conduct prior and during Debt Relief Orders: false 
representations, concealment, falsifying documents, fraudulently 
disposing of assets, not disclosing status.  
7 years prison 
Insolvency Act 
1986 
Part 8 
s262A 
Individual Voluntary Arrangements. It is a criminal offence to make 
false representation or commit fraud for obtaining creditors' 
approval of voluntary arrangement. 
7 years prison 
Insolvency Act 
1986 
Part 9 
s353 to 
s362 
Individual bankruptcy. Sections 353 to 360 provide for various 
criminal offences involving fraudulent conduct in bankruptcy: 
defrauding creditors, falsifying accounts, material omissions, 
concealment, falsifying documents, false representations, disposing 
of assets, failing to keep proper accounts, increasing extent of 
insolvency by gambling.  
7 years prison 
Insolvency Act 
1986 
s389 
It is a criminal offence to act as an insolvency practitioner when not 
qualified. 
7 years prison 
Forgery and 
Counterfeiting 
Act 1981 
Part 1 
It is a criminal offence to make, copy, use or possess a false 
instrument, a forgery, with the intention that it is used to induce 
somebody to accept it as genuine. Falls under HO code 60 when 
applied to drug prescriptions.  
10 years prison 
Identity 
Documents Act 
2010 
s4 
It is a criminal offence for a person with an improper intention to 
possess false identity documents. 
10 years prison 
Identity 
Documents Act 
2010 
s5 
It is a criminal offence to make or possess apparatus for producing 
falsified identity documents. 
10 years prison 
Stamp Duties 
Management Act 
1891 
s13 
It is a criminal offence to fraudulently print, mutilate or re-issue 
stamps. 
10 years prison 
Coinage Act 1971 s10 
It is a criminal offence to melt down or break up UK coins produced 
after 1969.  
2 years prison 
Forgery and 
Counterfeiting 
Act 1981 
Part 1 
It is a criminal offence to make, copy, use or possess a false 
instrument, a forgery, with the intention that it is used to induce 
somebody to accept it as genuine. Falls under HO code 61 when 
applied to other than drug prescriptions.  
10 years prison 
Forgery and 
Counterfeiting 
Act 1981 
Part 2 
It is a criminal offence to make, copy, use or possess counterfeit 
money, or equipment for producing counterfeit money.  
10 years prison 
Hallmarking Act 
1973 
s1 
It is an offence to describe an unhallmarked article as wholly or partly 
made of gold, silver or platinum.  
2 years prison 
Hallmarking Act 
1973 
s3 It is an offence to strike an article with a false sponsor's mark. 2 years prison 
Hallmarking Act 
1973 
s5 
It is an offence to alter a hallmarked article or to alter the hallmark 
without the consent of an assay office.  
2 years prison 
Hallmarking Act 
1973 
s6 
It is a criminal offence to counterfeit a die or hallmark or to remove a 
hallmark from an article with the intention of transposing it into 
another article. 
10 years prison 
Policing and 
Crime Act 2009 
s101 It is a criminal offence to import or export false identity documents.  7 years prison 
Protection of the 
Euro against 
Counterfeiting 
Regulations 2001 
Reg 2 
Reg 2 (SI 3948/2001) - failure to withdraw a counterfeit Euro note or 
coin from circulation.  
2 years prison 
Goods Vehicles 
(Licensing of 
Operators) Act 
1995 
s38 
It is an offence to falsify or alter documents, licenses, marks, plates 
related to goods vehicle operator licences.  
2 years prison 
Public Passenger 
Vehicles Act 1981 
s65 
It is a criminal offence to forge, or alter, or allow an operator's 
licence, certificate or other document under the Act to be used in 
2 years prison 
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deceit.  
Road Traffic Act 
1988 
s173 
It is a criminal offence to forge or alter a driving license, operator's 
licence, insurance certificate or vehicle test certificate.  
2 years prison 
Road Traffic 
Regulation Act 
1984 
s115 
It is a criminal offence to make, use or allowed to be used a ticket or 
means of identification or devices with the intentions to deceive in 
relation to parking.  
2 years prison 
Vehicle drivers 
(certificates of 
professional 
competence) 
Regulations 2007 
s13 
It is a criminal offence to forge, alter any driver test qualification 
document or to make a false statement to obtain a test qualification 
document. 
2 years prison 
Vehicle Excise 
and Registration 
Act 1994 
s33 
Criminal offence of failing to display a vehicle licence. Subject to 
automatic penalty from DVLA and direct enforcement action such as 
the wheel clamping, impounding and disposal of the unlicensed 
vehicle. 
Fine 
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Act Section Offence Penalty 
Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security 
Act 2001 
s54 
Criminal offence of making false or misleading statements for the 
purposes of obtaining authorisation (or withdrawal of 
authorisation) for the use, development or transfer of nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons under s47 and s 50. 
3 years prison 
Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security 
Act 2001 
s54 
When an offence of a corporation is proved to have been 
perpetrated with the consent or connivance of an officer of the 
corporation, the officer is liable to be prosecuted and punished. 
4 years prison 
Bribery Act 2010 s1 Criminal offence of bribing another.  
10 years 
prison 
Bribery Act 2010 s1 Criminal offence of receiving a bribe.  
10 years 
prison 
Bribery Act 2010 s6 Criminal offence of bribing a foreign official.  
10 years 
prison 
Bribery Act 2010 s7 
Criminal offence of commercial organisations failing to prevent 
bribery.  
Fine 
Bribery Act 2010 s14 
Criminal offence of consent or connivance of a senior officer or 
manager of a corporate body to bribery renders the individual and 
the corporate body liable.  
10 years 
prison 
Business Protection 
from Misleading 
Marketing 
Regulations 2008 
s6 
It is a criminal offence for a business to produce misleading 
advertising. Enforcement authorities are the CMA and TSS.  
2 years prison 
Business Protection 
from Misleading 
Marketing 
Regulations 2008 
s8 
An officer of a company may be prosecuted when he consents to, 
connives in or is negligent in offences of the company.   
2 years prison 
Business Protection 
from Misleading 
Marketing 
Regulations 2008 
s25 
It is a criminal offence to make a false statement to a CMA or TSS 
enforcement officer.  
2 years prison 
Communications Act 
2003 
s363 Criminal offence of TV license fee evasion.  Fine 
Companies Act 1985 s450 
It is a criminal offence for an officer of a company to fraudulently 
dispose of, alter or make omissions in company documents.  
7 years prison 
Companies Act 1985 s451 
It is a criminal offence to furnish false information to the 
Insolvency Service inspectors.  
2 years prison 
Companies Act 2006 
s171 to 
s178 
S171 to 177 define the general fiduciary duties of directors 
including s175 avoiding conflict of interests and s176 not accepting 
benefits from third parties (i.e. bribery) and not declaring personal 
interest in a proposed transaction. Under s178 breach of fiduciary 
duty is actionable through the civil courts. 
Compensation 
Competition Act 
1998 
Chapter 
1 
The Chapter I prohibition is equivalent to EU Article 101. It 
prohibits agreements between businesses that prevent restrict or 
distort competition to an appreciable extent in the UK, prohibits 
price fixing cartels & bid rigging arrangements. Under s32 the CMA 
may order the modification or termination of agreements. 
Maximum penalty is a fine of 10% of worldwide turnover. 
Fine 
Competition Act 
1998 
Chapter 
2 
The Chapter II prohibition is equivalent to EU Articles 102. It 
prohibits conduct of companies which amounts to an abuse of a 
dominant position. Under s33 the CMA may order the modification 
or cessation of infringing conduct. Maximum penalty is a fine of 
10% of worldwide turnover. 
Fine 
Consumer Credit Act 
1974 
  
Breach of regulations lead to enforcement notices by TSS or CMA: 
suspension, variance or revocation of credit license. Penalty for 
not complying with orders is up to £50,000 fine. 
Control 
Consumer 
Protection from 
Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 
s8 
Mens rea criminal offence of unfair commercial practice involving 
reckless or knowing failure in professional diligence to materially 
distort the economic behaviour of consumers, including reckless or 
untruthful representations. Professional diligence is honest market 
2 years prison 
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practice in the trader's field of activity.  Enforcement authorities 
are CMA and TSS. 
Consumer 
Protection from 
Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 
s9 
It is a strict liability criminal offence to engage in misleading 
commercial practice which deceives the average consumer: 
untruthful, false information or creates the impression that a 
product as that of a competitor.  
2 years prison 
Consumer 
Protection from 
Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 
s10 
It is a strict liability criminal offence to omit material information 
or to provide ambiguous information in marketing materials.  
2 years prison 
Consumer 
Protection from 
Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 
s11 
It is a strict liability criminal offence to engage in aggressive 
commercial practices which are coercive or cause undue influence.  
2 years prison 
Consumer 
Protection from 
Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 
s15 
An officer of a company may be prosecuted when he consents to, 
connives in or is negligent in offences of the company.  
2 years prison 
Contempt of Court 
(criminal) 
CL 
Common law criminal offence of direct contempt in the face of the 
court: interfering with proceedings in court or outside of court 
such as interference with witnesses or jurors; disobeying court 
orders or breaching undertakings. 
2 years prison 
Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 
1988 
s107 
It is a criminal offence to make, import or distribute articles which 
infringe copyrights. 
10 years 
prison 
Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 
1988 
s107 
It is a criminal offence to communicate a work to the public which 
infringes copyrights.  
2 years prison 
Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 
1988 
s198 
It is a criminal offence to make, distribute, sell, hire or otherwise 
exploit illicit recordings for commercial purposes causing damage 
to a performer.  
10 years 
prison 
Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 
1988 
s296 
It is a criminal offence to make, import, distribute, sell, hire, 
advertise or possess any device which facilitates the circumvention 
of technology device and software access prevention measures.  
2 years prison 
Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 
1988 
s297 It is an offence to fraudulently receive broadcast services.  Fine 
Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 
1988 
s297A 
It is a criminal offence to make, distribute, sell, hire, maintain or 
otherwise exploit unauthorised broadcast decoders causing 
commercial damage to the owner.  
10 years 
prison 
Council Tax 
Reduction Schemes 
(Detection of Fraud 
and Enforcement) 
(England) 
Regulations 2013 
s7 
It is a criminal offence to make a false representation for the 
purposes of obtaining a council tax reduction for oneself or for 
another. 
3 months 
prison 
Council Tax 
Reduction Schemes 
(Detection of Fraud 
and Enforcement) 
(England) 
Regulations 2013 
s8 
It is a criminal offence for a person to fail to report a change of 
circumstances which affects their council tax reduction 
entitlement, or for another, who is required by regulations, to fail 
to report a change of circumstances of a person. 
3 months 
prison 
Criminal Attempts 
Act 1981 
s1 
It is a criminal offence to attempt the commission of an offence 
except certain offences such as conspiracy and aiding and abetting. 
It is irrelevant that the offence attempted may be impossible to 
complete.  
Various 
penalties 
Criminal Justice Act 
1925 
s36 
It is a criminal offence to forge a passport or to make false 
statements to procure a passport.  
2 years prison 
Criminal Justice Act 
1987 
s2(14) 
It is a criminal offence to provide false or misleading information in 
response to a s2 notice.  
2 years prison 
Criminal Justice Act 
1987 
s12(1) 
Criminal offence of conspiracy to defraud. Penalties up to 10 years 
imprisonment or a fine. 
10 years 
prison 
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Criminal Law Act 
1977 
s1 
Criminal offence of conspiracy to commit any offence including 
fraud. Penalties are the same as that for the offence. 
Various 
penalties 
Customs and Excise 
Management Act 
1979 
s50 
Criminal offence of fraudulent evasion of excise duty on landing 
goods in the UK or by removing them from a bonded store or 
assisting in these offences.  
7 years prison 
Customs and Excise 
Management Act 
1979 
s167 
Criminal offence of making a false declaration or statement to the 
Customs.  
2 years prison 
Customs and Excise 
Management Act 
1979 
s168 
Criminal offence of counterfeiting or falsifying any document 
required for customs purposes.  
2 years prison 
Customs and Excise 
Management Act 
1979 
s170 Criminal offence of fraudulent evasion of excise duty.  7 years prison 
Customs and Excise 
Management Act 
1979 
s170B 
Criminal offence of knowingly concerned in taking steps to 
fraudulently evade excise duties by any person.  
7 years prison 
Enterprise Act 2002 
Part 8       
s214 
Part 8 civil proceedings emulate professional and trade regulators 
in that it is designed to promote good business practice towards 
consumers. Under s214 the CMA, TSS and various other bodies 
listed in s213 should consult with persons infringing consumer 
protection regulations to encourage an improvement in behaviour. 
Consultation 
Enterprise Act 2002 
Part 8       
s215 
If the infringements continue, the TSS and the other bodies may 
obtain County or High Court "stop now" civil enforcement orders 
or injunctions to protect the collective interests of consumers by 
an offender infringing consumer legislation incorporated in other 
Acts: it usually requires more than one breach. 
Injunction 
Enterprise Act 2002 
Part 8       
s215 
If the trader continues to infringe regulations despite the 
enforcement order he can be prosecuted for criminal contempt of 
court.  
2 years prison 
Enterprise Act 2002 
Part 8       
s219 
The TSS or other enforcing body may consent to an agreement 
with the infringing trader whereby he undertakes to refrain from 
infringing behaviour. The enforcer may publicise the terms of the 
undertaking. 
Undertaking 
Fair Trading Act 
1973 
Part 11 
Criminal offence of inducing a person to pay a promoter of a 
pyramid scheme with the prospect of receiving payments by 
introducing others to the scheme.  
2 years prison 
Finance Act 2003 s95 
Criminal offence of fraudulently evading stamp duty tax on land or 
buildings.  
7 years prison 
Finance Act 2007 
Sched 
24 
The penalties for inaccurate tax returns are up to the amount of 
underpaid tax, therefore the offender can be required to pay twice 
the underpayment. 
Fine 
Finance Act 2009 s94 
HMRC may publish details of deliberate tax defaulters including 
fraudsters, individuals and companies, who evade more than 
£25,000 in tax. 
Publicity 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s19 
Authorised persons. It is a criminal offence for an unauthorised 
person to carry out a regulated activity (s23). 
2 years prison 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s20 
Authorised persons. It is a criminal offence to falsely claim to be an 
authorised person (s24).  
6 months 
prison 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s21 
Authorised persons. It is a criminal offence for an unauthorised 
person to promote an investment activity. 
2 years prison 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s118 
Market abuse is a criminal offence under the CJA 1993 Part 5, 
prosecutable by the FCA (s402).  Market abuse includes:                                                                                                           
- Insider dealing (a species of fraud)                                                                                                  
- Effecting transactions to give a false or misleading impression of 
the supply or demand of investments.                                                                                                                          
- Transactions involving fictitious devices, deception or connivance.                                                                                                     
- Disseminating misleading information.                                                                          
7 years prison 
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Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s123 
Market abuse. The FCA may deal with market abuse as a 
regulatory infringement and impose financial penalties as it sees 
fit. 
Fine 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s206 
Disciplinary powers. The FCA can impose disciplinary financial 
penalties on authorised and unauthorised persons and firms 
(s404C) as it sees fit based on its own penalty policies (s210). 
Fine 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s206A 
Disciplinary powers. The FCA can suspend a person from a 
regulated activity for up to 12 months and impose restrictions as it 
sees fit. 
Suspension 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s344 
Auditors and actuaries. It is a criminal offence to give false or 
misleading information to an auditor or actuary. 
2 years prison 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s397 
Misleading practices. It is a criminal offence to induce a person to 
enter into or refrain from an agreement or the exercise of their 
rights by:                                              
 -  Making a statement, promise or forecast which is misleading, 
false or deceptive.                                                                                                                                            
- Dishonestly concealing any material facts.                                                                    
- Recklessly making (dishonestly or otherwise) a statement, 
promise or forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive.                                                                                                    
- Conduct which creates a false or misleading impression as to the 
market price or value of investments.                                                                                         
7 years prison 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s400 
Powers of prosecution. Offences of a corporation, partnership or 
association are attributable to managers if the offences were 
committed with the consent, connivance or neglect of 
management. 
Various 
penalties 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s402 
Money laundering. It is a criminal money laundering offence to 
conceal, arrange, acquire, use or possess the proceeds of crime.  
14 years 
prison 
Financial Services 
and Markets Act 
2000 
s402 
Money laundering. It is a criminal offence under POCA 2002 s330 
and s331 for a person in the regulated sectors to fail to report 
knowledge or suspicions of money laundering.  
5 years prison 
Fraud Act 2006 s12 
An officer or manager of a company may be prosecuted when he 
consents to, connives in or is negligent in fraud offences of the 
company.  Penalties are the same as the primary offence. 
Various 
penalties 
Gambling Act 2005 s42 
It is a criminal offence to cheat at gambling whether one wins or 
not.  
2 years prison 
Hallmarking Act 
1973 
Sched 3 
When a corporation has committed a hallmarking offence and it 
can be proved that it was perpetrated with the consent, 
connivance or act of neglect of an officer of the corporation, the 
officer is guilty of the same offence as the corporation. 
10 years 
prison 
HMRC MDD 
programme 
  
The HMRC Managing Deliberate Defaulters programme was 
introduced in 2011 to place deliberate tax evaders including 
fraudsters who have defaulted to more than £25,000 on a 
monitoring programme for up to 5 years (more than 900 on 
programme in 2011). 
Control 
Insolvency Act 1986 
Part 4 
s164 
Liquidators. It is a criminal offence for a liquidator to offer a bribe 
to secure his appointment.  
Fine 
Insolvency Act 1986 
Part 4 
s213 
Malpractice before and during liquidation. On application by the 
liquidator the court may order any persons who have been 
involved in fraudulent trading to make contributions to the 
company's assets. 
Compensation 
Insolvency Act 1986 
Part 4 
s214 
Malpractice before and during liquidation. On application by the 
liquidator the court may order any persons who have been 
involved in wrongful trading, i.e. trading whilst knowing the 
company was technically insolvent, to make contributions to the 
company's assets. 
Compensation 
Insolvency Act 1986 
Part 6 
s238 
Malpractice before and during liquidation. Where a company 
transaction has been made, not in good faith or not for the 
intention of benefiting the company, at undervalue within 2 years 
prior to administration, the court may order the restoration of the 
position had the transaction not been made, provided that the 
Restoration 
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recipient or acquirer of the asset was connected with the company 
or had notice of the circumstances surrounding the transaction 
(s241). 
Insolvency Act 1986 
Part 9 
s339 
Individual bankruptcy. Where an individual transaction has been 
made, not in good faith, at undervalue or in consideration of 
marriage within 5 years prior to administration, the court may 
order the restoration of the position had the transaction not been 
made, provided that the recipient or acquirer of the asset was 
connected with the individual or had notice of the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction (s241) 
Restoration 
Insolvency Act 1986 
Part 16 
s423 
Debt avoidance. When a person (individual or company) enters 
into a transaction to defraud creditors, that is to put the assets 
beyond the reach of a person who is or might make a claim, by 
gifting property or for an undervalued consideration or in 
consideration of marriage, the victim of the transaction may apply 
to the court to restore the position and to protect his interests. 
The court may order: that the assets are vested in a person for the 
benefit of the victims, that a person pays the benefits received 
from the transaction, to revive any sureties which were released 
by the transaction, to require security to be provided for 
obligations under the order. 
Restoration 
Insolvency Act 1986 
Sched 
A1 
Company Voluntary Arrangements. Schedule A1 provides for 
various criminal offences involving fraudulent conduct in company 
voluntary arrangements: failure to disclose CVA in business 
dealings, disposing of assets fraudulently, fraud in anticipation of 
CVA.  
7 years prison 
Legal Services Act 
2007 
s14 
Criminal offences of an unauthorised person or body carrying out 
reserved legal activities, and pretending to be authorised. An 
unauthorised person who pretends to have right of audience is 
also in contempt of court. 
2 years prison 
Mental Health Act 
1983 
s126 
Forgery, false statements etc. It is a criminal offence to wilfully 
make a false entry into any document, or to have any such 
documents under control, under the Act for the purposes of 
deception.  
2 years prison 
Misconduct in Public 
Office 
CL 
Common law criminal offence of abuse of trust by a public official 
who wilfully neglects to perform his duty or wilfully misconducts 
himself including fraud and deceit. 
Life 
imprisonment 
Misrepresentation 
Act 1967 
  
Damages for innocent and negligent misrepresentation unless the 
defendant can prove that he had reasonable grounds to believe 
and did believe up to the time the contract was made the 
representation was true. Does not apply to Scotland or Northern 
Ireland. 
Compensation 
Money Laundering 
Regulations 2007 
Part 2, 
3, 4 
It is a criminal offence to infringe the Part 2 due diligence, Part 3 
management systems and Part 4 registration requirements.  
2 years prison 
Money Laundering 
Regulations 2007 
s47 
If an offence has been committed by a corporate body, an officer 
or manager of a company may be prosecuted when he consents 
to, connives in or is negligent in money laundering offences of the 
company.  
2 years prison 
Parliamentary 
Standards Act 2009 
s10 
It is an offence for an MP to provide false or misleading 
information for the purposes of expense claims.  
12 months 
prison 
Perjury Act 1911 s1 
It is a criminal offence to make false statements made on oath in 
proceedings in court or outside of court before a person 
authorised by law to administer an oath.  
7 years prison 
Perjury Act 1911 s2 
It is a criminal offence to make false statements made on oath, 
when required by law in any matter other than court proceedings.  
7 years prison 
Perjury Act 1911 s5 
It is a criminal offence to make a false statement in any statutory 
declaration or document (e.g. accounts, reports) or oral 
declaration required by a statute. 
2 years prison 
Perverting the 
course of justice 
CL 
Common law criminal offence. An act which has the tendency to 
pervert and which is intended to pervert public justice, e.g. false 
allegations.  
Life 
imprisonment 
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Act Section Offence Penalty 
Prevention of Social 
Housing Fraud Act 
2013 
s1(1) 
It is a criminal offence to sub-let or part with housing under a 
secure tenancy agreement in breach of the tenancy agreement.  
Fine 
Prevention of Social 
Housing Fraud Act 
2013 
s1(2) 
It is a criminal offence to dishonestly sub-let or part with housing 
under a secure tenancy agreement in breach of the tenancy 
agreement.  
2 years prison 
Prevention of Social 
Housing Fraud Act 
2013 
s2(1) 
It is a criminal offence to sub-let or part with housing under an 
assured tenancy agreement in breach of the tenancy agreement.  
Fine 
Prevention of Social 
Housing Fraud Act 
2013 
s2(2) 
It is a criminal offence to dishonestly sub-let or part with housing 
under an assured tenancy agreement in breach of the tenancy 
agreement.  
2 years prison 
Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 
Part 5 
Part 5 recovery of proceeds of unlawful conduct or property which 
is intended to be used in unlawful conduct, judged by the High 
Court on the civil balance of probabilities, proceedings may be 
brought by SOCA, SFO, CPS (including tax evasion team). 
Confiscation 
Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 
Part 7 
s327 
Criminal money laundering offence of concealing, disguising, 
converting, transferring criminal property or removing it from the 
UK. 
14 years 
prison 
Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 
Part 7 
s328 
Criminal money laundering offence of involvement in 
arrangements which the person knows or suspects facilitates the 
acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property.  
14 years 
prison 
Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 
Part 7 
s329 
Criminal money laundering offences of acquiring, using or 
possessing criminal property. 
14 years 
prison 
Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 
Part 7 
s330, 
331, 
332 
Criminal money laundering offences of a person in a regulated 
sector failing to disclose knowledge or suspicions of money 
laundering, and tipping off an offender.  
5 years prison 
Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 
Part 8 
s342 
It is a criminal offence to make a disclosure which may prejudice 
an investigation, or to conceal, falsify or destroy materials relevant 
to an investigation for the purposes of confiscation, civil recovery 
or money laundering investigation. 
5 years prison 
Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 
Part 8 
s359 
It is a criminal offence to fail to knowingly or recklessly make a 
statement under a disclosure order which is false or misleading.  
2 years prison 
Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 
Part 8 
s366 
It is a criminal offence for a financial institution not to comply with 
a customer information order or to knowingly or recklessly provide 
false or misleading information. 
Fine 
Property 
Misdescriptions Act 
1991 
  
Strict liability criminal offence of an estate agent providing a 
misleading statement about land and buildings. 
Fine 
Regulation of 
Railways Act 1889 
s5 
It is a criminal offence to evade fare payment or to provide a false 
name and address. 
3 months 
prison 
Representation of 
the People Act 1983 
s60 
It is a criminal offence to impersonate or to aid, abet or procure 
impersonation of a voter, i.e. making a fraudulent vote by 
impersonating another person. 
2 years prison 
Representation of 
the People Act 1983 
s65 
It is a criminal offence to fraudulently tamper with a nomination or 
ballot paper. The maximum penalty for a polling officer is 2 years 
imprisonment.  
2 years prison 
Representation of 
the People Act 1983 
s113-
115 
It is a criminal offence to bribe a voter, to "treat" a voter to 
influence their vote, to threaten force, violence or other harm. 
12 months 
prison 
Road Traffic Act 
1988 
s174 
It is a criminal offence to provide false information for the 
purposes of obtaining driving and operating licences.  
2 years prison 
Road Traffic 
Regulation Act 1984 
s117 
It is a criminal offence to abuse a Blue Badge - falsely amend or 
forgery.  
Fine 
Serious Crime Act 
2007 
Part 2 
Act creates inchoate criminal offences of encouraging or assisting 
an offence including fraud and the penalties are the same as the 
primary offence.  
Various 
penalties 
Serious Organised 
Crime and Police Act 
2005 
s67 
It is a criminal offence to provide false or misleading information in 
response to a disclosure order (s62).  
2 years prison 
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Act Section Offence Penalty 
Social Security 
Administration Act 
1992 
s112 
Criminal offence of knowingly making a false representation or 
failing to provide prompt notification of change of circumstances 
without a reasonable excuse to obtain benefit.  
3 months 
prison 
Social Security 
Administration Act 
1992 
s114 
It is a criminal offence to fraudulently evade social security 
contributions.  
7 years prison 
Stamp Duties 
Management Act 
1891 
s21 
Any person who practises or is concerned in any fraudulent act, 
contrivance, or device, not specially provided for by law, with 
intent to defraud Her Majesty of any duty shall incur a penalty not 
exceeding £3,000. 
Fine 
Tax Credits Act 2002 s35 
Criminal offence of being knowingly concerned in fraudulent 
activity to obtain a tax credit by any person.  
7 years prison 
Taxes Management 
Act 1970 
s95 
Supplying an incorrect return due to fraud or neglect for income or 
capital gains tax is a punishable offence.  
Fine 
Taxes Management 
Act 1970 
s106A 
Criminal offence of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent 
evasion of income tax by any person.  
7 years prison 
Telecommunications 
Act 1984 
s42 
Fraudulent use of a telecommunications system. It is an offence to 
dishonestly obtain a telecommunications service with the intent to 
avoid payment of charges for that service.  
5 years prison 
Telecommunications 
Act 1984 
s42a 
It is an offence to possess or supply anything for fraudulent 
purposes in connection with the use of telecommunication system, 
for dishonestly obtaining telecommunications services.  
5 years prison 
Timeshare, Holiday 
Products, Resale 
and Exchange 
Contracts 
Regulations 2010 
s27 
Criminal offence of breaching the regulations. The regulations 
prohibit deceitful marketing events and provide a contract 
template, required disclosures and a 14 day cooling off period. 
Fine 
Trade Descriptions 
Act 1968 
s2 
Strict liability criminal offence of making false statements about a 
product or service. Enforced by the TSS and the CMA.  
2 years prison 
Trade Marks Act 
1994 
s92 
Criminal offence of unauthorised or counterfeit use of a trade 
mark. 
10 years 
prison 
Trade Marks Act 
1994 
s92 
Criminal offence of making or possessing articles for copying or 
counterfeiting trademarks.  
10 years 
prison 
Trade Marks Act 
1994 
s94 Criminal offence of falsification of trade mark register. 2 years prison 
Trade Marks Act 
1994 
s95 
Criminal offence of falsely representing that a trade mark is 
registered. 
Fine 
Transport Act 1968 s99(5) It is a criminal offence to falsify driver work record documents. 2 years prison 
Value Added Tax Act 
1994 
s72 Criminal offence of fraudulent evasion of VAT. 7 years prison 
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Appendix 7: Occupational fraud losses in Engineering Department at Westco 
 
 
Employee £tot £/y % loss %cum loss % schemes 
George 1,032,834 121,510 39.38% 100.00% 100.00% 
Connor 972,808 114,448 37.10% 60.62% 95.45% 
Empl 3 110,009 12,942 4.19% 23.52% 90.91% 
Empl 4 101,783 11,974 3.88% 19.33% 86.36% 
Empl 5 95,235 11,204 3.63% 15.44% 81.82% 
Empl 6 86,855 10,218 3.31% 11.81% 77.27% 
Norton 48,257 5,677 1.84% 8.50% 72.73% 
Carson 36,100 4,247 1.38% 6.66% 68.18% 
Empl 9 33,817 3,978 1.29% 5.28% 63.64% 
Empl 10 27,549 3,241 1.05% 3.99% 59.09% 
Empl 11 19,661 2,313 0.75% 2.94% 54.55% 
Empl 12 13,082 1,539 0.50% 2.19% 50.00% 
Empl 13 10,589 1,246 0.40% 1.70% 45.45% 
Empl 14 8,149 959 0.31% 1.29% 40.91% 
Empl 15 6,739 793 0.26% 0.98% 36.36% 
Empl 16 6,591 775 0.25% 0.72% 31.82% 
Charlton 6,074 715 0.23% 0.47% 27.27% 
Empl 18 2,188 257 0.08% 0.24% 22.73% 
Empl 19 2,124 250 0.08% 0.16% 18.18% 
Empl 20 904 106 0.03% 0.08% 13.64% 
Empl 21 654 77 0.02% 0.04% 9.09% 
Empl 22 454 53 0.02% 0.02% 4.55% 
 
2,622,455 308,524 
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Appendix 8: Occupational fraud losses at DEF Group 
 
Employee £/y % loss %cum loss % schemes 
Empl 1 62,942.00 33.82% 100.00% 100.00% 
Empl 2 23,239.00 12.49% 66.18% 98.67% 
Empl 3 16,000.00 8.60% 53.69% 97.33% 
Empl 4 9,898.00 5.32% 45.10% 96.00% 
Empl 5 9,183.00 4.93% 39.78% 94.67% 
Empl 6 7,875.00 4.23% 34.84% 93.33% 
Empl 7 7,314.00 3.93% 30.61% 92.00% 
Empl 8 6,154.00 3.31% 26.68% 90.67% 
Empl 9 3,809.00 2.05% 23.38% 89.33% 
Empl 10 3,354.00 1.80% 21.33% 88.00% 
Empl 11 3,120.00 1.68% 19.53% 86.67% 
Empl 12 2,861.00 1.54% 17.85% 85.33% 
Empl 13 2,541.00 1.37% 16.31% 84.00% 
Empl 14 2,000.00 1.07% 14.95% 82.67% 
Empl 15 1,950.00 1.05% 13.87% 81.33% 
Empl 16 1,804.00 0.97% 12.83% 80.00% 
Empl 17 1,640.00 0.88% 11.86% 78.67% 
Empl 18 1,554.00 0.83% 10.98% 77.33% 
Empl 19 1,305.00 0.70% 10.14% 76.00% 
Empl 20 1,100.00 0.59% 9.44% 74.67% 
Empl 21 1,050.00 0.56% 8.85% 73.33% 
Empl 22 950.00 0.51% 8.28% 72.00% 
Empl 23 945.00 0.51% 7.77% 70.67% 
Empl 24 941.00 0.51% 7.27% 69.33% 
Empl 25 763.00 0.41% 6.76% 68.00% 
Empl 26 737.00 0.40% 6.35% 66.67% 
Empl 27 706.00 0.38% 5.95% 65.33% 
Empl 28 697.00 0.37% 5.57% 64.00% 
Empl 29 653.00 0.35% 5.20% 62.67% 
Empl 30 609.00 0.33% 4.85% 61.33% 
Empl 31 600.00 0.32% 4.52% 60.00% 
Empl 32 600.00 0.32% 4.20% 58.67% 
Empl 33 575.00 0.31% 3.88% 57.33% 
Empl 34 523.00 0.28% 3.57% 56.00% 
Empl 35 500.00 0.27% 3.29% 54.67% 
Empl 36 500.00 0.27% 3.02% 53.33% 
Empl 37 450.00 0.24% 2.75% 52.00% 
Empl 38 394.00 0.21% 2.51% 50.67% 
Empl 39 339.00 0.18% 2.30% 49.33% 
Empl 40 300.00 0.16% 2.11% 48.00% 
Empl 41 288.00 0.15% 1.95% 46.67% 
Empl 42 232.00 0.12% 1.80% 45.33% 
Empl 43 200.00 0.11% 1.67% 44.00% 
Empl 44 200.00 0.11% 1.57% 42.67% 
Empl 45 200.00 0.11% 1.46% 41.33% 
Empl 46 186.00 0.10% 1.35% 40.00% 
Empl 47 179.00 0.10% 1.25% 38.67% 
Empl 48 155.00 0.08% 1.16% 37.33% 
Empl 49 150.00 0.08% 1.07% 36.00% 
Empl 50 150.00 0.08% 0.99% 34.67% 
contd 
Appendix 8 
 
 
Employee £/y % loss %cum loss % schemes 
Empl 51 122.00 0.07% 0.91% 33.33% 
Empl 52 108.00 0.06% 0.85% 32.00% 
Empl 53 104.00 0.06% 0.79% 30.67% 
Empl 54 100.00 0.05% 0.73% 29.33% 
Empl 55 100.00 0.05% 0.68% 28.00% 
Empl 56 100.00 0.05% 0.62% 26.67% 
Empl 57 100.00 0.05% 0.57% 25.33% 
Empl 58 100.00 0.05% 0.52% 24.00% 
Empl 59 100.00 0.05% 0.46% 22.67% 
Empl 60 100.00 0.05% 0.41% 21.33% 
Empl 61 90.00 0.05% 0.36% 20.00% 
Empl 62 82.00 0.04% 0.31% 18.67% 
Empl 63 75.00 0.04% 0.26% 17.33% 
Empl 64 70.00 0.04% 0.22% 16.00% 
Empl 65 54.00 0.03% 0.18% 14.67% 
Empl 66 53.00 0.03% 0.16% 13.33% 
Empl 67 50.00 0.03% 0.13% 12.00% 
Empl 68 45.00 0.02% 0.10% 10.67% 
Empl 69 31.00 0.02% 0.08% 9.33% 
Empl 70 28.00 0.02% 0.06% 8.00% 
Empl 71 25.00 0.01% 0.04% 6.67% 
Empl 72 19.00 0.01% 0.03% 5.33% 
Empl 73 15.00 0.01% 0.02% 4.00% 
Empl 74 13.00 0.01% 0.01% 2.67% 
Empl 75 11.00 0.01% 0.01% 1.33% 
 
186,110.00 
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